Decision-Making and AU´s Capacity to Attain Aspiration 3 of the Agenda 2063

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ABSTRACT

1.0 CHAPTER ONE
1.1 BACKGROUND
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
1.3 OBJECTIVES
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1.5 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY
1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
1.7 SCOPE, LIMITATION/ DELIMITATION
1.8 DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

2.0 CHAPTER TWO
2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW ON REGIONAL INTEGRATION
2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK- LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM, NEO-FUNCTIONALISM AND FEDERALISM
2.3 THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY TO AFRICAN UNION
2.4 AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
2.4.1 DECISION MAKING IN AU-APSA
2.4.2 APSA – THE CASE OF BURUNDI AND GAMBIA
2.5 MISSIONS IN APSA

3.0 CHAPTER THREE
3.1 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.2 STUDY AREA
3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN
3.4 TARGET POPULATION
3.5 DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE AND SAMPLING PROCEDURES
3.5.1 SAMPLING
3.5.2 SAMPLING TECHNIQUES
3.5.3 SAMPLE SIZE
3.6 DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS
3.7 DESCRIPTION OF DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES
3.8 DESCRIPTION OF DATA ANALYSIS
3.9 ETHICAL CONSIDERATION

4.0 CHAPTER FOUR
4.1 INTRODUCTION
4.2 ACTOR PARTICIPATION AND ATTAINMENT OF ASPIRATION
4.2.1 FINANCE
4.2.2 HUMAN RESOURCE CAPCITY
4.2.3 POLITICAL WILL
4.3 PROCEDURES OF DECISION MAKING AND ITS EFFECT IN THE ATTAINMENT OF ASPIRATION

5.0 CHAPTER
5.1 SUMMARY OF THE STUDY
5.2 CONCLUSION
5.3 RECOMMENDATION AND WAY FORWARD

REFERENCES

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

ABSTRACT

Africa as a continent is marred with significant challenges that revolves around the decisions our leaders make. In our case, for APSA to conduct its mandate it entirely depends on the relationship of member states. The main research question of this study seeks to find out who the actors are, who has the capacity to decide, when and how the decisions are made in attaining aspiration 3 in APSA. An understanding of the factors that influence decision making is imperative to building partnerships with the continent on global challenges such as peace and security, economic development and the protection of the environment. This study seeks to examine the dynamics of decision making and AUs capacity to attaining aspiration three of agenda 2063, a case study of APSA. The purpose of this study is: to find out who are the key actors involved in APSA for attaining aspiration 3 of agenda 2063 and to discover the procedures of decision making in APSA-PSC for attaining aspiration 3 of agenda 2063. This thesis applies three main theories of European integration (federalism, neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism) to African integration. The study used interview guides of the key informants, observations and secondary data through desk reviews to collect data. Findings from the two research questions reveals that finance, human resource and political will is very critical in the way decisions are made and influence actorness of APSA. It is evident that APSA is lacking in these three variables and thus affects even AUs capacity in attaining aspiration 3. The member states, non-state actors like Civil Society who have been identified as the actors have played a skewed role in the decision-making process. The member states who contribute in this decision process are influences heavily by the interests at play, the strongest contributing states and lack of political will. The study recommends constructive engagement with key actors such as private sector, civil society, think-tanks, universities and other key interest groups, have a secure source of funding and additional staff for PSC to attain aspiration 3.

1.0 CHAPTER ONE

1.1 BACKGROUND

The United Nations SDG 2030 and AUs Agendas 2063 are not conflicting but rather complimentary in that the two bodies are working towards relatively the same agenda where agenda seeks to transform Africa to its full potential and SDG 2030 seeks to transform the developing countries around the world. The agenda 2063 and UNs agenda 2030 have alike objectives of transforming Africa into a developed continent. The SDGs have emulated a somewhat similar blueprint to that of the agenda 2063 of the AU. It is key to note that through broad consultations across the continent, Africa was the only region that had developed a document which represented a united African voice in the formulation of the SDGs. This document greatly influenced the work of the Open Working Group on the SDGs and the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the post-2015 development Agenda. As a result, there is a high degree of convergence between the continent's priorities, as embodied in the African Union's Agenda 2063 and the 17 Sustainable Development Goals. The Millennium Development Goals that was established following the United Nations Millennium Summit in 2000 concluded in the year 2015 and further ushered the sustainable development goals set for the next 15 years. On September 25th, 2015, countries adopted a set of goals to end poverty, protect the planet and ensure prosperity for all as part of a new sustainable development agenda where each goal has specific targets to be achieved over the next 15 years (United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 2017). Peace, justice and institutions of SDG 16 is dedicated to the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, the provision of access to justice for all, and building effective, accountable institutions at all levels.

Similarly, the African Union Heads of summit known as the Summit has acknowledged the continents success and challenges over the years and to develop the continent, the AUC has embarked on a strategy for a transformative strategy mapped for the next 50 years that will be implemented in a 10-year plan for the next 5 decades. Following the launch of this agenda, the continent re-dedicated herself to the attainment of the Pan African Vision of an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa driven by its own citizens. To achieve this vision, the Golden Jubilee Summit of the Union came up with a solemn declaration in eight areas spanning: social and economic development; integration, democratic governance and peace and security amongst others as the planks of the vision.

Through in-depth consultations from experts from the RECs, international organizations and all spheres from around the world, the outcome was the documented formulated of the “Africa We Want.” Consultations were done at the local, regional and international platforms that involved the participation of people that led to the creation of the blueprint agenda 2063 that seeks to transform Africa.

The agenda 2063 focuses on 8 thematic areas: democratic governance; an integration agenda; African identity and renaissance; Africa’s place in the world; a determination of Africa’s destiny; an agenda for peace and security; an agenda for social and economic development; and the struggle against colonialism and the right to self-determination of people still under colonial rule (The African Union Commission, 2015). This agenda will be implemented at the national and regional level and strife to uphold the vision of the African Union.

SDG 16 is similar to the aspiration 3 of the agenda 2063. Under SDG 16 there are a number of indicators set out to enable the achievement of this goal. Indicator 16.7 ensures responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels (UN, 2017). Consistent with this is the Aspiration 3 of the Agenda 2063 which seeks to achieve the same outcome. Therefore, it is undoubtedly important to understand how decision making is done and AUs capacity to attaining aspiration three of agenda 2063 which can lead to the achievement of the goal itself which is a peaceful and just societies with an inclusive and effective institutions.

Aspiration 3 of the AU’s Agenda 2063 has been integrated in SDG 16. The Aspiration 3 of the 2063 seeks to achieve an Africa of good governance, democracy, and respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law. Aspiration 3 seeks to consolidate democratic gains and improving the quality of governance, respect for human rights and the rule of law; building strong institutions for a development state and facilitating the emergence of development-oriented and visionary leadership in all spheres and at all levels (The African Union Commission, 2015).

Both aspiration 3 of the Agenda 2063 and SDG 16 point to the need of inclusive and participatory decision-making at all levels as drivers and outcomes of sustainable development. Aspiration 3 has certain targets which include: to achieve capable institutions and transformative leadership in place; to consolidating democratic gains and improving the quality of governance, respect for human rights and the rule of law; building strong institutions and facilitating the emergence of development-oriented and visionary leadership in all spheres and at all levels. Decision making and the AUs capacity to achieve the Aspiration 3 of agenda 2063 and overall achieve the SDG 16 is relevant on the key inputs that leads to the question of what goes into decision making and who is supposed to implement those goals in Africa?

The highest decision-making organ of the African Union is the Assembly of the African Union, formally known as the African Union Assembly of Heads of State and Government (AU-AHSG). (Hoste & Anderson, 2010) States that the Assembly and the Executive Council, made up of the Foreign Ministers of AU member states, prepare decisions for the Assembly and are among the most influential decision-making organs in the AU. APSA is an operational structure for the effective implementation of the decisions taken in the areas of conflict prevention, peace-making, peace support operations and intervention, as well as peace building and post-conflict reconstruction.

The African Union (AU) institutions and provision are set out in a manner that seeks to enhance sovereignty of Africa however it has not passed the state centric vision of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (Olympio, 2004). Is the AU still dominated by national actors in achieving their own set goals? Is a question posed therefore the process of decision making or coming to a consensus might be a challenge? A reason for this could be national interests where the country comes first and regionalism comes second. Decision becomes a game of what favors who and who. Olympio states that AU has been set up as an intergovernmental organization other scholars state it as a supranational entity and issues surrounding sovereignty and intervention play a significant role in their decision making (Olympio, 2004). Although the European integration model has inspired the AU structures and institutions, the AU organs, and especially the AU Commission, lack the same supranational decision-making authority of its European counterpart. National interest is seen through the fact that the institutions are staffed by official state representatives. The major policy-making instruments of the AU are a mere reflection of what the states interests are (Hoste & Anderson, 2010).

The level of actorness is also determined as how ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ a regional bloc is. However, merely creating regional bodies is not a guarantee of increased influence. To effectively manage the challenges that come up, regional bodies need to possess some degree of actorness. The ‘strong and weak’ aspect of some regional blocs is likely to have some sort of effect on inter-regional relations but to date there is no way in which to systematically compare actorness across different RECs which in turn equally determines their decision-making (Rignér & Söderbaum, 2010). The preparation of a policy proposal goes through various stages. Decision making has three stages. The first stage is problematization where the public policy literature identifies the problem then there is framing of the problem and finally scripting it (Schlipphak, 2007).

Many African states remain economically and politically fragile and are inefficient in dealing with some of the challenges they face however the RECs are considered to be the ‘building blocks’ of the AU and instruments for the further integration of Africa. It is in recognition of these challenges that drives integration on other continents thus the AU and the RECs have gone towards embracing a supranational approach. External actors such as the European Union (EU) underestimate the complexities of the continent’s international relations and even on the nearby degree, there is constrained understanding of the dynamics shaping positions followed by the regional economic communities (RECs) (Hoste & Anderson, 2010).

Actorness and decision making is increasingly becoming recognized as a concept important to research on supranational institutions. According to (Hulse, 2014) actorness refers to the ability of regional organizations (ROs) to act deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system. Regional blocs have found the need to exhibit their presence in the international platform and emanates from the challenges of globalization, as most states are considered too weak to manage their own problems (Hettne & Söderbaum, 2008).

One of the key issues for African states remains the tension between weak intergovernmentalism and supranationalism that revolve around decision-making in the African Peace and Security Architecture. There are several reasons for this tension. States are reluctant to relegate part of their ‘recent’ independence to the supranational institutions. Second, in the past, most African international institutions were initiated as a reaction against something (colonialism or apartheid) not for something, with the exception of a strong but hard-to-implement pan-Africanist narrative. The only criterion has become one of geography and not qualification. The current model is therefore based on inclusiveness (Hoste & Anderson, 2010). Decision making is composite of actorness, convergence of preference, identity and the structures in place. These variables determine the achievability of the goals of aspiration 3 in APSA-PSC.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The main research question of this study seeks to find out who the actors are, who has the capacity to decide, when and how the decisions are made in attaining aspiration 3 in APSA-PSC. The thinking behind the Millennium Development Goals and now the Sustainable Development Goals is that the world has sought to attain certain minimum standards of human development with the aim of sustainably enriching and enhancing the overall quality of life not only within countries but also across regions. As such particular regions on the globe stand out as either less successful and/or worse off while others have registered considerable success. As it is, these realities continue to beckon for both academic and policy answers. The SDG 16.7 calls for an all-inclusive, participatory approach for strengthening the institutions. From this we gather that the dynamics in decision making is critical for achieving the goals and targets for SDGs that is in line with the African Union agenda

Africa as a continent is marred with significant challenges that revolves around the decisions our leaders make. In our case, for APSA-PSC to conduct its mandate it entirely depends on the relationship of member states. The OAU evolved to AU to eradicate the non-interference policy in conflict torn states but countries still do not want to interfere so that the status quo of the good relationship that are mostly defined by interests remain in place. This can be explained simply by what does the country got to gain or lose by interfering? Decision making as seen in the past and recent years have been lip-servicing where regional blocs state that a bottom-up approach is used in integration whereas the fate of regional blocs barely depend on the level of cooperation of heads of states. Interests also equally weighs in the decision-making dynamics as countries cooperate where interests diverge. Structure in place also determines how decisions are made such that the autonomy of an organization is maintained. OAU declined to intervene in internal disputes or systematic violations of human rights, insisting on existing principles of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of member states. (Article III of the OAU Charter). APSA was established within the context of the transformation from the OAU to the AU to enhance the AU’s capability of preventing and managing armed conflict on the continent, a need that was informed most profoundly by the horrific Rwandan Genocide of 1994 and the wars in Somalia, Liberia and Sierra Leone. APSA established with a normative shift from non-interference to non-indifference.

APSA comprises key institutions within the AU: The Peace and Security Council which is our focus, supported by; the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF), the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) and the Peace Fund. These institutions pose a challenge to the AU in that their defined process of decision-making has not been effective enough to carry out their mandate. An example is the creation of the ACIRC as a short measure to enhance the failed works of the ASF mainly attributed to the poor decision-making of the member states.

An understanding of the factors that influence decision making is imperative to building partnerships with the continent on global challenges such as peace and security, economic development and the protection of the environment. Against this background this study seeks to examine the dynamics of decision making and AUs capacity to attaining aspiration three of agenda 2063, a case study of APSA-PSC.

1.3 OBJECTIVES

The purpose of this study is:

1. To find out who are the key actors involved in APSA for attaining aspiration 3 of agenda 2063.
2. To discover the procedures of decision making in APSA-PSC for attaining aspiration 3 of agenda 2063

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. The success of the 3rd aspiration in agenda 2063 depends on actors involved in the process.
2. The success of the 3rd aspiration in agenda 2063 depends on the procedures of decision-making used.

1.5 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

The study seeks to make contributions towards policy development and add to the existing body of academic knowledge on decision making, AUs capacity and its role in regional integration. The study findings seek to aid the African Union in developing policies that suits socio-economic diversities in Africa. It will further contemplate on the dynamics and the effects of how member states and the AU organs make decisions. Through better decision-making models the African Union will enable African countries and peoples to find their rightful role in the international community. According to (Hoste & Anderson, 2010) the continental and regional levels of decision making are analyzed to provide an improved understanding of the political dynamics and interests of a variety of African institutions, organizations, countries and leaders. The study findings enable the African Union to come up with policies that safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of African countries and promote international cooperation within the framework of the UN. It will strengthen the AUs functionality and all its organs because of inclusive, participatory and effective decision-making strategies. The study also adds to the existing body of academic knowledge on decision-making and its implication on regional integration. Therefore, scholars and researchers will use the findings of the study as a source of reference in further studies on communication and regional integration.

1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

There are a substantial number of theoretical studies that have addressed the issue of regional integration. These include ones which specifically address the main issue of the importance of and/or necessity for regional economic integration, the challenges and strengthening of regional blocs. This study however takes a different approach and seeks to critical analyses the decision-making process of the African Union. Understanding the decision-making strategies provides a means to strengthening the institutions in place that furthers boosts the socio-economic livelihoods of the people. This topic is relevant and timely given that Africa is trying to enhance its regional integration process. There are outstanding issues that need to be recognised and addressed by African states, individually and collectively, in order to take this process forward. The continental and regional levels of decision making is critical to provide an improved understanding of the political dynamics and interests of a variety of African institutions, organizations, countries and leaders. This is a topic that has received limited political and scientific attention and yet an understanding of the factors that influence decision making is imperative to building partnerships with the continent on global challenges such as peace and security, economic development and the protection of the environment. The study demonstrates the decision-making process and African Unions capacity for attaining the aspiration 3 of agenda 2063. It also seeks to unpack what goes into achieving aspiration 3 by critically analyzing the process, structures and actorness of the African Union. The study highlights areas in which the Africa Union can learn from the EU in terms of the procedures of decision-making, its inclusivity and participation of people at the grass root level. An integrative approach is taken in understanding the institutional framework of the regional economic bodies in terms of their efficiency and their institutional framework. The analysis of this issue will end by stating areas in which improvement and review are needed. The importance of, decision making is fundamental in realizing the aspiration 3 of agenda 2063 and the benefits of the 50-year plan set out by the AUC in developing and connecting Africa through integration. (Schiff & Winters, 2003) Have indicated that a new analysis is now starting to focus on developing countries turning to regionalism as a means for growing. Regionalism is a process that entails global economic shift that is multi-dimensional in the new regionalism order and thus affects countries. Understanding the decision-making process and AUs capacity can therefore set precedence in attaining the goals of the AU which is to achieve an Africa of good governance, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law.

1.7 SCOPE, LIMITATION/ DELIMITATION

This study will focus on the decision making and AUs capacity in attaining aspiration 3 of Agenda 2063. The study will be carried out at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East-African Stand-by Force offices in Nairobi. The target population will be the staff members of the aforementioned institutions and regional integration experts. The choice for this study was considered since the African Union is the highest decision-making body and the treaty establishing the African Union sets direction for the development of all other RECs and thus a strong African Union is the foundation of all other RECs.

As for the limitations of the study, it will not be possible for the research to cover every aspiration of the agenda 2063 and thus a specific aspiration was selected which was still vast. However, the case study done will be a representation of the key aspects of decision making that affects the AU and its attainment of the agenda 2063 specifically aspiration 3. Data collection will pose a challenge which will likely involve lengthy interviews of key policy informants based here in Nairobi.

1.8 DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

Decision-making: This is the thought process of selecting a logical choice from the available options. When making a decision regarding regional integration, the involved parties must weigh the positives and negatives of each option and consider all the alternatives. For effective decision making, it is prudent to be able to forecast the outcome of each option as well and based on all these items determine which option is the best for that situation. According to (Laursen, 2008) institutional choice, explores the reasons why states choose to delegate or pool decision-making in international institutions. To explain institutional choice (Moravcsik, 2009) contrasts three possible explanations: Federalist ideology, centralized technocratic management or more credible commitment. The answer he gives is that states delegate and pool sovereignty to get more credible commitments. Pooling and delegation is a rational strategy adopted by the member states to pre-commit governments to future decisions, to encourage future cooperation and to improve future implementation of agreements (Ibid, 2011).

Actorness: Actorness in world politics is the result of a multitude of interactions. It is contextual, inter-subjective and relational and does not require the sovereign authority, decision-making powers and foreign policy instruments that characterize statehood. The actorness concept evolved as a deliberate attempt to move beyond methodological nationalism to account for the international activities of the then European Community (EC) (Murau and Spandler 2016). Regional organizations, such as the EU, are constituted of states and often lack real autonomy. And yet, the actorness concept holds that such entities can be more than just the sum of their parts. As social constructs international actors are established and consolidated through practices, discourses and institution-building (Van Langenhove, 2011). This involves the framing and positioning of a regional organization as a relevant actor in a relational context such as group-to-group relations. This is conceptualized in terms of institutions, recognition and identity and is a relational concept dependent on context and perception. It includes having autonomy. Apart from that an international actor needs to possess the structural prerequisites for actor capability which among them involve qualities such as the ability to set goals and achieve them, decision-making and monitoring facilities and means of performing actions.

2.0 CHAPTER TWO

2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW ON REGIONAL INTEGRATION

Regional integration is becoming increasingly popular, with the advent of globalization, countries can no longer be dependent but rather interdependent and interconnected. New regional blocs have been established with the old ones revived to much the current growing needs of states. Therefore, regional integration cannot be wholly defined as it can be confusing in certain areas/regions. According to Heinonen in theory it can be defined as a process, as a stage as well as an in an economic approach and political approach. (Heinonen, 2006).

Theorizing integration has been a problem throughout history and according to Haas this has been a problem for decades, he states that ‘Even fifteen years of work have not quite sufficed to create a consensus on a clear delimitation’ (Ernest, 1961). Karl Deutsch speaks of integration as a process leading to the creation of security communities and further considers it a process for the creation of political communities defined in institutional and attitudinal terms, a condition also described by Jacob and Teune. Federalists, finally, see the end of the integration process in the growth of a federal union among the constituent nations (Heinonen, 2006).

We therefore lack the clear definition of integration but not the possibilities to define it. Scholars have sort to break down the term and place it in different boxes to enable the understanding of the phenomena, after half a century of theorizing. Ernst Haas, defined integration as follows: ‘the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over preexisting national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones.’ (Haas 1968).

Many scholars among them Haas, Leon Lindberg and Karl Deutsch have seem to agree that integration is or seems to be a process in which states engage themselves in cooperation with other state which ultimately brings them closer. However, the limitation to such definition is that it integration entirely focuses on the political dimensions of the process even though integration can also have other multi-dimensions. Lindberg writes that Integration is not only ever-closer cooperation of states in a political field, or evolution of a collective decision-making system among states over time as Leon Lindberg described political integration, it can also take place, for example, in the field of economics, security, and environmental questions. Furthermore, it creates a framework for human activities where states co-operate in the field of economic policies and remove tariff barriers, they create opportunities also for actors in the private sector to initiate cooperation or activities that cross-national borders. Integration does not only benefit the states but also non-state actors have a hand in the stake too that creates a formal and informal kind of integration (Lindberg, 1971).

Formal integration according to Wallace is an outcome of deliberate political actions and includes, for example, the establishment of institutions, policies or legislation. Informal integration, on the other hand, refers to a process that has effective consequences without formal, authoritative intervention (Wallace, 1990). Formal integration does not necessarily always precede informal integration; in some situations, cooperation of non-state actors can also create pressures for deepening the formal integration process states Heinonen, (Heinonen, 2006). The problem therefore as indicated before is that the definition of integration as processual leaves the content of the end state of regional integration midair. Therefore, what is the processual of integration, a customs union? A common market? Or a political union? Therefore, the process of regional integration involves distinct phases toward an ever-closer community as seen in the EU.

The phases of integrations are pegged around economic cooperation between countries which can occur on three levels. The first level which is the lowest level is coordination, it involves the voluntary alignment of the states/national policies in different sectors. This is followed by harmonization which is considered a higher level of cooperation that involves the harmonization of the state’s policies. Even though it is regionally agreed upon, on this level the legislation is nationally implemented and controlled. The third level is the actual integration as the highest level of economic cooperation. Heinonen says that in a regionally integrated market, some of the traditional decision-making powers of nation states have been handed over to the regional level, and regional rules and decisions supersede national legislation where economic policies are formulated on the regional level (Heinonen, 2006).

According to Heinonen, formal integration is a state-led process, whereas in the informal process, non-state actors are predominant and by combining these different dimensions and fields of integration it is possible to identify very different kinds of processes. He explains further that for example, the last stage of formal economic integration can be the establishment of a monetary union, but in the informal field, private sector actors can continue to build closer cooperation links among themselves after this. In this process there are different decision-making process used to achieve the end goal (Heinonen, 2006).

Haas states that in the traditional context, state holds the supreme authority within its territory. However Regional integration creates a new source of authority, which is ‘superimposed over the pre-existing ones’ (Haas, 1968). Integration has been considered to create new form of political power where state sovereignty is partially handed to the regional body. This however not affected the supreme authority of the state. This question the decision-making processes of the state that affects sovereignty and questions whether integration limits the states authority or states integrate to pursue their interest. As a result, can decision be made to enhance regionalization or growth of the country or both? The clear distinction can be analyzed through dissecting the regional bodies and its decision-making methodology. The intentions cannot be known fully but what are the ingredients in achieving the end product of integration or making it successful. Thus, the decision-making process needs to be analyzed critically. According to Heinonen in an integrated community some of the decision-making powers have been transferred to a supranational level, this means that in states the national decision-making powers and authority has been transferred to a supranational level. Therefore, states have limited their sovereignty, but have not yet surrendered it completely (Heinonen, 2006).

2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK- LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM, NEO-FUNCTIONALISM AND FEDERALISM

This thesis applies three main theories of European integration (federalism, neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism) to African integration and thereby deals with the topic concerning the “relevance of this ongoing theoretical schism between neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism for identifying, describing, and predicting the eventual outcome of the process of economic and political integration in Africa” (Maluwa, 2003). The goal is both to find parts within the theories and their assumptions that need to be reviewed as well as to explain the history of African integration from a theoretical standpoint (Michel, 2012).

This thesis argues that African integration can only be explained using a mixture of both federalist, neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalist arguments. There is no single approach that can fully account for all processes in African cooperation since the 1950s, just as the European case cannot be explained completely by one single theory.

The African integration can only be explained by using both federalist, neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalist assumptions (Michel, 2012).

Theories of integration over centuries have mainly been developed to explain European integration. These three theories have been widely used to explain the integration process of other regional blocks however scholars have tries to move away from this and rather create a theory that uniquely fits the integration process as it is believed that not all regional bodies have evolved the same way as Amitavacharya has discussed in his papers the “Asean Way”. The AU has been critiqued to imitate the footpath of the EU regional integration process however there is no scholarly proof whether the AU imitated EU or vice versa.

Neo-functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism and federalism have been used in the analysis of the integration process in the AU. In the 1990s Andrew Moravcsik developed ‘liberal intergovernmentalism’ to explain the process of integration in Europe, suggesting the combination of a liberal theory to explain national preference formation and an intergovernmental theory of interstate bargaining to explain substantive outcomes (Moravcsik, 1991). In his book The Choice for Europe he added a third stage, institutional choice, where pooling and delegation of sovereignty was seen as a way to create ‘credible commitments’ (Moravcsik, 1998).

In liberal intergovernmentalism, the most critical foundation for this theory is that states are the main actors and have certain level of cooperation. (Simon, 2011) States that the governments have a strong and autonomous position in this approach, and bargain intensively for their interest. Further (Bache, Bulmer, & Goerge, 2011) states Within the Intergovernmentalism the national governments control the pace and nature of integration based on protecting and promoting their own national interests. (Bache, Bulmer, & Goerge, 2011) Adds that when those national interests are of similar kind, a closer integration is supported, but generally limited to some areas. African integration seems to take similar path with countries coming together to form with different interests, but integration process will make the states stronger. (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2009) Summarizes the theory as follow:

European integration can best be understood as a series of rational choices made by national leaders. These choices responded to constraints and opportunities stemming from the economic interests of powerful domestic constituents, the relative power of each state in the international system, and the role of institutions in bolstering the credibility of interstate commitments. (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2009)

According to (Hoffman, 1966) states are the main primary actors in the integration process. They are recognized as rational actors. In the AU the main pioneers for formation of this cooperation after independence was Kwame Nkrumah Jommo Kenyatta and Mwalimu Julius Nyerere that led the fight of other African states in gaining their independence that resulted in the formation of the OAU. Given the failures and dismantling of the OAU the AU came into force in 2000. During the Extraordinary Summit of the OAU in Sirte, Libya, on 9 September 1999, calls were made for the establishment of the AU. This was followed by the adoption of the Constitutive Act during the OAU Lomé Summit on 11 July 2000. The Act came into force on 26 May 2001 and the inaugural meeting of the AU was held in 2002 in Durban, South Africa, with the convening of the 1st Assembly of Heads of States. They comprise the summit and basically the powers of the community rests with them. They ensure that the welfare of the citizens in each country are met through a common understanding by the member states.

One key feature in liberal intergovernmentalism that it is distinguishable from the fore father of integration theories (realism) is that it sees the significance of institutions and its impact in the government preferences. The theory recognizes the role of international institutions and its contribution to the shaping of integration. At regional level the AU under the Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC (chapter 3 article 9) The institutions of the Community shall be such bodies, departments and services as may be established by the Summit. All these institutions have a significant role to play in the integration process.

Liberal intergovernmentalism recognizes the national or self-interest among states in pursuing integration. Structural factors like geographical proximity, similar or common interest like security, enlarging market and sound policies have a major impact that shapes the way government relates. Each government have their own national interests that benefits their country first and they also work with neighboring countries also to maintain their stability, security and economic vibrancy as well. According to (Hoffman, 1966) Intergovernmentalist argue that despite the working relation of countries to foster integration, their self-interest is what pushes for integration and unlike the neo-functionalist who argue of the spill-over effects happening continuously and on its own intergovernmentalist say that the effects have a driver behind it and among is the state’s national interest.

In liberal Intergovernmentalism integration is strengthened. The logic behind this statement according to (Hoffman, 1966) is that states do not become obsolete due to integration because of loss of some of their sovereignty but rather they become strengthened by the process. The AU heads of Assembly have notably taken steps to push forward the agenda of the African people with the most current imitative of launching the CFTA where yet there is remarkable rift in the manner in which it took so long to launch. In addition, not all African countries agreed the signing of the CFTA. This is just but an example of the way decision is made in the AU and its implementation or execution is done with weak structures in place. The agenda 2063 seeks to achieve a milestone by taking Africa to soaring heights of that of a developed continent.

(Hoffman, 1966) Argues that states set their own level of cooperation and that states have their free will to cooperate or not. This thus explains the radical changes of periods of fast integration when states cooperate and slow integration when states have a difference in policies leading to no co-operation. This in turn contributes to the manner in which decisions are made. The decision-making process becomes flawed with mishaps, slow cooperation and even stagnation in certain aspects. States are allowed to integrate in the pace they deem fit.

Liberal intergovernmentalism theory cannot fully explain the African integration process as the integration process has its twists and turns. Though it emphasizes on the role of the states, as the major driving source of integration, the idea of the establishment of AU was for the people when in reality they do not participate in any decisions. However, it clearly shows how power is mostly centered in the Heads of Assembly. The impact of pan- Africanism can neither be neglected as it contains the basis for why the African leaders sort to take up integration. This theory was developed as a critic of neo-functionalism where neo-functionalist (Ernest, 1961) argued that countries should integrate modestly in the areas of low politics to high politics. (Hoffman, 1966) Argued otherwise, that integration might work well in low politics that is in economic integration but during the spill-over to other areas it may need a push from elites and other actors.

Neo-functionalism describes integration as a spillover effect that actors are doers or the pushers. Such that coming together in a common area finally spills over creating another form of cooperation as Haas would put it. However, one distinguishable factor of intergovernmentalism is that it recognized institutions in the world politics and recognized also the effects of domestic politics in governments choosing their preferences. One challenge is that intergovernmentalism being a European theory cannot fully explain the African integration neither can one theory describe or predict the future of integration in Africa but a number of combination of two to three nay give a clear understanding to the process of integration.

According to (Heinonen, 2006) Europe was the region of the world, where regional integration started in the early 1950s with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952. Ernest Haas has theorized this by stating that the experience is the Uniting of Europe (1958). Ernst Haas has his main theoretical contribution as the concept of spill-over. Over time Lindberg used this concept to study the early years of the European Economic Community (EEC), which started its existence in 1958 (Lindberg, 1963). These early theories are usually referred to as neo-functionalist theories. There were some efforts to apply these neo-functionalist theories to integration in other parts of the world, especially in Latin America (Haas, 1961). The integration process in Europe faced a calamity in its mid-1960, when General de Gaulle instructed his ministers not to take part in meetings of the EEC Council. In the Luxembourg compromise in January 1966 the then six members of the European Communities (EC) agreed to disagree. The French insisted that decisions by a qualified majority vote (QMV) could not take place, when a Member State opposed a decision because of important national interests (Haas and Schmitter, 1964)

Neo-functionalists, on the contrary to other theories, defined integration as a process: “Political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. The end result of the process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones.” (Haas 1968)

(Heinonen, 2006) States that Leon Lindberg's attempt to try to define the preconditions that had to prevail before the process of integration could be launched successfully. These conditions included according to him, central institutions and central policies should be established and developed, because only they can assure that someone represents and promotes the 'regional view' as well as solves disputes between member states. Their tasks and capacity to implement those tasks should go well beyond the mandate of normal international institutions. Their tasks should be inherently expansive and lastly there should be some link between the interests of member states and the process of integration. (Lindberg, 1963).

According to (Heinonen, 2006) neo-functionalism was also clearly distinct from federalism, although even the Schuman declaration included certain federalist views. Nevertheless, the chosen strategy that narrowed the field of cooperation only to one specific sector made it distinct from federalism. The main departure from functionalism relates to one of the main criticisms of functionalism that its inability to see the relevance of political processes in international cooperation (Heinonen, 2006). As Ben Rosamond defines this distinction: 'Perhaps the main departure from earlier functionalist approaches to international order was what neo-functionalists saw as the reinstatement of political agency into the integration process (Rosamond, 2000).

Federalism played an important role in the thinking and resistance movements before and during the Second World War. The first initiatives to start an integration process after the War were made by the federalists, and they led to the establishment of the Council of Europe states (Heinonen, 2006), similarly during the struggle from colonialism states came together for this solely intention to establish their freedom and a united Africa. Federalism can be characterized by certain features. Federalist political systems, i.e. federations, are usually divided into central and regional authorities. Federalism is a political ideology that supports establishment of political life on such a model and it can be easily applied also to regional integration (Heinonen, 2006). In the European integration process, federalism usually refers to thinking that wants to take the integration forward and increase the powers of the European Union. On the other hand, federalism and the division between central and regional authority can also be found from the principle of subsidiarity that is commonly found as a principle in most regional organizations (Heinonen, 2006).

Table 1: Indicators for Federalism, Neo-functionalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

Source: (Michel, 2012), European Integration Theories and African Integration Realities Federalism, Neo-functionalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism in African Integration

2.3 THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY TO AFRICAN UNION

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established on 25 May 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia with 32 signatory governments. The OAU sort to rid the continent of colonization and apartheid, to promote unity and solidarity among African States, to coordinate and intensify cooperation for development and to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States. Soon after achieving independence, a number of African states expressed a growing desire for more unity within the continent. Not everyone was agreed on how this unity could be achieved, however, and two opinionated groups emerged in this respect. The Casablanca bloc, led by President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, wanted a federation of all African countries. Aside from Ghana, it comprised also Algeria, Guinea, Morocco, Egypt, Mali and Libya. Founded in 1961, its members were described as "progressive states". The other group was the Monrovian bloc, led by Senghor of Senegal, he felt that unity should be achieved gradually, through economic cooperation. It did not support the notion of a political federation. Its other members were Nigeria, Liberia, Ethiopia and most of the former French colonies. The failures of the OAU outweighed its successes. Arguably, its major failing was its inability to bring peace, prosperity, security, and stability to Africa.

According to Francis the African Union (AU) was established in 2001 to replace the Organization of African Unity (OAU). During the Extraordinary Summit of the OAU in Sirte, Libya, on 9 September 1999, calls were made for the establishment of the AU. This was followed by the adoption of the Constitutive Act during the OAU Lomé Summit on 11 July 2000. The Act came into force on 26 May 2001 and the inaugural meeting of the AU was held in 2002 in Durban, South Africa, with the convening of the 1st Assembly of Heads of States. The African Union was launched in 2002 with all the countries currently. The AU replaced the Organization of African Unity came that was as a result of the shift of thinking of African states. The AU has been designed to work more efficiently, effectively and better than the OAU. The fundamental shift that lead to the creation of the AU was that the OAU emphasized on the principal of national sovereignty and non-interference. This meant that states lacked the statutory authority and capacity to intervene in matters of peace and security. The AU on the other hand has the capacity to intervene in matters peace and security that affects a member states (Francis, 2006).

According to Mwanzia, the AU, which embraces international cooperation has also adopted a wider field of engagement options, from mediation to using force to intervene in specific circumstances. Article 4 of the Constitutive Act specifies: The right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect to grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security (Mwanzia, 2015).

The AU in reaffirming their commitments during the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) states that armed conflicts in Africa have led to millions of people, including women and children being immigrants and refugees. Mwanzia informs us that this informed the establishment of an operational structure for the effective implementation of the decisions taken in the areas of conflict prevention, peace-making, peace support operations and intervention, as well as peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction. He adds that in accordance with the authority conferred to that regard by Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union.

Thus, the Peace and Security Council was established to monitor and intervene in conflicts with an African force, conducted in a manner consistent with both the UN and the OAU Charters and the Cairo Declaration of 1993 (Mwanzia, 2015).

2.4 AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

Under the OAU, issues of peace and security were considered to belong exclusively to domestic jurisdiction of member states. OAU declined to intervene in internal disputes or systematic violations of human rights, insisting on existing principles of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of member states. (Article III of the OAU Charter. Mwanzia informs us that APSA was established within the context of the transformation from the OAU to the AU to enhance the AU’s capability of preventing and managing armed conflict on the continent, a need that was informed most profoundly by the horrific Rwandan Genocide of 1994 and the wars in Somalia, Liberia and Sierra Leone (Mwanzia, 2015).

Between 1989 and 1914, Africa was the most violent region. Civil wars on the African continent intensified in the early 1990s, but the nature of conflict changed from primarily interstate conflicts to intra-state conflicts. APSA established with a normative shift from non-interference to non-indifference to genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. A shift from state centric to human centric conceptualization of security that coincided with then end of the cold war.

According to the African Union, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, preface, July 2002, APSA is “an operational structure for the effective implementation of the decisions taken in the areas of conflict prevention, peace-making, peace support operations and intervention, as well as peace building and post-conflict reconstruction.” Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act creates a legal basis for intervention, but also imposes an obligation on the AU to intervene to prevent or stop perpetration of heinous crimes anywhere on the continent (Aning, 2013).

The normative and institutional foundations of the APSA constitute of: the African Union Constitutive Act, the Protocol on the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (PSC Protocol) and the Common African Defense and Security Policy (CADSP). APSA is envisioned as a means by which Africa can take a greater role in managing peace and security on the continent. It gives the AU the right to intervene in a member state when asked to do so by the said member state but can also do so independently in cases of war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide.

Engel & Port states that APSA also comprises the eight AU-recognized regional economic communities (RECs) and the two regional mechanisms (RMs) in charge of administering and managing the North African and Eastern African standby forces. The primary mandate lies with the Peace and Security Council which relies on the Panel of the wise and the Continental Early Warning System as key institutions for enabling it to live up to its APSA mandate. APSA amounts to operationalization of the AU Act objective of promotion of peace, security, and stability on the continent; principles upon which the Union will function, such as sovereign equality and interdependence among member states of the Union are operationalized in APSA (Engel & Porto, 2009).

The overall goal of Continental Early Warning System is to detect and report on situations that could escalate to armed conflict, providing the PSC with the information needed to take preventive action. CEWS collects and analyses information on several variables related to conflict outbreak in AU member states and brings its findings to the attention of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, who then briefs the PSC (Murithi, 2013). CEWS analysts provide recommendations and response options to the PSC and other decision makers, including building scenarios and identifying those organs of the AU that could be deployed to help defuse a particular situation. It is information generated through this system that triggers application of APSA (Murithi, 2013).

Disconnect between early warning and early response is due to the Operational and inherent political challenges at the AU such as insufficient levels of communication and collaboration with other AU peace and security organs relevant to conflict early warning. The lack of political will to intervene in the internal matters of member states is also another hindrance. As Williams recently noted the PSC’s preference for reaching decisions by consensus is in itself a constraint as countries here look out for their national interest and may not want to intervene in other states affairs as a result. The inadequate information and decision-making procedures of the entire system is flawed by interference of not only international actors but also the lack of political will of member states to do their parts accordingly. The political nature of the early-response side of the AU’s African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is likely to continue to constrain the rapid deployment of effective conflict prevention initiatives in the future (Williams, 2013)

Aning notes that the political leadership of the AU, as represented in the Assembly, makes the final decisions on important peace and security issues such as intervention in the affairs of member states. In reality, however, the PSC is empowered to take most decisions on security issues on behalf of the Assembly (Aning, 2013). Mwanzia states that the PSC is composed of 15 members and its seats are distributed to ensure a geopolitical balance: four to West Africa, three to Central Africa, three to East Africa, three to Southern Africa, and two to North Africa, without any right of veto powers for any member (Mwanzia, 2015). In the AU Protocol the Panel of the Wise is composed of five highly respected African personalities from various segments of society who have made an outstanding contribution to the cause of peace, security and development on the continent. Members are selected by the Chairperson of the AU Commission based on consultations with the member states, but they are ultimately appointed through a decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. The main function of the Panel is to support the PSC and Chairperson of the AU Commission on matters relating to preventive diplomacy by anticipating potential crisis situations and intervening in a timely fashion to prevent the escalation of a dispute or resolve existing tensions to reduce the likelihood of a return to violence (Mwanzia, 2015).

Mwanzia notes that African Standby Force (ASF) and African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) are essentially a reflection of the failure of the Continental Early Warning System. ASF was under construction since 2003. Consists of five regional brigades composed of multidisciplinary contingents on standby in their country of origin. The Brigades that together constitute the ASF are raised and maintained by the five Regional Economic Communities /Regional Mechanisms (ECOWAS, NARC, EASBRICOM, ECCAS, and SADC) which serve as building blocks of the Peace and Security Architecture of the AU. ASF has both civilian and military components and is intended to be available for rapid deployment. Original intent is that forces would be deployed outside their respective regions e.g. ECOMOG to be deployed in SADC. Current thinking appears to be the exact opposite, namely that regional standby forces be deployed exclusively within the jurisdiction of their respective RECs (Mwanzia, 2015).

ASF is a force organized into five Regional Brigades composed of multidisciplinary contingents on standby in their country of origin. The Brigades that together constitute the ASF are raised and maintained by the five Regional Economic Communities /Regional Mechanisms (ECOWAS, NARC, EASBRICOM, ECCAS, and SADC) which serve as building blocks of the Peace and Security Architecture of the AU (Mwanzia, 2015).

Rapid Deployment Capability is key to the notion of finding an “African solution to African problems.” Rapid deployment capability is the critical capability that has been lacking from the ASF to date mostly due to a lack of resources and poor decision-making processes. According to the AU, the PSC has the right to decide to deploy the ASF for missions, but the ASF can only intervene in a member state with the authorization of the AU Assembly. ASF troop availability ultimately remains dependent on the national security situation of individual member states and on the political will to divert troops to a particular ASF mission.

Vanessa states that the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) launched in 2013 following the AU’s inability to deploy the ASF in the 2012 crisis in Mali. Crisis made clear the urgent need to establish a ready-to-deploy capability. Instituted as a transitional solution given that a ready-to-deploy capacity within the ASF was at least three years away from being established at the time. As of October 2015, 13 countries had volunteered to join ACIRC, namely Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Egypt, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda, the motivation behind these countries for joining not know (Vanessa, 2010).

ACIRC differs from the ASF in that that the AU can deploy it with only the lead country on board, whereas with the standby brigades the AU needs to get approval from the RECs. ACIRC works directly through the AU, whereas the ASF works through regional economic communities. ASF is not only a more cumbersome process, but also more likely to be vetoed by the RECs, given their many member states (Mureithi, 2013).

Since ACIRC completely bypasses the RECs, there is also concern that this will result in a shift in the current balance of power away from the RECs and towards the AU. However, the shift of balance shouldn’t be a concern when it is. This is because if ACIRC is carrying out the APSA mandate better than ASF then it shouldn’t be a concern. The concern arises from the balance of power or the fears of keeping ties or relations that enhance national interest, in other terms there is no leverage. Many member states also worry that ACIRC will result in too much centralized power being placed in the hands of ACIRC troop-contributing countries (Mwanzia, 2015).

2.4.1 DECISION MAKING IN AU-APSA

There also remain some unresolved questions about the mandating procedure. Although it is not established as a legal requirement for the AU, at the policy level the Policy for the Establishment of the ASF provides that the AU will seek UN Security Council authorization for its enforcement actions.‘ So far, the AU has sought the support of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for all its missions, not only in cases of enforcement action states Vanessa (Vanessa, 2010). This not only allows AU the financial access and resources but also has allowed for a certain level of control from these international actors through the conditional authorization of the UNSC. However, since decisions of the UN Security Council can take a long time to be implemented, some have argued in favor of AU mandates taking precedence where urgent action is required but the vital factor will be the political process (Mwanzia, 2015).

Mwanzia reiterates there is a need to ensure political consensus among nations before an operation can be approved and deployed which has always posed a challenge in the AU decision-making process. The AU Peace and Security Council is a political body composed of member states that pursue their respective national interests. Its decisions regarding the deployment of an ASF Mission will therefore depend, among other things, on the interests and political dynamics of members of the Peace and Security Council and the strength and diplomatic skills of the Chairperson of the Peace and Security Council in any given crisis situation (Mwanzia, 2015). The Peace and Security Council ability to forge a consensus will be critical to the speediness and legitimacy of its decisions and, therefore, also of the deployments themselves.

2.4.2 APSA – THE CASE OF BURUNDI AND GAMBIA

APSA has had its share of success and failure. An example is the case of Burundi and Gambia. For Burundi it is a classic case of the failure that was marred with a number of challenges that will be discussed next. For a long time, structural factors like geography and shared historical past or experiences have influenced EAC policies. In the shared historical past, for example a shared identity among EAC states have led to prioritization of policies in certain areas more than others. When it comes to security policy EAC has been a non-active player in ensuring progress in talks and implementation of policies have been carried forward. Rwanda and Burundi accession to the EAC in 2007 (Manirankunda, 2010). Rwanda and Burundi’s historical and geographically share same ethnicity, culture, resources and language and yet are sworn rival enemies. Therefore, the main aspect as to why the other members are silent on the war-torn nature of state of Burundi, what factors impede the process of ensuring that Burundi salvages itself from the qualms of civil war will be analyzed in this section.

The first extraordinary summit on the crisis of Burundi was held on 13 May but announcements of a coup d’état in Burundi disrupted events which poisoned the relationship between Burundi and Rwanda and also between Dar-es-Salam and Kigali. This is because proof was found in the accusation that Rwanda hosted the coup d’état planners that flee arrest from Burundi. This further expressed Tanzania former president Kikwete that Rwanda had something to do with the coup d’état and had plans to destabilize the region and that it was geopolitical strategizing where Bujumbura had to answer to Rwanda according to (Institute for Security Studies, 2016)As a result, these foundational or structural analysis shows the basis as to why the AU is slow or rather seems that it does not want to implement the Security Policy on Burundi as a result of the tension between the member states of the community and enhanced mistrust by the community.

The second analytical framework by Byiers and Vanheukelom is institutional framework which basically could be understood as the rules governing which could be formal or informal. The formal institution of the EAC just like the PSC failure to pull sanctions and reiterate on strong grounds has been weak due to indifferences of views and opinions by the summit (EAC) and the mother-Heads of Assembly (AU). This comes with indifference towards the constitutional legitimacy of a 3rd presidential term for President Nkuruzinza of The Republic of Burundi. This indifference was worsened later by the ruling of the constitutional court of Burundi on 5th May 2015 that ruled in the favor of President Nkuruzinza running again. According to (Institute for Security Studies, 2016), the EAC affairs ministers from organizing member states had requested assistance from representative of EAC and COMESA to solve the crisis. The Tanzanian minister of Foreign Affairs Bernard Membe stated that “the term put forth for sitting presidents is just two, but the constitutional court has already ruled.”

Thus, the proposal from both sides was overlooked and President Kikwete side-stepped the third-term issue. The Tanzania president further states in the summit that:

“That they did not have the latitude to act counter to a ruling handed down by the Burundi Constitutional Court, the only body empowered to pass judgment on the question by the basic texts of Burundi. He insisted on the primacy of this body and the sovereign nature of the state of Burundi on the question, in the absence of a political federation of the EAC.” (Institute for Security Studies, 2016)

This shows the lack of clear mechanism upon facilitation of summit decisions and recommendation from committees that are binding and are in the protocol which requires states to protect the security of member states in times of conflict but the decision on constitutional matters that could threaten the stability of the nation again was overlooked in order to uphold the sovereignty of states.

The EALA also as an institution of EAC has done very minimal in terms of implementation of the Security Policy. The top-down approach as seen where all decisions are made by the summit has posed a challenge for other institutions to carry out certain mandates. The EACJ has also never been consulted on the Burundi crisis nor critical solutions from both institutions created. Therefore, as a result these factors pose a challenge to implementation of the security policy in Burundi.

The third analysis is the role of actors, incentives and agencies in implementation of the security policy. In this context, member states have been silent on the Burundi crisis up until recently when they decided to act on it. It is noted that it was until 2015 that EAC had to manage an internal crisis of its member state nine years later after the EAC peace and Security Strategy. This was further fueled by the rivalry between Rwanda and Burundi and disagreement with also the other partner states. The lack of political will and cry for protection of national interest made the EAC community silent on the Burundi crisis.

A delegation of the Wise was appointed by the EAC and the Common Market for Eastern and southern Africa (COMESA) at the end of 2014 where the prime minister of Tanzania Joseph Sinde met numerous institutions, organizations, political personalities and civil society. Therefore EAC slowness to work with other agents like civil society and overlooking the issue resulted in a buildup of tension which later a dialogue was opened .according to (Institute for Security Studies, 2016), this led to the convening by the current president of the EAC of an Extraordinary summit of heads of state in mid-May 2015 when the latent crisis turned into an open crisis and took the form of street demonstrations, violently repressed by the security forces.

Finally, on the external factors in this analysis, what role external players have in the APSA mandate in undertaking its crucial duties? A special envoy was created by the AU Heads of Assembly comprising of South African President Jacob Zuma, African Union President Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the UN special Envoy for the great lakes, and the executive secretary of the international Conference on the great lakes Region (ICGLR) where they discussed the conditions for having the election in Burundi and providing recommendations.

According to (Institute for Security Studies, 2016) , at the end of June 2015, the government boycotted the proceedings of the dialogue on the political, security, and socioeconomic and humanitarian situation in Burundi, which were fora convened by the joint international facilitation team made up of representatives and special envoys of the different international organizations involved in the Burundian crisis, namely the ICGLR, EAC, Un and AU. The Extraordinary Summit was boycotted by the President of Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda and later the summit simply called for a new postponement of the presidential elections and designated Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni as facilitator for the Burundi crisis. This causes a growing divide between the international players where the UN special Envoy publicly declared his disappointment and expressed the view that the EAC summit had been ‘below par’ (Institute for Security Studies, 2016).

The Burundi crisis has been gravely affected by the simple fact that all the powers are entirely engraved in the summit and as discussed, the Summit has been faced by interpersonal conflict that begun with Rwanda and Burundi and then followed by Rwanda and Tanzania. The first experience for EAC to solve an impeding conflict has failed miserably and has been exemplified by the mere fact that how the institutions of the EAC are not in coordination or working together. Facilitation could not be held smoothly due to boycotts and empty chair policy of Rwanda and many allegation of Rwanda support and involvement in the rebellion.

States were mainly after their national interest and the idea of preserving or respecting each other sovereignty was in play over and over, the vagueness in which the summit carries out the facilitation was also in question as to whether the APSA really wants to help solve the Burundi crisis or just watch and let time take its course. The lack of political will to be involved or the urgency in seeing a member state is trouble and needs help clearly shows how APSA needs to re-evaluate its priorities.

On the other hand, the case of Gambia is one of the success story of APSA. Mediation interventions deemed overall successful included the consistent and intense support by the AU and ECOWAS and the response by ECOWAS to the escalation of conflict in both The Gambia (opposition) and Guinea-Bissau (opposition). In the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, mediation efforts were found to be proactive and responsive to highly volatile situations. While both cases were related to elections, the mediation efforts managed to go beyond the election itself and addressed some of the root causes of the dispute. In Guinea-Bissau for example, ECOWAS mediation efforts first led the conflict parties to agreeing on a roadmap, which was then followed by the Conakry Agreement in October 2016. In the Gambia, ECOWAS mediation efforts were assessed to be appropriate, conducted at a high level, and were found to be given preference over a merely military solution (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2017).

In early 2017, as the crisis in light of the elections in The Gambia deepened, and diplomatic and mediation efforts had little to no effect on incumbent President Jammeh, ECOWAS mandated ECOMIG to ensure the safety of the elected President Adama Barrow, other political leaders and the entire population, to uphold the results of the presidential election, and to ensure that the president elect was sworn into office on 19 January 2017, in conformity with the constitution of the Republic of The Gambia (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2017).

ECOMIG troops were ready to jointly enter the country on air and by land, after ECOWAS issued an order for military intervention as a last resort. As additional mediation efforts were underway, however, ECOMIG troops halted their advance to allow for a non-military solution. Observers note that the military threat by ECOWAS did add a significant level of pressure. Clearly, in combination with coercive diplomacy and mediation, the military efforts contributed to a de-escalation of the conflict (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2017).

Academic studies note that ECOMIG represents the logical outcome of developments in two related sets of processes at the AU and ECOWAS that condemnation of unconstitutional changes of government, and a greater willingness to use military force as part of its conflict management strategies. On 21 January, outgoing president Jammeh went into exile and by 24 January, the state of emergency was lifted. President-elect Barrow returned to The Gambia on 26 January. ECOWAS commended the crucial role played by the mission in keeping The Gambia secure while also taking note of the fragile situation in the country. Consequently, the mission was extended for another 12 months (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2017).

In addition to peace enforcement efforts, ECOMIG is now also mandated to play a pivotal role in the reforms and training of the Gambian Armed forces. In a region threatened by terrorist and international criminal syndicates intermittently operating in the region, the extension of the ECOMIG mandate is aimed at not only stabilizing the Gambia but also at establishing a positive effect on regional security. Moreover, it is supposed to reduce the cross-border lawlessness along the Gambia-Senegal border of Casamance to prevent criminal and bandit groups from tapping into security vulnerabilities. All in all, ECOMIG was able to fulfil its mandate (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2017).

2.5 MISSIONS IN APSA

According to Mwanzia proper planning has posed a challenge on numerous occasion where the UN Security Council rejected AU plans to deploy a mission, due to gaps in planning and insufficient information. The planning processes for African peace support operations have often been undertaken ad hoc, at times in an uncoordinated fashion as a result. He states further that yet on those occasions where planning processes brought together the various Departments and Divisions within the Commission, the AU and the regional economic communities, or where they have been undertaken jointly with the UN, some of the best results have been attained. An example is the most recent planning initiatives between the AU and the UN on Somalia or the joint planning between ECOWAS and the AU on Mali bear testament to this and serve as models for the future. If better results are to be achieved, the planning capacities which are available at the AU and the regional economic communities will have to be reinforced, and member states and partners will have to invest more in strengthening the role of the strategic headquarters in Addis Ababa and the planning elements in the regions (Mwanzia, 2015).

Vanessa says that since the establishment of the ASF, the AU has deployed missions of its own to Burundi, Darfur, Somalia, Mali and the CAR. Each of these missions involved political decision-making processes, planning, deployment, strategic and operational management and mission support. Several of these missions were also handed over and liquidated. Together, they represent a significant demonstration of capacity and experience. All these missions have been undertaken with support from the UN, European Union (EU) and bilateral partners, and they thus also reflect a growing body of experience with various forms of partnerships and collaborative action (Vanessa, 2010).

3.0 CHAPTER THREE

3.1 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This section covers the study area, the research design, the methodology, a description of the sample size and sampling procedures. The data collection and data analysis procedures are covered. Lastly, the section looks at the ethical consideration.

3.2 STUDY AREA

This study focused on the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). APSA is located in Addis Ababa Ethiopia and has agencies all over the continent thus APSA has its regional office in Nairobi and at a national level the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is involved. APSA is also comprised of a number of stand-by brigades that is under the African Stand by force. The focus of the study will be the Peace and Security Council. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has two departments that solely deals with matters regarding APSA. The Directorate of Africa and AU and the Directorate of Peace and Security. In this two directorates there are desk officers that handle matters of APSA who report to the head of directorate who in turn reports to the Political Diplomatic Secretary who reports to the Cabinet Secretary and finally the Cabinet Secretary reports to the President.

Kenya has also remained instrumental in shaping its interests in other peace and security initiatives that the AU is engaged in, namely; the stabilization process in the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea Bissau and Mali. Besides this, the Ministry has been on the forefront in coordinating Kenya’s participation in meetings of the African Union (AU); the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD); International Conferences on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR); the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and East Africa Community (EAC), which are some of the main platforms from which Kenya as a member, articulates its position on peace, security and stability in the region and other interests for the country.

3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN

The study used interview guides of the key informants, observations and secondary data through desk reviews to collect data. These instruments were chosen because of a number of reasons. Firstly, APSA has agencies in every country thus having one too in Kenya. This makes it easier to work from here as there is no difference in travelling to the Headquarters. It was easy interviewing key stakeholders here Nairobi rather than sending questionnaires to the main office in Addis Ababa since the same agencies in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs liaise with the Headquarters and are the focal point of transmission among other agencies in the African Union Nairobi allowing me to collect the same information as I would in the Headquarters. Secondly interviewing allows for an in-depth understanding and further give a detailed exploratory conclusion. Lastly getting a large sample size will prove to be difficult thus interviewing of certain key stakeholders and use of secondary data will help achieve the goal of this study by giving an in-depth information.

3.4 TARGET POPULATION

The target population for this study are senior officers that work in the Africa and AU department and Peace and Security department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Other key stakeholders in the regional office of APSA in Nairobi who will be able to give me data.

3.5 DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE AND SAMPLING PROCEDURES

This section identified, defined and explained the sampling, sampling technique and the sample size that were used in this study.

3.5.1 SAMPLING

On sampling, the respondents were drawn from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and regional office of APSA in Nairobi.

3.5.2 SAMPLING TECHNIQUES

In a research context, there are two major categories of sampling techniques, which are probability and non-probability sampling. This study used non-probability sampling technique. The sampling approach used in this study was purposive sampling. This approach was adopted to identify knowledgeable respondents on the subject matter. Purposive sampling was used to select the officers who would partake in the interview. The individuals are willing to provide information on the subject matter. To select the key informants, the same purposive sampling strategy was used. These were individuals from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and regional office of APSA in Nairobi. These individuals are deemed to be knowledgeable about APSA that could lend insight to the study. The study therefore used this sampling approach to target these individuals.

3.5.3 SAMPLE SIZE

Saturation will be used to attain the needed number. This is where it seems as if information is repetitive and maximum output is achieved.

3.6 DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS

Data collection instruments are tools used to collect data from participants in a study (Cooper & Schindler, 2003). The study used key-informant interview guides for data collection. The key informant interview guides were used to collect data from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and regional office of APSA in Nairobi.

3.7 DESCRIPTION OF DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES

The key informant interview guide will be used as a data collection tool for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and regional office of APSA in Nairobi. The interviews will be conducted in different specific dates as arranged and agreed with the respondents. The researcher will have a research assistant to coordinate the data collection process in order to eliminate any form of biasness considering that the researcher also works at the Ministry.

3.8 DESCRIPTION OF DATA ANALYSIS

The collected data will be analyzed using content analysis. The findings of structured observation and face-to-face interviews will be analyzed as mentioned. In content analysis, there was the use of non-numerical approach. In other words, the data will be analyzed in narrative form. Further explained, such analysis is based on organizing the information based on the issues discussed, which will be analyzed as interpretation made. In this study, data will be organized based on the two study objectives as the main factors that determined the decision-making process. The analysis and interpretation of data will then be done.

3.9 ETHICAL CONSIDERATION

In order to ensure accurate data analysis that provide desired outcome, ethical issues were to be considered in this study. Before going to the field, the researcher sought the necessary permits and approvals from National Commission for Science, Technology & Innovation (NACOSTI) and Office of the President. Data will be analyzed objectively and precisely to avoid falsification. In order to protect the confidentiality of key informants of the government officials, their responses will be coded in the data presentation and analysis.

This investigation was likewise open to manager feedback for development. Unoriginality was stayed away from by gathering all the data or information required through moral system. Classification of data gave by the respondents was kept up and the key witness talk with guides were outlined such that the respondents did not endure any mental mischief, inconvenience, shame or loss of security. The researcher had a research assistant to coordinate the data collection process in order to eliminate any form of biasness considering that the researcher works at the Ministry too. The findings of the study have been disseminated through departmental seminar defenses as well as publication through journal articles.

4.0 CHAPTER FOUR

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This section seeks to give an in-depth analysis of the two research questions from the primary and secondary data collected that ultimately builds on the main question of decision making and AU’s capacity in attaining aspiration.

4.2 ACTOR PARTICIPATION AND ATTAINMENT OF ASPIRATION 3

To gain an in in depth understanding of the decision-making process we must examine the structures of the APSA. The PSC is mandated with the overall duty of coordinating the organ. The actors are the member states themselves. Therefore, understanding the structures gives us enough insight to know their challenges and whether the aspiration 3 can be achieved. Alternatively, we can know what other models to use. With the PSC there is considerable difference in their operations as a result of the invested needs of the member states of the AU and input of institutions by their respective governments.

According to (Fisher, 2010) notes that the PSC are supposed to initiate co-operation between member states, provide technical and administrative support, monitoring and research to support the development and implementation of regional policies. However, they are an example of the bureaucratic nature of organization where there is hardly neutrality and mostly follow their own agenda. This thus undermines the actorness of the PSC.

There is need to clarify the relationship between PSC and the panel of the wise. This is because the relationship has so far been limited. There is no clear mechanism in the appointment of the members of the PSC. The Executive Council and the Assembly should engage with the RECs to ensure the nominees meet the basic requirements.

This has been noted where the legitimacy of the APSA has been questioned as a result of the way they appoint members to the PSC

The correlation of the PSC and APSA components are also not aligned. There is not enough evidence of cooperation that has been seen between the various components of APSA. Thus, the actorness of the PSC is undermined, and questions of legitimacy has been raised. This creates a tremendous gap in the operation of the PSC.

The Peace and Security Council (PSC), the most visible component of the APSA to date, was established by the first Summit of the AU in Durban, South Africa in July 2002, as the standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. It is meant to act as a collective security and early warning instrument for timely and efficient response to both existing and emerging conflict and crisis situations in Africa. It is supported by the Commission, a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, an African Standby Force and a Special Fund, collectively referred to as the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Among other things, the objectives of the PSC are to promote peace, security and stability in Africa, in order to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property (Fisher, 2010).

4.2.1 FINANCE

Under this section of the interview, the research sought to find out the source of funding, whether it is sufficient or not and what affects the funding process in the PSC in order to attain aspiration 3.

“The Peace Fund is established as one of the key pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture under Article 21 of the PSC Protocol. It is meant to provide the necessary financial resources for peace support missions and other operational activities related to peace and security. The operations of the Peace Fund are to be governed by the relevant Financial Rules and Regulations of the AU.”

Source: Participant one

The same interviewee further described the Peace Fund in a verbatim quote:

“The Peace Fund shall be made up of financial appropriations from the regular budget of AU, including arrears of contributions, voluntary contributions from Member States and from other sources within Africa, including the private sector, civil society and individuals, as well as through appropriate fund-raising activities. The Chairperson of the Commission shall raise and accept voluntary contributions from sources outside Africa, in conformity with the objectives and principles of the AU.”

In cases where there are concerns and how the monies from the Peace Fund is appropriated, the interviewee sought to explain how the Peace Fund actually works in a verbatim quote:

“Within the Peace Fund, there is the revolving Trust Fund. The appropriate amount of the revolving Trust Fund is usually determined by the relevant Policy Organs of the AU upon recommendation by the Peace and Security Council. When required and following a decision by the relevant Policy Organs of the AU, the cost of the operations envisaged under the African Standby Force is assessed by Member States based on the scale of their contributions to the regular budget of the AU.”

Source: Participant two

From the above analysis it key to note that the process of financing and sourcing for finance is marred with uncertainty and challenges. There is a cause for concern regarding the funding of the Peace Fund. The Peace Fund remains little and precarious. The needs of the activities at hand is overwhelming as compared to the finance that is available thus suggesting that finance is insufficient. In this analysis from the above verbatim quotes it is key to note that reimbursement of contribution has not always been honored.

The Peace Fund is envisaged as a standing reserve on which the AU and REC/RMs can call upon in case of emergencies and unforeseen priorities. High-levelled Audit of the African Union. Between 2004 and 2007, an average of 1.9% of the total resources channeled through the Peace Fund came from African member states. The rest is provided by external partners. Due to a combination of factors including the high demand for financial resources and managerial issues, the reserve had a negative balance by 2009 (Fisher, 2010). In a tacit acknowledgement of this state of play, the AU Summit in Tripoli (2009) decided to gradually increase the reserve to a total of 12% by 2012. The Summit stated that it is critical that AU Member States meet their financial obligations, so that the organization’s dependency on external aid is reduced, and that sustainability and ownership guaranteed. In a context where capacities are stretched to the limit, and where organizational development, training and additional recruitment of staff are urgent, the questions and sustainability of APSA are many.

One interviewee sought to explain the importance of this fund in comparison from depending on the international donors which is still critical in a verbatim quote:

“Having specific guidelines and better articulation of the objectives of the Peace Fund can further improve its added value. As a legally approved financial tool, the Peace Fund could serve as a mechanism to align and harmonize the rather unpredictable and volatile external support provided by international partners. To realize that goal the AU member states, AU Commission and international partners must work together. The recently started process of AUC-partners dialogue on joint financing agreements is a step in the right direction.”

Source: Participant three

4.2.2 HUMAN RESOURCE CAPCITY

To effectively realise aspiration 3, it was key to find out the human resource capacity of the PSC. According to on of the interviewee stated in a verbatim quote:

“The fifteen members of the PSC are elected on the basis of equal rights, 10 are elected for a two-year period, while the remaining five are elected for a three-year period on the principle of equitable representation of the five regions: North, West, Central, East and Southern Africa.”

Source: Participant two

Another interviewee states in a verbatim quote:

“None of the fifteen members of the PSC have a veto, all members are entitled to one vote each. However, the Protocol took account of the need for regional balance so as to minimize tensions and increase the potential for consensus in dealing with contentious issues such as military intervention. In addition, it factored in the power balance among its membership by emphasizing the need for members of the PSC to not only be willing to participate in resolving conflicts, but most importantly, to possess the necessary political, military, financial and diplomatic muscle to do so. However, so far, this particular principle has not been adhered to on a consistent basis as some members of the PSC lack the aforementioned requirements. For instance, some current PSC members do not have Defense Attaches in their missions to the AU, and as such, send civilian officials to attend meetings of the Military Staff Committee (MSC)”

Source: Participant three

The process of recruitment as seen from the above verbatim quotes have been marred with challenges of beauracratic nature and unprocedural recruitment. In a source, one of the interviewees stated that the PSC’s decision making is vested in the Permanent Representative Council who are required to meet at least twice every month but have only met at least five times since 2006 in a verbatim quote:

“In a move designed to deal with some of the complications that rendered the Central Organ of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) redundant, the PSC’s decision-making is vested in the Permanent Representatives Council who are required to meet at least twice every month. However, given the unpredictable nature of conflicts, the PSC has on average been meeting at least five times a month since 2006. This has added an enormous burden on the members of the Council especially those with very skeletal staff at their embassies. Moreover, it has increased the workload of the PSC Secretariat, which is increasingly being requested to backstop members with limited capacity, compounding the Secretariat’s already overstretched resources. The other organs of the PSC i.e. the Council of Ministers and Heads of State and Government, are required to meet at least once a year.”

Source: Participant four

From the above, the role of the chair has been limited to chairing PSC sessions with minimal input either to the development of the agenda, work programme or more substantive aspects such as the drafting of reports and Communiqués. Consequently, the chair has played more of a facilitation role instead of actually driving the process by providing clear guidance and input to PSC meetings. The net result has been enormous burden on the PSC Secretariat which has had the additional responsibility of supporting PSC chairs with limited staff. In the long-run, the rather symbolic role of the chair could rob the PSC of the ownership of its programs and activities. While the AU Commission appears to have filled the gap by providing administrative and other forms of support to PSC meetings, a development that could be sustainable in the short-term, it is not sustainable in the long-term given that the Secretariat is understaffed as well.

On interviewee sort to give a number on the human resource available in the PSC Secretariat in a verbatim quote:

“The PSC Secretariat consisted of 4 professional staff, one secretary and an administrative assistant. However, even this limited number is considered a boost from the number of staff approved through the Maputo Structure, which only provided for 2 professional staff: The Secretary to PSC, a P2 official and an administrative assistant, a figure that does not even match the more mundane responsibilities of the Secretariat such as convening PSC meetings. The skeletal staff level has been exacerbated by the growing role of the PSC in dealing with a wide range of existing and emerging security issues. Despite being overstretched, the PSC Secretariat appears to have been quite efficient in carrying out its numerous tasks. However, its continued effectiveness cannot be guaranteed with its current staff levels and ever-growing mandate.”

Source: Participant five

From the above verbatim. The report states that meanwhile, even if the Secretariat proposed increased in the number of personnel from its current 4 staff posts to 13 is approved, that still pales in comparison to the UN’s Security Council Affairs Division with a staff complement of over 60. Needless to say, the disparity between the two support organs of the PSC and the UNSC is quite stark. To put this in perspective, the Security Council Affairs Division which has ten times more staff than the PSC Secretariat is limited to a purely support function, while, the PSC Secretariat with its skeletal staff has increasingly assumed a broader role due to some of the issues discussed above. This situation is even more problematic because the PSC Secretariat does not have a legal expert despite the fact it is dealing with a lot of issues that require legal interpretation. This is not sustainable and needs to be addressed urgently.

One interviewee strongly states that the PSC does not meet its capacity as the need to carry out their mandate is hindered by the lack of facilities and human resource capacity. The source states in a verbatim quote:

“For example, convening a PSC meeting is contingent on at least two considerations. First, is the availability of a conference room, the PSC is yet to have a dedicated meeting room with all the necessary translation equipment. Second, is the availability of translators, the PSC does not have a dedicated pool of translators and as such has to rely on those from the Commission’s Conference Services whose pool of translators is limited as well. That the Secretariat has to rely on this department is problematic because it is often overcommitted and most importantly, its working methods are not flexible. For instance, while the bulk of PSC meetings are determined by the exigencies of events, the conference services department requires prior booking of translators, an impractical situation from the standpoint of the PSC.”

Source: Participant six

From the above it is evident that most of the professional staff of the PSC Secretariat were hired through partner support raises questions of sustainability. The reluctance of member states to approve new posts, in spite of the overwhelming evidence of the need to do so, brings to the fore questions about their level of commitment to the full operationalization of the APSA and hinders decision-making. It is obvious that competing demands for resources in the respective member states in the face of the global economic crisis, has resulted in dampened political interest especially as it relates to approving more posts for some of the APSA components. So far, bi-lateral and multi-lateral partner support has filled the void however, this suffers from two defects. First, partner support is often not predictable and flexible and in the interest of the recipients, and second, it is not clear how long such support can be sustained.

Operationally, the PSC has been the most visible component of the emerging Peace and Security architecture. It has held nearly 250 meetings and briefing sessions on a wide range of issues, demonstrating two things. First, the growing commitment of AU member states to tackle conflicts on the continent. Second, the frequency with which it has met demonstrates the fragility of the security situation in some of its members. At another level, the PSC has convened three retreats on some key thematic and procedural issues in Dakar, Senegal in 2007, in Livingstone, Zambia in December 2008 and in Ezulwini, Swaziland in September 2009. During these meetings, the PSC adopted its working methods, the Livingstone Formula defining its relationship with civil society organizations and how to enhance the implementation of sanctions in situations involving unconstitutional change of government. In addition to the above, the PSC has authorized the deployment of peacekeepers to Burundi (AMIB), Comoros (AMISEC), Sudan (AMIS) and more recently Somalia (AMISOM). The deployment of peacekeepers in these theatres has exposed a major gap between the PSC’s willingness to authorize such missions and the AU’s ability to implement them. Shortage of resources like human and material has emerged as a major shortfall. How the AU deals with this mandate-resource gap would determine the continued credibility of the PSC, since decisions that are not backed by resources would in the long run erode its credibility.

One of the interviewee stated that in regard to employment of the staff, there is a disconnect between the AU and the regions when it comes to electing members of the PSC in a verbatim quote:

“There is a potential disconnect between the AU and the regions when it comes to electing members of the PSC, as despite the laid down criteria, election of members rests with the regions. This limits the ability of the AU to enforce its principles as the regions have adopted their own formula for nominating members to the PSC. For instance, some regions have agreed to have one of their members occupy the three-year seat almost on a permanent basis, thus, creating a pseudo-permanent member but without any veto powers. The gap between the AU and the regions on the criteria for electing members creates a dilemma and raises profound questions. First, to what extent is it realistic for the AU to enforce its criteria for electing members to the PSC? Second, under what circumstances should the AU reject candidates nominated by their regions? Finally, what does this gap say about the principle of subsidiarity that is meant to underpin the AU’s relations with the RECs?”

Source: Participant two

From the above verbatim it is clear that the same policy makers are in awe in how the recruitment of personnel/ human resource is possibly what undermines the effectiveness of the PSC in attaining aspiration 3. There is no clarity in how the appointment or the rejections are done. It not possible to reinforce all the laid down criteria since there is a huge resource gap in the PSC, AU and the member states. This backed by a verbatim quote:

“Although an exhaustive response to these questions is beyond the remit of this study, it is desirable to enforce the laid down criteria, it is unrealistic to enforce all of them given the huge resource disparities between AU member states. For instance, the capacities of members with enormous financial and human resources cannot be compared to some of the smaller and less well-resourced but equally important members of the AU.”

Source: Participant two

There was evidence that several member states have strengthened the staff component in their missions to the AU following their appointment to the PSC. The cases of Ghana and Uganda are glaring examples in this respect. Prior to their membership of the PSC, both countries had no defense attaches, however, they have since deployed these officials in their embassies in Addis Ababa; a practice that should be encouraged. At the heart of the challenges of enforcing the criteria for membership of the Council is the principle of subsidiarity, which is meant to be one of the guiding principles of the relationships between the AU and the RECs/RMs. The regions, which have adopted their own formulas for electing members to the PSC in some instances, appear to be driven more by political bargaining than complying with the criteria in the Protocol a situation that exposes gaps in the application of the subsidiarity principle.

It is evident therefore that the challenges in human resource recruitment, competences of the available staff, resource availability all have affected in the way the PSC functions and consequently the decision-making process is either altered, skipped or ambiguous and thus lacks viability. It certainly affects the mandate of APSA since decision-making is a rather tedious process marred with significant challenges that cannot certainly allow the attainment of the aspiration 3.

4.2.3 POLITICAL WILL

The research sought to interrogate and find out the effect of political will on actorness and decision making in the attainment of aspiration 3. One of interviewee in a verbatim quote states that

“Political will is merely a game of interest that favors the ones that are at play. The PSC has several mandates some of which are over ridden by the UN and the conflicting emerging issues between RECs also makes it hard for the PSC to function. Hegemonic countries in Africa have a crucial role in steering the direction of the PSC and its Peace Keep missions/operatives.”

Source: Participant one

Another interviewee states in a verbatim quote:

“The one principle that the PSC appears to have consistently enforced is the one that bars its members from participating in decision making on situations where they have a direct involvement. The Protocol stipulates that PSC members that are party to a conflict or a situation that is under consideration by the PSC should recuse themselves from the discussion and decision-making process on the particular case. This principle has been largely adhered to, with some few exceptions. For instance, when Sudan was a member of the PSC it was allowed to make presentations on the crisis in Darfur, it was not allowed to participate in the decision-making process. The AU needs to clarify what constitutes a party to conflict. Given the cross-border nature of most conflicts, there has been situations where some members of the PSC who were deemed to be party to a conflict insisted on participating in PSC meetings on the basis that from their standpoint they are not directly involved in the given conflict situation. If not properly addressed, this issue would in the long run undermine the credibility of the PSC as an impartial actor in conflict situations.”

Source: Participant seven

Thus, from the above statements it is evident there a lot that goes into political will, a variety of issues emerging in regard to when and how countries cooperate and when they do not. The varying interests among member states prevents them from attaining that strong political will that would steer the PSC in its operation and attaining aspiration 3.

4.3 PROCEDURES OF DECISION MAKING AND ITS EFFECT IN THE ATTAINMENT OF ASPIRATION 3

An interviewee stated that different stakeholders are usually involved in the consultation and review of the decision process, in a verbatim quote:

“The procedures of decision making involves a number of processes. Institutionally, the PSC is mandated to work with the Chairperson of the Commission, who will assist it in carrying out its mandate. Although the Commission has been providing the PSC with regular reports on progress and challenges on issues of peace and security on the continent, what has been missing is the link between the PSC and the Panel of the Wise, there is no formalized link between the two organs.”

Source: Anonymous

Another interviewee stated that different stakeholders are usually involved in the consultation and review of the decision process, in a verbatim quote:

“For example, the Military Staff Composition is mandated to advise the PSC on questions relating to military and security issues that are on its agenda. Consisting of senior military officers of PSC members, the chair of the MSC is held concurrently by the same country that is chairing the PSC. Since its establishment in 2004, the MSC has been engaged in providing advice on the PSC’s authorized peace operations in Burundi, Sudan, Comoros and currently Somalia.”

The same interviewee states further in regard to the above in a verbatim quote:

“The MSC cannot address civilian and police issues given its pure military composition. This deprives the PSC of the multi-dimensional advice that is required when it contemplates authorizing peace operations.”

Source: Participant six

Thus, from the above it’s clear that the decision process is not coherent and there isn’t a document that can attest to how the decisions are made in the PSC. From the analysis the decision-making process in the first place isn’t clear thus creates room for decisions to equally be by-passed. This leads to the question of is there an official rule of procedures?

The official rules of procedure as a document does not exist but the process of decision making is scattered under ambiguous statements in different protocols and among it the Constitutive Act establishing the African Union. The adoption of the PSC Protocol at the first ordinary session of the AU heads of state and government was in Durban, South Africa. It came into force in January 2004 following its ratification by a simple majority of member states of the AU and was launched in May 2004. This Protocol endowed the AU with a comprehensive peace and security architecture, which has come to be known as the African Union Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The Peace and Security Council (PSC) is central to the APSA and is a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts which operates as a collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa. The mandates accorded to the PSC as stipulated under Article 7.

In this itself the study reveals that the important document the rules of procedure does not exist on its own since decisions made can be derived from different guidelines under the PSC Protocol. This cannot be substantive as cases of collision and contradicting decisions can be made which poses a significant challenge in the attainment of aspiration 3.

5.0 CHAPTER 5

5.1 SUMMARY OF THE STUDY

Findings from the two hypothesis of the study reveals that the linkage between the PSC and the rest of the rest of the organs is not clear or rather it is very limited. The way the two that is the PSC and the rest of the organs is not at par and its optimal due to the act that it has not been fully operationalized. Moreover, institutional support to the PSC, whose agenda of activities has grown exponentially, is limited. The PSC and the Secretariat is overstretched due to growing demands on it to support both the PSC and some of its members with few capacities in their embassies.

Sustainability has been a question asked and from the findings it is noted that this issue is quite evident in the AU Commission and RECs/RMs because of the operationalization of the APSA has been dependent on partner support. From the findings this can be explained by the fact that recruitment of staff at the AU is constrained by the Maputo Structure which limits the number of personnel that can be hired through the regular budget.

As a result, there has been over reliance on external partner support for the key components of the APSA including the PSC. It is established that many of the staff of the PSC Secretariat, the Panel of the Wise and the Liaison Officers were recruited on short-term contract through support from various partners. This creates room for doubts and questions whether this approach is truly sustainably and ultimately will affect negatively the realization of aspiration 3 and the decision-making processes. The pathway of the PSC is not a certain one and its methodology in running its activities through partner support is equally not sustainable in decision-making processes. Further there is consensus among the AU and RECs about uncertainties that result from the unpredictable nature of partner support.

There is very little clarity on the application of subsidiarity and its effects on political will. From the findings it is viewed that the APSA-PSC merely views itself as an implementing body but plays the role of coordination thus decision making is not clearly articulated in its mandate. There those actors that ask whether the PSC’s role should be that of decision making, implementing or coordinating. The unanswered question is who identifies those specific areas that the AU should be involved in decision making and implementing and those for which it should have a coordination role thus this shows us that its mandate has not been clearly stated.

There is consensus from the data collected that the APSA-PSC is currently not playing that role effectively due to the human resource constraints at the headquarters. That this has been a cross cutting issue in AU. Thus, strengthening the human resource capacity of the AU Commission is important first in the application of actorness and in turn the realization of aspiration 3.

As (Fisher, 2010) states “an enhanced Commission would be a stronger position to provide the strategic guidance that is needed for the full operationalization of the APSA. For instance, the AU is lagging behind some of the RECs/RMs in the operationalization of some of the APSA components. The African Standby Force is a classic example of this trend. While some of the RECs/RMs had already exercised their PLANELMs and undertaken field exercises, the AMANI exercise for the AU PLANELM was undertaken only recently. Under the circumstance, the AU PLANELM which is meant to act as the nerve center of the ASF is essentially lagging behind the components that it is supposed to lead. This situation applies to other APSA components such as early warning where both ECOWAS and IGAD have more advanced early warning mechanisms than the AU. Needless to say, this undermines an effective application of the subsidiarity principle; an important principle that underpins the APSA.”

Much resources have been devoted to the development of conflict management instruments such as the ASF, there is a need for a balance with conflict prevention instruments such as early warning systems and improved governance, which is perhaps the single most important prevention tool. The governance body PSC has played a salient role here. However, even the conceptualization of the ASF is viewed as not comprehensive it is more of an instrument for peace support operation based on the six scenarios outlined in the roadmap for its operationalization. The actorness of PSC in decision making has rather been inefficient and does not fully capture the conflict triggers and the changing dynamics in all the regions.

There is limited coherence between and among the APSA components at the AU and the RECs/RMs. This is particularly noticeable with the PSC, the Panel of the Wise and similar structures in the regions. Further to date, there has been limited interaction between these pillars despite the fact that they are seized with the same conflict situations. Even with the more structured approach to operationalizing the ASF and the CEWS, there are both conceptual and practical disconnects. There is lack of consensus on a harmonization of information collection which trickles down and affects the whole decision process of the PSC and attainment of the aspiration 3.

Overall, there is need to diversify partner support for APSA. It is currently too dependent on EU support as even the REC/RM Liaison Officers to the AU are supported through the APF. This is viewed in some quarters as a risky strategy as the operationalization of the APSA could be weakened if EU support is withheld or withdrawn. Moreover, the imposition of ‘one-size-fits all’ conditionalities such as the need for all RECs/RMs to spend at least 70% of their previous APF allocations before new funds can be disbursed is problematic because not all RECs/RMs have the same 70 absorptive capacity and resource needs. Consequently, the capacity-building efforts in some RECs/RMs have been held back due to weak absorptive capacity or other factors in others.

In summary, finance, human resource and political will is very critical in the way decisions are made and influence actorness of APSA. It is evident that APSA is lacking in these three variables and thus affects even AUs capacity in attaining aspiration 3. The member states, non-state actors like Civil Society who have been identified as the actors have played a skewed role in the decision-making process. The member states who contribute in this decision process are influences heavily by the interests at play, the strongest contributing states and lack of political will.

5.2 CONCLUSION

In conclusion the three-variable finance, human resource and political has been noted as crucial in the procedures of decision making in APSA and identify the actors. The organizational and financial capacity of the AUC and REC/RMs is closely linked to successful operationalization of the Peace Fund and other internal and external financing arrangements. In order to strengthen APSA and ensure its effective organizational, managerial and financial functioning APSA-PSC management need to further strengthen ongoing efforts to ensure that the support services are in line with best international standards. Such continental and regional standard setting is also a must if APSA-PSC wants to pursue sustainable, flexible and predictable contributions from the UN and major international partners in order to achieve aspiration 3.

Improving the coordination and cooperation in APSA, the AU Commission and RECs/RMs (especially between Peace and Security and Political Affairs) at the Commission is a cornerstone for strengthening the institutional capacity of the PSC and thus improves the decision-making process. Increase collaboration and partnership with Civil Society as actors identified in the decision-making process can enhance the achievement of aspiration 3. The engagement of stakeholders and other outreach has proved reliable in enhancing key decisions made. APSA is operationalized in a wider context of peace and security on the continent. It cannot achieve its goals without constructive engagement with key actors such as private sector, civil society, think-tanks, universities and other key interest groups. Operationalization of APSA pillars has so far been limited to a small community of AU/RECs/RM officials. This should be changed so that support is given top increase awareness through constructive outreach and information flows in order to enhance decision making process

As noted by the high-levelled AU audit in 2012, none of the African organizations implementing APSA has the sufficient number and qualification of staff. This has and continues to be a serious constraint for the implementation of decisions made in APSA. This is recognized by African Heads of States who underlined the importance of strengthening the (AU) Commission’s capacity to better address the challenge including speedy recruitment of necessary staff.

As is the case in most international organization, monitoring of decisions reached by member states and other regional organization remains a key challenge for integration including strengthening of APSA. Such monitoring should take place at several levels: Firstly, timely and effective monitoring of implementation by AUC, RECs, RMs and member states of the PSC protocol and other policy frameworks related to the African Peace and Security Architecture (i.e. treaties, protocols etc.). Secondly, at the technical and operational level where agreed strategies, policies, concepts on APSA must be followed up by the executive agencies of the AU and REC/RMs.

In summary the APSA has a lot more to do in terms of operationalize its components, recruitment and finance budgeting which all affects the decisions process rendering it ineffective. Actorness of the APSA-PSC has been compromised by conditionality’s, lack of transparency and member states political will due to the divergent views in place and as revealed by financial and human resources challenges. In order to attain aspiration 3 of the AU then the financial capacity, human resource and political will needs to be improved or strengthened for better procedures of decision making.

5.3 RECOMMENDATION AND WAY FORWARD

Based on the findings of the study and conclusion, the study recommends the following to improve/strengthen AUs capacity in decision-making and further leading to the attainment of aspiration three:

1. Clarify PSC relationship with Panel: The AU should clarify the role of the Panel of the Wise and its relationship with the PSC, vice-versa. The relationship between the two entities has so far been very limited. While this could be explained by the fact that most of the components of the APSA are still being operationalized, it is equally important to ensure that they are properly aligned throughout the operationalization process.
2. Enforce criteria for appointing PSC members: While it might be impractical for the Executive Council and Assembly to enforce the full range criteria for membership of the PSC, it should nonetheless engage with the RECs to ensure that their nominees meet at least the basic requirements. For example, the capacity of members to participate fully in the activities of the PSC and adherence to good governance norms should be cardinal requirements for memberships. Appointing members that do not meet the basic criteria would in the long-run undermine the credibility and legitimacy of the PSC; two principles that should be preserved.
3. Improve synergy between PSC and other APSA components: Related to the above, the AU should ensure greater synergy between the PSC and other APSA components. There is a strong imperative for closer collaboration and coordination between the PSC and other components due to its pivotal role in the maintenance of peace and security on the continent. To date, there is limited evidence of cooperation between the various entities, a gap that needs to be plugged urgently.
4. Have additional staff for PSC Secretariat: Provide additional staff to deal with the Secretariat’s growing responsibilities. A first step in this direction would be to approve the 13 posts and proposed committees. It is critical to ensure that newly hired staff possesses diverse backgrounds and in-depth understanding of the dynamics of peace and conflict on the continent.
5. Establish modalities for the use of the Fund: The AU needs to establish modalities on what and how resources from the Peace Fund can be used for. There were no modalities in place on the use of the fund, this is a gap needs to be addressed. The AU should establish strong resource mobilization strategies and mechanisms for the Peace Fund. Such structures would ensure that resource mobilization is undertaken on a more structured and consistent manner
6. Provide clear and consistent strategic guidance: The AU should provide strategic guidance for the operationalization of APSA and its key decision-, made. While the AU has provided some guidance on specific components of the APSA such as the ASF, through the development of the roadmap for its full operationalization, it needs to do more for the other components. This would not only reinforce the principle of subsidiarity, but it would ensure greater harmonization coherence and decision making of APSA
7. Improve staffing levels at the APSA: the staffing level at the APSA needs to be significantly increased. To ensure sustainability and to enhance residual capacity, the AU needs to revise the Maputo Structure which currently limits the Commission’s ability to hire staff through its regular budget. While partner support has helped to fill this gap through the various capacity-building programs, it is nonetheless, not a sustainable foundation to build the APSA. Staffing of the various APSA components at the AU especially the PSC. This ultimately breaks down monotony of power and improves decision making.
8. Establish stronger institutional linkage and decision-making processes with the RECs/RMs: APSA should strengthen its relationship with the RECs and RMs. Despite the existence of the Protocol and the MoU between itself and these entities, the 72-institutional relationship between them remains weak. This is a critical gap given that the RECs/RMs are the pillars of the APSA thus hinders an effective decision-making process. To deal with this, it would be important to improve on the partnership framework between the Chairperson of the AU and the Chief Executives of the RECs/RMs. One practical step in this direction would be to ensure that the Chairperson of the AU meets with these officials in advance of AU Summits. Such meetings would allow them to review developments in the respective regions, and potentially shape the agenda and decisions of Summit meetings.
9. Dedicated translators: Provide the PSC Secretariat with its own dedicated translators who can be called upon without prior notification. Having a standby pool of translators is consistent with the mandate of the PSC, especially as it must provide adequate and timely response to emerging challenges.

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