Justification. A Pragmatic Perspective

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

Abstract

LIST OF ABBRIVIATIONS

LIST OF APPENDICES

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Problem
1.2 Aims of the Study
1.3 Hypotheses
1.4 Procedures
1.5 Limits of the Study
1.6 Value of the Study

CHAPTER TWO: JUSTIFICATION AND ITS PRAGMATIC NATURE
2.1 Justification and other Related Fields of Study
2.2 Justification in Politics
2.3 Approaches to Justification
2.3.1 Argumentation
2.3.1.1 Justification as Product and Process
2.3.1.2 Types of Justification
2.3.1.2.1 Deductive Justification
2.3.1.2.1.1 Syllogism
2.3.1.2.1.2 Enthymeme
2.3.1.2.2 Inductive Justification
2.3.1.2.3 Abductive Justification
2.3.1.3 Warrants
2.3.1.4 Argument Support
2.3.1.5 The Burden of Proof
2.3.2 Speech Acts in Justification
2.3.2.1 Speech Act Sequencing
2.3.2.2 Justification and Excuse
2.3.3 Fallacy
2.4 Related Topics
2.4.1 Refutation
2.4.2 Rhetorical Pragmatics
2.4.3 Audience

CHAPTER THREE :THE PRAGMATIC MODEL OF JUSTIFICATION
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Models of Justification
3.2.1 Toulmin’s (1958) Justificatory Argument
3.2.2 Schelgoff and Sacks (1973) Adjacency Pairs
3.2.3 Van Dijk’s (1977a) Speech Act Sequences
3.2.4 Ferrara’s (1980) Subordinate Acts in Sequences
3.2.5 Van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s Model of Critical Discussion(1984)
3.2.5.1 Strategic Maneuvering
3.2.6 Fritz’s (2005) Accusation Responses
3.2.7 Wodak’s (2006) Justification Discourse
3.3 The Eclectic Model
3.3.1 Criteria
3.3.2 Types
3.3.2.1 Orsolini’s (1993) Account of Justification Types
3.3.2.1.1 Backgrounding
3.3.2.1.2 Causal Explanation
3.3.2.1.3 Correction
3.2.3 The Pragmatic Structure of Justification
3.3.3.1 The Initiation Stage
3.3.3.1.1 Speech Acts
3.3.3.1.1.1 Accusing
3.3.3.1.1.2 Proposing
3.3.3.1.1.3 Refusing
3.3.3.1.1.4 Complaining
3.3.3.1.1.5 Compliment
3.3.3.1.1.6 Criticizing
3.3.3.1.1.7 Warning
3.3.3.1.1.8 Condemnation
3.3.3.1.1.9 Telling
3.3.3.1.2 Presuppositions
3.3.3.2 The Subsequent Stage
3.3.3.2.1 Cooperative Principle
3.3.3.2.1.1 Hedge of the Cooperative Principle
3.3.3.2.1.2 Conversational Implicature
3.3.3.2.2 Speech acts
3.3.3.2.2.1 Stating
3.3.3.2.2.2 Claiming
3.3.3.2.2.3 Denial
3.3.3.2.2.4 Justification
3.3.3.2.2.5 Apologizing
3.3.3.2.3 Aristotle Argumentative Appeals
3.3.3.2.4 Pragma-Rhetorical Tropes
3.3.3.2.4.1 Hyperbole
3.3.3.2.4.2 Rhetorical Question
3.3.3.2.4.3 Simile
3.3.3.2.4.4 Metaphor
3.3.3.2.4.5 Personification
3.3.3.2.4.6 Praeteritio
3.3.3.2.4.7 Amplification
3.3.3.2.5 Pragma-Dialectical Strategies
3.3.3.2.5.1 Support Strategies
3.3.3.2.5.2 Fallacies
3.3.3.3 The Concluding Stage
3.3.3.3.1 Speech Acts
3.3.3.3.1.2 Explaining
3.3.3.3.1.3 Promising
3.3.3.3.1.4 Thanking
3.3.3.3.1.5 Advice
3.4 Testing the Workability of the Model

CHAPTER FOUR: DATA AND ANALYSIS
4. 1 Introduction
4.2 Data Description
4.2.1 Political Speeches
4.2.2 Context
4.3 Data Analysis
4.3.1 Model of Analysis
4.3.2 Pragmatic Analysis
4.3.2.1 British Political Speeches
4.3.2.1.1 Tony Blair Speeches
4.3.3 Statistical Analysis
4.3.3.1 British Political Speeches
4.3.3.2 American Political Speeches
4.3.3.3 British vs. American Political Speeches: A Statistical Comparison

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS, PEDAGOGICAL RECOMMENDATIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
5.1 Conclusions
5.2 Pedagogical Recommendations
5.3 Suggestions for Further Research

Bibliography

A. References

B. Web Sources:

Appendices
Appendix 1
Appendix 2

Acknowledgements

All praise and thanks be to Almighty Allah for enabling me to complete this work in time.

I am deeply indebted to a number of people for all their help to make the completion of my dissertation possible. First and foremost, I would like to express my deep and sincere gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Hameed Al- Mas'udi whose critical comments and excellent academic guidance are the most invaluable for my dissertation.

I owe a great debt of gratitude to Prof. Dr. Fareed Hameed Al-Hindawi for his insight and guidance. His keen interest has contributed immensely to the evolution of my ideas about the topic. Besides, his encouragement and motivation have instigated me to strive for professional growth.

My special thanks go to a number of staff members of the Department of English at the University of Babylon: Prof. Emeritus Dr. Abdul- Majeed Al-Mashtah, Prof. Dr. Abbas Deygan Darweesh, Prof. Dr. Riyadh Tariq Al-Ameedi, and Asst. Prof. Dr. Qassim Obayes for their endless support.

My deepest gratitude is also due to my close friends and colleagues who have supported and kept me optimistic throughout my dissertation writing. Their much cherished friendship and constant support have been of great help to me. Without their warm motivation during my difficult times, this work could not have been written.

Last but not least, heartfelt thanks and gratitude are to my family, especially my wonderful mother and my considerate brother whose unfailing love, understanding, and encouragement over time and distance have enabled me to go this far and overcome my ups and downs.

Abstract

Justification may be a prerequisite for any claim that is made, whether the claim is about a weather forecast by a meteorologist, an accusation of negligence by an employee against his or her employers, or a doctor's diagnosis. Justification denotes a communicative act which is meant to compensate for the violation of a certain norm or to enable recipients to understand better something unpredicted or disputed.

Although justification is ubiquitous in everyday life, it has so far remained relatively unexplored in general and in the political domain in particular. Therefore, this study examines its pragmatic aspects in some selected British and American political speeches. It sets itself the task of fulfilling the following aims: (1) finding out the various criteria of justification resorted to by British and American decision-makers and discovering the most frequent criterion; (2) detecting the types of justification that are most recurrently used by British and American decision-makers in the data understudy ; (3) identifying the pragmatic structure of justification employed by British and American decision-makers shedding some light on its most basic structural components; (4) finding out the different pragmatic strategies employed by British and American decision-makers to justify their decisions and detecting the most frequent ones; (5) identifying the similarities and differences between British and American decision-makers regarding the use of the criteria, types, strategies and basic structural components of justification ; (6) specifying the role played by strategic maneuvering in justification; (7) designing an eclectic model for data analysis; (8) shedding some light on the different approaches proposed to account for the complex nature of justification.

In relation to the foregoing aims, the following hypotheses are tested: (1) justifications produced in the data under study are grounded on diverse criteria; (2) correction constitutes the most recurrent type of justification resorted to by British and American decision makers; (3) different types of justification require different situations; (4) no intra- or interlines of demarcation can be drawn between British and American political speeches concerning the pragmatic structure of justification; (5) some justification strategies occur with higher frequency than others in British and American decision-makers’ political speeches; (6) speech acts such as stating and telling are the most basic structural components of the justifications produced in the data under study; (7) certain structural components function as initiators of justifications in British and American decision-makers’ political speeches; (8) differences can be found between British and American decision-makers regarding the use of justification strategies; (9) British decision-makers employ more justification strategies than their American counterparts; and (10) sometimes, and in order to justify their decisions, British and American decision-makers resort to derailment of strategic maneuvering producing fallacies of various types.

To achieve the aims of the study and assess the validity of its hypotheses, a number of procedures are followed: (1) reviewing the literature relevant to justification and enhancing its pragmatic nature; (2) developing an eclectic model to be used in analyzing the data under study through surveying the relevant pragmatic theories; (3) randomly selecting data as representative examples for both British and American political speeches and analyzing them by means of the model developed for this purpose; (4) conducting a statistical analysis to support the findings of the pragmatic analysis; and (5) Conducting a comparison between the strategies of justification used by the British and American decision-makers.

The findings of data analysis demonstrate that while the first, the fourth, the fifth, the sixth, the seventh, the eighth, the ninth, and the tenth hypotheses are confirmed, the second and the third hypotheses are rejected.

LIST OF ABBRIVIATIONS

CP Cooperative Principle

CS Concluding stage

H Hearer

IS Initiation stage

S Speaker

SS Subsequent stage

LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix (1) Felicity Conditions

Appendix (2) Political Speeches

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: The Product of Justification (ibid.)

Figure 2: The Process of Justification (ibid)

Figure 3: The Eclectic Model for the Pragmatic Analysis of Justification

Figure 4: Rates of Justification Criteria in British Political Speeches

Figure 5: Rates of Justification Types in British Political Speeches

Figure 6: Rates of Justification Strategies in British Political Speeches

Figure 7: Rates of Speech Acts in British Political Speeches

Figure 8: Rates of Pragma-Rhetorical Strategies in British Political Speeches

Figure 9: Rates of Presuppositions in British Political Speeches

Figure 10: Rates of CP in British Political Speeches

Figure 11: Rates of Fallacies in British Political Speeches

Figure 12:) Rates of Support Strategies in British Political Speeches

Figure 13: Rates of Justification Criteria in American Political Speeches

Figure 14: Rates of Justification Types in American Political Speeches

Figure 15: Rates of Justification Strategies in American Political Speeches

Figure 16) Rates of Speech Acts in American Political Speeches

Figure 17: Rates of Pragma-Rhetorical Strategies in American Political Speeches

Figure 18: Rates of Presuppositions in American Political Speeches

Figure 19) Rates of CP in American Political Speeches

Figure 20: Rates of Fallacies in American Political Speeches

Figure 21: Rates of Support Strategies in American Political Speeches

Figure 22: Rates of Justification Criteria: British vs. American Political Speeches

Figure 23: Rates of Justification Strategies: British vs. American Political Speeches

Figure 24: Rates of Pragma-rhetorical Strategies: British vs. American Political Speeches

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Contextual Description of the Data

Table 2: Statistics of Justification Criteria in British Political Speeches

Table 3: Statistics of Justification Types in British Political Speeches

Table 4: The Pragmatic Structure of Justification in British Political Speeches

Table 5: Statistics of Justification Strategies in British Political Speeches

Table 6: Statistics of Speech Acts in British Political Speeches

Table 7: Statistics of Pragma-Rhetorical Strategies in British Political Speeches

Table 8: Statistics of Presuppositions in British Political Speeches

Table 9: Statistics of CP in British Political Speeches

Table 10: Statistics of Fallacies in British Political Speeches

Table 11: Statistics of Support Strategies in British Political Speeches

Table 12: Statistics of Justification Criteria in American Political Speeches

Table 13: Statistics of Justification Types in American Political Speeches

Table 14: The Pragmatic Structure of Justification in American Political Speeches

Table 15: Statistics of Justification Strategies in American Political Speeches

Table 16: Statistics of Speech Acts in American Political Speeches

Table 17: Statistics of Pragma-Rhetorical Strategies in American Political Speeches

Table 18: Statistics of Presuppositions in American Political Speeches

Table 19: Statistics of CP in American Political Speeches

Table 20:) Statistics of Fallacies in American Political Speeches

Table 21: Statistics of Support Strategies in American Political Speeches

Table 22: Statistics of Justification Criteria: British vs. American Political Speeches

Table 23: Statistics of Justification Strategies: British vs. American Political Speeches

Table 24: Statistics of Pragma-rhetorical Strategies: British vs. American Political Speeches

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Problem

According to Orsolini (1993: 281), in a conflictive talk, speakers assume two interactional roles: denying the addressee’s position and supplying some support for their own. Arguments that they employ as support normally indicate that speaker’s position is grounded on underlying norms and rules that are expected to be held by all participants. Thus, in a conflictive talk, supplying justifications means producing arguments that are able to render the speaker’s position less disputed by the recipient.

In this regard, Sinnotte-Armstrong and Fogelin (2010: 3) assert that one of the most salient uses of arguments is that of justifying a disputed claim. Thus, justifications are meant to provide reasons to accept their conclusions. These justifications have the effect of altering the addressee’s thinking by making him/her believe a conclusion that he has doubted before.

Prior to that, Kasachkoff (1988: 20-9) mentions that justifications and explanations serve diverse purposes. However, their purposes are recurrently mingled to the extent that they cannot be separated one from the other. Moreover, it is demonstrated that determining whether a given discourse is an explanation or a justification is not always an easy task to do and only will the context in which it occurs decide that. It will show whether the speaker is attempting to make the audience accept a particular fact or he/she concentrates on making the audience understand that fact.

In spite of the fact that justification is pervasive in everyday interactions, it has remained relatively linguistically, particularly pragmatically, unexplored. This study provides an investigation of justification as a communicative event from a pragmatic point of view. It is conducted in pursuit of redressing the balance, however slightly, with regards to studies concerned with refutation. It attempts to show that consideration of refutation can only be complete when justification is considered.

As for the realm of politics, it can be regarded as one of the main fields where justification is utilized. This is due to the fact that in politics, language use is categorized by employing specific strategies so as to be effective in conveying what politicians want to achieve and to create for themselves a positive image in order to accomplish their persuasive aims.

Nevertheless, it appears that the justificatory use of language in the political domain has not been given much attention, especially from a pragmatic perspective. Hence, the present study tries to pragmatically investigate this type of language use in political genres. These genres are represented by British and American political speeches.

According to Alo (2012: 88), political leaders and heads of nation states frequently resort to the oral word in the pursuit of swaying and rallying their supporters and persuading folks of the advantages that are possible to be gained from the formers’ leadership. Hence, political speeches are stimulated via the wish to influence and persuade the nation and familiarize their audience with their socio-economic polices, plans and actions.

This study seeks to understand and account for the triggering, onset and the resolution of exchanges which can be characterized by the justification that takes place. Additionally, it endeavours to explore justification within the political context in which it appears.

Specifically, as regards British and American political speeches, the present study sets itself towards answering the following questions:

1. What are the criteria that the justifications produced in the data under study are grounded on?
2. What are the types of justification used in British and American decision-makers’ political speeches?
3. What are the structural components of justifications produced in British and American political speeches?
4. What are the pragmatic strategies employed in the justification of British and American decision-makers?
5. What are the pragma-rhetorical strategies resorted to by British and American decision-makers to justify their decisions?
6. What are the pragma-dialectal strategies used in the justification by British and American decision-makers?
7. How often do British decision-makers employ justification strategies in comparison with their American counterparts?
8.What is the relationship between strategic maneuvering and justification?

1.2 Aims of the Study

The study attempts at answering the questions above through the following aims:

1. Finding out the various criteria of justification resorted to by British and American decision-makers and discovering the most frequent criterion.
2. Detecting the types of justification that are most recurrently used by British and American decision-makers in the data under study.
3. Identifying the pragmatic structure of justification employed by British and American decision-makers and shedding some light on its most basic structural components.
4. Finding out the different pragmatic, pragma-rhetorical and pragma-dialectical strategies employed by British and American decision-makers to justify their decisions and detecting the most frequent ones.
5. Identifying the similarities and differences between British and American decision-makers regarding the use of the criteria, types, strategies and basic structural components of justification.
6. Specifying the role played by strategic maneuvering in justification.
7. Designing an eclectic model for data analysis.
8. Shedding some light on the different approaches proposed to account for the complex nature of justification.

1.3 Hypotheses

It is hypothesized that:

1. Justifications produced in the data under study are grounded on diverse criteria.
2. Correction constitutes the most recurrent type of justification resorted to by British and American decision-makers.
3. Different types of justification require different situations.
4. No intra- or interlines of demarcation can be drawn between British and American political speeches concerning the pragmatic structure of justification.
5. Some justification strategies occur with a higher frequency than others in British and American decision-makers’ political speeches.
6. Speech acts such as stating and telling are the most basic structural components of the justifications produced in the data under study.
7. Certain structural components function as initiators of justification in British and American decision-makers’ political speeches.
8. Differences can be found between British and American decision-makers regarding the use of justification strategies.
9. British decision-makers employ more justification strategies than their American counterparts.
10. Sometimes, and in order to justify their decisions, British and American decision-makers resort to derailment of strategic maneuvering producing fallacies of various types.

1.4 Procedures

To achieve the aims of the study and to verify or refute its hypotheses, the following procedures have been followed:

1. Reviewing the literature relevant to justification enhancing its pragmatic nature.
2. Developing an eclectic model to be used in analyzing the data under study through surveying the relevant pragmatic theories.
3. Randomly selecting data as representative examples for both British and American political speeches and analyzing them by means of the model developed for this purpose.
4.Conducting a statistical analysis to support the findings of the pragmatic analysis.
5. Conducting a comparison between justification strategies used by the British and American decision-makers.

1.5 Limits of the Study

This study is limited to the investigation of justification with its different criteria, types, structure and strategies. The sample involve selected political speeches produced by British Prime Ministers: Tony Blair and David Cameron. The second half of the data is provided by speeches delivered by the American Presidents: George W. Bush and Barack Obama.

1.6 Value of the Study

It is hopefully presumed that the current study will produce insights for diverse fields such as rhetorical pragmatics, stylistics, and discourse analysis since it will reveal aspects which are related to the fields above. Additionally, it will have pedagogical insights for text-book writers and syllabus designers. Furthermore, it is hoped that this study will be of some value to professional politicians as it tries to enhance the skills and techniques they need to justify their decisions to fascinate their audience, stimulate crowds and mobilize opinions.

CHAPTER TWO

JUSTIFICATION AND ITS PRAGMATIC NATURE

2.1 Justification and other Related Fields of Study

The concept of justification can be encountered in various fields of inquiry such as philosophy, religion, law and politics. According to Audi (1999), justification denotes a concept of a wide scope that covers entire areas of epistemology and ethics. Hence, numerous things, of many different kinds, can be justified among which are beliefs and actions.

Precisely, epistemologists concentrate on the kind of justification that is indicative of truth. They have spent much time trying to analyze what is for a belief to be justified, and have come up with some very diverse accounts. The prominent division is that between internalist and externalist accounts (Swinburne, 2001: 1).

Justification by faith signifies one of the several concepts that have been utilized within Scripture and the Christian tradition to articulate the reconciliation effected by God with the world through Christ (McGrath, 1986:6). In fact, it is the “characteristic doctrine of the Protestant Reformation that sinful human beings can be justified before God through faith in Jesus Christ”(Audi,1999).

Law is another area in which justification has a central role to play. While noticing that the term justification is often used interchangeably with excuse, Gordon (1978) cited in Buchanan (2000: 23) believes that justification denotes factors which disassociate an act from its criminal nature, i.e., it renders lawful what would otherwise be regarded as unlawful. However, excuse simply turns the act unpunishable. In addition, a justification is only called for when an action appears wrong.

2.2 Justification in Politics

Chilton (2004: 3) mentions that politics can be viewed from two different perspectives. On the one hand, it can be taken as a fight in pursuit of power between two groups of people. Whereas the first group looks for asserting or sustaining power, the second one strives for resisting it. Alternatively, politics can also be considered as a sort of collaboration represented by the practices and institutes a community possesses for resolving a conflict of interest regarding money, effect, freedom and the like.

Similarly, according to Charteris-Black (2011: 4), politics is associated with acquiring, maintaining, and sustaining power. It is concerned with how resources are allotted and how social acts are harmonized to achieve determined goals. Moreover, it has to do with building trust. Nevertheless, a growing consciousness of the likelihood of manipulation of public opinion and the messaging of consent through focus groups makes trust a rarity in democracies.

In most political systems, leaders often resort to the spoken word to contrast the profits that result from their leadership with the dangers that will stem from that of their opponents. In more democratic societies the burden on leaders to persuade likely supporters that they and their policies can be trusted becomes greater (ibid: 1).

Van Dijk (1997: 12) says that political discourse can be identified in terms of its actors, i. e. politicians. These denote a group of people such as presidents, prime ministers and other members of government who are being paid for their activities, and being elected or appointed as the essential players in the polity.

However, it should be kept in mind that politicians are not the only participants in the realm of politics and that there are different recipients. Hence, political communication involves various players like the public, the people, citizens, the masses, beside other groups or categories. All of these groups and individuals may become dynamically involved in political discourse(ibid.).

As for justification in political discourse, Wodak (2002: 152) believes that justification and legitimation basically denote debatable acts or events of the past which may affect the narrative design of issues of national history. That is, they try to justify a social status quo ante. Moreover, political decisions regarding the present and future can be justified and legitimized by the same token.

It can be inferred from the lines above that within politics, justification is embedded in the notions of legitimization and delegitmization.

According to Chilton (2004: 47), these represent two ends of a spectrum. The former, which is directed at self, comprises a positive self-presentation reflected in acts of self-praise, self-apology, self- explanation, self-justification, self-identification as a source of authority, reason, and vision. Here, self represents a person or the group with which the former identifies or wishes to identify.

As for the latter, it can be shown in acts of negative other-presentation, acts of blaming, scape goating, marginalizing, excluding, attacking the moral character of a certain individual or a group, attacking the rationality and sanity of the other. The maximum is to rebut the humanness of the other (ibid.)

2.3 Approaches to Justification

2.3.1 Argumentation

Johnson (2000: 12) mentions that argumentation functions to assist one to accomplish numerous goals among them is that of justification.

Schlesinger et al. (2001: 80) believe that when people engage in argumentation, they regularly make statements, draw inferences, and make judgments, that they then defend and support via other statements. Such supporting statements are analyzed as justifications. Consider the following example where the second part of the utterance includes a justification of the first:

1. Rosie is inquisitive.
2. Even her best friends say so.

According to Toulmin (2003: 12), justificatory arguments are advanced to enhance an assertion. It could be assumed that this is the chief function of arguments, and that the other functions are subsidiary and sponging on this primary justificatory use.

Prior to that Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984: 34) state that argumentation can be treated as a complex or compound illocution of at least two discrete statements.

Bermejo-Luque (2006: 2) suggests that contrary to other forms of interaction, when arguing, people do not only attempt to convey their beliefs but they also incline to induce beliefs through giving reasons in order to render such beliefs probable. This amounts to offering justification for them. Hence, argumentation and justification are interrelated in the sense that it is not possible to determine what is considered as an act of arguing without appealing to the idea of justification.

Kienpointer (1987: 277) believes that to argue can be defined as a speech act complex rather than one isolated speech act, since it consists of a constellation of one or several arguments and one or more controversial claims. Additionally, arguments advanced to justify a claim are called pro-arguments, while those intended to refute it are referred to as contra-arguments. Furthermore, the pro- and contra-arguments are very often supported or attacked by further pro- and contra-arguments. Hence, the concern is normally with compound rather than simple argumentation.

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004: 2) believe that argumentation includes one or more expressions in which a constellation of propositions is conveyed. In the case of a positive standpoint, the argument is employed to justify the proposition conveyed in the viewpoint, whereas in the case of a negative standpoint, it is used to refute it.

At the micro level, argumentation is viewed as comprising elementary speech acts pertaining to the class of assertives. Moreover, at the macro level, the whole collection of these elementary speech acts forms the composite speech act of argumentation ( Henkemans, 2014: 43).

Lopes (2009: 241) states that in argumentation, “ there is a main assertion conforming to the main claim being made and a subordinate assertion counts as an attempt by the speaker to justify his claim and hence convince the listener of its acceptability.” Moreover, that claim is an assumption not a fact.

According to Zarefsky (2014: xv), argumentation denotes a heterogeneous field of inquiry typically investigating the relation that holds between statements given as conclusions and those that supply the grounds for the conclusions in question. In other words, argumentation is concerned with justifying statements. It questions the reasons for acknowledging certain conclusions. It has to do with how grounds are presented, buttressed, defended, and confronted.

Sinnott-Armstrong and Fogeline (2015: 4) say that one of the most salient uses of arguments is to justify a disputed claim. That is, arguments are utilized to indicate that one has a reason to believe the conclusion of the argument. In fact, different arguments are proposed to present different reasons of very dissimilar kinds. Different people can have different reasons to believe the same conclusion. These reasons can be justificatory reasons to believe or to disbelieve a certain claim.

Blair (2012: 305) asserts that the distinction between justification and proof stems from a line of demarcation that can be drawn between two sorts of claim or conclusion. Whereas the latter seeks to demonstrate the truth or untruth of a particular statement, the former looks for an action, a sort of behaviour, i.e. a predisposition to act.

Freeman (2014: 213) says that justification may be required for any claim that is made, whether the claim is about a weather forecast by a meteorologist, an accusation of negligence by an employee against his or her employers, a doctor's diagnosis, a remark by a business man about dishonesty of a customer, or a critic's verdict on a painting. Tolmin speculates to which degree argumentation concerning such different issues are able to be accounted for using the same model and whether it will be probable to assess the arguments in question by means of the very criteria.

2.3.1.1 Justification as Product and Process

Broadly speaking, justification is a good reason why something exists or is done. As in:

3. I can see no possible justification for any further tax increases.
4. His behavior is without justification. (Hornby, 2010: 842).

Moreover, according to Webster online dictionary, justification means:

1. Reasonable grounds, for complaint, defense, etc.
2. The act of justifying a proof, vindication, or explanation.

On the basis of the second definition above , two aspects of justification can be identified. The first aspect deals with justification as a product.

Lodder (1999: 8) states that when the “product of justification is studied, general structures of support between sets of premises and conclusions are defined.” From this perspective of justification, a statement is justified:

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

Figure 1: The Product of Justification (ibid.)

a. If the premises are justified, and
b. If by valid inference
c. The conclusion is derived from the premises

The second aspect of justification according to Webster online dictionary deals with justification as a process. According to Lodder (ibid.: 9), the process of justification is the exchange of information that is introduced step by step in order to justify a statement; each step corresponds to a stage in which a statement is either justified, or not. When the “process of justification is studied, rules are defined that determine for each stage of the process whether a statement is justified.” Here, a statement is justified after a sequence of one or more steps according to the rules of the procedures.

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

Figure 2: The Process of Justification (ibid)

2.3.1.2 Types of Justification

In their study of the patterns of justification in discourse, Warnick and Manusov (2000: 387) identify a number of justifications at use in communication. These include deductive, inductive, abductive or horizontal reasoning as well as the use of narrative and epideictic patterns.

2.3.1.2.1 Deductive Justification

Lodder (1999: 11) suggests that the deductive model is possibly the best-known way in which justification can be modeled as a product.

Chapman and Routledge (2009: 47) say that this signifies a version of reasoning where one moves from broad principles to a narrower case. Generally speaking, in deduction, it is claimed that the premises guarantee the truth of the conclusion. The premises are intended to provide support for the conclusion. Provided that if the premises were true, it would not be possible for the conclusion to be untrue ( Crews-Anderson, 2007: 19).

2.3.1.2.1.1 Syllogism

Walton ( 2006: 54) mentions that syllogism is a very common type of deduction. It is a specific kind of argument that consists of two premises and a solitary conclusion, and all three statements relate to what are referred to as categorical proposition. The latter is usually preceded by all or some.

5. All stunt pilots are daredevils.

Some stunt pilots are accountants.

Therefore, some accountants are daredevils.

According to Chapman and Routledgefd (2009: 48), deduction is encountered in logic. For example, in the syllogism “ All men are mortal; Peter is a man; therefore Peter is mortal,” the conclusion follows logically as a deduction from the premises.

Fahnestock (2011: 375) says that as a three -part structure for inferential reasoning, the syllogism demands, in its ideal form, statements with linking verbs, three carefully positioned frequent terms and specific quantifier, making claims of inclusion, exclusion, and partial overlap. Via a concentration on the quantifier plus the choice of affirming or denying, the resulting statement could assume four forms: universal affirmation, universal negative, particular affirmative, and particular negative.

According to Schlesinger et al. (2001), syllogism and modus ponens are closely related, however, their analyses differ in important respects. A syllogism can be analyzed either with a warrant or with an articulation, modus pones, on the other hand can be analyzed either in the progressive or in the regressive mode.

2.3.1.2.1.2 Enthymeme

Dascal (2003: 611) states that rhetorical reasoning can be enthymematic or paradigmatic, i. e. proceeding by example. For instance, to demonstrate that a certain person has gained a competition with a crown it suffices to say that he has gained the Winter Olympic games, and it would be redundant to say that the games in question have a crown as the reward because everyone is aware of that. In this case, the rhetorical syllogism is incomplete since only the minor premise is stated. It must be kept in mind that not all enthymemata are incomplete, but that a complete reduplication of premises and conclusion is not crucial for an enthymeme.

According to Walton (2007: 12-13), the conventional view throughout the history of logic since Aristotle has been the one in which enthymeme refers to a type of argument with an implicit premise that requires to be made explicit so that the argument becomes deductively valid. Hence, Aristotelian enthymeme is an argument with a missing premise.

2.3.1.2.2 Inductive Justification

Audi (1999) states that in its narrow sense, induction signifies inference to an overview based on its instance. However, in its wide sense, it refers to any amplietive inference. That is, any inference in which the claim conveyed by conclusion exceeds that cooperatively issued by premises. In the wide sense, induction contains argument by analogy.

Dascal ( 2003: 611) believes that completing rhetorical deduction is rhetorical induction or paradigmatic reasoning from examples or signs. Induction from example assume two forms in Aristotle's rhetoric. Occasionally, speakers mention two or three examples and then indicate that their conclusion follows because it is another example of the very type. Inferences from examples or from signs are acceptable starting points for rhetorical induction.

According to Walton ( 2006: 65), deduction is built on true or false assumptions, whereas induction introduces an additional parameter via presenting a new notion that a proposition is probable to be true or false. Chapman and Routledge (2009: 47) suggest that induction, contrary to deduction, is a version of reasoning where one reaches to general principles or law via generalizing over particular states.

In fact, Aristotle points out to the connection between rhetorical induction and its deductive version when he states that examples and fallible signs are three of four sources of enthymeme. Actually, signs turn to enthymemes via becoming the minor premises of syllogisms. It may be noticed that the difference between enthymematic and paradigmatic inference has to do with the movement of reasoning; from the general to the particular ( Dascal, 2003: 612).

2.3.1.2.3 Abductive Justification

According to Warnick and Manusov (2000: 387), abduction has been designated by both social scientists and logicians. Bateson (1979: 142) suggests that it is possible to describe some events or things and then to look around the world for other cases to fit the very rules proposed for such description . For instance, it can be looked at the anatomy of a frog and later looked around to find other instances of the same abstract relation recurring in other creatures. This extension of abstract elements of description is called abduction.

Warnick and Manusov ( 2000: 387) mention that Bybee ( 1991) narrows his definition of abduction to distinct form. For him, abduction is an inference that reaches a conclusion by observing alike features in two instances and concluding that they are identical. For instance: The “bank robber was a red haired, blue eyed, left handed, near sighted, tattooed, overweight, lame adolescent of indeterminate sex,” and so is this person. Therefore, this person must be the bank robber.

According to Walton (2005: 159), besides deduction and induction, another category of reasoning can be identified. This is referred to as abduction. Abduction is a type of predicting via a practice of formulating a probable hypothesis illustrating a particular set of truths or data. The triple division above is best clarified by means of the examples below:

6. Deducti on: Suppose a bag contains only red marbles, and you take one out. You may infer by deduction that the marble is red.
7. Induction: Suppose you do not know the color of the marbles in the bag, and you take one out and it is red. You may infer by induction that all the marbles in the bag are red.
8. Abduction: Suppose you find a red marble in the vicinity of a bag of red marbles. You may infer by abduction that the marble is from the bag.

2.3.1.3 Warrants

According to Pollock (1995: 59), warrant and justification are closely associated concepts, but they are also significantly diverse. That is, a proposition is probable to be warranted without being justifiably believed, as it may become justified as a consequence of constructing an argument that has not yet been constructed. Similarly, a justified belief is possible to fail to be warranted because additional reasoning may expose a defeater for some defeasible inference utilized in the justification.

Hitchcock (2003: 69) suggests that in The Uses of Argument (1958), Toulmin presents “a new, dialectically grounded structure for the layout of arguments, substituting the traditional terminology of premiss and conclusion with new set of terms: claim, data, warrant, modal qualifier, rebuttal, and backing.”

Freeman (2014: 214) mentions that a crucial issue prevailing in Toulmin's inquiries has to do with the fashion that assertions and opinions pertaining to all types of subjects are liable to be justified. He is mainly fascinated by criteria that need to be utilized in a rational valuation of arguments in support of such assertions and opinion.

Toulmin considers the use of arguments as a try to defend a statement. To him, the justification function denotes: stating something means producing a claim. That is, a person that states a certain idea puts forward a claim to acceptance via a probable challenger. Occasionally, that claim involves justification through advancing argumentation to enhance it and meet the challenger(ibid: 222).

Prior to that, Van Dijk (1980: 118) says that the typical form of a statement in the Warrant class is of the implicative kind; that is if p, then q. Moreover, warrants may themselves require further motivation or Backing, i. e. a statement about the relevance of the general implication. Furthermore, the warrant statement may remain implied as its validity is grounded on overall or traditional knowledge which due to pragmatic reasons need not be identified in informal communication.

According to Toulmin et al. (1984: 45), warrants are statements signifying how the facts are connected to the claim or conclusion. For example:

9. A: I should choose the ice cream today!

Q: Why do you say that?

A: Jack chose yesterday, and Jill the day before.

Q: So?

A: Everyone should have a turn at choosing.

In the interchange above, A first supports her former claim via presenting a specific ground. When Q raised his eyebrow, A goes on to provide a further additional statements of a more general kind. The latter statement has the impact of permitting the move from ground to conclusion. Such a general step on authorizing is labeled as warrant (ibid: 46).

Besnard and Hunter (2008: 4) mention that warrant refers to that portion of argument that relates facts to qualified claims. It captures a form of defeasible rule, a rule that is normally valid, when the required facts hold, but in exceptional circumstances, it may not hold. . It is said that if the required conditions hold, then there is a reason to accept the claim. Hence, the facts plus the warrant can be regarded as the support for the argument.

According to Toulmin (2003: 91), when making an assertion, a speaker commits himself to the claim which any assertion comprises. If such claim is challenged, the speaker has to be capable of establishing it, i. e., making it good and showing that it is justifiable. Hence, the speaker can resort to some facts and present them as the foundation upon which the claim is based. Thus, a distinction can be made between the claim or conclusion (C)and the facts resorted to as a foundation for the claim, the data (D). To produce a specific set of data as the basis for some conclusion commits the speaker to a certain step, and the question is now about the nature and justification of this step.

At this point, the task is not that of strengthening the ground on which the argument is constructed, but is rather to demonstrate that the step to the original conclusion is an appropriate and legitimate one. Hence, broad, putative assertions that are able to operate like links and permit the type of pace which the utterer’s argument pledges him to are necessary. Proposition of this sort is referred to as warrants to be distinguished from both conclusions and data (ibid: 92).

Blair (2012: 302) says that Toulmin suggested that an essential component of any argumentation is a warrant which is utilized in the pursuit of permitting deduction from the reasons being dependent upon to the claim or conclusion brought forward based on them. Additionally, “a warrant is of the form, Given such grounds, one may infer such a claim.” Thus, it guarantees the bearing of the reasons, due to the fact that reasons permit inferring merely when they are relevant.

Freeman (2014: 222) states that whereas data refer to the facts the claim is grounded on, warrant supplies a description of the way data head to that very claim. Moreover, a subsidiary difference emerges from the fact that the former are resorted to overtly, while the latter is usually implicit.

According to Draper (1988: 20), for Toulmin, a claim is typically buttressed data, whereas warrant denotes a broad principle via means of which data function as a sort of backing for that claim. For example:

10. Petersen is not a Roman Catholic (claim)

Because he is a Swede (data)

And very few Swedes are Roman Catholic (warrant)

It can be said that of Toulmin's seven roles, there typically occur after because as reasons for belief. These include data, warrants and backing. Actually, backing is a reason for accepting a warrant; it can be regarded as a recursive justification, or it may be an appeal to authority, or some other reason for belief (ibid).

Hitchcock (2003: 69) believes that Toulmin presents his suggestion concerning the framework of arguments in a solitary context of use, that of extenuating a speaker's statement in reply to a challenger. Moreover, while the data constitute the foundation of one’s claim, the warrant forms his defense for deducing that claim from grounds. Justifying a pace from reasons to claim involves appeal made to some general considerations. Furthermore, when warrant is defeasible, circumstances of exclusion or refutation need mentioning. In addition, an opponent is possible to seek a defense concerning the warrant, and that defense will occur in the form of backing for that warrant.

According to Renkema(2004: 204), Toulmin's model can be enriched by differentiating between the following warrant kinds: the motivational warrant; the authoritative warrant, and the substantive warrant. Actually, motivational warrants connect claim to data via stating the benefit of the claim for the receiver. Authoritative warrants, on the other hand, utilize the credibility of an authority to make the claim stick. Additionally, there are many subtypes of substantive warrants, all grounded on systematic relationship between concepts in the outside world. For instance, We are allowed to smoke here, because there is an ashtray on the table. It is probable that the types of warrant has an impact on the acceptability of the effects on an argument.

2.3.1.4 Argument Support

According to Draper (1988: 23), in an extended sense, warrant refers to any support for a claim, any reason for a belief.

Fahnestock and Secor (1982: 28) say that a crucial component of argument is a premise. That is, a reason addressed to a third party to be persuaded of a certain standpoint. At any rate, arguers need one because statement as in: This lake should remain free and wild forever, because only then will our children and grandchildren be able to enjoy it. It is possible to produce an exceedingly lengthy argument via presenting further supportive statements intended for the standpoint or through buttressing the supportive statements themselves. However as a minimum, one premise is required

According to Toulmin et al. (1984: 6), when people produce the various kinds of assertions or claims, they do not expect to persuade others immediately. As an alternative, they commonly resort to the listeners' understanding and approval via supplying extra support for the major claims. The preliminary claim is liable to be believed merely when it is more illustrated and justified by means of presenting supplementary consideration, arguments, or further reasonings.

Huber and Snider (2006: 53) propose that in order to influence the belief and behavior of others on any topic, one needs to get the best information to guarantee success. Such information includes the argument one selects and the materials utilized to support that argument. Thus, support material consists of the evidence on which one grounded his argument. Such material will provide the facts used by the speaker to alter the listeners' opinions.

Mayberry (2009: 43) suggests that, in its broadest sense, argument's support is defined as all the material one inserts into one's argument to strengthen the probability of its claim. Successful argument of claims requires knowledge of how to select proper support for a specific claim, how to determine how much support is essential, and how to organize that support in the most persuading way.

According to Rieke et al. (1999: 10), Usually, no more than someone's statement of the claim is demanded:

11. A: This university should not torture animals in the name of research.

B: You 're right.

Moreover, it common for arguers to offer support in conjunction with a claim without waiting to discover whether it will be required by others. Furthermore, it is also typical to give reasons where the claim is grasped but not vocalized. In their conversation, A might say Animals have rights against unnecessary suffering and B will grasp from the context that it is a claim about university research (ibid).

2.3.1.5 The Burden of Proof

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984: 169-170) suggest that the protagonist of a standpoint has effectively justified it merely if he/she has effectively justified (i) the inference from the grounds or premises to the point of view and (ii) the premises. Moreover, such effective defenses require effectively satisfying the challenges of the antagonist.

Blair (2012: 53) mentions that, in Van Eemeren and Grootendorst view, effective justification of the inference results when either (1) the opponent admits properly formulated omitted premises that make the argument deductively valid, or (2) the opponent consents that the inference satisfies the rules of inference validity will govern the arguments.

Successful defense of a premise, on the other hand, occurs when either the opponent declares that the premise is equivalent to one of the propositions both parties take as their initial shared commitment store, or the opponent agrees that the premise is proved by one of the proposition-testing methods both parties accept to consider as authoritative, or the premise itself is adequately supported via an additional argument (ibid: 54).

Prior to that ,Van Eemeren and Grootendorst. (1997: 208) state that argumentation utilizes language in order to justify or refute a standpoint in pursuit of securing agreement in views. Investigation of argumentation customarily concentrates on two things: communications where a pair of people engaged in arguments like discussion or debate; or texts represented by speeches or editorial where one issues an argument.

Garssen (2001: 91) states that in the pragma-dialectical argumentation theory advanced by Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984), argumentation is considered as portion of a critical discussion directed at solving a variance of attitude.

It can be observed that, as has been proposed by Van Eemeren et al. (2015: 3), arguments do not merely appear as monologic bundles in the sense that an argument is likely to be initiated in the course of interactions between a person that advances a viewpoint and another that doubts it.

According to Walton (1988: 234), the burden of proof can be defined as a division presented in a reasoned dialogue which sets a strength of argument demanded by one party to rationally influence the other party.

Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2001: 5) suggest that from a pragma-dialectical perspective, the burden of proof for a viewpoint requires the commitment to defend it when inquired to do that. This signifies an obligation to offer a satisfactory answer to the critical reply produced by the antagonist.

Regardless of being in a mixed or a nonmixed differences of opinion, maintaining the burden of proof is meaningless if the proponent has previously supported the very stance effectively against the very opponent beginning from the same point of departure (Van Eemeren, 2010: 214).

Practically, one can occasionally discard the burden of proof as a result of incidental circumstances such as the antagonist forsaking his doubt without any additional critical consideration, or the death of the protagonist. Actually, the burden of proof is just quitted if the viewpoint has been decisively supported in a critical discussion. So, it is capable of being sustained whereas the opposition needs to be withdrawn (ibid).

2.3.2 Speech Acts in Justification

When employing a justification, the speaker confesses that an offence has been committed and admits some responsibility for it. Simultaneously, he / she supplies extenuating conditions locating that conduct in a better situation and rendering it to be more tolerable. Justifications are frequently started by the conjunct but, signifying that the offender acknowledges accountability, but possesses a worthy cause for behaving in that way (Ogiermann, 2009: 142)

12. Because I looked at your case individually and I decided you needed double the dosage.
13. I simply did not notice you.

Goetz (2010: 403) states that in negotiating the social world, adults often make verbal justifications for their actions or thoughts while making inferences about the feelings and beliefs of others. One is able to issue a claim such as I didn't eat the last cookie, but one is further probable to persuade one's discusser if one says, I didn't eat the last cookie because I haven't been in the kitchen.

According to Comparini (2013: 60), justifications are socially and culturally situated speech acts. They are a pragmatic device utilized at certain interpersonal junctures to accomplish certain interpersonal goals. Hence, Edmondson (1981: 147) proposes certain felicity conditions to be satisfied by an utterance in order to be regarded as a speech act of justification. These are:

(i) S wishes H to know that S does not find a past action A, for which he is fully responsible, socially discreditable.
(ii) That S did A, and that this may be deemed socially discreditable is presupposed in the justify. S is to be interpreted as making a claim as to his own social standing in producing a Justify.
(iii) There is a complementary relationship between justifications and Excuses as concerns the answerability of the speaker, and whether or not there is, as it were, anything to answer.

Additionally, Brandom (1994: 172) proposes that an essential element of the sense of asserting is defending, championing, or justifying. Furthermore, the commitment involved in asserting requires the undertaking of a justificatory responsibility regarding what is claimed. Hence, when asserting a sentence, one warrants extra assertions besides commits oneself to justifying the original claim. Assertions play a double role in justification: as justifiers and as justified, i.e. premises and conclusions.

2.3.2.1 Speech Act Sequencing

Van Dijk (1979: 447) says that speech acts do not occur alone. They may appear in ordered sequences of speech acts performed by one speaker or by subsequent speakers, i.e. in the course of a conversation. Much in the same way as sentences may occur in sequences which should satisfy a number of constraints. It should be expected that speech act series are not random.

According to Ferrara (1980: 235), speech acts do not usually occur in isolation in real life; rather, they come in sequences and are performed by speakers who are engaged in rule-governed activities, such as debating, making conversation, proposing bills in parliament, testifying at trails, teaching in classrooms, preaching and praying in churches, and writing novels. Moreover, when occurring in sequences, speech acts are typically dependent on each other, in time they share a diverse status in the course of the interlocutor’s act.

Trosborg (1995: 194) says that in order to felicitously issue a request, the speaker needs to be able to motivate or justify his wish/demand, as in:

14. Close the door, please. It’s cold in here.
15. Get me a drink, will you? I’m so thirsty.
16. Would you do the dishes? The kitchen in a total mess.

According to Trosborg (ibid.), reasons generally assume the form of causal clauses supporting a request. Via putting forward the reason behind producing the request, the speaker predicts possible questions on the part of the hearer, while he simultaneously supplies a justification for asking. Moreover, such introductory statements of reasons assist the speaker to discover whether the hearer considers his reasons behind inquiring satisfactory.

In his study entitled ‘Speech Acts Sequences in Discourse,’ Mbisike (2008: 63-4) identifies a number of speech acts that exhibit a justificatory relation with one another in a sequence, as in:

17. A good and responsible government does not come by chance. Vote sensibly to ensure this.

The public service advertisement above includes two speech acts. The initial speech act is an assertive, the speaker believes the proposition conveyed and wishes that the hearer believes it too. However, the next speech act is a directive. The main illocutionary goal is included in the directive, whereas the assertive is no more than a supportive device supplying a motivation for the main act. Hence, the relationship between the two speech acts is that of justification. The intended effect is to supply the motivation/reason for issuing the directive to increase compliance (ibid: 64).

According to Lopes (2009: 241), justification is a pragmatic relation involving a succession of speech acts and inferences process.

For example:

18. Please take note of what I'm going to say…., because sometimes things are not published according to the facts.

The chief speech act is that of directive, whereas the statement is merely a subsidiary act the speaker utilizes in pursuit of enhancing the hearer's readiness to execute the request.

2.3.2.2 Justification and Excuse

In Bach and Harnish’s (1978) terminology, excuse belongs to the category of directives. These convey the speaker’s attitude concerning a certain potential action by the hearer. Additionally, they express the speaker’s intent concerning his utterance or the viewpoint it conveys to be regarded as a real motive for the listener to take an action.

Edmondson (1981: 147) suggests that the following conditions should be satisfied by an utterance to be considered as an excuse.

(i) S wishes H to believe that S is not fully accountable for the fact that he performed a past action A, nor is he fully responsible for any consequences following that action.
(ii) To perform an Excuse is to presuppose that S did A, and that this may be deemed socially discreditable. S is therefore to be interpreted as making a plea as to his own standing as a social member in performing an Excuse.
(iii) An Excuse and Justify share some characteristics.

It may seem a difficult task to say what exactly distinguished excuses from justifications. Nevertheless, Austin (1956: 2) believes that justification and excuse both occur in a situation in which one is blamed for doing something which can be characterized as "bad, wrong, inept, unwelcome, or in some other of the numerous possible way untoward." Thus, he will attempt to defend his conduct. There are two options available to do so. The first choice is to admit that he committed the thing in question, but to claim that it was a worthy or an acceptable thing to do. This means that he justifies the action giving reasons for doing it. The other possibility is to acknowledge that it was not a worthy thing to do, but to claim that it is quite unfair or inaccurate to report badly X did A.

According to Scott and Lyman (1968: 47), justifications are accounts in which one accepts responsibility for the act in question, but denies the pejorative quality connected with it. Hence, a soldier in a battle may confess that he has killed other men, but deny that he did an immoral act as those he murdered were members of an enemy group. However, excuses are accounts in which one admits that the act in question is bad, wrong, or inappropriate but denies full responsibility. Consequently, the same solider could acknowledge the mistakenness of murdering others but argue that his actions are performed unwillingly , i. e., he is under orders and has to obey.

Cody and McLaughlin (1988) state that Excuses and justifications are differentiated on the ground of two issues: (1) whether or not an offence has indeed occurred, and (2) whether or not the person called on to give an account is in fact responsible for its occurrence. For example, someone accused of failing to appear for an appointment may excuse himself by saying that he has been a victim of a flat tyre, or justify being late by claiming that the person who has been kept waiting has been imprecise regarding the time they are to meet.

Ogiermann (2009: 138) suggests that the term justification is used to refer to mitigating circumstances justifying not so much the offence itself via redefining it as non-offensive as the offender's behaviour leading up to the offence, whereas the term excuse refers to external mitigating circumstances which are obviously beyond the speaker's control and would have led to the offence without their contribution. Consider the examples:

19. My watch has stopped. (Excuse)
20 I was suddenly called to a meeting. (Justification)

2.3.3 Fallacy

According to Walton (1995:1), fallacies refer to kinds of errors or deceptive tactics of argumentation that are intended to trick or trip up partakers in argumentation in various types of everyday discussions.

In his approach, Walton (ibid: 7) regards a fallacy as an infringement of a rule of critical discussion or a breach of a rule of a sort of dialogue other than that of a critical discussion. Furthermore, he attaches fallacies to illicit dialectical swings from one sort of interchange to another. That is, an argument that seems accurate is likely to turn inaccurate as a move has occurred in the kind of interchange that is executed which causes the argument to be no longer proper or even obstructive.

Van Eemeren et al. (2009: 1) suggest that fallacies are possible to be considered as erroneous moves in argumentative exchanges. The concept of fallacy is at the heart of each comprehensive theory of argumentation and the treatment of the fallacies can be considered as the acid test of any specific approach to argumentation.

It is stated that the pragma-dialectical approach to fallacies developed by Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 1992, 2004) not merely more sophisticated than the standard treatment, but it is also further precise. In this approach, a fallacy is taken to be “a speech act that counts as a violation of one or more of the rules for a critical discussion, which frustrates efforts to resolve a difference of opinion.” Hence, the use of the term fallacy is analytically associated with the rules for critical discussion.

According to Walton (1987: 31), there exist about fifteen main fallacies proposed by the standard treatment of recent and traditional logic texts, grounded on how they can be divided up. Each of these has traditionally been considered as a serious and systematic sort of error or fault in reasoning.

The systematic study of fallacies is pioneered by Aristotle whose practical manual on the art of argumentation, De Sophisticis Elenchis, regards a fallacy as a deliberative deceptive tactic of argumentation employed to trick and get the best of a speech partner in dialogue unfairly (Walton, 1995: 7).

2.4 Related Topics

2.4.1 Refutation

Fahnestock and Secor (1982: 307-312) believe that refutation is an indispensible part of all positive arguments. Each refutation is initiated through distinguishing the type of argument being rebutted, because each type has its inherent weaknesses.

According to Walton (2009: 4), refutation denotes a species of rebuttal; it demonstrates that the argument it is directed to is untenable. It is possible to be called a knock-down counter-argument. However, a rebuttal is an argument directed against another one to illuminate that the former is somehow defective. Whereas the argument confronted with a refutation has to be abandoned, the one confronted with a rebuttal may or may not be given up.

Ilie (2009: 36-8) states that refutation requires the employment of rhetorical and argumentative means in pursuit of opposing to an antagonist’s argument or denying his counterarguments. By refutation, speakers place themselves with reference to their proponents via strengthening their stances and refusing their opponents’. Thus, they mark the space separating them.

Sinnott-Armstrong and Fogelin (2010: 381) mention that beside justifying and explaining their conclusions, arguments are also occasionally utilized to refute other arguments. That is, to refute an argument is to indicate that it is no good.

According to Sinnott-Armstrong and Fogelin (2015: 333), it is possible to refute an argument without showing that its conclusion is false. In fact, a refutation of an argument suffices if it results in objections that cannot be answered. Hence, the forms of effective refutations mirror the norms of a good argument since the purpose of a refutation is to demonstrate that one of these criteria has not been met.

It has been stated that objections to specific arguments can assume at any rate three forms: by directly attacking the opponent’s statements or claims, by advancing counterstatements or counter claims, and by emphasizing and contrasting the arguments in the two sets of statements or claims (Ilie, 2009: 38).

Similarly, Sinnott-Armstrong and Fogelin (2010: 381) mention that refutations take four main patterns: (1) It is possible to argue that certain premises are dubious or even false, (2) It can be argued that the conclusion of the argument leads to absurd consequences, (3) It can be shown that the conclusion has nothing to do with the premises, and (4) It is possible to show that the argument begs the question.

Finally, besides substantial nurture and specific awareness, refuting an argument involves important thinking abilities, forceful determination and sincere individual obligation (Ilie, 2009: 38).

2.4.2 Rhetorical Pragmatics

McQuarrie and Mick ( 1996: 424) state that from Aristotle through the start of modern psychology, the discipline of rhetoric was the primary source of Western thinking about persuasion. . Its fundamental preoccupation has always been method and manner; how to find out an influential means to convey a thought in a certain situation, and how to change its form to fit in diverse situations.

Booth (2004:3) says that ,as Aristotle insisted, rhetoric has no exact territory or subject matter of its own because it is found everywhere. In short, it is seen as the total range of resources that human beings share for producing effect on one another. That is, rhetoric comprises the whole range of arts not only of persuasion but also of producing or reducing misunderstanding.

According to Walton (2007a: 7), rhetoric studies persuasive arguments founded on the beliefs, commitment, or values of the target audience to be persuaded.

Zarefsky (2014: xv) suggests that rhetorical argument concentrates on the connection that exists between arguments and audience. Therefore, it examines the way people are encouraged to believe a statement. The statements presented as a conclusion are referred to as claims due to the fact that they advance a claim on the audience's belief. This claim has to be justified by the grounds proposed for it. Put differently, tolerability of the grounds enhances the probability that the audience will admit the claim advanced in the conclusion.

According to Larrazabal and Korta (2006: 7), rhetoric is clearly not only vital for argumentation theorists, but for the production, analysis, and evaluation of any sort of persuasive discourse. Dascal (2003: 607) mentions that persuasive utterances have as their essential contextual ingredients a forum, an exigence, a speaker and an audience.

Sloane (2001: 96) states that Aristotle, in his Rhetoric, recognizes three canonical modes of artistic prof; ethos, pathos, and logos. It is demonstrated that in order to persuade, one has to exhibit good character, influence the audience via appealing to emotions, and put forward good reasons.

Larrazabal and Korta (2006: 6) mention that it has been a very common view to stress the relevance of pathos in classical rhetoric in opposition to the insistence of Aristotle on all the three components ethos, logos, pathos, and chiefly on logos. In this regards, Aristotle expresses the idea that the best rhetorician is an expert in syllogism.

According to Dascal (2003: 611), logos is closely attached to ethos and pathos of a particular argument. Additionally, the logical facet of argument is reliant on its emotive and circumstantial facets. Put differently, it has to be abided by the methodological dictum, that is, it has to go beyond the logos, expressive evidences and evidences from character have to be taken into consideration .

Larrazabal and Korta (2006: 7) suggest that rhetorical pragmatics is not remote from logic in the sense that it takes logic at the very ground in discourse construction. Nevertheless, the significant notion of the intention to persuade connects rhetoric to pragmatics in a global intentional architecture of individuals, simultaneously differentiating and combining communicative intention and persuasive intention. Moreover, both in monologic and dialogic discourse, the unit of analysis is a distinctive speech act. The satisfaction of the communicative intention leads to the satisfaction of a persuasive intention.

2.4.3 Audience

According to Perelman and Olbrechts- Tyteca (1969: 19), the audience is often not a totally organized construction. However, it is crucial for a speaker seeking to persuade a concrete audience is that his construction of the audience has to be adequate to the occasion. It is demonstrated that an inadequate representation of the audience, can have very unfortunate consequences.

Booth (2004: 51) states that no rhetorical effect will succeed, unless it attaches to the beliefs and passions of the audience addressed. This usually involves some accommodation or adaptation to audience's needs and expectations. In fact, the majority of orators have emphasized the inevitability of adaptation to audience. That is, consideration should be taken of the prejudices, beliefs, optimism and fear, emotional routines, and stages of comprehension with regard to the subject.

Sloane (2006: 69) suggests that definitions of audience often denote a real person or a group of people who see, hear, or read an event or work. Additionally, in rhetoric, a key idea is that a discourse is constructed in relation to those who will hear or read it. As a result, many think that rhetors should consider the needs of their audience when speaking or writing. Nevertheless, how to carry out this task is a matter of some controversy.

According to Booth (2004: 52), Baltasar Gracion states that influential speech is " like a feast, at which the dishes are made to please the guests, and not the cooks."

CHAPTER THREE

THE PRAGMATIC MODEL OF JUSTIFICATION

3.1 Introduction

This chapter is devoted to the development of the pragmatic model to be adopted for the data analysis of the current work. To pursue this goal, it is essential to review other relevant models because the eclectic model borrows much from such diverse models.

3.2 Models of Justification

It has been mentioned earlier that justification is a topic with a wide coverage that pertains to various fields of study (cf 2.1). Hence, it has been investigated by different scholars who have developed various models for analyzing justification in a way that serves their goals best.

For realizing the aims of the current work and developing its model, only the models which can get these aims fulfilled will be reviewed.

3.2.1 Toulmin’s (1958) Justificatory Argument

Hitchcock and Verheij (2006: 1) say that in The Uses of Argument, Toulmin concentrates on a solitary use of argument that of defending a claim made by asserting something. Throughout the process of rational justification, Toulmin suggests field-invariant criteria of analysis intended to do justice to the process of defending a specific claim counter to a challenger.

Toulmin (2003: 15) tries to draw a parallel between judicial process and intellectual process by its virtue arguments are set out and performed to enhance a preliminary assertion. In this regard, he states that specific phases are possible to be identified as common to the procedures for handling numerous kinds of law- case. These include:

An initiation stage: at which the charge or claim is clearly stated.

A subsequent stage: in which evidence is set out or testimony given in support of the charge or claim, and

A concluding stage: at which a verdict is given, and the sentence or other judicial act issuing from the verdict is pronounced.

According to Toulmin ( ibid.), in spite of the diverse fields of arguments certain crucial resemblances of patterns and procedures can be identified among legal arguments and justificatory arguments in general. That is, when turning to the setting out of the justification of a conclusion, a number of different stages can be recognized.

3.2.2 Schelgoff and Sacks (1973) Adjacency Pairs

According to Fritz (1995: 474), numerous dialogue forms are structured around specific essential sequences of speech acts. Actually, such sequences are the crucial building block of dialogues rather than solitary speech acts. In this regard, Schelgoff and Sack (1973: 73) introduce the notion of adjacency pairs. These scholars suggest a class of closely interrelated series of turns which they labeled adjacency pairs. These are kinds of paired utterances of which question-answer, greeting-greeting, offer-acceptance/refusal are archetypical.

Adjacency pairs exhibit the criteria below:

1. Two utterance long
2. Adjacent positioning of component utterances
3. Produced by different speakers
4. Relative ordering of parts
5. Discriminative relation

Examples of first pair parts include question, greeting, challenges, offer, request, invitation, and announcement. Regarding some sets, the second part is mutual while with others there is one proper second. Additionally, for some pairs, more than one constitute an appropriate second (Coulthard, 1985: 71).

Adjacent pairs are used for initiating and concluding conversation. However, in this study, the researcher is interested in the first use. Hence, What will be adopted from this model are the members which belong to the first pair parts. This is not an exhaustive list in the sense that other strategies will be added based on the requirements of the study.

3.2.3 Van Dijk’s (1977a) Speech Act Sequences

According to Felix-Brasdefer (2008: 323), the term speech act sequence was pioneered by Van Dijk to account for the coherence and function of speech act sequences in conversation.

Van Dijk (1977a: 213) states that “speech acts usually occur in sequences such as an assertion followed by an explanation or addition, an assertion followed by a correction or alternative, or an assertion followed by a denial or contradiction,” as in:

21. I need money. Can you lend me a thousand dollars?

In the example above, the first speech act is executed to establish conditions for the following speech act. It provides a reason for it. Hence, it may alter the context of communication in a way that the speech act of request becomes not only appropriate but also a normal act (Van Dijk, 1980:185).

Van Dijk (1977a: 215) states that in order to make their requests appropriate, speakers resort to specify a justification for them and hence make them sound more acceptable. In other words, to render requests more appropriate, they need motivation. That is, satisfaction of the requested action by the hearer at the same time satisfies a desire of the speaker. As such, the likelihood that the former will cope with the request may be enriched. For example:

22. I am cold. Please shut the window

It may be said that the speaker does not mainly desire to issue an assertion regarding his physical condition but rather to produce a request, despite the fact that it is impossible to deny that the first part of the utterance is regarded as an assertion. Hence, for this example to be taken as a request, the assertion has somehow to be part of that request (ibid.).

Van Dijk (1980: 182) mentions that a typical way that connects speech acts in series is called conditional dependence. Consider the example:

23. I have no watch. Can you tell me the time?

The two speech acts together form a perfectly acceptable combination. The assertion achieved via the utterance of the first sentence may provide the motivation that serves as a condition for the request. It should be taken into consideration that appropriateness conditions may be relative. That is, a speech act may not be appropriate in isolation but may function in a sequence of speech acts (ibid.)

According to Van Dijk (1980: 182), explanation is another relation that occurs between speech acts in speech act sequences.

Compare:

24. I have no watch. Can you please tell me the time? (Justification)
25. Can you please tell me the time? I have no watch. (Explanation)

It can be assumed that the situational conditions for the second series resemble those of the first. The difference stems from the fact that the assertion no longer establishes the accurate context of the request but instead subsequently provides the grounds for it. Therefore, it works as an explanation of the request. Thus, assertions concerning conditions of whichever type that follow other speech acts typically assume an explanatory function (ibid:183):

26. Oh, sorry! I didn't see you.
27. Stop worrying. He isn't dangerous.

3.2.4 Ferrara’s (1980) Subordinate Acts in Sequences

Hickey (1998: 75) notes that Ferrara (1980) has pioneered the study of speech act sequence and has successfully tried to present an interactive element to pragmatic meaning. Based on the assumption that communication is not achieved by isolated linguistic elements but rather by utterances in discourse, Ferrara proposes a number of thought-provoking questions. He clarifies his model of speech act sequence with the following examples:

28. There are thirty people in here. Could you open the window?
29. You have gotten really fat. Why don’t you go on a diet?
30. You flunked all your tests. Forgot the bike.
31. You are soaking wet. Come on in and change your clothes.

(Ferrara, 1980: 235)

Ferrara (ibid.) suggests that the first pair of utterances could be said in a crowded classroom, in the course of a seminar by someone adjacent to someone else sitting by the window. Here, the speaker's primary goal is to get the window open, whereas the secondary goal is to supply a good justification for the request. He attempts to fulfill the former via addressing an indirect request to the hearer, and the latter by claiming a specific state of affairs to be a good reason for producing the request.

One basic organizational principle at work is that of dominance versus subordination: a main point and a subordinate goal (to provide a good justification for the request). Ferrara argues that, applied to subordinate speech acts in a sequence, standard conditions of appropriateness may well be necessary but not sufficient. To be non-defective, an assertion must be seen in terms of what follows (Hickey, 1998: 76).

Ferrara (1980: 240) mentions that, in the sequences above and in the very contexts, justifying is not a different act from asserting. When a speaker articulates the first sentence of each pair, he/she is likely to : (a) perform an assertion, and (b) justify the act expressed by the second sentence of the same pair. Put differently, the speaker desires to supply a motivation regarding his execution of the main act and all he has to do is to choose from the collection of all likely assertions, the one which has the capability of counting as a feasible reason for performing the main act.

According to Ferrara (ibid.:241), creating an effective justificatory relation with a request, an order, an advice, a threat, or an invitation requires that a speech act satisfies extra conditions, in addition to these justifying its appropriateness when it is executed in isolation or when it is primary act in the sequence. The crucial further condition which has to be met is that the subordinate speech act should pertain to a state of affairs which is considered as a sufficient, plausible reason for the executing of the main act.

Moreover, the subordinate act should be effective to the main act. That is, it has to be able to establish a relation with the main act which rises the chances of the latter’s success. The ability of an act to enter a relationship of this kind is a function of (a) its own successfulness, (b) its own possible prelocutionary effects, (c) the condition of success of the main act, and (d) the context of interaction (ibid).

Furthermore, it can be inferred from the prior examples that an assertion is able to create a justificatory relation with the main act as its propositional content depicts a state of affairs which can result in a preferable attitude towards an aim fulfilled by means of numerous set of acts which comprises the justified speech act. Nevertheless, other speech acts are capable of doing so but in another way. For instance, a promise may justify a question (ibid: 243):

32. I will give you a new sweater for Christmas. What’s your size?

Al- Hindawi (1999: 34) states that in his account, Ferrara (1980) concentrates on sequences with a subordinate act plus main act (Justification) avoiding the reference to sequences with a main act plus subordinate act structure (explanation).

Al- Hindawi (ibid.) says that the two types of sequences share similar properties. The components of the main act plus subordinate act sequence do not have equal status, i. e., one of them is subordinate to the other. The subordinate act enters into a successive justificatory relation with the main act. In addition, the main act can be performed to achieve the illocutionary goal without any supplement justification for the act. The only difference between the two types of sequences is that in the first type, the subordinate act justifies the performance of the following act, whereas in the second type it justifies the initiation of the preceding act.

3.2.5 Van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s Model of Critical Discussion(1984)

Broadly speaking, and since justification generally occurs in argumentative discourse, it is essential to shed light on the pragma-dialectic theory of argumentation proposed by Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984).

According to Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002: 134), in a pragma-dialectic approach, argumentative discourse is reconstructed as a try at eliminating a difference of opinion. This causes a depiction of the discourse according to a critical discussion. Such model elucidates the dissimilarity of views and the stance of the participants.

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004: 57-8) state that this model is grounded on the idea that a variance of attitude will not eliminate unless the participants engaged have arrived at agreement regarding whether the standpoints in question are acceptable or not. Moreover, and contrary to logical approaches, the dialectic technique for executing a critical discussion focuses not merely on the formal bond holds between premises and conclusions, but also on every speech act influential in the practice of eliminating variance of attitude.

According to Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2015: 157-8), the discussion begins with a confrontational stage during which the variance of attitude is revealed. In the opening stage, the commitments of the parties are made and the parts of proponent and opponent are allocated. In the argumentation stage, the proponent defends his standpoint against the opponent’s criticism. Then, in the concluding stage, the discussion outcome is identified.

3.2.5.1 Strategic Maneuvering

Originally, the pragma-dialectic analysis focused merely on the dialectical facet. In argumentative discourse, arguers aim at winning the discourse and at the same time executing it in a reasonable way. Hence, it becomes possible to integrate rhetorical insights into a dialectical framework of analysis through the notion of strategic maneuvering. It is proposed to eliminate the tension between chasing dialectical and rhetorical goals simultaneously (Van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2002: 135).

Strategic maneuvering refers to the continual efforts made in all moves that are carried out in argumentative discourse to keep the balance between reasonableness and effectiveness (Van Eemeren, 2010: 40)

Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002: 139) identify three inseparable aspects of strategic maneuvering: topical potential, audience demand, and presentational devices. Considering each of these aspects, the two participants attain the chance to affect the outcome of the discourse in a way the suit them best. All of these are connected to specific kind of options made in the maneuvering (Van Eemeren, 2010: 93).

Since the three aspects of strategic maneuvering operate simultaneously, it is only possible to separate them analytically. Nevertheless, for successful analysis, all the three should be taken into consideration together with their reciprocal communication (Van Eemeren and Garssen, 2011: 1).

According to Van Eemeren (2010: 93), the first of these signifies a repertoire of choices concerning rendering an argumentative move available to the discussant in a specific situation and at a specific stage in the exchange.

Moreover, for optimum rhetorical outcome, the moves that are produced in every stages of the discourse should be adapted to audience demand. That is, they must harmonize with the listener’s values and preferences. Furthermore, presentational devices indicate that influential means must be searched to express the diverse moves in the discourse . That is, the moves have to be stylistically effective. Rhetorical figures can be utilized as presentational devices(Van Eemeren and Houltlosser, 2002: 140).

As for this study, what will be adopted from the three aspects of strategic maneuvering outlined above is audience demand. This pole of strategic maneuvering performs a strategic function in the justification executed by British and American decision-makers.

Rees and Rigotti (2011: 208) state that the reconciliation of the dialectical aim of reasonably eliminating a variance of attitude with the rhetorical goal of conducting an influential argumentation emphasizes the role played by the audience of the argumentative communication. Due to the fact that the arguer wishes to improve his situation in relation to the audience, the other two aspects of strategic maneuvering, topical potential and presentational devices, are planned to adapt these options to the audience demand.

Adaptation to audience demand signifies a try in each stage at creating the necessary communion, wherever possible with those whom the argumentative discourse is directed at (Van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2009: 6).

According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969: 19), for rhetorical purposes, it is favourable to identify an audience as the collaborative of those the speaker wants to effect by his argumentation. Whether conscious or not, every speaker considers those he is trying to persuade. These people constitute the audience to whom he is directing his speech.

Van Eemeren and Garssen (2011: 6) suggest that the arguer may wish his argumentation to exert an influence on other people besides an immediate recipient. Those people do not partake in the discussion, but they happen to be there. For example, listeners to a radio broadcast of a speech produced to a different audience or television bystanders viewing a debate between politicians.

In such situations, two antagonists are involved: the official antagonist is the one immediately addressed by the protagonist, and a third party antagonist indirectly reached by the protagonist. Usually, it is the third part antagonist that is considered more important, as in election debate between politicians when likely voters are indirectly addressed as a third party antagonist. The audience that the arguer regards more significant to affect is called primary audience, whereas the person or persons influential in affecting them is the secondary audience (Van Eemeren, 2010: 109).

Moreover, and according to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969: 22), speakers, occasionally, find themselves trying to reach a composite audience, comprising persons with different charismas, devotions, and functions. In order to win over such audience, he must resort to multiplicity of arguments. Examples are speeches delivered before parliamentary meetings.

Van Eemeren and Garssen (2011: 8) say that in their attempt to adapt the strategic maneuvering to their audience’s demand, arguers could depend on the audience’s overt commitments concessions conveyed in the opening stage, the covert contextual commitments relating to the argumentative situation, besides endoxa, i. e. the commitments made of commonly established views and preferences . All of them identify the audience’s frame of reference.

3.2.6 Fritz’s (2005) Accusation Responses

In his study On Answering Accusations in Controversies, Fritz (2005: 151-162) suggests a model of accusation responses which comprises four moves.

Broadly speaking, when one accuses a person of having done something wrong, or blame him/her regarding a particular action, the latter is probable to react to this accusation via utilizing some agreed upon responses including denying the charge, excusing the action by citing extenuating conditions, justifying such an action by giving reasons, and finally apologizing (1995: 475)

As an illustration of his model, Fritz (2005: 153) portrays a situation where a speaker accuses a hearer of having smoked a cigarette. The hearer may respond to the speaker’s accusation by means of one of four moves:

(i) The hearer may deny that he smoked a cigarette.
(ii) He may justify his action by saying that there is no reason why he should not have smoked.
(iii) He may cite an excuse by saying that he is not totally answerable for his action.
(iv) He may apologize for having smoked.

Similarly, it has been stated that an array of responses for accusations can be distinguished. These include denial, counter-accusation, justification/excuse, admission and apologies. Moreover, denials, counter-accusations, justifications/excuses are preferred reactions while admissions and apologies are dispreferred. The first group refute or challenge the attribution of blame, while the second one accept the blame charge (Atkinson and Drew,1979: 60) .

As far as this study is concerned, some of the foregoing reactions to accusation represented by the three moves: denial, justification and apology will be incorporated into the eclectic model. Moreover, other moves will be added by the researcher in order enrich and increase the comprehensiveness of the very model.

3.2.7 Wodak’s (2006) Justification Discourse

Wodak (2006: 59) proposes that justification discourse involves two components: blaming and denying. Both verbal practices constitute recurrent and essential properties of conflictive talk. Additionally, they can be conveyed via numerous direct and indirect linguistic means, grounded on the particular context of the interactions, the purposes of the utterances, and on the formality of the conversations.

Blaming and denying are to be found in private and friendly interactions as well as in the realms of politics, the law and the media. In political and persuasive discourse, both are cautiously and intentionally designed to achieve positive presentation of self and negative presentation of others. Their linguistic expressions relay on the type of genre and the formality of the settings (ibid: 60).

From a conversational analysis perspective, blaming comprises two elements: firstly, a particular act is produced; then, a negative evaluation of that very act follows, usually an accusation. In fact, accusations are likely to pertain to situational factors, or to external factors beyond the particular situation. Moreover, they can be expressed directly or indirectly dependent on the knowledge that the parties in the dispute or conflict are expected to have (ibid.).

Responding to antagonistic conduct, a defendant could either apologize and attempt to legitimize his acts by means of accounts and different sorts of evidence, or he could simply reject the accusation. Moreover, silence is likely to occur which is taken as an accused admission of the validity of accusation. Furthermore, occasionally, a counteraccusation can appear; besides, the accusation can be partly or wholly denied.

3.3 The Eclectic Model

3.3.1 Criteria

Broadly speaking, and according to Wodok (2002:153), it is suggested that justifications can be carried out in the pursuit of justifying some controversial acts or events of the past or political decisions concerning either the present or future.

Prior to that, Orsolini (1993: 295) suggests that justifications are conducted to compensate for the violation of some norm. That is, when disagreements appear in disputes, the recipient expects some reference to norms, which is capable of grounding the speaker’s position. Moreover, they function to assist the recipient to understand better something unexpected or questionable.

Moreover, Lopes (2009: 241) states that justifications normally occur in argumentative contexts.

According to Van Eemeren (2010: 108) with respect to the meta-theoretical principle of socialization, argumentative discourse is usually conducted in the pursuit of fulfilling specific communicative and interactional influences on others. Maintaining these influences involves that the argumentative moves that are produced at each stage of the resolution process be attached to the audience’s frames of reference in order to be entirely accepted (Van Eemeren and Garssen, 2011: 5).

Similarly, justification is subjective as it depends on a particular audience. It says not that something is true but rather that a person should believe it. In other words, what is justified is commitment to a position or stand point, not certification of its truth. Via stressing justification, an argument indicates that people are open-minded and disposed to be persuaded without the assurance of truth, yet skeptical enough not to take statements just on faith. Additionally, justification has degrees of strength, ranging from the merely plausible to the highly probable, and the strength attributed to the argument will vary accordingly (Zarefsky, 2014: 41).

In his study of the Spanish conjunctions como, ya que, and pues, Goethals (2010: 2204-8) considers them as makers of justificational speech acts. He categorizes a speech event as comprising three dimensions: model, interpersonal, and sequential. Moreover, these three justificational conjunctions at the sequential dimension recognize the speech event as an act of justification. Furthermore, these conjunctions have some characteristics which they share with their English counterparts: as, since and for.

Verstraete (2007: 189) suggests that the conjunctions as and since are possible to have a temporal as well as a justificational sense. Their justificational meaning is exemplified below. The since-clause in (1) supplies a justification for the suspicion of caffeine, and the as-clause in (2) provides a justification for the estimation of the queue as depressing.

33.Men who are heavy coffee drinkers, over five cups a day, seem to have more than double the risk of heart disease and stroke than people who never drink coffee. Caffeine was suspected as the culprit, since it can speed up the heart and raise blood pressure.

34. “It was the sort of scene you see on television, when they picture the depression of the 1930s, he said “But behind each of those queuing was a more depressing story, as they all have families and children. I have never seen anything like it in my life.”

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