New International Economic Order (NIEO)
Lagos Plan of Action
Africa’s Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER)
United Nations Programme of Action for Africa Economic Recovery
African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes
African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation
At Government level
At the Level of People and their Organisations
At the Level of the International Community
At the Level of Women’s Organisations
New Partnership For Africa’s Development - NEPAD
Goals for NEPAD
Africa’s challenges in implementing developmental programmes have to do with fundamentals of the very idea of their dependency underpinning. These challenges include structural, endogenous and exogenous factors which continue to constrain Africa’s endeavours. So the argument is that Africa failed to implement or was initially destined to fail. The paper delves deeper into Africa ’ s development trajectory reflecting that developmental plans were destined to fail as long as there was no clear paradigm shift from the long standing and perpetual asymmetric donor-recipient relationship still steeped within weakened neo-colonial relations that are incommensurate with Africa’s developmental path.
Myriad continental and internationally inspired developmental trajectories were undertaken by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations (UN) to develop the continent; however they failed to produce envisaged socio-economic developmental goals. That resulted from lack of political will, commitment and financial assistance, failed promises of international donors. Khor in Aderemi (2002) explains that developmental strategies in Africa were inspired by externally influenced and international liberal policies supplemented by inward continental alternatives. These neo-liberal policies advanced laissezz faire economic policies supported and preferred by the developed countries and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) (Wold Bank and the International Monetary Fund) as pedestals for development in the South or developing or underdeveloped countries. Laissezz faire economic policies were penned by scholars from the United State of America and Great Britain and used them as global doctrines to penetrate global markets and discourage developing countries to abolish protectionism and tariff barriers. Furthermore these policies have focussed on containing or checkmating communism by denouncing it as an inappropriate economic doctrine. However continental initiatives focussed primarily on self-sustainability and self-sufficiency but they did not succeed because of lack of funding and internal politics within African countries
These developmental interventions undertaken have been: New International Economic Order (NIEO), Lagos Plan of Action, Africa ’ s Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER), United Nations Programme of Action for Africa Economic Recovery (UN- PAAERD), African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes (AAF - SAP), African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation, and the New Partnership For Africa ’ s Development (NEPAD).
New International Economic Order (NIEO)
Over the years, Africa was known as the Dark Continent. This derogative term derived from Afro Pessimistic perceptions resulting from slavery, colonialism, World Wars 1 and 11 as well as economic marginalisation. Through slavery and colonialism, Africans felt that their existence in the following worldview: social, economic and political realms. That human non- existence was exacerbated by persecution, inferiority, discrimination and dependency. That was tantamount to loss of independence, freedom and dignity. That appalling state of affairs propelled Africans in the Diaspora to restore the continental dignity (Boateng, 2005).
According to Barrel (2000) Marcus Garvey has in 1900 enunciated a philosophy of Pan Africanism in order to free Africans from the bondage of slavery and colonialism. Mentam (2000) adds that Garvey felt that Africa was his ancestral home and the spiritual cradle of all African descendent people. His paramount goal was to release Africa form the tyrannous European imperial grasp and build a free, united and black Africa. That philosophy was further embraced and enhanced by Aime Cesare, Leopold Senghor and Leon Damas through the movement of Negritude explained as “ affirmation that one is black and proud of it”. These movements emphasised the desire for identity, racial unity and freedom.
Another proponent of Pan Africanism was W.E.B. Du Bois who was spearheading Garvey’s philosophy. In his quest to spread the philosophy, Du Bois convened in 1919 a Pan African Congress in Paris, followed by the second one in London in 1921, Paris and Brussels, the third in London and Lisbon in 1923 and the fourth in New York in 1935. The fourth Conference was held in Manchester in 1945 under the following theme: “We ask in all the world, that black folk is treated as men”. The congress declared that freedom, education, democracy and social betterment should be apportioned to the African folks. African luminaries such as Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta and Wallace Johnson attended the congress. Nkrumah was the rapporteur of the two sessions when West African colonies were discussed. Upon his arrival in his native Gold Coast, Nkrumah promoted the resolutions of the Congress. These ideas, mobilisation of internal support and fight for independence led to the independence of Ghana in March 1957. Other leaders such as Kenyatta followed those principles by introducing African Humanism in Kenya, Kenneth Kaunda followed by introducing African Socialism in Zambia and Julius Nyerere introduced Ujamaa in Tanzania (Nabudere, 2001).
The joy and excitement that was experienced by Africans resulting from self- determination and independence diminished dismally because Africa was plunged in the quagmire of poverty, conflicts and underdevelopment. The fruits of independence benefited a few coterie and cohorts such as political leaders, their associates, families, ethnical groups and few members of their parties. Nzongola - Ntalaja (1987) emphasises that ….
“For the people, independence was meaningless without better standard of living; greater civil liberties and the promise of a better life for their children .Instead of making these promised benefits available to the masses, the politicians who inherited state power … lived in much greater luxury than most of their European predecessors and used violence and arbitrary force against the people. For the latter, the first or nominal independence had failed. Their discontent with neo colonial state served as a basis for an inspiration towards a new genuine independence …”
According to Taylor (2005), endeavours undertaken to develop Africa emerged before, during and immediately after the decolonisation process. The most symbolic endeavour happened at the Bandung Conference in 1955. During the 70’s African leaders and intellectuals became concerned about Africa’s position in the International Political Economy (IPE). Most resolutions adopted by African leaders through the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) maintained that economic integration of Africa in the global world was a prerequisite for real independence and development. That became the main theme for OAU’s declarations at Addis Ababa (1970 and 1973), Kinshasa (1976) and Libreville (1977).
According to Aaronson (2005), African states acquired independence reflecting weaknesses in economy, politics and societies. These weaknesses were intensified by external forces such as the economic crises of the 70’s caused by the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 when an oil cartel, Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) raised the price of petrol by 400 %. That affected the balance of payment negatively because the USA and Western Europe responded by trying to counter inflation through interest rates hikes. Suddenly, the interest payable on loans that were granted to developing states at lower rates increased. That began the debt trap cycle in which African countries are entrenched.
Africans attempted to respond to their plight through a litany of “Pax - Africana,” that is, African solutions to African problems. It all started by forging links with the other developing countries through the establishment of the Group of 77, currently known as G 77 and China. The latter demanded a New International Economic Order (NIEO) to advance the interests of developing states in a global economic situation that has marginalised their interests. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) became a formal platform where demands from Africans and other poor continents were presented. NIEO was quickly rejected by the major industrial powers because it was perceived as a communist plot for destroying the system of capitalism and its western civilisation (Leysens and Thompson (2006).
Olukoshi (2002) adds that the lack of economic development in the continent propelled the creation of NIEO which was geared towards global economic development and the re - positioning of Africa within the global trading system. NIEO became an issue raised by all Third World countries, including Africa in all multilateral forums. The rejection of NIEO by the major industrial powers reflected a contestation of two major ideologies of Soviet led communism and US led democracy. The West rejected that to consolidate the grip for its ideology in Africa.
NIEO proposed for massive export relocation of industry from the north to the south in order to raise global profit. It addressed the problem of lower wages and ineffective utilisation of abundant natural resources. The NIEO, moreover far from begging additional transfer whose limitation and largely harmful character was shown in history, envisaged an increase in prices for traditional exports from south as well as the mobilisation of additional resources generated in this way (mining and oil resources in particular) to finance the new stage of growth without any transfers (United Nations Documents on Development, 2007). NIEO proposed for massive relocation of industry and failed to come up with a plan to develop industrial capacity in the continent to exploit raw materials.
Taylor (2005a) further asserts that the Dependency Theory propelled and enhanced NIEO. It deeply argued that the South’s relationship with the north was historically contingent, and that its status of impoverishment and dependence was rooted in the process through which it was integrated into the capitalist world economy during the colonial period, a theme that drew its intellectual heritage from Lenin. Although originally drawn up by Latin Americanists, African scholars soon applied the theory to the continent, arguing that Africa was integrated into the world economy at a subordinate position in the emerging global division of labour.
NIEO applied to Africa, was supposed to address various issues surrounding on-going global trade and investment regimes that were felt to hinder the continent’s development. It called for the restructuring of the perceived external and structural constraints on development. NIEO called for the restructuring of structural constraints but ignored to develop appropriate endogenous mechanisms necessary to counter the external structures. It fails to recognise continental problems such as lack of transparency and good governance.
Tesha in Maloka (2002a) emphasises that the failure of NIEO did not discourage Africans to continue producing developmental programmes. The first Afro centric policy initiative of that era was the adoption of the African Declaration on Cooperation, Development and Economic Independence in 1973.The Declaration provided a strategy for Africa’s gradual disengagement from the world economy within a framework of individual and collective self - reliance. This was an instrument for translating the provisions of the OAU Charter on economic cooperation into reality. The Declaration provided a pedestal for yet another Declaration, The Kinshasa Declaration on the Principle of the Establishment of an African Economic Community. The OAU’s Heads of State and Government in 1973 adopted it.
It is poignant to uncover that five years passed on and neither results of the two Declarations were visible. That raised a serious alarm and concern among African leaders. Responding to that, the OAU Secretary General convened a meeting of African experts to address the problems and establish the way forward to accelerate the implementation of the two Declarations adopted in 1973. A group of African experts converged in Monrovia, Liberia, in 1979 and drafted the Monrovia Strategy for the Economic Development of Africa (Maloka, 2004b).
Nyongo’o (2007) adds that the 1979 Heads of States and Government convergence in Monrovia debated and examined the economic problems facing the continent. The debate focussed on NIEO and a resolution was reached to develop Africa in the context of NIEO. It is noteworthy to ascertain that a 1976 document entitled “The Revised Framework of the Principles for the Implementation of New International Economic Order in Africa ” became the intellectual and theoretical foundation of the Monrovia strategy.
Makgetlaneng (2003) maintains that the meeting in Monrovia aimed to analyse and discuss socio economic problems facing Africa as well as providing appropriate mechanisms to address and solve those problems. Experts declared that concrete measures for achieving socio-economic national and collective or continental self-reliance within the framework of NIEO were needed. Africans perceived political commitment to the achievement of rapid economic growth as essential to the realisation of collective self - reliant development. This meeting culminated in the drafting of the Monrovia Declaration. It emphasised the:
- Enhancement of collective self-reliance and self-centred development through socio-economic integration of African economies: This emphasised African countries pooling their resources together to generate income which would accelerate socio - economic development. In this regard, mineral resources such as mining were to be utilised in the form of selling concessions to investors to generate wealth for Africans.
- Pursuance of self-reliance through the creation of national, sub regional and regional institutions: Various governance institutions that developed common policies domestically, sub regionally and continentally were to be established to harmonise self-reliance policies aimed at advancing development.
- Science and technology should form the backbone of Africa ’ s developmental process: As a continent aspiring to industrialise, science and technology were seen as means to advance the attainment of development in order to increase manufacturing and engineering.
- Ensuring self-reliance in food production and guarantee the African peoples proper and enough nutrition, together with other basic needs for a civilised standard of living; African agriculture was to be developed, promoted and encouraged for providing food security and commercial purposes. and
- Maintaining a proper planning for all sectors of development especially in agriculture, environment and natural resources - to achieve modern economies at sub - regional and regional levels by the year 2000: An all integrated and common approach was to be developed to harness Africa’s development through the proper utilisation of agriculture, protection of the environment and production of mineral resources for beneficiation.
Lagos Plan of Action
According to Baah (2003), African experts have quite for some time been searching for guidelines and measures for national and collective self-reliance in social and economic development. In order to achieve that, the experts requested the OAU, to prepare a plan for a detailed elaboration of the principles and objectives outlined in the 1979 Monrovia Declaration. Le Pere in Ikome (2007) adds explain that the Second Extra Ordinary Session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Lagos, Nigeria in July 1980. The session produced and approved the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the Final Act of Lagos (FAL). Zounmenou (2006) adds that the assembly that was organised by the OAU in 1980, at Lagos, Nigeria culminated in a unilateral endorsement and acceptance of LPA as the framework for the socio- economic development of Africa.
“ The LPA was self-consciously autarchic and inward-looking. It was a watershed in Africa ’ s regional co-operation history. It was the first genuinely indigenous and continent-wide effort to forge a comprehensive, unified approach to Africa ’ s problems of economic development. Emerging from perceptions of the continent ’ s general vulnerability to global economic forces, the initiative ’ s central thrust was that Africa needed to actively strive to reduce its dependence on external nations and to replace this dependence with a self - sustaining development strategy based on the maximum internal use of the continent ’ s strategy. This approach did not imply an attempt to sever all economic relations with the outside world. Rather, it called for a disengagement from those features of the international economic system that was keeping Africa poor and weak. ”
According to Roussel (2005) the LPA consisted of some fundamental principles that included:
- Development process centred on citizens: This is a form of development accommodating all stakeholders, including civil society to identify the needs and processes required for development.
- Developmental process that is democratised: This is a form of development which is based on consensus, debates and accommodation of the deliberations of all stakeholders for advancing their livelihoods. and
- To promote self-reliance and self-sustainability collectively: This is a development that is orientated around people choosing best available means for achieving a long lasting progress.
It is through the LPA that African leaders were committed to take solid moves for realising national and collective self-reliance in economic and social domains encapsulated in NIEO. Fundamentally, the LPA was a detailed elaboration of the general principles and objectives reached at in Monrovia. It went into details and sector by sector about the way in which Africa could through collective self-reliance; achieve rapid economic and social development during the last two decades of the 20th century. Conversely, the FAL committed African governments to establish the African Economic Community (AEC) by the year 2000 and outlined necessary steps available to this effect. The FAL took the principles, programs and projects explained succinctly in the LPA and went further to state the kind of economic and political institutional agreements necessary to realise these.
Aderemi in Roussel (2002) maintains that FAL is an adjunct of LPA because it strongly emphasised sub-regional economic cooperation and integration. It further incorporates succinct suggestions for regional integration and proposed for the establishment of the AEC by the year 2000. Ikome (2007) adds that in the early 1980’s, the LPA which was a collective self-reliance strategy, became the pre-eminent feature of Africa’s international relations. It was translated into a series of resolutions and treaty agreements that created leaps and bounds of economic co-operation and integration institutions across the continent.
De Sa in Makgetlaneng (2003) maintains that the LPA was established as a strategy for Africa’s socio economic development. Cheru (2002) emphasises that LPA was driven by the crisis of the inherited structures of the political economy. It focussed on attaining socio - economic growth within each member states in areas such as food and agriculture, industry, environment and energy. It adopted specific as well as general targets with time limits for each aspect of the economic planning.
According to Adesina (2003), the LPA is divided into thirteen chapters, covering a wide array of issues ranging from food and agriculture to industry, development of human resources, science and technology, transport, trade and finance, technical cooperation for strengthening economic development, environment and development as well as energy. It also addressed the issue of “women and development”, planning coordination, and mechanisms for implementation. Its core principles were around the need to domesticise Africa’s development in the framework of “collective self-reliance and self-sustaining development ” through the integration of the various economic sectors across regional economic communities and the continent.
Adedeji (2002) outlines the objectives of the LPA, which are:
- To alleviate poverty and improve the living standards of the people: This aims at reducing poverty which is a scourge attacking Africans. Furthermore, it aimed at creating jobs, skilling people and educating masses to sustain and maintain their livelihoods
- To produce through expanded and diversified productive capabilities that can be sustained over a period: This is aimed at tackling lopsided production capacities that are curtailed to extraction of mineral resources and agriculture. In this regard, industrialisation that maximises production was seen as an alternative. and
- Self-reliance and self-sustaining development at national level and Continental level: In this regard, inward form of development which relies on the mobilisation of African resources was encouraged nationally and continentally. This is a means to alleviate aid mentality which has been pervasive across the continent.
- Self-reliance involves the following:
- The internalisation of the forces of demand which determines the direction of development, economic growth process and patterns of output: In this regard, development should be harnessed according to the needs of the society and all resources necessary for that process should be converged and utilised to steer the process
- Increasing substitution of domestic factor inputs for external factor input s: This advocates for export of finished products rather that export raw materials and purchase finished products.
- Increasing participation of the mass of the people in the production and consumption of the social product: In this regard, the integration of many processes in the form of education and skilling of people is required to accelerate development. And Increasing self-reliance sustainment through the promotion of the patterns and processes of a holistic human development in which various sectors and sub sectors, programmes and activities mutually support and reinforce each other so that when related to the internalisation of the forces determining demand and supply; the whole economic, social and political system develop its own internal dynamics: This involves and integrated development whereby people are educated, industries are developed and international knowledge is brought into the continent to develop Africa.
As contained in the Final Act of Lagos (1980), the LPA identified Africa’s development crisis as structural and enmeshed in a hostile external environment, which includes developed countries and foreign Transnational Corporations (TNCs). The LPA became the platform for moving Africa towards a sustainable developmental route through collective “self-reliance and self-sustained development ” at three levels which are national, sub - regional, regional (Africa) and international.
The sub-regional and regional dimensions involved integration of economies in various phases, while the international dimension involved enhanced cooperation with other developing regions of the world. National policies were required to be oriented towards sub - regional and regional integration, and pooling of resources to build institutions that will be viable within national contexts. Capacity sharing in human resources, scientific and research capacity as well as trade negotiations are cardinal to the LPA.
According to Aderemi (2002), the core objective of self-sufficiency in food production required a strong political will to channel a greatly increased volume of resources to agriculture for carrying it through essential re-orientations of social systems. The focus was to develop policies that will induce small farmers and members of agricultural cooperatives achieving higher levels of productivity. By taking the structuralist approach, the LPA emphasised improvements in the living conditions of farmers and increased their incomes making farming more attractive and remunerative. Infrastructural support (roads, storage and processing facilities), resource inputs, technical support, training and education areas were highly emphasised. The LPA put research at the heart for transforming agricultural production. Agriculture was not considered in isolation but it included a wider social and economic framework.
The LPA emphasised industrialisation to be indispensable for providing basic needs of the African population and ensuring the integration of the economy and the modernisation of the society. Industrialisation was emphasised for the transformation of sub regions and the whole of Africa. It was perceived to be the heartbeat that would remove Africa from underdevelopment and economic dependence by creating jobs, domesticising technological absorption and development. A domesticised collective industrialisation was directed to achieve inter sectoral linkages for sub regional interdependency as well as the provision of the markets. This would be achievable through the exploitation of local markets. All and sundry, the programme was aimed at Africa achieving 2% of the world’s industrial production by the year 2000 (OAU, 1980).
According to the LPA, national policies would emphasise development of technical, supervisory, and managerial capacity through a wider human resource development framework and financial institutions that would focus on accelerated industrial development. Small and medium scale enterprises were to be the concerns of national policymakers. Regional emphases were to be placed on industrial complexes with financing beyond the capacity of individual countries. The LPA assumed a mixture of private sector, semi-public and public sector ownership structure (Karuuombe, 2003).
In creating cross border investment, the LPA emphasised a joint venture option. The area of comparative advantage for such a cross-border was to be in the heavy industrial sector, especially in the production of capital goods. In both the industrial and agricultural strategies, the LPA emphasised ecologically sensible and sustainable practices, employment technologies appropriate to local conditions, with significant emphasis on conservation. In agricultural, industrial policies and trade negotiations, the LPA emphasised pooling capacity and strategy (ibid).
The LPA linked industrial production to energy by emphasising regional approach in the key areas of the exploitation of energy resources, researching into renewable energy, facilitation of an intra-African supply chain and a payment system that would minimise the demand on limited foreign exchange. The option of paying for petroleum in local currency or barter trading was suggested. However major oil exporting countries had entered into a reservation on the short term implementation of such an arrangement despite the call for the demonstration of African solidarity. The LPA emphasised the coordination of energy policy and industrial policies at sub-regional and regional levels. Rural access to energy for electrification and production was also emphasised. A number of regional research centres -n different energy sources were suggested through the establishment of an African Energy Commission as the regional policy organ (Adesina, 2003).
In its policy framework on human resource development, as well as science and technology, the LPA called for a large-scale curriculum revision to render all levels of education and training to be more relevant to the development needs of local African environment. Both as an object of development and mentor of socio - economic development, the emphasis of LPA focussed on the continent and relevance. Although it welcomed international support, the LPA was insistent that that should be supplementary to the African self-reliant effort. Regional cooperation in the creation of multinational training institutions and research facilities was another point of LPA’s regional integration approach (ibid).
Within the LPA programme, therefore the agenda of regional economic and social integration required a reconfiguration of the transport and communication infrastructure to boost regional trade, open up landlocked countries, and minimise barriers to the movement of goods and persons within the region. This was not only to construct infrastructures, but also to localise and internalise production processes. That involved the stimulation of the use of local, human and material resources and the standardisation of networks and equipment, research and dissemination of techniques adapted to the African context in the building of transport and communication infrastructures. This was expected to enjoin into industrial strategy (Taddesse, 2003).
Makgetlaneng (2003) continues to point out that the major underlying principle of the LPA was that the relevance of economic development was only measured by the advancement of the wellbeing of the people. He emphasised that neither adjustment programme nor economic programme was relevant if it made the material conditions of the people extremely miserable. Given that, the LPA maintained that the main objective of Africa was the reduction and eradication of poverty and a qualitative improvement of the living standards of the people. The second objective was geared towards achieving the first objective for increasing production through expanded and diversified productive capacities. That was perceived to be sustainable over a long period. The third goal promoted self-reliance nationally and collectively. The only way for African leaders to solve Africa’s socio - economic problems as it was stated, has been through their own efforts. In that context, external assistance was secondary and complementary to self-reliant efforts.
As contained in the United Nations Document on Development (2007), the LPA emphasised regional food security through national production. That emphasised the promotion of self-reliance in food production as well as a solution to Africa’s socio-economic problems. That inward approach relegated external assistance or support to secondary role, but failed to identify social agents for the achievement of its objectives. Conversely, the plan perceived self-reliance and auto centric development within international capitalism, but failed to address questions as to whether international capitalism could be adjusted to serve the achievement of self-reliant and auto centric development. The plan rather assumed that international organisations for the governance of capitalism, which were criticised, could be reformed to support its auto centric development and self-reliance. Maloka (2002) adds that The LPA’s main weakness was its inability to provide enough resources for its implementation. It remained a blueprint for Africa’s development without requisite resources for its implementation.
Mkandawire and Soludo (1999) highlight that in evaluating Africa’s underdevelopment, the LPA was lopsided and marginal by focussing only on the external factors that created and sustained dependency on capitalism. This became evident in the area of trade, where Africa depended too much on the export of primary products (agricultural and minerals) which exacerbated openness to external shocks. The excessive outward orientation, in the context of inherited colonial structures of production and fragmentation of the continent produced considerable dislocation in the economies.
Olukoshi (2002) identified four key elements distinguishing the LPA:
First: The definition adopted in the LPA as the source of Africa’s economic problems was essentially a mixture of domestic weakness and external constraints. The LPA located a greater accent on the hostile and difficult external environment, which confronted Africa in the course of the 60’s and 70’s. In this instance, too much emphasis was put on the questions of trade. The reversal of the hostile international environment became one of the strategies of the LPA
Second: The problem of import substitution industrialisation and the failure of many African countries to move beyond basic light manufacturing; imbalances between light manufacturing intermediate and capital goods sectors of African economies. Concerning these, the LPA failed to adopt a solution, which involved jettisoning import substitution wholesale. It called for the articulation of domestic foundations of the African economies and also as part of this restructuring, a diversification of industrial investment through a more even spread investment of light, intermediate and heavy industry;
Third: There was never any attempt undertaken to involve the state as the key player in the developmental process. The LPA criticised lack of state involvement in economic policy making, rigidness in the planning of systems and distortions in the allocation of resources for technical background that have been produced ahead of it. The question of the role of the state was considered strategic in getting Africa out of the crisis. All and sundry, the LPA was critical of the state; and
Fourth: the LPA emphasised the need to strengthen sub - regions and regional cooperation. It failed to address itself decisively to the centrality of the political factor in the regional integration project. It assumed that African leaders were members of one race and that, because they are in one region, they would be able to work together to achieve regional integration.
For that reason, the LPA assumed the position of those African leaders whose interests were different and antagonistic working towards a united front in the struggle for regional integration. It did not encourage them to regard their common objectives as the key factor to facilitating their merger. It failed to call upon African countries, individually and collectively to committing themselves in practicing the rational utilisation of resources in their efforts for achieving socio - economic and political stability.
According to Asprenger (2002), the following reflect the failures of LPA:
- The LPA failed to blame African leaders for Africa ’ s failure at the expense of exogenous forces: In seeking solutions to Africa’s problems, the LPA apportioned the blame to external forces such as IFIs and ignored the role played by Africans such as corruption and authoritarian regimes.
- LPA exonerated postcolonial leaders concerning Africa ’ s socio economic and political predicament: The factors which complemented external factors, African leadership which entrenched authoritarianism and poor governance policies were exonerated form Africa’s failures. By and large, this skewed assessment of the situation compounded Africa’s problems.
- The LPA reflected a top-down approach to resolve Africa ’ s crisis: The development
-f LPA ignored other important sector of the society, civilians in formulating relevant approaches to Africa’s development.
- The LPA failed to recognise poor governance as the cause of Africa ’ s underdevelopment and apportioned the blame to the external forces: Poor governance that involved violation of human rights and democratic practices resulted in Africa’s socio-economic malaise. These factors were ignored by African leadership to hold on to power for a long time at the expense of the masses and
- The LPA identified Africa ’ s problems, provided solutions but failed to provide appropriate financing to address that: The LPA was unable to mobilise resources for the implementation of its plan and that made it to be more workable on paper but inefficient practically. That was a serious improper planning.
Based on faulty assumption about Africa’s economic condition and ignorance of systematic malgovernance, the LPA’s prescriptions were economically illiterate. Its main strategy was based upon the continuation of import substitution and relied on three conditions that Africa lacked the following:
First: The actual surplus extracted from agricultural sector was invested in the industrial sector, where it would be converted into additional manufacturing capacity: This implied that agriculture was basically to provide security for citizens and the surplus production was to be diverted into agriculture so that it generates industrial capacity and manufacturing for peasants;
Second: Peasants were to continue producing and expanding production despite conditions that clearly work against them: The peasants who constitute the bulk of the agricultural sector were encouraged to work hard to expand their production capacity regardless of conditions confronting them such as mundane technology and lack of subsidies from the state; and
Third: Certain heavy industries need specialised work force and relatively large markets to be efficient and viable: The government should create an environment which would develop a curriculum in concert with industries to produce people who are geared to work in the industrial sector to sustain efficiency and make them viable.
The reason why these measures were undertaken and what priorities were to be given to them were not stated. This is based on the reasoning that the LPA failed to trace and point out the origin of the crises of African agriculture. The World Bank criticised the LPA for not giving enough room to the private sector .It further took the LPA to task for not conceding to the reforms necessary in the public sector to stimulate growth. The criticism of the LPA by the World Bank reflects an asymmetric relationship between the donor and the continent. In this context, what is best for the donor is best for the continent .The donor then release funds on account of upholding its values and principles at the expense of socio economic realities confronting the continent.
The LPA reflected the African development thought of that time, with its emphasis on self
- reliance and state led development. In this context, the state was the leading actor and should withstand the worst in elaborating the social, economic and cultural policies that enable the mobilisation of resources and capabilities of the country. The LPA also emphasised the role of the state in the fair distribution of both development burdens and benefits. The LPA did not clearly discuss the role of the state in development but it made it clear that that the state was part of the development crisis and the main agent for its resolution. Although the LPA provided for integration, it did not adequately address crucial elements for African development such as capacity, autonomy and partnership.
According to Bujra (2004), the World Bank (WB) responded to LPAs crises by constructing a document called Accelerated Development in Sub Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action. That document prescribed a different development formula for Africa in this pattern: While the LPA avoided raising political issues, it devoted attention to politics and economics for development. For the latter to be accelerated, the document recommended that the state was supposed to decrease its role in the economy and social welfare, through inter - alia, privatisation of state enterprises; promotion of private sector participation in the economy; liberalisation, the increase of the rule of the economy through market force, and export-led growth programmes.
That fundamentally advised African countries to adopt and implement Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). These are programmes that encouraged reduction on social spending and privatisation of state enterprises as well as allowing a free market economy. That document was accepted by the donor countries and criticised the LPA and -ther Afro-centric initiatives which were aimed at Africa’s development. That resulted in donor countries coercing African leaders to implement SAPs for Africa’s development.
Turok (1987) points out that the WB and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) continued to frustrate Africa’s development by introducing the intervention strategy called “policy - based lending”. The IMF’s programme became known as Stabilisation Policies whereas the World Bank introduced Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP’s). These policies aimed at addressing Africa’s ailing developmental process but they employed different mechanisms. In this context, Stabilisation Policies aimed at reducing short-term disequilibrium by paying attention to, budget deficits, balance of payment deficits and inflation. Conversely, SAPs focussed on restructuring of economies towards greater efficiency in the medium term.
In 1981 another endeavour to resolve Africa’s crises resulted in the production of a document called “Towards Accelerated Development in Africa ” jointly produced by the WB and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). That dossier was commonly known as the Berg Report. The report solely blamed African internal crisis as the main causes for Africa’s economic failure and development while exonerating the prescriptive international economic systems and their trade regime. The report continued to prescribe both Stabilisation Policies and SAPs and enforced the following conditions for Africa’s development:
- Devaluation of national currency and adoption of a floating exchange rate regime: The overvalued currency that was not in commensurate with the production and economic standing of the country was to be devaluated in accordance to international standards.
- Deregulation of domestic interest rates: Interest rates were to be regulated to control supply and demand of goods. This is envisaged to apportion value to the country’s production, sale of goods and property. Investors will get value for money and FDI is accelerated in this regard.
- Liberalisation of external trade and financial transfers: This encourages privatisation and minimises the role of the state in the economy.
- De - control of prices: Market forces and economists should play a major role in the determination of any pricing.
- Elimination of subsidies: This involves the removal of subsidies on the social sector such as education, health and agriculture.
- Imposition of cost recovery measures in educational and health sectors: Excessive benefits such as free services for employees were eliminated
- Rationalisation of public enterprises, through privatisation or outright Liquidation: This involves rightsizing and downsizing of civil society in government sectors. Furthermore, certain state assets were to be privatised and
- Reduction in the size of the civil service to curb budget deficits and public borrowing: Right sizing and downsizing of the public sector.
By 1988, over 30 African countries had already adopted stabilisation and SAPs which were supported by the WB and the IMF. Economically these policies were regarded as orthodox policies and assumed that premium instruments of control on money supply, credit squeeze, exchange rate and interest adjustment including trade liberalisation could bring positive results in African which struggled within weak and disarticulate structures. However, there is documented evidence that both SAPs and Stabilisation Policies had failed Africa dismally. In implementing these policies, Africa experienced the following:
- Sustained economic growth failed to materialise;
- the rate of investment decreased;
- budget and balance of payment deficits widened after some temporary relief and
- Debt service obligations have become unbearable (Lawson, in Baylis and Smith, 2005).
According to Steward, Lall and Wanngwe (1992), Africa’s developmental did not only raise doubts and questions at policy-making levels endogenously Africa, but also exogenously at international forums such as the 43rd session of the United Nations General Assembly. During the Assembly, it transpired that the implementation of these programmes resulted in reduction of expenditures in social sectors moreover on education, primary health care as well as on the public sector and parastatals where it reduced employment capacity. Both policies failed to materialise in Africa because they neglected to tackle fundamental structural requirements such as poverty reduction and provision of employment.
Africa’s Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER)
According to Lawal (2006), the failure of the LPA and the deepening crises of caused by the imposition of SAPs and Stabilisation Policies resulted in the OAU developing and delivering another programme called Africa ’ s Priority Programme for Economic Recovery of 1986-1990 ( APPER). This programme aimed at resuscitating Africa by emphasising deep commitment to the principles and objectives of LAP and FAL. These were planned to be achieved through a five year plan focussing on:
- Developing approaches suitable to accelerate the implementation of LPA: Africa was to develop mechanisms, time frames and terms of references which would be the basis for implementation of LPA;
- Developing an ad hoc mechanism necessary to improve food security and the rehabilitation of agriculture to overcome drought: Special mechanisms, approaches and programmes were to be developed to improve the production of food and agricultural sector;
- Development of a common platform of action sub - regionally, continentally and internationally; a well-coordinated common platform was to be developed nationally, regionally and continentally to implement the aims of the LPA. This was aimed at ensuring consistency and uniformity .
Mashele (2006) emphasises that APPER failed to address the lower rates of FDI into Africa. The programme was lopsided by concentrating only on debt which it regarded as a buffer for development. Apart from that, there were debt-servicing problems that were external and beyond Africa’s control. These problems included, deteriorating terms of trade; reduction in export earnings for debt servicing; unprecedented rise in interest rates; sharp exchange rate fluctuations; deteriorating terms of borrowing; and the reduction in the flow of concessional resources. These negative effects resulted in the net capital outflow from most African states to developed states. This affected about 26 Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in Africa. Just like its predecessor, APPER blamed the continent’s misery and quagmire on external factors and absolved African leaders from any responsibility. Furthermore, external debt burden and the apartheid government in South Africa were highly blamed for Africa’s socio economic miseries.
Owusu (2006) emphasises that APPER continued the general principles of LPA and perpetuated some ideas contained in the Berg Report. The donor community used APPER to convince the African leadership that internal problems have been responsible for developmental shortcomings. Just like its predecessors, APPER relied heavily on prescriptive measures and conditions attached by the donor community. However, the donor countries and agencies failed to provide the much-needed financial resources and concentrated on talking too much (United Nations Documents, 2005).
United Nations Programme of Action for Africa Economic Recovery (UN-PAAERD)
As contained in the United Nations Documents (2007), APPER relied heavily on external and technical assistance that attributed to its failure. The failure of APPER introduced the external intervention by the UN aimed at Africa’s recovery. The UN introduced a programme called the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery (UN - PAAERD) and combined it with APPER for Africa’s economic recovery. The UN-PAAERD resulted from the concern raised by the UN regarding Africa’s socio-economic malaise. In inaugurating the UN-PAAERD, the Secretary General of the UN, Javier Perez De Cuellar said the following:
“The international community, in adopting the Programme of action had clearly expressed their human solidarity with their brothers and sisters in Africa determined and continued efforts were needed to meet the challenge. The image of Africa as a dependent continent must disappear. Africa is a continent rich in physical and human resources. The realisation of its potential will not fulfil the hopes and aspirations of the peoples of Africa, but also contribute immeasurably to the economic and social wellbeing of the entire world ”
The above-mentioned quote expresses the UN’s mutual desire to work in concert with the OAU to provide an appropriate framework necessary for Africa’s development. The UN - PAAERD was a programme based on an equal partnership reflecting: “mutual commitment and cooperation ” between the UN and Africa. It was highly centralised on two pillars, which were:
I. Determination and commitment of African countries to launch national and regional programmes of economic development; and
II. The response of the international community and its commitment to support and complement African development efforts (UN Chronicle, 1986).
The UN-PAAERD which was adopted in May 1986 by the ad hoc session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) was devoted to address Africa’s socio - economic malaise. It was through that effort that African countries together with the UN agreed to undertake structural reforms geared for national and regional programmes in priority areas such as: food and agriculture, human resources, transport and communication, population, the promotion of the role of women in development, as well as regional and sub - regional cooperation and integration. African countries committed to mobilise US $82.5 billion from domestic resources to make up for US $128. 1 billion required for its implementation. That concerted endeavour reflected a consensus between Africa and the international community to resuscitate Africa’s ailing development. The major weakness of the UN - PAEERD was that it was too descriptive and prescriptive and lacked appropriate implementation mechanisms as well as punitive measures necessary for donor countries when they failed to fulfil on their promises (Bujra, 2004).
Rasheed and Chole (1994) emphasise that the UN-PAAERD was regarded as an unprecedented unique partnership between Africa and the international community to develop the continent. Nyong’ o (2007) adds that apart from the cooperation, UN-PAAERD perpetuated the SAPs and Stabilisation Policies by exposing Africa to economic programs and objectives prescribed by the external donor countries and their agencies. In its approach to develop Africa, UN-PAAERD ignored addressing external problems such as debt and unequal exchange of trade.
Owusu (2006) further expounds that the UN PAAERD adopted APPER and requested international support to accelerate its implementation. The programme cajoled developed nations to consider changing their asymmetric relationship with Africa by looking into the following: elimination of protectionism, removal of higher prices for agricultural commodities, support balance of payment, reduction of debt burden. Apart from the adoption of APPER by UN PAAERD, African leaders were obliviously unaware that the programme perpetuated and entrenched the failed SAPs and Stabilisation Policies. It is not surprising that between 1980 and 1989 about 241 adjustment programmes were implemented in 36 countries while APPER failed like its predecessors.
According to Adedeji (1988), the adoption of the UN-PAAERD has further deteriorated Africa’s ailing socio-economic and political conditions. The worst affected areas of education, health, employment and income caused more damage to women and children. The South African Communist Party Perspectives document of (1995) adds that the adoption of the UN PAAERD deeply plunged Africa into a socio economic quagmire worse than before. For an example context, real wage per capita income fell by an annual average of 0.7 % while the rates of illiteracy, mortality and debt have all risen.
Ohiorhenuan and Keeler (2011) further explain that by the late 80’s after the introduction of the UN-PAAERD, one third of the urban population in sub-Saharan Africa remained below absolute poverty level. Infant mortality rates averaged 105 per thousand for Africa vis ` a vis 70 for all developing countries. Child death rates in Africa were twice the level of all developing countries. Only 25 % of the rural population in Africa had access to safe and clean water vis ` a vis 40 % of other developing countries. The percentage of enrolment in secondary school was for example, 20% in Kenya, Zambia and Cote d ` Ivoire and 30 % in Nigeria. The percentage of age group enrolled in post-secondary school system was less than 3 % in Africa compared to 7 % in Indonesia and 10 % in Brazil. No African country achieved a domestic savings rate of 10 % of Gross Domestic Products (GDP) economically.
According to Nwanko and Richards (2004), by the late eighties the UN-PAEERD managed to cajole over 30 African countries to adopt Stabilisation Policies and SAPs of the WB and IMF by 1988. The impact of these programmes was intensively and adversely negative on socio-economic development of the continent. Economically, the orthodox structural adjustment programmes by their design assumed that instruments of control of money supply, credit squeeze, exchange rate and interest rate adjustments as well as trade liberalization could yield positive results in African countries which struggled with weak and disarticulate structures. The practice has failed to materialise because of the highly anticipated improvement on the rate of investment has tremendously plummeted, whereas the budget and balance of payment deficits widened after some temporary relief, and debt service obligations became unbearable.
Socially, the negative impact raised more doubts and questions not only at policy making levels within and outside Africa, but also in international fora such as the 43rd session of UNGA’s mid-review of UN-PAAERD. It became well known and conspicuous that the implementation of these programmes reflected a significant reduction of expenditures in social sectors, especially education and primary health care, shrinkage of the public sector and parastatals.
Tesha (2002) in Maloka (2002a) continue to explain that OAU members ascertained that the promised additional resources promised by the donors were not provided. The reason behind was that the donor community ignored demands for new and additional resources. The new partnership proposed under the UN-PAAERD became a mockery to African development. Consequently, the duration provided for its implementation lapsed without any significant improvements in the resource flows to Africa. Furthermore, SAPs and Stabilisation Policies continued to devastate African socio-economic policies.
African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes (AAF-SAP)
The general assessment of orthodox adjustment programmes led to the conclusion that, those programmes aimed at restoring growth, especially the achievement of fiscal and external balances and the free play of markets would not be achieved without addressing the basic structural bottlenecks of African economies. Consequently, at the beginning of 1988, the United Nations Economic Commission of Africa (UNECA) with the assistance from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) searched for a suitable African alternative framework for SAPs and Stabilisation Policies necessary to address Africa’s socio - economic problems (OAU Report, 1989).
Maloka (2002a) emphasises that the search for an alternative framework resulted in extensive consultation within and outside Africa. The search was premised on the perception of reaching a common consensus among Africans as well as bilateral and multilateral development partners. In that regard, an ad hoc International Advisory Board comprising of African high-ranking office and non-office bearers including officials from the Bretton Woods Institutions was established. The primary objective of that board was to develop a broad orientation appropriate to study Africa’s development. Consequently, the study presented preliminary findings resulting from discussions of consensus building at an international workshop of African and non-African economists held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from the 3rd to the 5th of January, 1989. The outcome of the convergence encouraged UNECA to prepare a preliminary draft for government officials comprising of Ministries of Finance and the Ministries of Economic Planning and Development.
At inter-governmental level, the proposals were examined during the meeting of senior officials of Ministries of Finance and Central Banks in Blantyre, Malawi in 1989. The meeting produced the “ Blantyre Statement ” constituting inputs which revised proposals for presentation at the 24th session of the Commission and the 15th meeting of the Conference of African Ministries responsible for Economic Planning and Development. Both meetings took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 27 March to 9 April 1989. The final stage of the consensus building resulted in a joint meeting of African Ministries of Economic Planning and Development and the Ministers of Finance held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on the 10th of April 1989. The meeting culminated in the adoption of the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation ( AAF - SAP) (Maloka, 2002a).
AAF-SAP was a document that contained 60 pages covering a wide range of policies and other development related issues. It described the structure for Africa’s political economy as well as development objectives. It provided the necessary framework to probe orthodox adjustment programmes which outlined an alternative framework and also recommended new policy directions and instruments and discussed implementation strategies necessary for Africa’s development. AAF - SAP rejected Stabilisation Policies and SAPs which were sponsored by the Bretton Woods Institutions because of empirical and theoretical reasons (Shaaeldin, 1991).
Orthodox adjustment economic policies were criticised because they prescribed fallacious approach aimed at improving Africa’s financial balances and price structures. That was at the expense of handling structural realities that generated crisis. It was ascertained that weak production structures and imperfect markets in Africa resulted from orthodox programmes. It was also realised that factor immobility and weak supply elasticities reduced the impact of devaluation by switching expenditures and stimulating exports. Imperfection in money and capital markets resulted in a situation whereby high interest rates propagated inflationary pressures and aggravated speculative behaviour (OAU Resolution, 1989).
The document further criticised and challenged a pronouncement from the Bretton Woods Institutions that countries which pursued orthodox structural policies were good economic performers compared to those that were against their implementation. It pointed out that the growth rate of various countries differed broadly during the period between 1980-87. That was false because other factors such as weather, commodity market conditions, inflow of external resources and debt situation accounted for varied growth in different countries (ibid).
As contained in Africa Policy Information Centre (1992), AAF-SAP clearly reflected a valid point by pointing out inseparable and intermingling effects of structural weaknesses, external factors, external financing and policy reforms as the causes of underdevelopment in the continent. That was because several observers noted that market imperfections, infrastructural inadequacies and institutional rigidities often reduced the degree of the responsiveness of the economic agents against price incentives.
As a means for addressing Africa’s developmental malaise, AAF-SAP recommended the following recommendations which were presented in three groups. They were:
I. Those intended to strengthen and diversify production capacity;
II. Those designed to improve income level and distribution pattern, and
III. Those related to the pattern of expenditure for needs satisfaction.
The pre-eminent features of recommended measures were:
- Reliance on selectivity in foreign exchange and credit allocation, import licensing and export promotion;
- Manipulation of prices in relation to multiple exchange rates, subsidised interest rates and guaranteed minimum prices for food crops; and the
- The improvement of institutional arrangements. For example, land reforms, creating greater access to rural finance and strengthening intra - African monetary co - operation.
One of the main characteristics of AAF-SAP was its emphasis on the direct and indirect role of governments to influence the allocation of resources (United Nations Economic Commission For Africa, 1990).
According to Adedeji (1988b), the other characteristic of AAF-SAP was its holistic approach to development by embracing macro-economic framework policy directions and measures. In this context, implementation strategies were to consider the dynamic relationships which existed among all major elements relating to adjustment concerning transformation. For that to succeed, the difference between structural adjustment and longterm development were to be eliminated.
The alternative framework emphasised full mobilisation as well as efficient utilisation of domestic resources. That created a necessary platform for the establishment of a conducive environment sustainable for development by adopting a pragmatic approach between the public and private sectors for Africa’s development. All and sundry, the cardinal point of AAF-SAP was its human dimension, which recognised, motivated and empowered people to ensure the equitable distribution of income for development on a sustainable basis. It categorically maintained that a development programme that marginalised its people was inappropriate. Other major hallmarks of AAF-SAP were:
- AAF-SAP was not a standard programme applied indiscriminately in all countries under all circumstances. In some circumstances, it would be used for designing specific country programmes, selecting relevant policy instruments and measures as well as adopting the relevant implementation strategy;
- As a human centred framework AAF-SAP acknowledged full democratisation of all levels of economic and social activities in all stages including decision making to implementation;
- It called for high and intensified inter-country cooperation in the creation, implementation and monitoring of national programmes; and
- It was perceived as the pedestal for a constructive dialogue between African countries and their development partners in the implementation and financing of country programmes.
Development scholars regarded AAF-SAP as the basis for cooperation where the resources provided by the international community were to be merged to those provided by African governments towards sustainable development That was achievable through adjustment of transformation which ensured that the 1990’s would witness the socio - economic revival of Africa.
African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation
The beginning of the last decade of the previous century brought about the concerted attempts by Africans (governments, NGO’s, civil society and labour movements) to develop Afro centric processes aimed at addressing Africa’s socio economic and political malaise. Those endeavours began with the Conference on Popular Participation in the Recovery and Development of Africa held in Arusha, Republic of Tanzania, from the 12th to 16th of February 1990. This unprecedented meeting in African affairs was a joint undertaking of African people’s organisations, African governments, Non-Governmental Organisations and the United Nations’ agencies. The conference was attended by over 500 people consisting of grassroots, labour movements, representatives of African governments, agencies of the UN System, regional and sub regional organisations, bilateral donors, as well as specialists from in and outside Africa (Popular Participation in Economic Recovery in Africa, 2007).
The conference provided a platform to the debate towards finding appropriate means necessary to attach meaning to concepts relating to democratic development, people’s solidarity and creativity, self-reliance as well as the construction of policy recommendations for national governments, popular organisations and the international community aimed in establishing consolidation for participation and developmental patterns. All and sundry, these participants searched for collective and mutual understanding concerning the role of popular participation in the development and transformation of Africa (AU Documents, 2004). The conference was proposed by non-governmental organisations as the mid-term review of the failed UN - PAAERD (ibid).
Herbert (2007) expresses that the conference resulted from a concern among Africans regarding Africa’s deteriorating socio economic situations. Africans became perpetually worried about severe downfall in human and economic conditions around the continent during the eighties, inability to achieve popular participation, as well an inability to accept the role of popular participation in the process of recovery and development. The following objectives were developed to create platforms necessary for popular democratic participation:
- Recognition of the role of African people for participation in continental recovery and developmental efforts;
- Infusing sense to national governments and the international community to dimensions; dynamics, processes and the potential for a development approach entrenched in popular initiatives and self - reliant endeavours;
- Identification of barriers to people’s participation in development and articulation of appropriate approaches promoting development for articulating succinct approaches to the promotion of popular participation in policy formulation, planning, implementation monitoring and evaluation of development programmes; o Recommending appropriate ways to be taken by various stakeholders such as governments, the UN system, private and public sector, donor agencies for the development of appropriate environment for tangible popular participation in the development process and encouraging people and their organisations to undertake self - reliant development initiatives;
- Creating a conducive framework for exchanging data, experience and knowledge for mutual support among people and their organisations; and
- Providing indicators monitoring progress by facilitating people’s participation in development.
- As contained in the Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation (1990) the conference lasted for five days where stakeholders engaged in dialogues and debates through plenary sessions and workshops. These endeavours culminated in the identification of common areas for concern which are necessary for popular participation in Africa’s development.
These areas are:
- Asserting the role of popular participation,
- Promotion of popular participation,
- Popular participation in development; and
- Monitoring of popular participation.
A detailed explanation of each area is provided here under:
- Asserting the role of Popular Participation
The conference has unilaterally accepted that the causes of Africa’s underdevelopment did not only embrace economic problems but included human, legal, political and social ones. These problems reflected unprecedented proportions of human suffering, poverty and hunger to African masses. Delegates emphasised that those problems were to be addressed through institutionalisation of political freedoms such as speech, opinion, tolerance of differences, and ensuring people’s maximum participation, their organisations as well as associations. Everyone in the society should be incorporated in the process to ensure that a people centred approach was enhanced.
The conference further emphasised that development objectives in Africa should reflect the goal of human centred development. That was achievable by satisfying people’s needs, socio-economic justice and people’s empowerment by determining the direction and content of development. Ecological and environmental crises were never to be addressed without sustainable development process commanding full support and people’s participation. That could be achieved by using AAF-SAP which provided the best framework to address the problem. The orthodox structural programmes which undermined development of human beings and disapproved the role of popular participation was disregarded. Popular participation was perceived as an end and means suitable to address Africa’s fractured socio
- economic situation. It provided the platform for collective commitment to determine people’s based development process and willingness by sacrificing and directing their energies for its application (Kufuor, 2000).
- Promotion of Popular Participation
The delegates confirmed that popular participation was all and sundry a consolidation of people’s efforts for developing and creating appropriate policies and programmes which served their interests fully. For that to be possible, a political processes accommodating freedom of opinions, tolerating differences and accepting joint agreement on issues was necessary. That was perceived to be able to maximise effective participation of people, organisations and delegates. Such an action required participation from people within all sectors of the society. Additionally, the roles of the state and international community were cardinal for the creation of such conditions (African Charter for Popular Participation - 2007).
Women’s marginalisation and child abuse became a primary concern for all delegates. The conference affirmed that women and children’s rights should be enshrined on national laws of all African states. That should accommodate social, economic and political rights. These rights are perceived to be the primary features of a democratic and participatory pattern of development (Mindzie, 2007).
The state is highly regarded as the base for popular participation. African governments were encouraged to develop an appropriate platform and environment that is conducive for the people to realise their maximum participation. That would be achievable by forging a new partnership between African governments and civil society. That partnership should not recognise the importance of gender related issues only but create a platform that will ensure the involvement of women at all decision-making levels. Governments were highly encouraged to set specific targets for ensuring appointment of women in senior and management positions in all government departments.
People’s full participation in self-development, freedom of expression and freedom from fear were encouraged to be highly guaranteed by African states. That was perceived to be achievable through the extension and protection of people’s fundamental rights that are indicated earlier. Governments were encouraged to implement the African Charter Human and People’s Rights; Convention for the Rights of the Child and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation - 2007).
- Popular Participation in Development
It is important to note that the following strategies, frameworks and actions were highly emphasised for popular participation in development:
At Government level
African governments were highly advised to develop and adopt development strategies and approaches containing aspirations and interests of Africans. That should reflect African values, economic, social and cultural realities. It was believed that would be achievable if African governments promoted the formulation and implementation of national development programmes drawn from popular participation. Apart from that, these programmes were to aim at achieving self - reliant and self-sustaining people centred development premised on democratic agreements (African Charter For Popular Participation, 1990).
An environment conducive for enabling a people centred and broad based participation was regarded as necessary. That environment was necessary to enhance initiatives and creativity through the following mechanisms:
- Promotion of massive literacy and skills training advancing human research;
- Extension of economic power to the people through equal distribution of income, support of people’s production by providing access to land, credit and technology; and
- Provision of a platform allowing people to participate in the formulation and implementation of social policies.
At the Level of People and their Organisations
Participation of the people has been highly regarded as the cornerstone for development.
The following were regarded as appropriate means necessary to enhance people’s participation and democratic governance:
- Establishment of independent grassroots organisations encouraging self - reliant participation development aimed at increasing output productivity of the masses;
- Provision of conducive platforms capacitating people’s effective participation in debates regarding economic policy as well as development issues;
- Promotion of education, literacy, skills training and human resource development enhancing people’s to participation in governance; and
- Shaking off lethargy and traditional beliefs derailing development. That focussed on customs and cultural practices undermining the status of women in society while recognising and valuing patriarchal beliefs and practices contributing to development. Rural and urban people’s organisations such as workers, peasants, women, youth, students, should be encouraged to initiate and implement strategies intensifying their productive power and meet their basic needs; and o Joint endeavours were to be undertaken to transform negative attitudes projected to the disabled to incorporate them into the mainstream of development.
At the Level of the International Community
As developmental partners, the international community was cajoled to support African popular participation through:
- Supporting African countries in their drive to internalise development and transformation process. The IMF, WB and other multilateral and bilateral donors were requested to unconditionally accept and help African initiatives to conceptualise, formulate and implement Afro - centric development programmes; o Directing technical assistance programmes which consolidate national capabilities for policy analysis and design as well as in the implementation of economic reform and developmental programmes;
- Assisting in democratising development in African countries by supporting decentralisation of developmental process, activating African participation and their organisations to formulate developmental strategies and economic reform programmes, open debate and consensus building process on development and reform;
- Reduction of Africa’s debt and debt servicing obligation through the provision of the extension of the moratorium on debt servicing obligations releasing resources for financing development; and
- Ensuring that human dimension is cardinal to the adjustment programmes that must adhere to the objectives and aspirations of African people (ibid).
At the Level of Women’s Organisations
Many African women’s organisations should pay particular attention to the following to ensure maximum participation of women in the process of development.
- As architects of confidence among women, popular African organisations were encouraged to strengthen women’s capacity;
- African social organisations should concertedly struggle to attain policies and programmes that reflect and recognise the role of women as producers, mothers, active community mobilisers and custodians of culture; and
- African social organisations should work to ensure that men in particular and society in general understand women’s role in the recovery and transformation of Africa so that they can pursue common appropriate courses of action.
- Monitoring of Popular Participation According to Dias (2007), the Conference adopted the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development that was used to monitor the progress of recommendations and resolutions undertaken. The Charter emphasised the following:
- Acceleration of literacy rate. That was regarded as the index of capacity for mass
participation in public debate, decision making and general development process; o Enhancement of freedom of association, especially political association and the presence of democratic institutions such as political parties, trade unions, people’s grass roots organisations and professional associations and the guarantee of constitutional rights;
- Provision of ample representation for people and their organisations in national bodies;
- Provision of the rule of law and socio - economic justice including equal distribution of income and the creation of full employment opportunities;
- Protection of ecological, human and legal environment; and
- Creation of a platform for press and media freedom to facilitate a public debate on major issues.
It is imperative to comprehend that the above mentioned endeavours were based on African self-reliance and integration, popular participation in development, centrality of the state to the developmental processes, the removal of inequalities in the international economic and trading system and an African alternative to market growth. African home grown strategies of continental development were opposed, undermined and thrown away by the international donors especially the World Bank and IMF.
Africa’s developmental programmes failed because of a vacuum of real leadership to steer the continent into a brighter and future because independence leaders were pre - occupied with their own positions of power, tenure and material well - being, more often than not at the expense of their African citizens. Almost all African leaders, be they civilian or military ran Africa into a quagmire as they believed that their names were synonymous with the names of the countries they liberated. They became sacrosanct and turned to dictators who pillaged African resources, human and material together with the developed world.
Contemporary false perceptions in African international relations discourse hold that NEPAD is the first endeavour undertaken by Africans to address continental socioeconomic and political malaise seriously. The crux of the matter is that the previous endeavours failed and therefor Africa has every reason to want NEPAD to succeed where others failed. It is clear that Africa approached the developed world for assistance on the path to recovery and sustainable development.
Those attempts failed to deliver envisaged results as they were for all intents and purposes, opposed, undermined and thrown away by the very Bretton Woods’ institutions or international financial regimes that NEPAD invites to partner today. The donor communities’ reluctance to support these initiatives implied that African countries were unable to guarantee investment for development on the continent. This however, does not mean that African leaders are not responsible for the lack of development because few of them undertook the responsibility for development. It appears that NEPAD changes from this because Africans are being tasked with securing their own development by the West as long as this new phase of development is implemented in partnership with the West.
The Africans who were involved in these programmes relied heavily on foreign sponsorships from the developed countries that attached strict conditionalisties on Africans’ exercise of basic right to decide about the future of their nations and the continent. This situation was supposed to improve if the African leaders were committed to carry out their own development agenda which is developed in accordance to the needs of people of the continent. However, given the leader’s excessive exogenous dependence, their narrow political base and their perpetual failure to demonstrate tangible commitment, the implementation of these plans suffered from gentle neglect because of the unavailability of funds and visionary leadership.
It is important to acknowledge that until the establishment of NEPAD, the lack of resources and the will to soldier on self - reliantly, they (African leaders) ignored and abandoned their own strategies, including two United Nations Programs of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development as well as the United Nations Agenda for the Development of Africa which were created together with the international community under the auspices of the United Nations. Meanwhile it is truth to say that the international community is responsible for stifling African development, even in cases where there has been an agreement on the way in which development should take place, African states lacked the ability to implement these projects.
The developmental programmes in Africa originated from few elites who did not consult with academics and civil society to construct developmental plans that included all stakeholders. The neglect of other stakeholders reflected a top down approach to resolve continental problems. Such an approach neglects the contributions of other stakeholders who can bring informative and alternative ideas that might corroborate the ideas of the policymakers to become a plan which reflects the perceptions and ideas of a variety of stakeholders from civil society, academics, religious organisations and policymakers.
African leadership failed to recognise endogenous problems to address developmental failures. These leaders were highly interested in entrenching their grip on domestic leadership. In their quest, there was serious violation to principles of democracy and human rights that was characterised by suppression to opposition parties, corruption, dictatorship and pervasive corruption. For example, former leader of Zaire Mobutu Sese Seko imprisoned anyone who opposed his leadership and became extremely rich because of his corrupt practices. These domestic malpractices resulted in myriad people in various countries entrenched in the quagmire of poverty to the oblivion of political leaders. In addressing continental developmental failure, a lopsided perception directed at exogenous parties, for example, the donor parties became a cardinal feature in the thinking of African leadership. Apart from that, donor partners carry the blame of failing to adhere to their promises and attach myriad conditions such as SAPs for Africa’s development. The very same conditions are attached to NEPAD through good governance and trade liberalisation in exchange of accelerated aid from the donor partners.
New Partnership For Africa’s Development - NEPAD
According to Cilliers (2002a), the last years of the last century witnessed African leaders searching for appropriate strategies aimed at releasing Africa from the economic quagmire and socio-political malaise. This energetic search resulted in the creation of the New Partnership for Africa ’ s Development (NEPAD) in the 21st century. NEPAD results from the merger of two prominent initiatives aimed at addressing Africa’s underdevelopment that was caused by unfavorable terms of trade, lack of good governance and the entire dependency of African development from Western funding. These two initiatives are the Millennium Partnership for African Recovery (MAP) and the Omega Plan. The two widely known documents incorporated the little known document called Compact for African Recovery produced by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA, 2010).
The production of three documents by the African leadership reflects the burning desire of an African experience of unfulfilled missions over the last decades of political independence. The motivation behind these initiatives has been premised on a common vision and shared belief that they (those leaders) had an obligation for eradicating poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively on a path of sustainable growth and development in the 21st century. Those initiatives were highly based on the determination and desire by Africans to extract themselves from the quagmire of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalizing world.
In this regard, MAP resulted from separate mandates given to three African leaders, Presidents Obasanjo of Nigeria, Mbeki of South Africa and Bouteflika of Algeria to engage with the rich North countries and the IFIs regarding economic and financial situation of poor countries in the South generally and Africa in particular. The crusade began at the extra ordinary Summit of the OAU held in Sirte, Libya in 1999, when Presidents Mbeki and Bouteflika were mandated in consultation with the OAU’s Contact Group on Africa’s External Debt to engage with Africa’s creditors regarding the cancellation of the continent’s external debt cancellation (Ikome, 2007).
This mandate was given to both Presidents to engage with Africa’s creditors to find appropriate means for the cancellation of Africa’s debt which resulted in socio - economic and political malaise. That was the bold endeavour undertaken by the OAU to look for a common platform with the donors to resolve Africa’s debt crisis. It should be comprehended that the mandate was not the sole activity of both mandated leaders. The mandate was sanctioned under the auspices of the continental organisation.
Within seven months, the South Summit of Non Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Group of 77 poor countries affectionately known as G77 and China, in Havana, Cuba mandated Mbeki and Obasanjo, chairpersons of NAM and G77 and China respectively to convey the concerns of the South to the G8 and IFIs. Analysts maintain that these two separate mandates given to the OAU troika were aimed at addressing the continental plight and the marginalization of the South in a rapidly globalising world. The common factors in these mandates, which are poverty eradication and debt reversal culminated in the development of MAP (Kanyegirire and Ndangam, 2006).
The plight of poverty and debt escalation has been a common feature of South -South cooperation. The above mentioned organisations provided an appropriate platform for Africa’s socio economic marginalisation to be highly debated. That is where the mandate which formed the backbone of MAP was developed. The problem with the mandate given to two Presidents was that it did not have any time frames and actions to be undertaken if the donors are intransigent. These meetings became talk shops for the South to raise their common frustrations.
The leaders began their crusade by meeting with the G8 countries in Okinawa, Japan, in July 2000 (Sidiropoulos and Hughes, 2004). Gelb (2002) maintains that African delegation dominated representation of the South at that meeting. The discussion was transformed from a mere debate concerning debt relief into discussions focusing on development, especially African development in particular. It became evident that during those discussions, the G8 requested African leaders to develop a plan of action that succinctly explained Africa’s expectation from the rich and developed countries.
After Okinawa meeting, Obasanjo and Bouteflika mandated Mbeki to develop an African developmental plan. Mbeki responded by producing MAP which was by African leaders for the first time at the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos in 2000. The presentation of an African development for the first time in public at Davos reflected Africa’s high regard for the rich developed and donor countries and lack of respect to the masses they lead. African scholars and development specialists were not consulted in this regard. That is the reason why MAP is perceived as a top - down approach by African citizenry.
Obi (2001) adds that after presentation, the developed countries, especially the G8 the countries demanded that the elements of “partnership and ownership ” be incorporated in the African recovery programme. In their explanation, the G8 countries emphasised that the programme was proudly owned by Africans to develop the continent in partnership with the rich developed countries. Preeminently, the awarding of the mandate to Mbeki resulted in the programme being diluted into the objectives of South Africa’ foreign policy. “This explains why the early drafts of the early MAP document were driven by a Deep South African reading of the development problems facing Africa and the prognosis for Africa extricating itself out of development quagmire ” . It should be understood that the transfer of the mandate to Mbeki afforded him the opportunity to drum up support for democracy, promotion of human rights and economic development which are the cornerstones for South Africa’s foreign policy. This gave South Africa an opportunity to asserts itself in the continent and globally
Adesina (2001a) argues that the 35th Ordinary Session of the OAU, 3rd Ordinary Session of Africa’s Economic Community as well as the Declaration and Programme of Action of the G77 in Havana, 2000 did not mention the mandate enshrined in MAP. However, the OAU Session focused on:
I. A commitment to exclude those who came to power by coup d `etat from attending OAU sessions; and
II. The adoption of a proposal submitted by President Obasanjo on peace and security issues.
Furthermore, the G77 and China Summit focused primarily on debt eradication and poverty in the South. This raises questions as to who gave the mandate to the three Presidents, but above all a workable programme was produced after those high level engagements. This attests to why some of the Presidents such as Gadhafi and Mugabe heavily criticized NEPAD which originates from MAP.
MAP, which prioritised the promotion of democracy, protection of human rights, and good political as well as economic governance as cornerstones of Africa’s development, differs from previous African development initiatives. This is by the fact that it acknowledges both exogenous and endogenous factors as impediments to African recovery. Furthermore, its origin raises suspicion because it revolves around three Presidents excluding the rest. Matters are further exacerbated by the fact that President Mbeki pronounced publicly outside the continent at the WEF in Davos, Switzerland where he emphasised that participation in the programme was open to all African countries prepared and ready to commit themselves to the underlying principles guiding the initiative.
Mbeki’s declaration caused angst among African leaders such as Abdoulaye Wade, also present at the WEF gathering. After WEF’s convergence, Wade crafted the Omega Plan to counter MAP because he assumed that it was entrenching Anglophone philosophy in the continent (Adesina, 2001a). Mbeki’s action and Wade’s aftermath reaction resuscitated the Anglophone and Francophone competition in the continent. This is by the fact that there is secrecy surrounding the development of MAP and Wade countering the programme which is aimed at developing the continent. One of the major problems surrounding MAP is its lack of consultation.
Boko and Seck (2008) add that the Omega Plan is perceived as a symptom of the deeply anchored Francophone-Anglophone divide in African politics. Senegalese diplomats defended the Omega Plan that it was an original and independent plan developed earlier by Wade. By developing the plan, Wade aimed at developing Africa by constructing regional infrastructure and educational projects. Senegalese diplomats continued to defend Wade by emphasising that the plan was long developed before his election as president of Senegal.
The plan identified the development of infrastructure and human resources, including investment in agriculture as the basic important elements of any renewal plan. It emphasised that after African states freed themselves from the burden of investment in infrastructure and human resource development then they would possess the resources necessary for improving the quality of their economic governance. The Omega Plan was initially presented by Wade at the Franco-African Summit held in Yaoundé, Cameroon in January 2001 (Bala and Vickers, 2002).
The Omega Plan and MAP were jointly presented at the extraordinary Summit of the OAU in Libya in March 2001.The Summit endorsed both initiatives and decided that every effort should be undertaken to merge both. This was because both plans pursued similar objectives aiming for the recovery and development of the continent. African leaders realised that, for the continent to be taken seriously, it had to present a single, coordinated initiative to its international partners and moreover more than one initiative would confuse Africa’s partners. Therefore, the main motive for merging the initiatives was to ease Africa’s dealings with its external partners (Ikome, 2007).
Regardless the problem surrounding the secrecy of MAP and counter measures from Francophone countries by producing Omega Plan. African leaders took initiatives necessary for the development of Africa. It was a wise move by the OAU to recognise both initiatives and further demanded for their merge. This action is unifying because the continent comprises various countries with different perceptions. The union of both plans has been anticipated to be accepted across the continent.
Myriad endeavours were undertaken by African leaders and development specialists to merge the two plans. Those endeavours culminated in the production of New African Initiative (NAI) which consolidated MAP and Omega Plan ready for presentation at the OAU Summit scheduled for Lusaka in July 2001. Before the submission of the consolidated plan, Presidents Mbeki and Wade held a serious meeting in Pretoria to iron out a few differences and consolidate their presentation for the Summit. NAI was finally presented at the OAU Summit in Lusaka on the 11th of July 2001 where it was unanimously accepted as the declaration of the Summit. In terms of the declaration, a 15 member Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) was appointed to drive NAI forward. It was to be chaired by Obasanjo, assisted by Wade and Bouteflika, with Mbeki as the secretary (Akokpari, 2004b).
Diescho (2002) adds that on the 11th of July 2001, 15 members HSGIC was elected and mandated to steer the NAI framework forward. Adding to the executive were three Heads of States each from the 5 OAU regions. These three states comprised of Central Africa represented by Cameroon, Gabon, and Sao Tome and Principe; East Africa represented by Ethiopia, Mauritius and Rwanda; North Africa represented by Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia; Southern Africa represented by Botswana, Mozambique and South Africa while West Africa was represented by Mali, Nigeria and Senegal. It is imperative to realise that the formation of the 15 member HSGIC and three additional members from each of the five regions symbolized unity and acceptance from African heads of states that they were ready to engage with the rest of the world to develop the continent. This highlighted that the continental Organisation regarded Africa’s development as a concerted effort.
Tawflik (2008) highlights that African leaders perceived NAI as “ Africa ’ s strategy for achieving sustainable development in the 21 st century ”. In this context, it was important to recognise the contribution of the little known document called Compact for African Recovery produced by the Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) indicated earlier. It presented an important component of UNECA’s response to the implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration (MDG’s) and called for African countries to foster partnership with developed countries by investing in the necessary resources through aid, debt relief, and market access necessary to “ jump start ” African economies in their recovery effort.
However, Africa was called upon to put in place the necessary political reforms ensuring that their economies would take off. The Compact became the valuable document for welding two African documents into NAI. The incorporation of the Compact into NAI extends the role of the international community in Africa’s recovery. This brings another element that NAI was not only curtailed to Africa but UNECA which is the subsidiary body of the UN contributed its knowledge of development in the programme. This raises the question of the UN’s role in playing its part for ensuring the success of the plan because it failed to commit to its earlier developmental plans in Africa.
African leaders worked hard to garner support for the new initiative from the continent’s external and international partners. On the 20th of July 2001, a group of some of HSGIC presented NAI to the G -8 Summit in Genoa, Italy. The G 8 leaders welcomed the initiative and endorsed it as the Genoa Plan for Africa. Notwithstanding that, the G8 committed itself to forging a new partnership with Africa aimed at addressing the continent’s developmental problems. The G8 also undertook to help in promoting the initiative in multilateral forums.
The Summit then appointed a committee of personal representatives to work with the African leaders to developing a plan of action for adoption by the G8 Summit to be held in Canada in June 2002 (Malcolmson, 2004). The problem here is that the G8 leaders did not provide time frames for ensuring that the plan of action is well undertaken. Over and above junior officials were African Heads of State and Government to work out modalities of implementing the plant. That culminated in a meeting held in Abuja, Nigeria on the 23rd of October where a decision was taken to rename the initiative from NAI to New Partnership for Africa ’ s Development (NEPAD).
NEPAD is an innovative Afro-centric developmental framework. It seeks to address challenges the current challenges facing the African continent. These challenges include inter alia poverty, underdevelopment and continued marginalization. It is premised on African countries making commitment to good governance, democracy and human rights while attempting to prevent and resolve situations of conflict and instability on the continent (Ramsamy, 2004). The G8 ensured their presence by enforcing the concept of partnership into the developmental programme. This highlights that NEPAD cannot succeed without external donors who impose their terms to Africa as was the case by invoking the concept of partnership in the developmental plan.
Goals for NEPAD
The following goals have been identified:
I. To promote growth and sustainable development. By enrolling all children of school going age in schools by 2015; progressing towards gender equality by through women empowerment and elimination of gender inequalities in schools by 2015; reduction of infant and child mortality ratios by two - thirds by 2015; increasing access to reproductive health services by 2015; and reversing the loss of environmental resources by 2015;
II. Eradication of the widespread and severe poverty: To develop programmes which will educate people, skill them and allow them to contribute to the labour of the continent in order to eradicate poverty; and
III. Halting the marginalization of Africa in the globalization process - Active participation and involvement at all multilateral levels to change multilateral regimes in order to incorporate Africa into a rapidly globalising world (Spicer, 2002).
These goals are achievable in the following categories:
I. Peace, Security, Democracy and Political Governance: This is subdivided into two categories: Peace and Security initiative which ensures peace and security through conflict prevention and resolution, peacekeeping and post conflict reconstruction and the democracy and political governance in itiative aiming at promoting the principles of democracy, transparency, accountability, integrity, respect for human rights and the rule of law;
II. Economic and Corporate Governance: Aiming to deliver sound, stable fiscal and macroeconomic management, investor friendly systems of commercial law, sound banking and insurance as well as sound government fiscal management;
III. Bridging the Infrastructure Gap: This includes roads, ports, railroads, electricity, water, sanitation and facilities for health and education. This would incorporate information and telecommunications areas;
IV. Human Resource Development: Envisaged to incorporate all development themes to include inter alia: health, education, poverty reduction, agriculture, gender development;
V. Capital Flows: Looking at investment promotion, debt reduction, increased aid and aid reform;
VI. Market Access: Focusing on increased resource beneficiation, diversification of agriculture and increased manufacturing and
VII. Environment: Focusing on all matters relating to climate change, global warming, preservation of wetlands and transnational parks to pursue sustainable development (NEPAD Document, 2001).
In conclusion, Africa’s developmental trajectory has been confronted by numerous problems resulting from dependency, lack of political will and inability by African leaders to acknowledge endogenous problems such as authoritarianism, absence of good governance, neo-patrimonialism, pork barrel, corruption as well as conflict and poverty. Laissezz faire economic practice exposed African products to heavily subsidised products which coerced African producers to increase prices of their goods as well as closing business because of failure to generate profit. Furthermore, SAPs introduced by IFIs cajoled African states to abandon state interventionist oriented welfarist Keynesian approach, to degenerate the continent into and socio-economic quagmire. Pre-eminently these developmental programmes have been unable to provide clear solutions and directions to resolve the continental problems and they only managed to provide a catalogue of the continental problems.
The paper recommends the following:
- Continental developmental programmes should develop comprehensible common policies which invoke terms of reference, time frames and responsible people to lead implementation;
- Continental developmental programmes should mobilise resources needed to facilitate the implementation of its own policies, programmes and plans. This should be done by inter alia tax incentives for MNCs which impart knowledge and skills and accelerate development of the continent
- Civil society should always be consulted by progenitors of developmental programmes in utilising their expertise and knowledge for expanding the horizons of developmental trajectory. This will assist in narrowing existing gaps between states and civil society.
- In implementing laissezz faire policies, developmental programmes should develop protective regimes aimed at promoting and protecting the interests of the African citizenry.
- Africa, through developmental programmes should negotiate with the developed countries and IFIs for a Marshall Plan like development aid which is not accompanied by any form of conditions. This form of aid should be directed at accelerating sustainable development across the continent whereby the developed countries will provide expertise. The only form of intervention should be though evaluation and assessment of projects.
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