Japan's (UN)certain future? Permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council - A Delphi Study

Table of Contents

Tables

Figures

Abbreviations

A Note on the Text

1. Introduction

2. The Delphi Technique: General Remarks on Methodology
2.1. Origin and Fields of Application
2.2. Definition and Classification - an Attempt
2.3. Potential and Limits

3. Contextual Embedding of Japan’s Candidature
3.1. Security Council Reform - a Precondition
3.1.1. The Security Council: Composition, Functions and Powers
3.1.2. Why Reform?
3.1.3. Security Council Reform Discussions: Development and Content
3.2 Japan’s Quest for Permanent Security Council Membership
3.2.1. Credentials and Motives
3.2.2. Japan’s Pursuit of its Quest
3.2.3. National and International Support
3.2.4. Japan’s UN policy

4. Japan - a Permanent Member on the Security Council? Results of a Delphi study
4.1. The Delphi Technique in the Context of the Present Study
4.1.1. Aims
4.1.2. Type
4.1.3. Resources
4.2. Participants
4.2.1. Structure of the Panel of Experts
4.2.2. Scope of the Panel of Experts
4.2.3. Recruitment of the Experts
4.2.4. The Final Panel
4.3. Questionnaire
4.3.1. Structure and Scope
4.3.2. Type of Questions
4.3.3. Technical Implementation
4.3.4. The Final Questionnaire
4.4. Implementation and Evaluation of the Study
4.4.1. First and Second Wave of Inquiry
4.4.2. The Feedback
4.4.3. The Dropout Rate
4.4.4. Changes in Expert Opinion between the First and the Second Wave
4.5. Results
4.5.1. Japan’s Prospect of Becoming a Permanent Security Council Member
4.5.2. Japan’s Continuing Pursuit of its Quest
4.5.3. Development of National and International Support
4.5.4. Japan’s Future UN Policy

5. Conclusion

6. Bibliography

7. Appendix:
7.1. Delphi Outline
7.2. Participant’s Profiles
7.3. Questionnaire
7.4. Results

Table

Table 1. Should Japan become a permanent Security Council member?

Table 2. Reasons for agreeing with permanent Security Council membership

Table 3. Reasons for opposing permanent Security Council membership

Figures

Figure 1. Comparison of percentage contributions to the UN regular budget

Figure 2. Coincidence of voting with the US in the Security Council

Figure 3. When will Japan become a permanent Security Council member?

Figure 4. The Veto

Figure 5. Aims and Motives

Figure 6. Arguments in favour of Japan’s candidature

Figure 7. Arguments against Japan’s candidature

Figure 8. Japan’s pursuit for permanent Security Council membership

Figure 9. How to advance Japan’s quest? Important vs. desirable developments

Figure 10. Scenarios of support: a decrease in contributions to the UN budget

Figure 11. Scenarios of support: a comprehensive involvement of SDF in PKO

Figure 12. Scenarios of support: a clear pro-veto stance

Figure 13. Domestic support in 2008 and 2013

Figure 14. Is China a threat?

Figure 15. What to expect from Japan as a permanent SC member?

Figure 16. What to expect if Japan will not become a permanent SC member?

Figure 17. Scenarios of the future number of SDF participating in PKO

Figure 18. Scenarios of the future scope of SDF involvement in PKO

Figure 19. Scenarios of Japan’s future contributions to the UN budget

Figure 20 Scenarios of Japan’s future ODA policy…

Abbreviations

illustration not visible in this excerpt

A Note on the Text

All English translations of Japanese and German sources were made by the author. Japanese names are reproduced in the Japanese order, i.e. family name first, first name second. The Hepburn romanisation system was applied for transcribing Japanese terms.

1. Introduction

“We, the Japanese people, […] desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. […] We […] pledge our national honor to accomplish these high ideals and purposes with all our resources.”

(cit. in Hook et al. 2001:466)

This excerpt from the Preamble to Japan’s Constitution that came into effect from 3. May 1947 clearly reflects Japan’s desire to regain a respectable position within the international arena. Defeated in battle and under allied occupation, it seemed as if Japan “would never again be able to play a major role on the world stage” (Linhart 1996:404). More than half a century later, circumstances have changed dramatically: not only has Japan recovered from its wartime devastation, it has also become a major economic power and risen to the status of key international player. Has Japan, in that sense, attained its goal and acquired an “honored place” in international society, as is stated in the Preamble to its Constitution?

There are several means by which to assess Japan’s place on an international stage. With regard to the above question, however, the United Nations Security Council lends itself to being a foremost measure. This can be ascribed to three rationales: firstly, the Security Council can be argued as epitomising what might indeed be called an “honored place” in international society. Not only is a permanent Security Council seat highly elitist, it is also a “scarce international resource” (Hurd, cit. in Drifte 2000:95) that enhances a country’s prestige and confers it immense status. Secondly, the Security Council is endowed with the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” (UN Charter, Art. 24); a function, that reveals remarkable parallels with the introductory quote which refers to an “international society striving for the preservation of peace”. Thirdly, it is overtly known, at least since the early 1990s, that Japan is pursuing permanent membership and that it has certainly tried to accomplish this “high ideal”, if not openly (“with all its resources”), then at least indirectly, from as early as the late 1960s onwards. (Drifte 2000:50)

When measured against the standard of the Security Council, it seems futile to ask whether Japan has achieved an “honored place”: despite the fact that Japan has been elected a record number of eight times as non-permanent member into the Security Council and is planning to run elections for its ninth term in autumn 2004, it has clearly not accomplished its goal of becoming a permanent Security Council member. Such a logic, however, only serves to prompt the inevitable question of whether Japan will, in days to come, attain a permanent seat on the Security Council, thus securing its “honored place” in international society?

The aim of this thesis is to unveil the mystery that surrounds this question and to investigate whether Japan can be expected to become a permanent Security Council member in the future. In order to accomplish this task, there are two requirements that need to be met: firstly, the employment of a methodological tool that renders the exploration of future trends and developments scientifically possible and secondly, the careful demarcation of the investigated topic within its wider context.

As to the first requirement, the Delphi technique is identified as an optimal method for advancing the aim that is pursued within this thesis. Not only is the application of the Delphi technique suitable when dealing with “uncertainties in an area of imperfect knowledge” (Kaynak et al., cit. in Häder 2002:21), it is also proven to deliver well-founded predictions; hence its employment to identify future trends and developments pertaining to Japan’s quest for permanent Security Council membership.^[1] With reference to the second requirement, namely the wider context in which Japan’s quest is embedded, it needs to be borne in mind that Security Council reform serves as a precondition for a Council’s enlargement and thus, for Japan’s potential inclusion as a permanent member.

Regarding this broader context, it is widely held that the recent war in Iraq has given a new impetus to the reform debate (cf. Shukshin 2003, MacAskill 2003). Such an effect is echoed by the latest Security Council reform proposal that was advanced by the United Kingdom in autumn 2003 in order to restore the “UN’s ‘battered and bruised’ credibility in the wake of the Iraq war” (Wintour 2003:#1). The prospect of a new momentum for Security Council reform looks all the more promising in light of the 10th anniversary of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security Council reform^[2] in January 2004, the forthcoming 60th anniversary of the United Nations’ foundation in 2005 and the approaching US elections in November 2004^[3]. All these developments indicate both the relevance and the timeliness of the subject that is addressed within this thesis.

Although one chapter of this thesis is dedicated to discussing the broader aspects of Security Council reform, effort is made to exclude any such external factors when conducting the Delphi study itself, thus placing prime focus on Japan-related issues pertaining to its quest. In keeping with that delineation, the Delphi study examines four distinctive subject areas: firstly, Japan’s prospect of realising its bid; secondly, Japan’s continuing pursuit of its quest in terms of intensity and means; thirdly, the development of national and international support for Japan’s bid; and fourthly, the possible consequences of the identified trend with regard to Japan’s future United Nations policy.

In addition to the primary sources that are gained on these four subject areas from the Delphi study, this thesis further resorts to a wide range of secondary literature that comprises of English, German and Japanese language material. Such literature serves the purpose of providing a solid knowledge base on the topic of Japan’s quest for permanent Security Council membership in its present state, so that it can subsequently be extended into the future by application of the Delphi technique. In addition to the printed material, valuable information on the subject area that is explored by this thesis is also acquired in interviews and/or personal conversations with various experts in New York, Tokyo and Vienna. The oral material proves to be vital in complementing and updating the written information, thus contributing to a rounded and informed understanding of Japan’s quest for permanent membership. Both the oral and printed material have great significance in shaping the content of the deployed questionnaire.

The body of this thesis comprises of five chapters: Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2. sheds light on the Delphi technique and provides background information on its origin and application (2.1.), definition and classification (2.2.) and potential and limits (2.3.). Chapter 3. attempts to embed Japan’s quest in the broader context of Security Council reform (3.1.) and in the narrower context of Japan (3.2.); thereby covering both the present Council’s composition, functions and powers, the grounds for its reform and the related discussions, as well as the four subject areas that surround Japan’s quest, namely Japan’s credentials and motives for becoming a permanent member, Japan’s pursuit of its quest, the national and international support for Japan’s bid and Japan’s United Nations policy.

The bulk of this thesis is formed by Chapter 4., which discusses in detail the conducted Delphi study. Beginning with the study’s preparatory stage, particular attention is given to the Delphi technique’s application (4.1.), the participating experts (4.2.) and the deployed questionnaire (4.3.). This is followed by a description of the study’s implementation and its evaluation (4.4.), before embarking upon the presentation of the final results (4.5.). This presentation reproduces the structure that is dictated by the four subject areas that pertain to Japan’s bid, namely its prospects, its continuing pursuit, its support base and its future UN policy. Chapter 5. provides a summary of the attained results, thus rounding up the picture before finally turning to the task of answering the initial question of whether Japan will achieve its quest of acquiring permanent membership on the Security Council, thereby fulfilling its “desire to occupy an honored place in […] international society”.

2. The Delphi Technique: General Remarks on Methodology

Upon investigating the Delphi technique, it soon becomes apparent that despite the vast growth in its application^[4], there are few unified standards for its use. This is perpetuated by the pioneer spirit that is exhibited by its practitioners, who tend to adopt and adapt the method to fit their needs, thus creating “the impression […] that each author considers his procedure as more or less typical for a Delphi study” (Häder 2002:23). With the aim of establishing a common ground for the various understandings and applications of the Delphi technique and in order to present a concise overview of that method, Chapter 2.1. gives a brief outline of the Delphi technique’s origin, its development as well as its fields of application. Within the subsequent Chapter 2.2., an attempt is made to provide a definition for that method and to introduce a consistent classification model for Delphi studies. Chapter 2.3. then sheds a critical light on the Delphi technique by pointing out both its potential and limits.

2.1. Origin and Fields of Application

The Delphi technique owes its name to the ancient Oracle of Delphi. The legend goes that Delphi, a place in contemporary Greece, belonged to Apollo, the God of wisdom, who proclaimed prophecies through his priestess Pythia. Those who were seeking advice had to note down their question and present it to the Oracle. Subsequently, they had to make an offering and await the day when the result of the priests’ consultation would be announced by Pythia. The answers were given cryptically. Above all, the Oracle was consulted for political concerns, shaping decisions over war and peace and exerting great influence over the ancient Greek cities. Going back as far as to the 8th century B.C., the Oracle of Delphi reached its peak in the 6th and 5th century B.C. and came to an end in the 4th century A.D., when a newly Christian Rome proscribed its prophesying. (Häder 2002: 13-14)

Comparing the myth of the ancient Oracle with the contemporary Delphi technique, Häder identifies six interesting parallels: first, the user of the Oracle had to make offerings, i.e. the prophecies were not free of charge; second, the interrogation of the Oracle required a certain waiting period, i.e. the results were not available immediately; third, the questions presented to the Oracle had to be in written form, i.e. information was not requested orally; fourth, the findings of the Oracle were based on the consultation of priests, i.e. a group of experts was involved; fifth, the answers of the Oracle were not straightforward, i.e. a leeway for interpretation was afforded; and sixth, the information provided by the Oracle allowed influence to be exerted over the social and political life of those days, i.e. the outcome had significant bearing on decision-making. (Häder 2002:14-15)

The first reference to the application of the Delphi technique in present days goes back to 1948, when this method is said to have been used to predict the outcome of dog- or horseraces^[5]. (Häder 2002:15) Within the following years, the Delphi technique was employed for the purpose of estimating probable targets and effects of a Soviet atomic bombing attack on the United States in an unpublished Rand Corporation study conducted in the early 1950s. Following its application in the area of defence research, the Delphi technique in the mid 1960s found way into the non-military areas of technological forecasting, a development that was initiated with the “Report on a Long-Range Forecasting Study” published as a Rand paper in 1964. It soon began to find application in government, industry and academia and started spreading to Europe and Asia. (Linstone, Turoff 1975:10-11) One of the first and best known Delphi studies undertaken to date in the field of technological forecasting is study by the National Institute of Science and Technology Policy (NISTEP) in Japan that has been conducted at regular intervals ever since 1971. (Häder 2002:15-16)

Although the main area of application for the Delphi technique has remained that of technological forecasting, which led to its pigeonholing as a forecasting procedure, the Delphi technique has been used in a variety of other arenas in which judgemental information is essential. These areas include the gathering of current and historical data not accurately known or available, the examining of the significance of historical events, the evaluating of possible budget allocations, the exploring of urban and regional planning options, the delineating of the pros and cons associated with potential policy options, the developing of causal relationships in complex economic or social phenomena, the distinguishing and clarifying of real and perceived human motivations and the exposing of priorities of personal values and social goals. (Linstone, Turoff 1975:4)

2.2. Definition and Classification - an Attempt

A glance at the available literature on the Delphi technique reveals that there are many different understandings of the Delphi method, resulting in a great degree of variety in its definition. Such a variety is commensurate to the diversification that the Delphi technique has experienced both in terms of design and use ever since its first application in the late 1940s. It further denotes the lack of a “right” definition for the Delphi technique so far. Häder groups the existing definitions into two basic camps: those that associate the Delphi technique with a particular form of group communication^[6] and those that define it as dealing with problems of a particular content, namely with prognoses^[7]. (Häder 2002:19-22) Bridging the span between these two camps of thought is the definition proposed by Häder and Häder, which serves as a guiding light for the purpose of this paper and states that:

“The Delphi technique is a relatively well structured process of group communication, during the course of which experts assess issues that are informed by an insecure and incomplete knowledge base.”

(cit. in Häder 2002:21)

Despite such a diversity in the definitions of the Delphi technique, there are certain elements that seem to form an integral part of most Delphi studies. These elements include: some feedback of individual contributions of information and knowledge; some assessment of the group judgement or view; some opportunity for individuals to revise their views; and some degree of anonymity for the individual responses. (Linstone, Turoff 1975:3) In the words of Häder, the basic concept of all Delphi studies consists of utilising expert opinion in several waves of inquiry for problem solving whilst capitalising on the use of anonymous feedback. (Häder 2002:22) Another dimension is added by Hasse, who observes that a broad consensus seems to have emerged amongst most Delphi studies on the subject of using the technique to deliver quantifications, thus characterising an ultimately statistical method. (Hasse 1999:215-216)

As to possible classification models for Delphi studies, an equally diverse impression is gained from the available literature. In that spirit, Dichtl and Müller identify six types of Delphi studies, namely those aimed at making prognoses; solving problems; evaluating situations; building goals; gathering ideas; and forging a consensus (cit. in Hasse 1999:215). A similar approach that groups Delphi studies according to their aim is adopted by Häder, who introduces a classification model that distinguishes between four different types, those being Delphi studies targeted at aggregating ideas (so-called Type 1); predicting future developments (Type 2); determining and qualifying expert opinion (Type 3); and building a consensus amongst experts (Type 4). (Häder 2002:29-36)

A closer look at Häder’s classification model reveals that each of the four identified types induces a distinct methodological approach to the Delphi process, significantly shaping both the design and conduct of the endeavour: whilst Type 1 is of qualitative nature, using open questions, selecting experts according to their expertise and exhibiting a pronounced role for the participants, Type 4 is of quantitative character, applying a standardised questionnaire, choosing experts by predetermined criteria and assigning greater importance to the monitoring team than to the participants. Delphi studies of Type 2 and 3 are located somewhere in between these two extremes, with both of them exhibiting qualitative as well as quantitative design elements, providing chiefly closed questions and revealing an equal role played by the participants and the monitoring team. Whilst the former makes use of hypothesis in order to locate best-suited experts for participation, the latter may either be a total population survey or undertake a deliberate selection of participants. (Häder 2002:36)

2.3. Potential and Limits

At first sight, it may seem that the Delphi technique is a fairly simple concept that can be easily employed. Yet a closer look at the actual outcomes achieved by applying such a technique reveals that there are just as many failures with Delphi studies than there are successes. (Linstone, Turoff 1975:6) In order to minimise the potential of any such disappointments, it is important to consider the problems and risks that are involved in carrying out a Delphi study before embarking upon such an exercise and to always keep in mind both the potential and the limits posed by this method.

There are two factors that may be held responsible for the poor success of a Delphi study: firstly, failures may be attributed to the lack of diligence shown by the monitoring team, which results in the wrong application of the Delphi technique. Examples of such failings include the imposing of the monitors’ views and biases upon the respondent group by over-specifying the structure of the Delphi, the using of poor techniques to summarise and present the group response and the ignoring of disagreements, so that discouraged dissenters drop out and an artificial consensus is generated (Linstone, Turoff 1975:6) . However, failures can (and in fact, often are) also be ascribed to the methodology itself. In this context, major points of criticism include the lack of precise standards for the use and implementation of the Delphi technique, the great variation of its possible forms, the almost uncontrollable influence of the monitor and the deficient experimental confirmation of the method (Seeger, cit. in Keller 2001:27).

In addition to such criticisms concerning the Delphi technique, Häder raises another source of criticism that applies to situations when predicted developments do not occur in the way they had been envisaged: namely the fact that even experts do not always make correct predictions but can sometimes be mistaken. Telling examples of such mistakes include the statement by Albert Einstein in 1932 that there is not the slightest indication that humankind will ever be able to develop atomic energy, the prediction by the BATELLE Institute in 1965 that the last buses will have disappeared from the city traffic by 1990 and the outcome of a market research survey by Daimler Motors in 1901 which envisaged that the worldwide demand of motor vehicles will not exceed one million, if for no other reason than the sheer lack of available chauffeurs. (Häder 2002:27-28)

Such sources of criticisms clearly reveal the limits that might restrict the Delphi technique. In order to minimise the disappointments and, in that sense, to maximise the potential of the Delphi technique, Häder suggests that it should not be approached with the expectation that the future shall be predicted, but rather with the attitude that current visions of the future shall be glimpsed through the eyes of experts. Depending on the aim of the study, such an approach allows conclusions to be drawn and actions to be taken accordingly. At this point, the notion of self-fulfilling prophecies, i.e. prophecies that are initially incorrect but bring about their actual occurrence^[8], and self-destroying prophecies, i.e. prophecies that are initially correct but cause their non-occurrence^[9], comes into play as a result of the gained self-dynamic of the prophecies. In any case, the possibility of failures cannot be completely factored out and the most important decision upon choosing to apply the Delphi technique is to have a clear idea about the aim of the study. (Häder2002:29)

3. Contextual Embedding of Japan’s Candidature

The subject-area that is covered by the Delphi study conducted in the course of this thesis concerns the specific topic of Japan’s quest for permanent Security Council membership. Japan’s candidature, however, cannot be seen as an issue in isolation. Rather, it should be understood as being embedded in the wider context of Security Council reform, which serves as a prerequisite for the Council’s enlargement and entails the fulfilment of a number of conditions.^[10] A careful line is therefore to be drawn between Japan-related issues pertaining to its candidature for permanent Security Council membership, on the one hand, and Japan-unrelated issues concerning Security Council reform in general, on the other. Given the conditional relationship that prevails between these two concerns, a clear-cut demarcation is sometimes difficult to achieve.

According to Satoh, Japan is broadly recognized in the international community as being well qualified for permanent membership “if and when reform takes place” (Satoh 2001a:45). This attitude is further reflected in the words of Inderfurth, who, acting as US representative on the occasion of the 50th session of the General Assembly in November 1995, said that the United States “could not agree to a Council enlargement that did not result in […] [Japan’s] permanent membership” (cit. in Fassbender 1998:238). These statements clearly display the close interdependence between Japan’s permanent membership and Security Council reform, further implying that the successful realisation of the latter will result in the attainment of the former. This conditionality prompts the question of whether the focus of this thesis, being placed on Japan’s Security Council membership, is misplaced, given that much of the matter could equally be tackled by addressing the general question of Security Council reform, an issue that goes beyond the range of Japan.

There are three considerations that support this study’s rationale of placing focus on Japan alone, not equating this subject matter with or replacing it by the broader issue of Security Council reform: Firstly, not all Japan-related concerns and details that are worthy of attention can be caught in the general net cast by addressing Security Council reform. Despite the fact that some aspects of Japan’s quest may indeed be tackled by pursuing a more general line based on the assumption that Security Council reform will entail Japan’s permanent membership, this approach would certainly prove unsuitable for providing a more detailed depiction of Japan’s candidature^[11]. Secondly, the influence that Japan is able to exercise on the course of Security Council reform should not be overlooked, but rather be subject of careful examination. Last but not least, the very assumption that a successful realisation of Security Council reform will inevitably result in Japan gaining a permanent Security Council seat is debatable.

Satoh’s and Inderfurth’s statements clearly reveal that the current situation is extremely favourable for Japan’s candidature if and when reform happens. These statements, however, need to be placed into their temporal context; it cannot be assumed that Japan’s prospect will remain as bright in the years to come, given that “Japan’s financial contributions to the UN budget and its development aid [are] the main source of legitimacy for permanent Security Council membership” (Drifte 2000:99) and that material capabilities of states undergo changes.^[12] As Schwartzberg notes, “there is no guarantee that today’s economic giants will maintain their pre-eminence. Japan, for example, though rich in human and capital resources, is endowed with a meagre natural resource base and faces increasing competition from other emerging “tigers” on the Pacific rim. Will it loom as prominently on the global stage a generation hence as it does at present?” (cit. in Knight 2002:27)

Despite the fact that the general aspects of Security Council reform are factored out as much as possible within the Delphi study conducted in the course of this thesis, their impact on both Japan’s outlook for permanent membership^[13] and on the very nature of this membership itself^[14] cannot be ignored. For that reason, the following Chapter 3.1. examines the general aspects pertaining to Security Council reform, with special focus being placed on the causes of reform and the content of the reform discussions. Chapter 3.2. then takes a closer look at the Japan-specific issues with regard to its candidature for permanent Security Council membership up to the present day. This depiction is subsequently extended into the future by conducting a Delphi study, as is fully covered in Chapter 4.. Given that Japan’s candidature for permanent membership relies on reform as a precondition, this study demands certain hypothetical foundations^[15] and recognition of the fact that all consequent predictions stem from a theoretical starting point.

3.1. Security Council Reform - a Precondition

A major difficulty in addressing the subject of Security Council procedure in general and Security Council reform in particular, with the aspiration to provide as complete and topical a picture as possible, is that one is aiming at a continuously moving target. As Bailey and Daws point out, “new, albeit usually minor, procedural measures are adopted almost every month [within the Security Council] […] and any subsequent agreement by States could make […] [the most cursory] observations appear out of date” (Bailey, Daws 1998:382). Such a flaw is equally evident when applied to the issue of Security Council reform, where any attempt to comprehensively portray the latest state of affairs may by marred by new proposals or the altered attitudes of the member states.

Despite the mutable nature of the issues involved in the reform discussions, it is appropriate to make some general observations on the issue of Security Council reform, given that it colours the scenarios explored by this thesis. For that purpose, Chapter 3.1.1. provides a condensed overview of the Security Council’s composition, functions and powers, which serves as the basis for the discussions in chapters 3.1.2. and 3.1.3.. Whilst the former explores the causes of reform with a particular focus being laid on the Council’s legitimacy and effectiveness, the latter concentrates on the actual reform discussions: after providing an outline of the discussion’s development so far, light is then shed on the content of the reform discussions themselves, with special consideration given to the matter of Security Council enlargement and the much debated veto right.

3.1.1. The Security Council: Composition, Functions and Powers

The Security Council in its present form consists of five permanent and ten non-permanent or rotating members, amounting to a total size of fifteen. As opposed to the permanent members^[16], who are continuously represented on the Council and who possess the veto right^[17], the rotating members are elected for a term of two years, with five members being replaced per year and retiring members not being eligible for immediate re-election. Since 1965, the year that witnessed the only enlargement of the Security Council in the category of non-permanent membership from six to ten (extending the overall size of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen), the criterion of equitable geographical distribution has become decisive for the selection of non-permanent members.^[18] The selection is further guided by the capacity of members states to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the organisation. (Winkelmann 2000:477-478)

According to Article 24 of the UN Charter, the Security Council has the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security.^[19] In order to carry out this responsibility, it is given specific powers as detailed in Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the UN Charter.^[20] These powers include the employment of peaceful means (negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, etc.)^[21] to settle disputes and the use of non-armed (interruption of economic relations, disruption of means of communication, severance of diplomatic relations)^[22] and, if proven inadequate, of armed force (demonstrations, blockade, other operations by air, sea, or land forces of members of the UN)^[23] to restore international peace and security. Furthermore, the Security Council is the only body within the UN system whose decisions are binding on all members, which renders it the apex body of the United Nations. (Knight 2002:19) It is no surprise, then, that the spotlight of the reform discussions has been focused on the Security Council.

3.1.2. Why Reform?

“The United Nations must […] adapt itself to the changing times. One critical area […] is reform of the Security Council. The Council must work effectively, but it must also enjoy unquestioned legitimacy. Those two criteria define the space within which a solution must be found. I urge Member States to tackle this challenge without delay.”

(Annan 2000:69)

Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s words as expressed in the UN Millennium Report clearly reveal both the necessity and the urgency of Security Council reform. This need is further indicated in the resolve, articulated by the UN member states on the occasion of the 55th General Assembly in September 2000, to “intensify our efforts to achieve a comprehensive reform of the Security Council in all its aspects”^[24]. Almost sixty years after the foundation of the United Nations in 1945, fundamental changes in international society and global order have presented both new challenges and fresh opportunities to the organisation in general, and the Security Council, in particular. Whilst the substantial increase in the membership of the United Nations^[25], combined with the rise of new powers^[26] and the emergence of different patterns of conflict^[27] has demanded a thorough review of the Security Council’s structure and working methods, the altered international situation in the post-Cold War era has facilitated reform discussions^[28], paving the way for the attempt to create a Council that is deemed fit for meeting the challenges facing the 21st century^[29].

Against this backdrop of changed international circumstances and new global challenges in the post-Cold Ware era, legitimacy and effectiveness, respectively the lack of legitimacy and effectiveness, are the two major charges levied against the Security Council. Whilst the allegation of illegitimacy stems from the perception that the Council is dominated by a few states and is not truly representative of the rest of the UN body (Knight 2002:24), the charge of ineffectiveness can be ascribed to the Council’s failure at times to respond to a crisis in a timely and proper manner (Satoh 2001a:50). The question of legitimacy, in other words, is intrinsically linked to the issues of expanding the Security Council and changing its composition, while the question of effectiveness is deeply entwined with the issue concerning the Council’s working methods, including the veto. These issues constitute the respective Cluster I and Cluster II of the reform discussions, as is highlighted in Chapter 3.1.3..

For the Security Council to be truly representative of the broader membership of the United Nations, it must reflect this membership’s values, present its ideas or views, be typical of its geographical make-up, population base and political views and act as its delegate. (Knight 2002:24) When measured by these standards, the Security Council in its present form proves unrepresentative in many ways: Not only is the Council’s composition based on the distribution of power and alignments in 1945 and dominated by the five veto wielding permanent members who embody the victors of World War II (and their successor states) (Satoh 2003:160), but also the membership of the United Nations has risen from 51 in 1945 to 191 in 2003, thus becoming disproportionate to the size of the Security Council, which has only once been expanded from eleven to fifteen in 1965 (Satoh 2003:162). In view of this deficit of structural adjustments, the Council’s size and makeup is not representative in terms of geopolitical distribution^[30], regional distribution^[31], distribution by population^[32] and capacity distribution^[33]. (Knight 2002:24-27)

Given that the effectiveness of the Council is in jeopardy if the politically and economically strongest states are not represented on it (Drifte 2000:164), capacity representation constitutes a bridge between the issues of legitimacy and effectiveness. The veto, despite its allocation to Cluster II, is another such overlap: not only is it perceived as being anachronistic and undemocratic and as running contrary to the Charter principle of sovereign equality of states (Fassbender 1998:263); it is also held responsible for the Security Council’s failure at times to fulfil its mission in an efficient and effective manner, given that the P5 do not hesitate to (ab)use their power for the pursuit of national interests^[34]. (Satoh 2003:160-161) Besides these occasional overlaps, the issues of legitimacy and effectiveness represent competing priorities in a sense that too big an increase in the Security Council’s membership may inversely affect its effectiveness.^[35]

Further elaborating on the issue of effectiveness, the very functioning of the Security Council needs to be challenged. After a long period of virtual paralysis during the Cold War^[36], the Security Council witnessed an unprecedented activism in the late 20th and early 21st century as epitomised in the new spirit of cooperation among the P5. This allowed multilateral action to be taken (under the lead of the US) both in the First Gulf War and the War in Afghanistan; examples, which may rather constitute the exception than the rule. (Watanabe 1993:76-77) As a matter of fact, the recent Iraq War has once again demonstrated the lack of functioning of the Security Council (Satoh 2003:165), clearly highlightening the necessity of reform. To put it in the words of Secretary-General Kofi Annan: “Unless the Security Council regains the confidence of states and world public opinion, individual states will increasingly resort exclusively to their own national perceptions of emerging threats and how best to deal with them.” (cit. in Anonymous 2003:26).

3.1.3. Security Council Reform Discussions: Development and Content

According to Drifte, “the seeds for reform efforts of the UN Charter were sown right from the beginning of the UN in 1945” (Drifte 2000:6). Despite the fact that those initial concerns revolved around the veto right, challenges against the Council’s composition soon arose and proposals to increase the number of non-permanent seats were considered from 1956 onwards, resulting in an expansion from six to ten in 1965. (Drifte 2000:158-161) As a result of the continuing increase in UN membership, the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council was first included in the agenda of the General Assembly in 1979. It was not until 1992, however, that the changed international environment allowed the successful adoption of a resolution on that matter^[37], which was the first step towards the establishment of a working group on Security Council reform^[38] in December 1993. (Bailey, Daws 1998:382-383)

The OEWG took up its work in January 1994 and has reached its 10th year of deliberations in June 2003 with little prospect of realising Security Council reform (Satoh 2003:161), thus evoking the mockery that it is “open-ended in its composition but never-ending in its nature” (Kim 2000:82). In hindsight, reform discussions can be said as having gained momentum twice thus far: the first year that was considered to be the make-or-break year of Security Council reform was 1997, when a new reform proposal had been put forward^[39], coinciding with the election of a new Secretary-General and the re-election of a seemingly freer handed US President Clinton. (Drifte 2000:181-182) In this case, it was the fierce opposition campaign conducted by the so-called “Coffee Club”^[40] that took the wind out of the sails. (Satoh 2001a:45-46) The second peak-year in the reform discussions arose in 2000, with a total of 169 member states stressing the importance of Security Council reform on the occasion of the General Assembly in September 2000. (Satoh 2001a:48) In the same year, the United States announced that it was “prepared to consider reform proposals that would result in a slightly larger number of seats than twenty one” (Satoh 2002:7). Bearing in mind that the US are perceived as holding the “key to the realisation of reform” (Satoh 2001b:6), this second momentum petered out due to the consequences of the change in US administration in January 2001 and the terrorist attacks of 9/11. (Satoh 2003:165)

Reform discussions within the OEWG are organised around two major topics, namely Cluster I, dealing with the equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and Cluster II, focusing on other matters related to the Security Council, particularly measures and practices to enhance the Council’s transparency and to improve its working methods. (Fassbender 1998:229) Despite the fact that the principal thrust of the reform discussions has been on Cluster I (Fassbender 1998:230) there is a wide divergence of perspectives on the cluster’s priorities: the classical line of tension lies between the P5, that prefer status quo, and the NAM countries^[41], that favour complete reform; a more delicate line of division exists between aspirants^[42], that support quicker reform in Cluster I and the Coffee Club that favours a more rapid reform in Cluster II. (Kim 2000:86)

As far as the overall size of a reformed Council is concerned, a certain convergence of positions towards the “magic number” of 24 can be noted. This number corresponds with the views held by a majority of countries as expressed in the Razali Plan and forms the middle-ground between 26, the number proposed by the NAM (Knight 2002:31), and a number that slightly exceeds 21, as is considered by the United States (Satoh 2003:162). Despite the fact that a large number of UN member states seek an increase in both permanent and non-permanent membership^[43], there is still a wide divergence in opinion on which countries to elect as new permanent members. Whilst a majority of UN member states have announced their support for Japan’s and Germany’s candidacy (Pleuger 2003:685), there is a lack of consensus among the developing countries^[44] on which states to nominate from amongst themselves for permanent membership.^[45] (Fassbender 1998:252) This situation is further aggravated by the fact that the developed nations carry serious reservations towards the idea of awarding the veto power to permanent members from the developing world. (Satoh 2001a:49)

Given that the developing countries, in turn, would not agree to any reform proposal that confers veto power to industrialised countries only^[46] (Satoh: 2003:162-163), it is no exaggeration to claim that the veto constitutes the biggest and most difficult obstacle in the reform discussions and is the “crucial question that shall decide upon the success of Security Council reform”. (Satoh 2001b:9) There are four positions that dominate the debate concerning the veto issue: to eliminate the veto altogether; to limit the scope of the veto’s use; to allow the existing permanent five to retain their veto, but not extend it to potential new members; and to extend the veto power to new permanent members. (Knight 2002:28-29) Whilst the present P5, for obvious reasons, would not agree to curtail, let alone to relinquish their prerogatives, which rules out option one and two, the expansion of the inequity of the veto to a few other countries or the creation of a new category of membership, namely that of permanent members without the right of veto, would not find favour with the majority of UN member states, which bars option three and four. (Drifte 2000:174) This divide epitomises the intrinsic difficulty in Security Council reform and constitutes a fundamental concern that remains yet to be bridged.

Despite the growing calls for Security Council reform since its very inception, with a minor concession in 1965, reform discussions only began in earnest after the collapse of the Cold War, as epitomised in the establishment of the OEWG in December 1993. After a decade of deliberations marked by two peaks in 1997 and 2000, reform discussions in the OEWG at present seem to have reached a deadlock. The crux of the matter is that for Security Council reform to happen it requires the support of both the (veto-wielding) P5 and the (majority-wielding) developing countries as represented by NAM. These two groups pursue diametrically opposed interests in regard to Security Council reform, with further refraction and entanglement courtesy of two other interest groups, namely the Aspirants and the “Coffee Club”. Such differences become immovable obstacles when it is remembered that decisions within the OEWG are adopted by consensus, thus falling prey to the stranglehold of interest groups. This raises the fundamental question of whether the reform discussion’s priority should rather be that of changing the voting methods in the OEWG, as is suggested by Satoh. (Satoh 2003:162,166)

3.2 Japan’s Quest for Permanent Security Council Membership

Within the topic of Security Council reform, Japan and its quest for permanent Security Council membership constitutes a subject in its own right. The aim of this chapter is to provide a solid knowledge base on this subject matter, thereby providing the context for the Delphi study that is detailed in Chapter 4.. One means of approaching the subject of Japan’s quest would be to examine it from the economic, political and military vantage points, all of which pervade the surrounding discussions. Although it is tempting to establish these perspectives as the basis for this chapter, it is considered best to adapt the chapter’s structure to reflect the four key concerns that are identified as the component parts of Japan’s quest.

In keeping with these component parts, Chapter 3.2.1. focuses on Japan’s credentials and motives for gaining a permanent Security Council seat, Chapter 3.2.2. examines Japan’s pursuit of its quest thus far, Chapter 3.2.3. concentrates on the development of the national and international support for Japan’s bid and Chapter 3.2.4. centres around Japan’s UN policy ever since its admission in 1956. This choice of structure serves the purpose of ensuring that the background information that is provided in this chapter correlates with the eventual Delphi predictions. Because of the intertwined nature of these subject matters, some repetition is unavoidable and certain common themes, such as the economic, political and military aspects, echo throughout the chapter.

3.2.1. Credentials and Motives

There is an intrinsic difficulty in pinning down a definitive set of credentials that warrant permanent Security Council membership for new countries. This is largely due to the precedent of enlarging the permanent category of Security Council membership, as well as the fact that the current P5 attained their positions from the outcome of World War II. Therefore, it is decided to measure Japan’s qualifications for permanent membership not by the benchmark of predetermined credentials, but rather by the mindset of the criticisms that are levied against the present Security Council.^[47] Consequently, by looking at the main arguments and counterarguments that surround Japan’s candidature, an insight is gained into its current credentials for permanent Security Council membership.

Most supporters of Japan’s bid consider its financial contribution to the UN budget (Fig.1.) and its development aid as the main source of legitimacy for permanent Security Council membership. This is reflected in the results of a domestic public opinion poll (see Chapter 3.2.3. Tab.2.) and is further backed by Satoh, who, recalling his conversations with other nations’ representatives at the United Nations, identifies Japan’s role as an economic power with a global perspective, its ability to relate to the struggles of developing countries as leading ODA donor, and its bearing of 20 per cent of the UN budget as the three (out of five) most commonly given reasons to support Japan’s permanent membership. The two remaining rationales include Japan’s position as an avowed non-nuclear state and its being an Asian democracy. (Satoh 2003:163) Complementary to this, Drifte refers to the non-nuclear status argument as the epitome of Japan’s exceptionalism^[48], reflecting the belief that as a civilian power^[49] Japan will bring a fresh perspective to the Security Council. (Drifte 2000:108-109) Furthermore, Fassbender acknowledges that Japan’s status as an Asian country gives it a comparative advantage over Germany since its membership, despite strengthening the group of industrialised states, would at least improve the representation of Asia. (Fassbender 1998:250) Another asset of Japan’s candidature can be seen in its position as a non-colonial power in Africa (Yoshikawa 1998:8-9) and in its not belonging to NATO, which is again perceived as diminishing Germany’s case given that “four out of the five permanent members are practically NATO” (Hoyos 2002:#2).

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Figure 1. Comparison of percentage contributions to the UN regular budget (Hook et al. 2001:319)

Critics of Japan’s quest, on the other hand, question whether Japan would actually assume an independent stance as permanent member on the Security Council and voice concerns that Japan’s membership might, in fact, give the United States a “second veto right” (Drifte 2000:141). These concerns stem from the history of Japan’s close adherence to US positions within the UN^[50], as reflected in its voting pattern as non-permanent Security Council member^[51] (Fig.2). In addition to its close bilateral ties with the United States, Japan’s merit for permanent Security Council membership is challenged when gauged by the record of its political performance within the UN, considering that Japan’s multilateral diplomacy in non-economic fields is seen as being in an “underdeveloped state” (Drifte 2000:104) and that the emphasis seems to lie more on its potential rather than on its actual achievements. (Drifte 2000:104) Of greater concern to opponents is the fear that permanent Security Council membership would entail fully-fledged contributions to UN peace activities^[52], a development that Japan, so goes their reasoning, neither can nor should pursue due to the constraints imposed by Article 9 of its Constitution.^[53] This resilient attitude toward Japan’s military participation in UN peace activities is reflected in the results of a domestic public opinion poll (see Chapter 3.2.3. Tab.3.) and coincides with the apprehensions of many Asian leaders who, recalling Japan’s culpability in World War II, express their concern about “[Japan’s] aspiration toward becoming a ‘military giant’ once again” (Funabashi 1991:63).

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Figure 2. Coincidence of voting with the US in the Security Council (Hook et al. 2001:311)

Despite the fact that the comprehensive participation of Self-Defense Forces in UN peace activities is widely held as being a requirement for Japan’s bid to have political legitimacy^[54], there is nothing in the UN Charter that puts an extra obligation on permanent members with regard to their involvement in PKO. (Drifte 2000:75) From a legal (as opposed to a political) point of view, it can thus be argued that a military contribution to UN peace activities is not a prerequisite for Japan’s eligibility as permanent Security Council member.^[55] Even if political necessity was paramount, it has to be borne in mind that there is a wide range of opinions on how to interpret Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution: although the official interpretation acknowledges the unconstitutionality of SDF participation in UN peace activities^[56], it has been mooted that there is nothing in the Constitution that restricts Japan to contribute to UN peace activities (Yokota 2002:224) and that from a legal point of view “[t]he participation of the Self Defense Forces in peacekeeping forces is 100 per cent permissible under the constitution” (Shinyo 1998:155).

With regard to the charges that Japan has a low political profile within the United Nations and maintains close bilateral ties with the United States, it can be countered that Japan’s ulterior motive of permanent Security Council membership may sometimes constrain its performance (Drifte 2000:111) given the need to garner support, above all from the United States, which is the country that holds the “key to the realization of [Security Council] reform” (Satoh 2001:49). Furthermore, it should be noted that Japan has not always voted in line with the United States, as evidenced in its voting behaviour in the General Assembly (Oshiba 2002:112) and particularly on issues such as development, the Middle East and disarmament (Akashi 2002:95). Concerning Japan’s financial clout which serves as the main reasoning in favour of its bid, it should be borne in mind that Japan has dropped from its top spot as ODA donor in 2002 (Watts 2003:#2) and that domestic wariness of increased financial contributions compounded by the decade-long domestic recession constitute a major reason acting against Japan’s candidature (see Chapter 3.2.3. Tab.3.).

[...]

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^[1] It is an interesting detail that the Delphi technique has its origin in a cult that was instrumental in deciding over war or peace[1] and is applied within this study to investigate Japan’s future position in a political body, i.e. the Security Council, which (in theory) plays an equally important role in deciding over war and peace in present day and age.

^[2] The so-called “Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters on the Security Council” was brought to life in December 1993 to discuss Security Council reform and took up its deliberations in January 1994. (Drifte 2000:161) For further details see Chapter 3.1.3..

^[3] Bearing in mind that the United States are perceived as holding the “key to the realisation of reform” (Satoh 2001a:49); however “the only reform in which it [the present Bush administration] could really feel invested would be one reducing the number of permanent members, preferably to one” (Laurenti 2003:#15).

^[4] Whilst the number of Delphi studies that had be conducted could be counted in three digits in the 1960s (Linstone, Turoff 1975:3), this figure reached four digits in the 1970s (Seeger, cit. in Häder 2002:15) and it has found an ever increasing application since the beginning of the 1990s (Häder 2002:16).

^[5] Depending on the source of information, statements on whether these races were dog- or horse-races differ. (Häder 2002:15)

^[6] Linstone and Turoff define the Delphi technique as “a method for structuring a group communication process so that the process is effective in allowing a group of individuals, as a whole, to deal with a complex problem” (Linstone, Turoff 1975:3).

^[7] Kaynak et al. characterise the Delphi technique as being “suitable to use when dealing with uncertainties in an area of imperfect knowledge” (cit. in Häder 2002:21).

^[8] If an incorrectly predicted shortage of a product, for instance, results in its increased demand, which then causes the predicted shortage and fulfils the initial prophecy. (Häder 2002:29)

^[9] If a predicted shortage of a product, for instance, leads to counteractive measures to be taken (such as an increased production of that product), thereby averting the initial prophecy. Another example would be the avoidance of a predicted natural disaster. (Häder2002:29)

^[10] Security Council reform is linked to the amendment of the UN Charter, which, in turn, requires the affirmative vote of at least two thirds of the members of the General Assembly, including the permanent members of the Security Council. (UN Charter, Art. 108)

^[11] It would not grasp such questions as what to expect from Japan as permanent Security Council member, for instance, or what to await from Japan if it continues to be kept outside.

^[12] As will be discussed in Chapter 3.1.2. material capabilities as gauged by a country’s economic might is only one criterion, namely that of capacity representation, that may govern the selection of new Security Council members. Further criteria include regional representation, representation by population or geopolitical representation. (Knight 2002:25-27)

^[13] The decision of which countries to include in a reformed Council and hence, by which criteria to select new members, for instance, is an integral part of the reform discussions.

^[14] A glance at the current reform discussions reveals that the simple extension of “permanent membership” (including all its privileges) to new Security Council members, for instance, may not find approval by the current P5, which might result in the creation of a new category of Security Council membership that lacks the right of veto. (Fassbender 1998:255-262) See Chapter 3.1.3..

^[15] As will be outlined in Chapter 4.1.1., one such assumption is that neither the United Nations nor the Security Council will cease to exist. Further assumptions include that permanent membership will continue to be a highly disputed position and that Japan will retain its economic might.

^[16] The Republic of China (replaced by the People’s Republic of China since 1971), France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (replaced by the Russian Federation since 1991), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America.

^[17] While each Security Council member has one vote, decision on crucial matters are made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the P5. (Knight 2002:37)

^[18] Five of the ten non-permanent seats are allocated to Africa and Asia, one to Eastern Europe, two to Latin America and two to Western Europe and others. Before 1965, a gentlemen’s agreement between the US and the USSR assigned two seats to Latin America and one seat each to Eastern Europe, Western Europe, the Commonwealth and the Middle East. (Fassbender 1998:221-222)

^[19] UN Charter, Art. 24

^[20] UN Charter, Art. 33-51

^[21] UN Charter, Art. 33

^[22] UN Charter, Art. 41

^[23] UN Charter, Art. 42

^[24] A/RES/55/2

^[25] As a result of the period of decolonialisation in the 1960s, which triggered the admission of several new, mainly developing countries into the United Nations, forming a “new aggressive majority” in the General Assembly. (Knight 2002:20)

^[26] Both from among the industrialised and the developing world. (Drifte 2000:6) Whilst Japan and Germany are examples of the rise of new economic powers, India and Pakistan exemplify the expansion of the nuclear power club (Knight 2002:21-22).

^[27] With the receding of the dominant global ideologies after the end of the Cold War, long-dormant national, ethnic and religious conflicts erupted (Kang 2002:82) and a shift from interstate to intrastate conflicts became apparent (Dicke 2003:698).

^[28] The new co-operation among the P5 in the aftermath of the Cold War made Security Council reform a more tangible prospect for potential new members and further evoked the non-aspirants’ interest in reform discussions, reflecting their desire for “damage limitation”. (Bailey, Daws 1998:384)

^[29] Such as globalisation and its implication; peace, security and disarmament; human rights; development and poverty eradication; environmental degradation; (Park 2000:11) and terrorism.

^[30] As reflected in that four out of the five permanent members are European or linked through history to Europe, China is the only permanent member that does not belong to the industrialised world; and none of the permanent members are from the southern hemisphere. (Knight 2002:25)

^[31] As evidenced in that the current P5 represent North America, Western and Eastern Europe and Asia and that neither Central America and the Caribbean, South America nor Africa have a claim to representation. (Knight 2002:26)

^[32] As reflected in that forty-six per cent of the states on the Security Council are European (in origin or associated with Europe), whilst the areas they represent contain only 20 per cent of the world’s population. (Russett, O’Neilland and Sutterlin, cit. in Knight 2002:26)

^[33] As measured by a country’s capacity to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security (Russett, O’Neilland and Sutterlin, cit. in Knight 2002:27), i.e. a country’s economic and military power.

^[34] According to Satoh, there is no big difference between the P5 when it comes to using the veto for the pursuit of narrow national interests. An example is the Chinese veto against the extending of the mandate for the stationing of peacekeeping troops in Macedonia in 1999, a reaction to Macedonia’s decision to establish diplomatic ties with Taiwan. (Satoh 2003:160-161)

^[35] This argument is often put forward by the industrialised states, which try to fend off claims for an increase in membership since any such increase may diminish their influence and, so goes the reasoning, impede the Council’s ability to fulfil its mission effectively. (Fassbender 1998:235)

^[36] As a result of the clash of political, ideological and strategic interests of the rival superpowers, the USA and the Soviet Union, which resulted in the excessive use of the veto and the so-called hidden veto (i.e. the threat of veto) by both superpowers, causing the sustained circumvention of possible Council actions. (Knight 2002:20)

^[37] Resolution 47/62 was adopted on the 11. December 1992 and requested the Secretary-General to invite member states to submit written comments on a possible review on the membership of the Security Council. (Fassbender 1998:225)

^[38] Based on the opinions from member states, Resolution 48/264 was adopted on 3. December 1993. It established the so-called “Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters on the Security Council”. (Drifte 2000:161) Henceforth referred to as the OEWG.

^[39] By Razali Ismail, the then Chairman of the OEWG. The so-called Razali Plan envisages the addition of five new permanent and four new non-permanent members (Kim 2000:84) and was thought of having a strong chance of success. However, it met a fierce opposition campaign conducted by the Coffee Club. (Satoh 2001a:46)

^[40] A group of middle powers, which, despite their different motivations, joined together in 1997 to pursue a common aim, namely that of preventing any expansion of permanent membership. (Satoh 2001a:45) Coffee Club members include Italy, Spain, Pakistan, Mexico, New Zealand, Korea, Canada, amongst others. (Satoh 2001b:3)

^[41] The Non-Aligned Movement represents the interests of developing countries and counts 115 members (Satoh 2001b:5), including all 53 members of the African block (Drifte 2000:146). Whilst some of NAM leaders such as India and South Africa act as aspirants, others such as Egypt, Indonesia and Pakistan are active members of the Coffee Club. (Kim 2000:86)

^[42] Including Brazil, Egypt, Germany, India, Japan, Nigeria, South Africa, etc. (Satoh 2001b:2).

^[43] As was expressed by 98 countries on the occasion of the General Assembly in September 2000. (Satoh 2001a:48)

^[44] Or more precisely, among the three major developing regions Latin America/Caribbean, Asia and Africa that are widely supported for gaining one permanent seat each. (Fassbender 1998:252)

^[45] It is no secret that the candidacy of Brazil is opposed by Argentina, that India’s claim is strongly rejected by Pakistan and that Nigeria is competing with South Africa and Egypt. (Fassbender 1998:247)

^[46] The so-called “Quick Fix” solution, envisages the addition of two new permanents members, namely Germany and Japan, and three new non-permanent members and met strong opposition from the developing countries led by NAM. (Kim 2000:84)

^[47] See Chapter 3.1.2..

^[48] Japan’s exceptionalism is extended from addressing its non-nuclear status and policy to refer to its war-renouncing Constitution and serves as rationale for arguing that Japan’s permanent Security Council membership would have particular legitimacy. (Drifte 2000:108)

^[49] See Chapter 3.2.4..

^[50] See Chapter 3.2.4..

^[51] With slight deviances between the 1970s and the 1990s that coincide with the United State’s loss of interest in cooperating with the United Nations. See Chapter 3.2.4..

^[52] Currently, the participation of Self-Defense Forces in UN peace activities is restricted to traditional Peacekeeping Operations with a focus on non-military support duties such as construction and sanitation. (Heinrich et al. 1999:90) It is based on five principles as set out in the Law relating to the Cooperation for the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Others (henceforth referred to as PKO Law): firstly, the existence of a ceasefire agreement; secondly, the consent by the countries or parties in conflict to the deployment of the UN peacekeeping mission and the Japanese participation in it; thirdly, the impartiality of the mission; fourthly, the withdrawal of Japanese units if any of these conditions are not met; and fifthly, the limitation of the use of weapons to the minimum required to protect the lives and persons of the mission members. (Shinyo 1998:162)

^[53] Which provides that “[…] the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes […]” (cit. in Yokota 2002:218). The official interpretation of this Article is that individual self-defence is permissible as an inherent right of sovereign states, but the right to collective self-defence exceeds the territorial defence needs of Japan and is thus prohibited. Therefore, Japan is not able to participate in multilateral force-type operations, nor can it participate in peace enforcement units or expanded peacekeeping under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. (Shinyo 1998:155)

^[54] Drifte points out that the Japanese government, despite its efforts to separate the two policy priorities, has always been aware of the link between fully-fledged PKO contribution and permanent Security Council membership, as becomes evident in its continuing efforts to upgrade Japan’s contribution to PKO. (Drifte 2000:78)

^[55] Rather, it is the peacekeeping budget for which permanent members on the Security Council are supposed to carry special responsibilities; an area, in which Japan’s contributions rank second only after that of the United States and are greater than that of the other for permanent members combined. (Satoh 2001:50-51)

^[56] The official interpretation of Article 9 says that the individual self-defence is permissible as an inherent right of sovereign states, but that the right to collective self-defence exceeds the territorial defence needs of Japan and is thus prohibited. This translates into Japan being able to participate neither in multilateral force-type operations, nor in peace enforcement units or expanded peacekeeping under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. (Shinyo 1998:155)