EU Enlargement. A Norms Entrepreneurship Exercise?

Table of Contents

Abstract

EU Enlargement: A Norms Entrepreneurship Exercise?.

Introduction.

Norms and EU Enlargements.

Second Enlargement Round: Phase I-1981.

The Eastern enlargement/Fourth round of enlargement-2004. 10

Conclusion.

References.

EU Enlargement: A Norms Entrepreneurship Exercise?

Abstract

This paper takes a look at the debates surrounding EU enlargement from the perspective of norms entrepreneurship.. It begins by introducing the challenges that come with enlargement including both administrative and financial commitments that EU members must bear as they enlarge. In the cost-benefits analysis, it would only mean that EU would enlarge in circumstances where benefits have surpassed costs. However this is not always the case with EU enlargement. Consequently leading to the need for a search of other motives behind the enlargement which this paper has attempted. The question to what extent are norms the drives of EU enlargement? has been answered with two objectives. First the examination of when and how norms are formulated in the process of an enlargement and secondly the evaluation of the role norms play in making the final decision to enlarge. This paper using an historical approach has probed the debates and negotiations around EU enlargement from the Second to the CEECs enlargement accounting for the role of norms in shaping debates and framing members’ behavior. Finally this paper has concluded that in cases where the need for norms entrepreneurship superseded the calculations of cost and benefits, EU framed the enlargement as a norms exercise hence the conclusion that norms play a key role in enlargement.

Introduction

To enlarge or not to enlarge has been a central question in the politics of European Union (EU). In the Cold War period we witnessed EU enlargement more as an infrequent occurrence with United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden joining in 1973, Greece 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986. However, in the post-Cold War era, enlargement has become a permanent item at the top of the EU’s agenda (Frank Schimmelfennig, 2006). EU enlargement as ‘a process of gradual and formal institutionalization of organizational rules and norms’ affects both the EU as an organization and the new entrant member (F. Schimmelfennig, 2002). Enlargement raises issues in “deciding where Europe stops, or should stop… What kinds of criteria are being used to determine this?” (Sjursen, 2006). Besides the questions on extend and criteria, enlargement enables “the behavior of a larger group of actors becomes governed by EU rules” (Frank Schimmelfennig, 2006). This means the EU gains control over the behavior of many actors as a result of enlargement.

This power of gaining control over the behavior of other actors always come at a cost. For instance, it is argued that any round of enlargement increases decision and transaction costs (Schimmelfennig F. , 2006). The heterogeneity of the new members complicate the decision making process since each member has its own preferences. In similar vein, the addition of new languages means added costs of interpretation hence an increase in cost of communication. New forms of contact must be established which translates to establishment of many other offices and employment of new staff which leads to additional administrative costs. In regard to the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) enlargement of 2004, it has been argued that they would expose members especially from the southern countries to stiff competition in low-tech industries like textile, metalworking and leather (R. E. Baldwin, 1997). Similarly, EU transfers to the CEECs would outweigh their contributions making them net recipients of EU transfers (Schimmelfennig F. , 2006). This meant that members had to dip further into their coffers to fund this round of enlargement.

In similar vein, in the calculation of the commission, the eastern enlargement would increase EU population by 29 percent, the GDP would only grow by 9 percent consequently making the GDP per head to reduce by 16 percent^[1]. Coupled with other factors like budget increase which was projected to rise based on the scenario of enlargement and pre-enlargement policy from 20 percent to two-thirds (R. E. Baldwin, 1997). Stemming from these costs, Netherlands and Germany which are net contributors objected to the eastern enlargement (Schimmelfennig F. , 2006). However, The CEECs became members of EU in 2004. This therefore points to the fact that EU, despite being a rational actor with the commission carrying out calculation on the economic costs and benefits still enlarged eastwards with all indicators pointing to more financial commitment from members and stiff competition in low-tech industries for southern members. This meant that economic considerations did not matter to the EU in this enlargement round.

Eastern enlargement did not only pose economic challenges but also political challenges. For instance it has been opined that, the new members would bring in problematic legacies of ethno-nationalistic conflicts and authoritarian political traditions, move EU closer to problematic regions of the Balkans and Middle East and worsen the distributional problems due to wider economic cleavages (Schimmelfennig F. , 2006). It has been argued that, “the lengthy process of eastern and south-eastern enlargement is a prospect which is prompting a good deal of nervousness among the practitioners” (Wallace, 2001). Despite the risks that brought about the nervousness, EU still enlarged eastwards. Subsequently Frank elsewhere has argued that, this decision went beyond the explanation power of liberal intergovernmentalism and called for sociological explanations with liberal values and norms as the drives behind EU enlargement (Schimmelfennig F. , 2001). This paper therefore seeks to answer the question; to what extent are norms the drives of EU enlargement? In answering this question, this paper addresses the following two objectives. First the examination of when and how norms are formulated in the process of an enlargement and secondly the evaluation of the role norms play in making the final decision to enlarge. By adopting an historical approach, this paper takes a look at the enlargements starting with the second round to the CEECs enlargement probing the formation and use of norms to sufficiently answer the research question.

Norms and EU Enlargements

In this section, I examine the circumstances under which the EU members resolves to the use of norms in justifying or rejecting any move towards enlargement. The norms here are the values and identities that are vital to Europe used in defining the degree of belonging to the European community. In doing this, the paper appreciates other conditions based on the rational approaches to enlargement and why the sociological approaches are resorted to in justifying a decision to enlarge. Similarly, the paper evaluate the persuasive power of the norms over rational economic calculations and power balance in convincing members to approve a particular round of enlargement. Starting with the second round of enlargement to the CEECs enlargement, the paper will be able to sufficiently account for the role of norms in EU enlargement. In the end the paper can conclude whether norms persuasive power has been the drive behind EU enlargement thus concluding whether EU enlargement is a norms entrepreneurship exercise.

Second Enlargement Round: Phase I-1981

This round is marked by the entry of Greece to the EEC after making her application in 1975 barely two years after the first enlargement thus no proper adjustment had taken place. The effects of the first enlargement being described as ‘more severe than anticipated’ stretching the community system and institutions to the limit^[2]. Consequently raising doubts about the ability of the Commission and the Council to “survive the addition of yet more member governments, each with its own special national interests to protect and defend”^[3]. To this end, enlargement looked less viable despite the Council’s pronouncement in 1972 of a possibility of a European Union an idea which was thrown in disarray by the oil crisis of 1973 (Verney, 2006). The crisis did not only complicate the chances of integration but left each country pre-occupied with measures to overcome the crisis shifting the focus from the European agenda to national-domestic agenda.

The economic recession which diverted the attention of Nation-States called for a new objectives of the EEC buttressed by the Tindemans Report which claimed that, “Over the years, the European public has lost a guiding light, namely the political consensus between our countries on our reasons for undertaking this joint task and the characteristics with which we wish to endow it” (European Council 1976: 11). Subsequently, it has been deduced that EU suffered both questions of legitimacy and direction (Verney, 2006). It is at this time when EU is facing enormous challenges that Greece which was also of less economic consequence applied to join EU. It is noteworthy that at this time, there was only one condition provided for under the Treaty of Rome which was geographical under Article 237 limiting the right to apply to European states. However, there were two informal conditions on politics and economics that had been imposed on the country wishing to join the Community (Verney, 2006).

Greece approached EEC in 1959 for membership but was only offered an association agreement and it is observed that by mid 1970s, the evaluation of Greece revealed impracticability of full membership. The Commission in its ‘Opinion’ estimated the Greek GDP per capita to be less than 60 percent of EC average as well as only being 84 percent and 70 percent of Ireland and Italy respectively which were the poorest.^[4] Consequently, bringing fear among member that the Greece membership would slow down the growth of integration. It is lamented that, “unless the Commission is in a position to force the pace, history shows us that integration proceeds at the pace which is acceptable to the slowest member-government”^[5]. This meant that the overall economic growth of members would be slowed to accommodate the pace of Greece which members were uneasy with. Subsequently leading to different suggestions like that offered by Willy Brandt, former West German Chancellor who proposed two-tier structure or Europe of two-speeds revealing the fears that members were nursing.

Greek membership would also mean huge financial costs beside the economic risks (Verney, 2006). For instance it was observed that, “If Greece had been a full member in 1976, the additional net cost to the Community would have amounted to 4 per cent of the existing budget”^[6]. In similar vein, the under developed Greek agricultural sector meant an increase in cost of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) which was already a thorn in the flesh of the Nine members of the community (Verney, 2006). Further, major agricultural produces from Greece were surplus within the community. For instance The Guardian reported that, ‘Greek wine could make the wine lake deeper’^[7]. Sectoral interests strongly opposed the Greek membership. The opposition which took center-stage in both Municipal and national elections in France in 1977 and 1978 respectively with major parties objecting to Greece membership demanding that CAP reforms needed to precede it (Verney, 2006). Coupled with Greek migrant workers challenge that Germany was having, Greek membership stood to hurt the community most.

The fear of importation of conflict to the community added to the economic equation making Greece membership even more complex. Greece and Turkey both EC associates had been having conflict over sovereignty in Aegean as well as over Cyprus which Turkey invaded in 1974 which to a great degree threatened peace between the two countries. It is argued that by Greek accession it would drag EC into the East Mediterranean problem as well as lose its neutrality as an arbiter (Verney, 2006). In addition, there is no land frontiers that Greece was sharing with other members except a sea border with Italy which still worked against Greece prospect of membership. Geopolitically however, Greece had some advantages which made it host strategic US bases both as a NATO member and as a frontline State. Unfortunately, the 1967 coup and Turkish invasion of Cyprus was blamed on the US action and inaction respectively leading to opposition to NATO and subsequent withdrawal of Greece from NATO’s military wing citing abandonment by allies at the time of need, thus weakening the Alliance’s strategic south eastern wing (Verney, 2006).

Following the fall of the Junta, speculations were rife especially by foreign journalists that Greece would become neutral or move towards Soviet Union^[8]. The anti-US party (PASOK) and a pro-Soviet communist party made great strides in votes’ share making 25 percent and 9 percent respectively in 1977. Subsequently leading to fears that Greece would drift away from the west. Despite even the enormous structural changes that Greece had to undergo and the suggestion to delay^[9] the membership for the adjustments, the Council of ministers agreed to accept unconditionally the Greek application giving way for negotiations and entry after the conclusion (Verney, 2006). The complexities notwithstanding, Greece formally enter the community on 1 January 1981 having launched the application on 12 June 1975. The Economist alluded to Greece welcoming by the community as that of ‘half-open arms’^[10] indicating the underlying fears.

The negotiations of Greek membership was marked with both low and high politics (see Wallace 1979:21-2; Leigh 1978:5) changing the tone and momentum of the negotiations. The second phase which brought in actors like political parties, economic interests groups opposed the Greek membership on the basis of economic terms hence deepening the fears (Verney, 2006). Nonetheless some members argued that Greece would act as a link to other markets views expressed in the EU parliament debates of 1975^[11]. Greece was viewed as a potential bridge for European economic and trade link with the Middle East, the Mediterranean and Africa. The Greece’s large merchant marine fleet was viewed to be of great potential in making EC a major global shipping power. These are observed to have been associated with the later stages of negotiations not the crucial stages (Verney, 2006). Opposition for membership was not only coming from the EC members but also from within Greece. The political left viewed association with EC as that of foreign monopoly, some business circles also disapproving EC association on the fear of losing national subsidies for particular economic segments critical to political interest (Ifantis, 2001).

Nevertheless, the application was motivated by strategic foreign policy informed by Greek-Turkish Conflict, the Greek government without hesitation accepted the legal acquis communautaire (Elvert, 2004). How then did Greece succeed in concluding negotiations so fast to EC membership? Die Welt, has claimed for instance that, EC entry would compensate the withdrawal by Greece from NATO tying it closer to Europe’.^[12] The Times, in more dramatic way noted that ‘it should be possible to balance the divorce proceedings in NATO with marriage negotiations in the Commission’^[13]. It has also been opined that the EC membership could have been used as a carrot to lure Greece back to NATO’s (Verney, 2006). On the other hand security arguments were offered with Britain favoring Greek membership as a crucial strategic ally in stabilizing the unpredictable Balkans after the exit of President Tito^[14]. It is noteworthy that in December 1973 about 18 months before Greece launched an accession application, the ‘Declaration on the European Identity’ was published by the Nine Foreign Ministers outlining the ‘cherished values’ of EU’s common civilization^[15]. The values that included: representative democracy, the rule of law, social justice and human rights. These values, economic and security considerations on Greek EC accession notwithstanding played a key role in influencing decision.

Greece has been observed to have European credentials from the classical Athens heritage as the origin of European civilization with a cross-party consensus appearing in EU parliament debate in November of 1975 (Verney, 2006). This followed the description of Greece as the ‘fountainhead’ by the Socialist Group representative and speaker from the Christian Democrats asserting that it is ‘the part of the world where the European ideal first showed its true face’^[16] President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing of France who was a great proponent of culturally-based EU construction while commenting after the successful completion of EC entry negotiations described Greek membership as ‘a return to the roots’^[17]. Greece was not described as the ‘other’ in debates towards its accession thus legitimizing the enlargement. Giscard d’Estaing’s formulation, signified that the Greek entry was a consolidation of community’s own ‘European’ nature. It is argued that accession of Greece as the birthplace of democracy would reinforce the creation of the community as a reflection of the age-old tradition of values inherent in Europe (Verney, 2006).

The view of Greece as a center of European values was re-echoed by the Commission Vice-President, Sir Christopher Soames, when the Greek chief negotiator Ioannis Pesmazoglu of the Association agreement was arrested by the Junta. He said, ‘here was a European country –the fount of our ideals of democratic liberty – which would in due course join us as a full member . . . as a European democracy among European democracies’^[18]. This kind of speeches shaped the discourse on Greek membership being seen as part and parcel of Europe in terms of values and ideals. It is opined that at this time when the EC was striving to establish European Identity, the EC anti-Junta strategy conceptualized the Greek accession and enlargement as that of values key of which democracy (Verney, 2006). Subsequently, European Commission’s ‘fresco’ on enlargement, indicated that the community was ‘entrusted . . . with a political responsibility which it cannot refuse, except at the price of denying the principles on which it is itself grounded’^[19]. This made rejecting Greece an impossible task despite the practical challenges since it would affect the core values upon which the community was founded hence credibility and legitimacy.

Stemming from the above it is clear that actors in this enlargement process were able to instrumentally use the norms not only as an identity but also to constrain their behavior and influence their choices (Schimmelfennig F. , 2001). It has been argued that ‘accession was presented as an issue of principle that allowed consensus to emerge’. It has been further opined that whereas, ‘interests could be divisive, bringing out differences among the member states, values had the potential to unify by emphasizing concepts supposedly common within the Community’ (Verney, 2006). The need of members to demonstrate their commitment to community values guaranteed a positive result since democracy of Greece was at stake. Consequently, presenting the debate on enlargement as a question of value-based did not only alter the perception of the audience but also set boundaries on what could be said about the candidate hence influencing the outcome. The admission of Greece based on the democratic obligation affirms the constitutive and persuasive power of norms in EU enlargement.

Second Phase of the Second Enlargement (Spain and Portugal-1986)

This phase of second enlargement was influence by the first phase of Greek accession which provided a precedent. Franco made application to EEC for the first time on 9 February 1962 being motivated purely by economic interests. The European Commission’s response was negative indicating that a ‘non-democratic’ state would not become member of EEC (Elvert, 2004). The framing of the membership to EC here being seen as that of purely value based with Greek having been admitted on the same grounds. Spain only managed to be considered for membership after the death of Franco with accession negotiations starting in 1978. It has been observed that, this meant the aspirations stemming from Franco’s time were close within reach. Consequently, many interests groups supported the move to join EC with Prime Minister Suárez Gonzáles of the Union de Centro Democrático (UCD) leading the pack. However some far left political parties opposed the EC membership arguing that it was a capitalist superstructure meant to keep the European people down (Guardia, 2001). Despite the serious economic issues especially in agricultural trade and fisheries raised by EC members about Spain the argument for consolidation of democracy carried the day with no country vetoing Spanish quest of accession.

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^[1] European Commission, Agenda 2000, DOC/97/7

^[2] Irish Times, 5 August 1975

^[3] The Economist, 22 November 1975

^[4] The Commission, European Commission 1976: 9

^[5] The Times, 17 March 1977

^[6] The Commission, European Commission 1976: 8

^[7] Guardian, 9 October 1975

^[8] Daily Telegraph, quoted in Akropolis, 4 September 1974

^[9] The Commission, European Commission 1976: 9–10

^[10] The Economist, editions of 7 December 1974 and 10 May 1975, respectively

^[11] EP, 12 November 1975, pp. 116 and 125.

^[12] Die Welt, 13 February 1976

^[13] The Times, 18 September 1975

^[14] Guardian, 8 February 1976

^[15] The Council, The Council of Ministers 1973

^[16] Interventions by Mr Giraud and Mr Boano, EP, 12 November 1975, pp. 121–2.

^[17] Kathimerini, 22 April 1979

^[18] EP, 6 June 1973, p. 90

^[19] The Commission, European Commission 1978: 6