Counterinsurgency and Policing

Inhalt

Abstract:

Introduction

Counterinsurgency (COIN) Theory

Community Oriented Policing (COP)

Definitions of Community Oriented Policing and Counterinsurgency

Community Oriented Policing Explained

Crime Prevention and Peace Preservation

Communications Policing

Community Building Policing

Counterinsurgency Explained

Domestic COIN v. Overseas COIN

Enemy-Centric v. Population-Centric COIN

Effectiveness of Community Oriented Policing Strategy

Effectiveness of Population-Centric Counterinsurgency Warfare

Nexus of Counterinsurgency and Community Oriented Policing

Conclusion

References

Abstract:

Terrorist activities, tactics and strategies are uncoordinated and asymmetrical. These conditions do not fit into traditional law enforcement models. Since 9/11 out of the 60 plots 43 where stopped by local law enforcement officers. The COIN warfare theory first championed by French Army Lieutenant Colonel David Galula has served as the foundation for the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps revision of the U.S. Counterinsurgency Manual. The theory’s basic premise is that the government can only succeed when the population at large rejects the rebels, their message and works with authorities. A counterinsurgency strategy for law enforcement would require the establishment of a persistent presence, psychological operations that enables the community to discern facts and rumors, and carefully select, train and supervise law enforcement personnel suited for complicated tasks (Evans 2005). Counterinsurgency (COIN) theory can be used as a crime control model that incorporates police practice and operations of crime control and anti/counterterrorism.

Key Words: Community Oriented Policing, Counterinsurgency (COIN), Insurgency

Introduction

In Mayer & Erickson’s (2011) research, Changing Today’s Law Enforcement Culture to Face 21stCcentury Threats, examined law enforcement culture and terrorism. They hold that though law enforcement culture is unique to different agencies, they share the same organizational structure. The increase in crime and government initiatives supporting suppression and interdiction fit traditional crime models. Organizational culture is created through years of reinforcement and the reluctance to change is detrimental in counterterrorism enforcement. Terrorist activities, tactics and strategies are uncoordinated and asymmetrical which do not fit into traditional law enforcement models. A unified training standard applied to state and local law enforcement personnel in terrorism awareness and counterterrorism education would ensure a consistent knowledge base in understanding the terrorist threat (Mayer & Erickson 2001).

In their research, 60 Terrorist Plots Since 9/11: Continued Lessons in Domestic Counterterrorism, Bucci, Carafano & Zuckerman (2013) noted that since 9/11, there have been over 60 terrorist plots conducted in the U.S., more than half being considered homegrown. Bucci et. al. (2013) noted that out of the 60 plots 43 where stopped by local law enforcement officers. Since 9/11 of the 154 people arrested or killed for domestic terrorism 77 had U.S. citizenship. Bucci et. al noted that there must be a proactive approach to terrorism prevention, there must be maintenance of current counterterrorism tools (PATRIOT Act provisions) a streamline domestic counterterrorism system based on a needs basis and addressing violent extremism.

In his research, Stewart (2011), Growing Concern Over the NYPD's Counterterrorism Methods, he notated that the New York Police Department presents the most successful application of counterterrorism enforcement. Stewart (2011) expounded on the departments establishment of relationships with foreign law enforcement and security agencies, federal law enforcement agencies, other high-threat cities, and inter/intra-state departments to facilitate timely information sharing. Stewart (2011) identifies they key aspect of the NYPD’s success is the training of various service personnel in strategic locations to recognize and act against possible threats to take a proactive approach to terrorism in the prevention, mitigation or response to terrorist attacks.

Counterinsurgency (COIN) Theory

Counterinsurgency (COIN) is a warfare theory that outlines a proven set of techniques that governments can use to defeat violent, internal and organized challenges to government authority and legitimacy (Gventer 2016). The COIN warfare theory was first championed by French Army Lieutenant Colonel David Galula. He published a book titled, Counterinsurgency

Warfare: Theory and Practice, in 1964. This book is now recognized as the doctrine for classical counterinsurgency (Military Review 2006). Gaula’s military career led him to see the evolution from conventional warfare to guerrilla warfare, from World War II, in the North Africa, Italy, and Germany campaigns, to becoming a military observer during the Chinese and Greek civil wars, to fighting Algerian rebels in 1956, Galula became the foremost authority in counterinsurgency. His book and his work with the RAND Corporation (Treatise: Pacification in Algeria, 1956-58) before his death in 1967 served as the foundation for the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps revision of the U.S. Counterinsurgency Manual (Military Review 2006).

In studying the influence of Glaula in post-1945 conflict, Gventer (2016), 20th Century: Post-1945, Foreign Relations and Foreign Policy, noted that the basic premise of COIN theory is that rebellions can only be suppressed by gaining support of the population. The government can only succeed when the population at large rejects the rebels, their message and works with authorities.

Community Oriented Policing (COP)

Community Oriented Policing (COP) is an evolving strategy based on the failures of previous models of professional and reform policing to address issues within the community (Wilson 2005). In his research, Wilson (2005), Determinants of Community Policing: An Open Systems Model of Implementation , identifies that the basic concept of COP is to increase the cooperation between citizens and police to address community concerns and improve community life. The central theme is that “the public should be seen along with the police as

‘co-producers of safety and order’” (Skolnick and Bayley, 1988, p. 5).

Wilson (2005), identifies two theories that dominate COP; Contingency Theory and Institutional Theory. These two theories will be will be applied in the study to ascertain the efficacy and interoperability of COIN as a crime control model. The results of this study using departments that use counterterrorism units for crime control, will further be compared to Wilson (2005), Determinants of Community Policing: An Open Systems Model of Implementation, for its

Wilson (2005) stated that contingency theory holds that COP implementation is a function of an organizations environment, structural dimensions and how they function together. Donaldson (1987) stated that this theory is an adaptive. The theory assumes that organizations are rationally trying to pursue effective performance.

Institutional theory as described by Donaldson (1995) are organizations that are social systems molded by the social, cultural and symbolic construction of the community. Simply put, organizations are a reflection of the ideas, expectations, opinions, knowledge and laws of the surrounding environment (Wilson 2005).

Role of Local Police in Counterterrorism

In the aftermath of 9/11 police administrators like William Bratton (Fmr. NYPD Commissioner) and George Kelling championed the argument for greater police involvement in anti/counterterrorism enforcement. They outlined two critical points: 1) terrorism does not differ much from traditional crime and 2) police are in a better position to identify local terrorist threats, the most at risk targets and can coordinate a first response to an attack. This novel approach is a best practice within policing. This approach puts a priority on prevention, service to the community and other agency and community partnerships (Newman & Clarke 2008).

Despite many distinctions between terrorists and conventional criminals, they share many of the same traits with one another. As an example, terrorist like serial murders, plan their respective crimes meticulously with the determination succeed. Even more similar are the crimes both commit such as robbery, drug dealing or fraud to sustain themselves. The only difference between a criminal and terrorist are the acts they commit (Newman & Clarke 2008).

There are many reasons for the development of a community policing program that addresses the terrorism threat and the tension that will exist between the community and the police. Special training and skills are necessary to adapt community policing to this new challenge (Newman & Clarke 2008).

Definitions of Community Oriented Policing and Counterinsurgency

There are many different definitions of Community Oriented Policing, of these they all state these basic tenants as described by Koch and Bennett (1993). Koch and Bennett (1993) stated, that it is a core belief that law enforcement should: a) Consult with and consider the wishes of the public in identifying, reassessing and practicing operational policing policy and b) Partner with the public in attempting to find local solutions to local problems. The field is abundant with research that shows the proven effectiveness of community oriented policing as a viable strategy that reduces crime and increase public relations between the community and law enforcement.

The Department of State’s (2009), U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, defined counterinsurgency as a mix of civilian and military efforts designed to contain and address insurgences at its root cause. COIN must be highly adaptable and requires a broad base of knowledge in a variety of disciplines. Its primary purpose to establish and maintain the legitimacy of the government and reducing radical influence. COIN emphasizes political reform but is entirely dependent on foreign military/government to address legitimate grievances.

Community Oriented Policing Explained

There are three different variances of Community Oriented Policing(COP) identified by Ferreira in his 1996 study, COP Effectiveness in a Democracy;(a) Crime Prevention and Peace Preservation, (b) Communications Policing and (c) Community Building Policing.

Crime Prevention and Peace Preservation

Lambert (1984) in his research identified the following concept: That it is the task of the police to prevent crime and preserve the peace then the police must obtain the full and active cooperation of the community especially in monitoring and controlling police activities.

Communications Policing

Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Roemer (1993) surmised that community policing is to be understood as the communication by police about the risk and security within society. In chronicling the various stages of policing and what they term as communitarianism it is incumbent upon law enforcement to become the facilitators of public consensus and making the community partners enabling them has bearers of community tradition and self-security.

Community Building Policing

Alderson (1979) suggested that law enforcement should examine and evaluate the social rather than legal aspects of community policing. Further insinuating that the success of the law enforcement-community relationship will only occur when law enforcement encroaches itself in all aspects of the community by developing personal relationships at the street level. Because communities are fluid and are in flux it is incumbent upon law enforcement to build the communities which is core to its obligations. This idea is reinforced by Kelling and Stewart (1989) who hold that for law enforcement to respond appropriately they must establish the practice of garnering neighborhood relationships that strengthens its ability to deal with its own problems.

Counterinsurgency Explained

The Department of State’s (2009), U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, identified the five main functions of a COIN strategy: Political, Economic, Security, Information and Control. The political aspect of provides the framework for government reform and political reconciliation. The economic aspect s confidence in government and denies the recruitment of both men and women by insurgents who would otherwise be unemployed. The security aspect is the local legal framework, civilian oversight and an established judicial system. The information aspect must match the strategic narrative, resonate with target audiences. The control aspect is achieved in the transition from intervening forces to national forces and from military to civil institutions.

Domestic COIN v. Overseas COIN

The Department of State’s (2009), U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, found that there are significantly different conceptual and practical dynamics involved with COIN within or outside national boundaries. Intervention in a foreign country is done by choice where domestically its done by necessity. Using COIN in a foreign land makes the intervening forces vulnerable to insurgents who have the strategic advantage by living in the area. When the intervening force plans on a transition and departure, the insurgents will remain. The population understands this and may be less cooperative otherwise. In conducing COIN operations, domestically, the government has greater strategic patience and is readily familiar with the geography, culture, history, sociology and politics of the area occupied by the insurgents.

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