Hungarian Soviet Union (1968) and Poland (1980/81) Foreign Policy

Term Paper 2001 16 Pages

Russian / Slavic Languages




Political history of Hungary from 1956 to 1981

Kádárism and the Czechoslovak Crisis in 1968

Kádárism and the Polish Crisis in 1980/81



List of Abbreviations


In May 1998 János Kádár was forced to resign from his post as the First Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (MSZMP). In this moment nearly 32 years of political domination of a countries political system by one person ended. In this period Kádár was able to form a specific political, economic and social system, that gave Hungary a special position among the countries in the communist block. The Hungarian ,,socreal"-system from the late 1960's until the late 1980's allowed its citizens much more personal freedom, a higher economic living-standard and much less ideological demand of the people's life compared to the societies in the socialist ,,brother" countries. Also the system of ,,goulash communism" or ,,refrigerator socialism"1 was admired as a model by the countries in the East of Europe and highly recognised by the Western countries, it is only a part of ,,Kádárism". The other part is the despotic and unscrupulous restoration of the socialist regime and dictatorship of the party, by Kádár and Soviet forces after the Revolution in autumn 1956.

The crises of real existing socialism in 1968 in Czechoslovakia and 1980/81 in Poland had specifically different effects on Hungary compared to other countries due to three reasons. Firstly Kádárism was a system implemented by force on a society after a deep crisis of communist rule. Secondly Hungary was the country in the Soviet Empire which allowed the greatest openness towards the Western countries and had the most intensive contacts to its eastern neighbours. Thirdly were exactly these years also crucial years for the political and economic system in Hungary, which resemble to a curtain extend the situations in theßR and in Poland.

The scope of this paper will be the Hungarian policy during the two crises. The main focus is the direct policy of the government and the ruling party towards the other government respectively ruling party in the country in crisis. This is set in the current political framework of the Soviet Union and the position of the other satellite states. Also the internal situation of Hungary in these moments and the influence of the crisis on Hungarian internal policy is described. For a deeper understanding of the political situation in Hungary a brief overview of the development in Hungary from 1956 to 1981 is given.

Political history of Hungary from 1956 to 1981

The Hungarian uprising in 1956 under the prime minister Imre Nagy was crushed by Soviet tanks at the 4th November after Hungary declared as a reaction to the Soviet invasion its neutrality and the its leaving of the Warsaw Pact Treaty. Also the whole uprising only lasted for 15 days it led to a complete dismantling of the communist party state, a mobilisation of the masses in support for policy of changes of the Prime Minister and a civil war during the Soviet invasion. The secretary of the at this moment policy Communist party was János Kádár, who defected to the Soviets and returned back to Hungary under the protection of Soviet tanks. He was installed as the head of the ,,Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government". The new founded Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (MSZMP) had after the uprising only 38,000 members (the former communist party MDP had 900,000 in September 1956)2. The other institutions on which the rule of the party was based were in similar conditions. The auxiliary organisations either were dissolved or joined the uprising, the public administration was broadly taken over by new formed workers councils and the army was either passive during the invasion or fought against the Soviet troops and the secret police ÁVO.3

The restoration of communist rule was therefore only possible with a despotic and terrorist policy under the protection of the Soviet troops. From November 1956 until July 1958 22,000 were sentenced for their activities during the revolution, 300 death-sentences were imposed, among them those against Imre Nagy and the military leader of the uprising Maleter. After this Stalinist like reign of terror a period of consolidation of the dictatorship of Kádár and the party began, which still had the society in a iron grip and on the countryside began a period of re-collectivisation4. In 1963 the Kádár's position in the party and state was well established and the system began to liberalise, to reduce the ideological pressure on the society and to open towards outside. The system reduced its ideological demand on the population expressed by ,,those who are not against us are with us"5. An amnesty for most of the prisoners of 1956 was issued and the Hungarians were the first in the Eastern Block being able to profit from the beginning détente and were allowed to travel to the Western countries but also to the Eastern neighbours.6

The economy in Hungary was still ailing and Kádár knew about the necessity of economic performance for the stability of the political system. The reforms based on plans of Nagy, which were introduced in 1958, had very little effects on the economy and therefore a complete change of the economic planing was envisaged. For having a wider basis for the support of the economic reforms, the system wanted consensus with the population, especially against the resistance of the state and party bureaucracy, which was in hand of full communist but was lacking of qualified people. This one the one hand led to a arrangement with the intelligentsia in the country, which was allowed to work under less restrictions, when they did not criticise the system and on the other hand it attracted high qualified people, which became the non-ideological group of technocrats in the system. The economic reforms under the label ,,New Economic Mechanism" (NEM), which was prepared in 1965 was introduced in 1968 with the allowance of Moscow.7

The new economic system contained decentralised planning, a profit oriented management of the enterprises, and prices based on the costs or on world market prices. Additional to the implementation of some marked mechanism into the central-planned economy Hungary changed the economic focus from heavy industry to chemical and consumer goods industry, which was build with the help of Western technology. Also the principle of economic autarky was abandoned and the trade with Western and CMEA countries was intensified. The most important step was the changes in the collective farms, where the farmers were allowed to cultivate their own plots and to sell these products on markets without any price restrictions. The supply with consumer goods and foodstuff in the shops and markets immediately increased. Also the whole economic situation improved and Hungary showed in the following years high economic growth rates. Hungary became the consumer paradise in the Eastern Block and also the party with its ideology went in favour of ,,consumerism" into the background. This liberalisation was only restricted to the economic life and intellectuals which went too far with their research and publications were forced to leave the country, like the sociologist Szelenyi. In 1973 the economic reforms were stopped and partly redone due to the pressure of Brezhnev, who saw the developments in Hungary as going to far.8 Very soon the economic situation became worse, this effect was enhanced by the effects of the oil crisis in 1973 leading to the continuation of reforms and in 1978 to a wave of further economic liberalisation. The already existing by-professionalism of wide ranges of society was legalised, in the area of service like gastronomy private activity was supported, workers which had problems to improve their salaries with additional activities were allowed to make over-hours in their companies to fill problems of supply. The system and the life in Hungary were more and more characterised by ideological decline. Effects for this were for example, that Polish contract workers were needed in mining and metallurgy, because the work among the avant-garde of the worker's state was to unattractive. People engaged in private business showed their wealth open and drove Western cars and black market activities were hardly stopped by the authorities. The Hungarians had to work hard to take part in their ,,socialist" consumer paradise and to keep their living standard. This had strong effects on the Hungarian society like alcoholism, high rate of divorce and still high rate of emigration. The prices of basic foodstuff were still guaranteed on a low level and foreign loans were used to subsidise them. In 1980 the legitimating of the Kádárist system was only limited to the promise of further economic prosperity and the person János Kádár, who was the guarantor for economic progress and the specific position of Hungary among the communist countries. This created a very difficult situation, when in 1980 the economy stagnated for the first time and the government was forced to rise prices.9

Kádárism and the Czechoslovak Crisis in 1968

Czechoslovakia did not experience a crisis of de-Stalinisation in the 50's and continued the coercive regime into the 1960's. In the mid-1960's a reform movement inside of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KS S) that especially wanted to change the economic system. They wanted to decentralise the planing system. The apparatus blocked these efforts and only partly measures were introduced in 1965, which failed to reach their goals improving of the economic situation. The struggle inside the party between dogmatic hard-liners and pragmatic reformers became more intensive. In January 1968 the party replaced the long- years secretary Novotny with the little known A. Dub ek, after Brezhnev in December 1967 told the party they should solve the leadership problem on their own. Dub ek was seen as a compromise candidate between the two fractions. The new secretaries agenda was to create a ,,socialism with a human face", a system that changes its political practice to a more liberal one without questioning the institutional framework like the leadership inside the party. The changes in under the regime of Dub ek were led by party leaders and slowly but surely reached lower levels of the apparatus and reached only some groups of the society, like intellectuals and students. The "reforms from above" accelerated from March until the August 1968. Their most obvious sign were the open criticism of the real existing socialist system by the Czechoslovak media and intellectuals.10

The leadership of the CPSU did not approve the events in Czechoslovakia starting in March 1968 after the removal of Novotny as head of state. Inside the leadership of the Kremlin was disputes how to react to these events, which were not as clear anti-Communist or anti-Soviet than for example in Hungary in 1956. Also this was no direct threat for the political system in the Soviet Block, the KS S behaved more and more independently. The concerns of the leadership in the Kremlin was the military control over the Block, especially in a country with such a strategic importance and to continue the political control the satellite states apparatus by the CPSU. This was clearly expressed in the so-called ,,Brezhnev Doctrine" right before the military intervention in August 1956. From the Dresden summit of the Warsaw Pact Treaty members at 23rd March a military intervention was prepared. Especially two countries in the Block were pushing Moscow to a decisive and quick intervention. This was on the one hand the very dogmatic W. Ulbricht and on the other hand the Polish leader Gomułka. For Poland the situation was more difficult, because at the same time he was confronted with a struggle inside of the party and student strikes, which were demanding their ,,Dub ek". Both were not satisfied with the indecisiveness of the Soviet leadership. Also the Bulgarian Zhivkov demanded measures but was loyal to the line of Moscow. Brezhnev preferred to increase pressure on the leadership of the KS S and to discuss a solution for the problems in theßR. The reluctance of a military intervention can be understood by the difficult geopolitical situation in which the Soviet leadership found it self. On the one hand he had to foster his dogmatic position in CPSU against more reform minded after removing Krushchev 4 years before. On the other the East-West conflict reached its peak after the 6 Days War in the Middle East in 1967 and China rejected the position of the Soviet Union as leader of the Communist system during the ,,Cultural Revolution", which led to tensions between these two powers. This became increasingly difficult because Dub ek avoided meetings with Brezhnev and the ambassador of the USSR in Prague. This draws the attention to the role and the position of Hungarian leader in this conflict.11

The Czechoslovak reformers found in János Kádár and his pragmatic policy the most like minded leader in the Eastern block. The New Economic Mechanism introduced to the January 1st was seen as a possible pattern for the future development in theßR. At the same time these two countries granted their citizens the most individual freedom like travelling to Western but also eastern neighbour countries. Also the relationship between the citizens of the two countries was intensified, especially between the Hungarians living in South Slovakia but also in the Czech Lands and their relatives in the motherland. For Kádár the events in Czechoslovakia were a two-sided issue. He found allies for his policy, which were only unwillingly tolerated by Brezhnev, but conflict between Moscow and Prague ignited by the reforms also threatened the Hungarian reforms.12 The policy of the MSZMP during the Prague Spring illustrates their ambivalent position and the pragmatism of Kádár's policy. In spring 1968 several meetings and also telephone calls between the Aleksander Dub ek and János Kádár took place. In these meetings they exchanged their ideas and support for each other's reforms. Among the leaders of the Eastern Block the Hungarian leader behaved the most sympathetic towards his Czechoslovak colleague. Dub ek saw in Kádár a paternal friend. As documents show which became available in the 1990's Kádár played a much more complex role in the Crisis of the Prague spring. Like the other leaders except of the Romanian, he demanded measures by the Soviet Union to restore order in theßR. After the removal of the minister of defence by Dub ek without approval by the Soviet Union, Brezhnev asked Kádár to get in contact with Dub ek. In the following meeting in Brno in April Kádár told Dub ek about his personal experiences in 1956 to warn for further reforms. The meeting was reported in details to Brezhnev, who was in favour of this indirect way of using pressure against Prague. In mid-June 1968 the Czechoslovak leaders were invited to Budapest and the Hungarian party and government gave them a heartily welcome. In all speeches and publications MSZMP backed the secretary of the KS S and the programme of ,,socialism with a human face", but also warned of the danger of a ,,counter-revolutionary" change in theßR especially a change to social democracy or installation a national- communist system like in Yugoslavia. Brezhnev approved this meeting, because like the Hungarian leadership the leadership of the CPSU was not sure to undertake a military intervention. Ulbricht and Gomułka were astonished by the Hungarian behaviour because they demanded a military intervention against the developments in their neighbour country. At the same time the MSZMP kept intensive informal relations with conservatives in the KS S, which were in opposition to Dub ek and his reforms. Hungary supported their position inside the party and established relation between them and members of the CPSU and KGB.13 The position of the Hungarian leadership changed in end of June. In Prague the ,,2000 words manifesto", which praised the non-communist values of the Masaryk inter-war government and an article commemorating the 10th anniversary of the execution of Imre Nagy by historian Machatka, were published. The first letter was the strongest expression against the communist system inßR until this time and caused reaction in all communist countries. The second was a personal affront against Kádár especially because the Czechoslovak government reacted against these articles after a personal letter of Kádár to Dub ek. A few days later Kádár agreed in Moscow in a military intervention in theßR and promised military help by the Hungarian army. For the invasion the Soviet Union demanded the invitation by high-officials of the KS S. In this case the MSZMP was very willing to help. The letter of the ,,Prague Revolutionary Workers-Peasant Government" (it is the same name Kádár used in 1956) was prepared by KGB and a member of the Czechoslovak Politburo in Kádár's villa at July 20th, with the knowledge of the secretary. It is also no wonder that two of the five signatories were those KS S members with informal contacts with the MSZMP. After all these measures undertaken by Kádár the the Hungarian communist party it is no wonder that the Hungarian army together with the armies of the socialist brother countries moved into theßR during the night from August 20th and 21st and occupied the country. These events led to the ,,end of socialism with a human face" and to the removal of the reform leadership in spring 1969. The ,,normalisation" regime under Husak installed on of the most repressive systems in the Eastern Block. At the same time Hungary could continue its economic reforms. The loyalty towards Moscow enlarged the scope for the Hungarian experiments. It also strengthened the anyway strong position of Kádár internal, because he is the guarantor for good relations with the Soviet Union and the internal consensus inside the party. There was no wider reaction to the events in Prague among the Hungarian population. Some critical Hungarian intellectuals supporting the ,,Prague Spring" also in its dimension of civil rights and democratisation, criticised the invasion, saw the limited scope of reforms possible in Hungary. They were either forced to emigrate or were imprisoned.14

Kádárism and the Polish Crisis in 1980/81

In 1980 Poland came into a deep economic and also social crisis. These crisis the result of a failed economic policy which had some similarities with the NEM, that brought economic growth and prosperity in the early 1970's. It also was the result of a deep trench between the party leadership, less ideological technocrats and the majority of the population. Workers were alienated by the price rises, the ignorance of the party and the unions to their demands and the harsh reaction of the regime to workers unrest in 1970 and 1976. The intelligentsia was limited in its possibilities to work by strict censorship and became joined the workers in their protest. The peasants, who still had their own land, were not supported by the state and could, sell their products only to very low fixed prices. In 1980 the Polish economy was on the ground, the economy declined, the burden of foreign debt was high and subsidies for basic foodstuff burdened the budget. The necessary price rises resulted again in workers strikes, but the demands of workers in Gda sk included also political demands like the right form free trade unions in August 1980. The government was not willing to give in the strikes spread over the whole country. The new formed trade union Solidarno was able to build an organisation over the whole country, including workers, the intelligentsia and peasants with up about 9 million members. They challenged the political monopoly of the party, which on the other side, had to change its political leadership, lost a great part of its members and started to loose its political unity. The lasting struggle between the opposition and the government lasted for 18 months before the military under secretary of the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR) General Jaruzelski declared the ,,state of war" at December 13th 1981.15

The Soviet Union and his successor Kania received full support and approved the removing of the ailing leadership of Gierek. The Gdansk agreement was seen by Moscow as manoeuvre to get the country under control again and not as serious concession to the striking workers. When it came to the registration of the trade union Solidarno without accepting the leading role of the PZPR the Soviet Union increased the pressure on Kania. In autumn Kania had to go to Moscow and was forced to undertake decisive steps against the workers movement. The Brezhnev drew the parallels to the events of Prague 12 years before and offered its ,,fraternal help". The Polish secretary rejected the help and promised that Poland is able to solve its own problems. The Soviet Union increased its pressure on Poland using several measures. The Polish situation and the PZPR were criticised in the Soviet media and made aggressive attacks against Solidarno . The number of Warsaw Pact forces along Poland's borders was increased and joint military manoeuvres were held crossing into Polish territory. Meetings of the Warsaw Pact leaders and defence ministers were held more frequently. As it seems in December 1980 the Soviet Union was even preparing an invasion into Poland, together with the GDR and theßR. Several reasons might have prevented this. On international level the increased confrontation between the USA and Soviet Union due to the Afghanistan invasion in the year before. Internally the efforts of the Polish leadership to solve the problem without Soviet interference, especially the preparations undertaken by the security forces under Jaruzelski. As a third factor the situation did not escalate like the public unrest in Hungary 1956 due to the reform oriented policy of the ,,self-limited revolution". Among the other leaders on the Soviet block it were Husak and Honecker criticising the Polish developments because they were afraid that the Polish virus could infect their countries. In 1981 the pressure from outside continued and especially in September, when Solidarno on its Congress called on the workers of the ,,socialist brother countries" to follow their example. When in December 13th 1981 Jaruzelski declared Martial Law and Solidarity as a organisation crushed, this was the result of long prepared measures and approved by the Soviet Union leaders.16 The Polish crisis came for Hungary in a very untimely moment. The Hungarian economy experienced for the first time since the 1960's a steady decline and was forced to increase the food prices because of the high inflation of costs. These price rises were many times over the rise of annual wages and led to the reduction of living standards for the Hungarians. This did not provoke strikes or other protest by the population but was a signal for the end of increasing prosperity, the most important pillar of Kádár's legitimisation. Also the high living standard of Hungary compared to the other countries made the country not so vulnerable than the other countries for repeating the Polish events, but the openness of the Hungarian society was a danger for being infected by the ,,Polish virus". Hungary was the main country for Poles to make holidays and for ,,suitcase" trade. In the towns with mining or metallurgy industry, like Miskolc and Pécs were a high number of Polish contract workers. Also in cultural and intellectual were intensive contacts between the two countries.

The MSZMP, unlike other Socialist-bloc countries, which attacked the PZPR and its leaders, tried to support their Polish comrades by refraining from criticising the Polish leadership. Kádár explained Brezhnev that the Hungarian party refrains from "interfering from the outside". Kádár argued that in situation as in Poland, it would be wrong to embarrass the leadership of PZPR with critical statements or to provoke the opposition with outside. Internally the Hungarian party took advantage from the Polish developments. They could show how much better the life is in Hungary compared to Poland and point out the wise policy of the party leader. At the 25th anniversary of ending the counterrevolution in 1956, he mentioned the mistakes repeatedly committed by the Polish leadership over the years. On the other side the leadership of MSZMP saw clear that the problems in Poland were due to the socialist system and could be therefore a challenge for the other countries in the bloc. Also a more dogmatic policy of the conservative leadership in Moscow as a reaction could end the modest policy in Hungary and the consensus between party and society. The party leaders were aware that, there are people in Hungary who sympathise with Solidarity, like the dissident Konrád György, who would like to see the Polish example spread to Hungary. For this reason they thought it necessary to warn the public that they would defend the achievements of socialism in Hungary against everybody. In connection with the frequent price rises great care was taken not to provoke reactions similar to those in Poland. In early 1981, shortly after the confrontation between the Polish authorities and Solidarity over the issue of Saturdays off, the five-day working week was introduced in Hungary. So the people can see that in Hungary the state gives its citizens rights were the Polish had to fight for. Only in summer 1981 the Hungarians started anti-Polish propaganda on the domestic front. The decline of the Hungarian economy was connected with the events in Poland. Poles were presented as lazy striking people living on the expense of the hard-working people of the other socialist countries. The media did not inform the Hungarian for the causes of the Polish crisis and presented the Solidarno leaders as selfish people following orders of the imperialistic West.17

The relationship between the parties was still good and the contacts were intensive. Polish politicians visited Budapest to listen to the advice of the Hungarian comrades. In March 1981 even Kania came to learn from Kádár, about Hungarian economic policy. The Hungarian model and the person Kádár were genuinely respected in Poland and even the PZPR tried to use Kádár's popularity for their policy. Kádár explained to the Polish leader that mere copying his ,,normalisation programme" from 1956 and his economic reforms was useless and that the Polish features had to be taken into account. Therefore Kádár only shared his experiences and was not willing to give advice. Kádár supported the moderate Polish leadership to find a political solution and to refrain from restoring order by force. He also said that for Hungary only a socialist solution would be acceptable with a continued leadership of the party. He also warned the Poles to use the former leadership as scapegoats for the situation, because this would weaken the position and unity of the party, which was for him the guarantee for a solution. Kádár always drew parallels between the events in 1956 and 1980/81 and warned the PZPR that they should let the events not to go to far.

In September 1981 Kádár for the first time criticised the PZPR for their policies in a closed letter to the Central Committee of the party and to Kania personally. This letter was referring to the Solidarity congress, in which the MSZMP saw a direct threat for the other socialist countries. The party leader urged his Polish comrades to take firm actions against the ,,enemies of socialism" and those ,,spreading anti-Soviet propaganda". When martial law was imposed in Poland this was welcomed by the Hungarian leadership. The Hungarian evening news presented the Polish events on December 13th with the words ,,finally good news from Poland"18. Whereas the other socialist countries, on the one hand relieved where by the events in Poland, they on the other hand did not support the coup d'etate like policy of Jaruzelski. It was only Hungary that immediately promised Poland economic help for winter. Also Hungary immediately stopped all anti-Polish propaganda and Hungarian media should only use material from the Polish press agency reports about Poland. In polls the majority Hungarians expressed their hope that the restoration of law and order in Poland will improve in Hungary. However some Hungarian intellectuals protested against Jaruzelski's move and it came to distribution of leaflets at Budapest Universities. Also the Catholic Church started a relief campaign for Polish people like in the Western countries. On the long term the events in Poland might weakened the position of the MSZMP, because from 1981 on inside the party political disputes emerged and alternative models of development of the socialist system in Hungary were developed.19


The policy of Hungary under the rule of János Kádár during the crises of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Poland in 1980/81 show the same patterns than the general policy of Kádárism. Four main features can be seen looking at the events described above. Firstly the domination of the socialist system can not be questioned. All activities against the system in general are seen as counter-revolutionary: the policy of Nagy Imre and the uprising in 1956, the criticism of the system in Czechoslovakia and the Solidarno movement. Secondly the relationship between Hungary (and the other states in the block) and the Soviet Union is not allowed to be touched. This means that all kind of anti-Soviet action (1956) or propaganda like in 1968 and 1981 are condemned by the MSZMP as well. On the other side that despite all freedom Kádár had under Brezhnev he never acts against the will of the Soviet Union and in the decisive moment Hungary stands in line with Moscow. Thirdly significant feature is the flexibility of the Kádárist system. Decisions are always pragmatic they do not follow moral or dogmatic guidelines, which especially can be seen towards Dub ek. The last feature is that these decisions are always taken to secure the individualistic Hungarian policy from the pressure from Moscow or the danger of reform movements from above and below.


Timothy Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution, 1991, London

K. Benda, P. Hanak, L. Makkai, ..., Die Geschichte Ungarns von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart, 1988, Corvina Kiado, 1988

Csaba Békés, New Findings on the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, George Washington University ( http://www.gwu.edu/ ~nsarchiv/CWIHP/BULLETINS/b2a1.htm )

Mihály Bihary, Kádár é s rendszere, in: Rubicon 7-8/2000 , Kádár- é let ú, Rubicon-Ház, Budapest

Henry Bogdan, From Warsaw to Sofia,


Grzegorz Eckiert, State against Society, 1996, Princeton University Press, Princeton

István Feherváry, The Long Road to Revolution The Hungarian Gulag 1945-1956, Pro Libertate Publishing ( http://www.hungary.com/corvinus/lib/revol.htm ), Santa Fe, New Mexico

György Földes, Barátság felsöfokon, in: Rubicon 6/2000 , Ki volt Kádár, Rubicon-Ház, Budapest

Sean Hanley, Intellectuals and Politics in Central Europe ( http:/www.ce- review.org/99/25/books25-hanley.html)

Joseph Held (1), Hungary on a fixed course, An Outline of Hungarian History, 1945 to the present, in: Joseph Held (eds.), The Columbia History of Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, 1992, Columbia University Press, New York

Joseph Held (2) , Dictionary of Eastern European History since 1945, 1994, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut

Sándor Kiss, Kádár ,,apánk" - Kinek az apja?, in: Rubicon 6/2000 , Ki volt Kádár,, RubiconHáz, Budapest

Gusztav Kosztolanyi, Consumerism: Shop till You Drop , in Central-European Review (www.ce-review.org/99 /8/consume-csardas8.html) , 14/08/1999

Adam Krzemi ski, Polen im 20. Jahrhundert, 1998, Beck, München

Miklós Kun, Kádár and the Prague Spring, in: The Hungarian Quarterly

( http://www.hungary.com/hungq/no152/113.html ) , Volume XXXIX, No. 152, Winter 1998 Thomas M. Magstadt, Communism between Marx and the Marketplace: Implications for U.S. foreign policy, in Policy Analysis, No. 87, 2/7/1987, Cato Institute, Washington D.C. Gábor Murányi, Mit tudhattunk a Szolidartásr ó l? A var ó si teher, in: hvg, No. 36, 09/09/2000,

Kiadja A HVG, Budapest

William Robinson, The Pattern of Reform in Hungary, A Political, Economic and Cultural Analysis , 1973, Praeger Publishers, New York

Joseph Rothchild, Return to Diversity, 1993, Oxford University Press, Oxford

Nigel Swain, Hungary, in: Stephen White, Judy Batt and Paul G. Lewis (eds.) Developments in East European Politics, 1993, Macmillan Press, London

Jánosch Tischler, Kádár and the Polish Crisis 1980-81, ( www.hungary.com/hungq/no151/105.html )

Rudolf Tökés, Political Transition and Social Transformation in Hungary,

( http://www.cidob.es/Castellano/Publicaciones/Afers/tokes.html ), University of Connecticut

List of Abbreviations

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten


1 The label ,,Goulash Communism" was formed by L. Brezhnev to express the specific Hungarian character of the economic reforms and ,,refrigerator socialism" is a criticism of Hungarian intellectuals, describing the substitution of ideology by consumerism in Hungary. see: Gusztav Kosztolanyi; Consumerism: Shop till You Drop ; in Central-European Review (www.ce-review.org/99 /8/consume-csardas8.html); 14/08/1999

2 see Grzegorz Eckiert; State against Society; 1996; Princeton University Press, Princeton, for September 1956: pg. 318 and for December 1956 pg. 85

3 for general developments see Henry Bogdan; From Warsaw to Sofia; (http://www.hungary.com/corvinus/lib/bogdan/index.htm), pp. 325-326 and Joseph Rothchild; Return to Diversity; 1993; Oxford University Press, Oxford, pg. 160

4 For periodisation of the reign of Kádár see: Mihály Bihary; Kádár és rendszere; in: Rubicon 7-8/2000 ,,Kádár-életút"; Rubicon-Ház, Budapest, pg. 56

5 in 1964 Kádár repeated this sentence, which in 1953 was originally used by Nagy as a reverse of the Stalinist ,,those who are not with us are against us" see Joseph Held (1); Hungary on a fixed course, An Outline of Hungarian History, 1945 to the present; in: Joseph Held (eds.), The Columbia History of Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century; 1992; Columbia University Press, New York pg. 219

6,see Held (1), pp. 220-223; Joseph Rothchild; Return to Diversity; 1993; Oxford University Press, Oxford, pg. 203-204 and Csaba Békés; New Findings on the 1956 Hungarian Revolution; George Washington University (http://www.gwu.edu/ ~nsarchiv/CWIHP/BULLETINS/b2a1.htm )

7 for pre-1968 reforms see: William Robinson; The Pattern of Reform in Hungary, A Political, Economic and Cultural Analysis; ; 1973; Praeger Publishers, New York, p. 19-23

8 for general development see Rothchild, pp. 205-207 for effects of NEM: Gusztav Kosztolanyi; Consumerism: Shop till You Drop ; in Central-European Review (www.ce- review.org/99 /8/consume-csardas8.html); 14/08/1999; and Rudolf Tökés; Political Transition and Social Transformation in Hungary; http://www.cidob.es/Castellano/Publicaciones/Afers/tokes.html; University of Connecticut

9 for general development see Bogdan pp. 320-324and for the economic problems in the 1980's see Thomas M. Magstadt; Communism between Marx and the Marketplace: Implications for U.S. foreign policy; in Policy Analysis; No. 87, 2/7/1987; Cato Institute, Washington D.C. and K. Benda, P. Hanak, L. Makkai, ...; Die Geschichte Ungarns von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart; 1988; Corvina Kiado, 1988

10 Grzegorz Ekiert; pp. 122-123 and pp. 133-135

11 Grzegorz Ekiert, pp. 156-159 and Henry Bogdan, pp. 334-335, for Poland see: Adam Krzemi ski; Polen im 20. Jahrhundert; 1998; Beck, München, pg. 139

12 At this time there were no conflicts inside the MSZMP, Kádár's position was not questioned by anyone and the Stalinist fraction around Rákosi was excluded from the party in 1963.

13 19; Miklós Kun; Kádár and the Prague Spring; The Hungarian Quarterly (http://www.hungary.com/hungq/no152/113.html); Volume XXXIX, No. 152, Winter 1998 and for ,,2000 Words Manifesto" see Joseph Held (2) ; Dictionary of Eastern European History since 1945; 1994; Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, p. 173

14 ibid.

15 see Grzegorz Eckiert, pp. 222- 256 and Adam Krzemi ski pp. 157-169

16 T. Garton Ash; The Polish Revolution; 1991; London; p. 151 and Joseph Held (2) p. 366 - 389 and Krzemi ski, pp. 165-166

17 see Jánosch Tischler; Kádár and the Polish Crisis 1980-81;

(www.hungary.com/hungq/no151/105.html) for supporters of Solidarity in Hungary see and for Hungarian intellectuals see: Sean Hanley Intellectuals and Politics in Central Europe http:/www.ce-review.org/99/25/books25-hanley.html

18 Gábor Murányi; Mit tudhattunk a Szolidartásról? A varósi teher; in: hvg, No. 36; 09/09/2000; Kiadja A HVG, Budapest, pp. 71-73

19 see Tischler and György Földes; Barátság felsö fokon; in: Rubicon 6/2000, Ki volt Kádár; ; Rubicon-Ház, Budapest, pg. 28


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Hungarian Soviet Union Poland Foreign Policy



Title: Hungarian Soviet Union (1968) and Poland (1980/81) Foreign Policy