TABLE OF CONTENTS
Globalisation as a process of transformation
The origins of globalisation: Is it new or not?
Manifestations of globalisation
Gains and losses as a result of globalisation: a two-edged sword
Globalisation and sovereignty
SECURITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR EARA: HUMAN SECURITY
The historical development of the new security agenda
The new security agenda in the aftermath of the cold war
GLOBALISATION AND SECURITY: A COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP
MANIFESTATIONS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GLOBALISATION AND SECURITY
Security and extraterritoriality
Security within global networks
New security agenda as a product of globalisation
State capacity to provide security
I would like to express my sincere appreciation to the following:
- Dr Heidi Hudson and Nico Combrink for their invaluable assistance and guidance.
- Mr Kola Eister, for proof-reading the document.
- Mrs Elize Kruger for typing the script.
- The Staff of the Free State Sasol Library particularly the Inter-Library Loans section and Miss Jean Prophet for her assistance with the Internet sources.
- The Staff of Bloemfontein City Library in particular Amos Mkham for his sacrifices.
- Bakgwatlheng botlhe!
Lastly, I would like to dedicate this min-thesis to my (late) mother, Mosai; my wife, Nono and son, Letebele.
Today, we see globalisation manifesting itself in various dimensions of our life such as communications and technology, economy, ecological problems, criminal networks, health, religion, norms and ideologies. But, according to Clark (1999:103), of all the potential manifestations of globalisation, those in the security domain have been the least systematically explored.
Since little research has been done on the impact of globalisation on security, this study becomes significant to the extent that it will contribute to this debate and innovatively apply the acquired knowledge to the field of human security. The fundamental importance of the inquiry rests on the examination of how the globalisation of security has resulted in the state forfeiting some of its key functions in the area of security.
The end of the Cold War and the transformation of the state’s functions which resulted from globalisation, and the process of globalisation itself, have contributed to the newly expanded view of security in the post-Cold War era (Clark, 1999:112-114). As a result the new concept of security has been broadened to include not only military and political but also economic, social and environmental components (Simai, 1994: 348). It is against this background that the relationship between globalisation and security will be explained.
The aim, therefore, is to establish how, as a result of globalisation, the state is no longer able to fully provide security to its citizens. Some scholars assert that the link between globalisation and security is imposed from the outside and is transforming the security environment within which states operate. Consequently the state is portrayed as having diminished capacity to produce security. The opposing view holds that such accounts of the relations between globalisation and security are deeply flawed and misleading, since they project an image of globalisation as a disembodied process taking place over and beyond states, and simply impacting upon states, as a new constraining influence from the outside (Clark, 1999:107).
The transformation of the substance and mode of attainment of security displays deep seated internal changes as well. In other words, globalisation does not only affect the state from the “outside in”, but also from the “inside out”. This is evident in the new agreements between the state and society and in the transformed function of the state. Traditionally states monopolised legitimacy over the use of force and subsequent provision of security. In the post-Cold War period states are less prone to pursue their security within a unilateralist approach. An integrated approach to security is being followed as a consequence of high levels of interdependence. At the heart of the security state is the sophistication of military technology; its consequent cost; the restructuring of the defence industrial base (DIB); and the move towards a multilateral legitimation of military action. These four factors mentioned above are responsible for the globalisation of the security state.
This work proposes to explore the interface between globalisation and security. More specifically, the goals of the study are to:
- provide a conceptual clarification of globalisation as a process of transformation;
- to examine the concept of security in the post-Cold War era and provide a discussion of the new human security agenda; and
- to offer four areas of evidence in support of the claim that security is being reshaped by the impact of globalisation.
The latter relates to security and extra-territoriality; security within global networks; new security agenda as a product of globalisation; and state capacity to provide security.
This research work will adopt a deductive approach in the sense that general and established theories and concepts will be utilised and applied to the impact of globalisation on security based on the contending views of the realist and the liberal approaches. The research design is a mixture of descriptive and exploratory strategies. It is descriptive in the sense that a discussion of globalisation and security discourses will be given in a broad and all-encompassing sense. As a result of the ensuing debate between the proponents of the statist and the globalist schools of thought, there appears to be no consensus as to the implications of globalisation for security. The study is exploratory since very little research on the explicit link between globalisation and security exists and also due to the complexity of the linkage.
The complexity of the relationship stems from the view that globalisation is a force from the outside which impacts on the ability of the state to offer security in the traditional sense. In other words, it refers to protection of the borders against invasion by a foreign enemy, as a result of nuclear and other extraterritorial forces. This view fails to take into account the new compacts between the state and civil society. These new bargains are as result of the transformation of the state itself and also as a result of the process of globalisation. Because of the new agreements, the transformation of the state and the process of globalisation itself, the state is offering a new type of security and a new way of offering that security. The new type of security is human security, which does not only put emphasis on military aspects but on the other dimensions like the economic, environmental, political, financial and technological aspects. The new way of providing security is no longer a unilateral approach, but a multilateral coalition of forces. The relationship between globalisation and security is therefore much more complex than a simple linear linkage.
This study will build the argument on the works by Clark (1999), Hirst and Thompson (2000) as well as Scholte (2000). The following section deals with the conceptual clarification of globalisation as a process of transformation.
Globalisation as a process of transformation
The current world order is characterised by intense global change, where instant communications, the development of an integrated global economy, a global culture, and new non-state social movements have transformed world politics. Consequently this period is usually referred to as the era of globalisation.
The process of globalisation, as it will be revealed later in this work, is not a straightforward process. Although the process has affected almost every aspect of reality and has left no one completely untouched, its impact is uneven. Furthermore, there are also many myths associated with the process of globalisation which will be uncovered and countered in this discussion. Globalisation as it will be shown is an ambivalent and often contradictory process in certain respects. It has appeared to be like a two-edged sword, benefiting North America, the Pacific Rim and Europe whilst marginalising millions in the developing world.
The process of globalisation implies that social relations acquire relatively distanceless and borderless qualities, so that human lives are increasingly played out in the world as a single place (Scholte, 1998: 14). Accordingly Heywood (1997: 14) defines globalisation as “a complex web of interconnectedness that means that our lives are increasingly shaped by events that occur, and decision that are made, at a great distance from us. The central feature of globalisation is therefore that geographical distance is of declining relevance, and that territorial boundaries, such as those between nation-states, are becoming less significant.” At present goods, capital, people, knowledge, images and communications including crime, culture, pollutants, drugs, fashions and beliefs, are flowing across national borders (Held and McGrew, 1994: 58; Buthelezi, 1996 : 26).
Many writes contend that these social relations are not only at the economic level but that they transcend all aspects of human lives (Walters, 1997: 4; Dlamini, 1999: 80; Tandon, 1999: 26; Davies, 1996: 37; Cable, 1999: 2-4). Globalisation actually means that national governments, companies, unions and organisations are increasingly being ruled by global forces. As a result of globalisation goods and services are now organised on a global scale and consumed as such. There has emerged a new relationship between the government, labour and political structures. The nation states are co-operating more with neighbouring states and are forming regional economic regimes and a global culture is emerging. The “western” culture is reflected by the spread of Macdonald’s, jeans and music, which is being entrenched all over the world. (Isaacs, 1997: 20-21).
Globalisation, in this study, is conceptualised as being different from internationalisation, liberalisation, americanisation, universalisation or modernisation. Scholte’s (2000: 46-50) conceptualisation of globalisation as deterritorialisation or as the growth of “supra-territorial” relations between people will be followed. In this context globalisation refers to a fundamental change in the nature of social space. The proliferation and spread of supra-territorial or what is known as “transworld” or “transborder” connections bring an end to what could be referred to as “territorialism”, meaning, a situation where social geography is completely territorial. As will be outlined later in this study, territory still matters very much in our globalising world despite the fact that it no longer constitutes the whole of our geography.
The present era, according to Scholte (2000: 47-48), has experienced a proliferation of social relations that are at least partially – and usually quite substantially – detached from logic of territoriality. Examples range from telephone calls, electronic finance and the depletion of the stratospheric ozone. Such phenomena cannot be situated at a fixed territorial location. They operate without regard to territorial distance. They substantially bypass and cross territorial borders. Thus, technologically speaking, a telephone conversation can occur across an ocean as readily as across a street. Today money deposited with a major bank is mostly stored in “placeless” cyberspace rather than in a vault. Ozone depletion exists everywhere on earth at the same time and its relative distribution across different parts of the globe moves regardless of territorial distances or borders. Hence the geography of these global conditions cannot be conceptualised in terms of territoriality alone. They also reside in the world as a single place – that is, in a transworld space. Comprehended in this context, globality marks a distinct kind of space-time compression, and one that is mostly new to contemporary history.
Having defined globalisation, it is necessary to briefly establish whether it is a new phenomenon or just a continuation of processes that have been around for a long time.
The origins of globalisation: Is it new or not?
This is another area of contention between the liberalists, the realists and the Marxists. The realists argue that globalisation is nothing especially new, and that is has not changed the fundamental character of world politics, namely the territorial division of the world into nation states. The liberalists hold a different view. The economically and technologically led interdependence and interconnectedness between societies will result in greater economic prosperity for the people of the world. Marxists insist that globalisation is really only the latest stage in the development of international capitalism (Smith and Baylis, 1998: 6-7). According to Nzimande (2001: 7), what we today refer to as globalisation is a quantitative and a qualitative development in the growth of imperialism. Scholte (200: 19) provides an outline of theorists who trace the origin of globalisation from as far back as 100 to 500 years ago. According to these theorists globalisation only reached its height in recent times. Others trace it from the early fifteenth and the mid-eighteenth centuries. Others have located the start of globalisation in the late nineteenth century. But globalisation reached its peak during the 1960’s
Smith and Baylis (1998: 7-9) outline some of the theories which serve as precursors of globalisation. These theories reflect some of the similarities between globalisation as a current phenomenon and the features of world politics identified by writers before the contemporary period. It is essential to mention that these theories came into being long before globalisation became the buzzword of modern politics. Some of these theories relate to modernisation and industrialisation, economic growth, economic interdependence, the notion of the global village, world society, the end of history thesis and the liberal peace theory. It can be concluded that this process of globalisation which has its origins many decades ago only manifested itself fully in recent times.
Ever since the late 1970s a new wave of globalisation has been triggered and motivated by market deregulation and economic policy liberalisation; by the new micro-electronics-based information and communications technologies; and by the globalisation of financial markets (Oman, 1999: 36). Castell (in Kraak, 2000: 30-31) argues that until the late 1970s, the world economy was loosely connected but today as result of globalisation, all these activities can operate across the globe in a coordinated manner. You can buy shares on a world market from your computer at home, at any time of day or night. Or a company in New York can know exactly how many cell phones are produced in a Beijing factory in real time: the monitor can change as soon as each cell phone comes off the production line. These processes result from a combination of computer and telecommunication technologies.
The above-mentioned processes lead many to conclude that a new process has been taking place in the world economy since the 1970s, and this process involves the rapid development of the world economy from an international economy to a global economy (Isaacs, 1997: 20; Ostry, 1998: 2). So fully-fledged globalisation is a relatively new development. The changes therefore present a quantitative change in the nature of World politics. But they are more than that – a quantitative change has also taken place and a new world order is beginning to emerge as a result (Smith and Baylis, 1998:7; Cable, 1999: 9). Some of the functions which were traditionally performed by the state are elevated to suprastate bodies. For example in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) represents the “internationalisation” of security. The formation of institutions such as the Western European Union (WEU) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) pre-supposes that Europe is witnessing the emergence of new structures of collective security which attract a stronger international integration of military and security affairs (Held and McGrew, 1994: 62-63). It wold suffice to give evidence of the manifestations of globalisation in only four areas, namely communication, technology, finance and the military.
Manifestations of globalisation
According to Mills (1999: V), globalisation is today an irreversible fact of life. The world is becoming a smaller, inter-connected, hyperlinked and hyperactive place. As a result we see globalisation manifesting itself in communications, technology, finance and the military.
In terms of communication and technology the new global economy has been initiated by breakthroughs in five areas of technological progress; micro-electronics, computing (both hardware and software), telecommunications, opti-electronics, (advances in fibre optics) and bio-genetic engineering. All these technologies share one common generation, storage and manipulation of information, since they can all be used together. Castells (in Kraak, 2000: 30) calls this “informationalism”. It elevates knowledge and information to a new and central position in the historical development of capitalism.
For example, a wide range of supra-territorial connections have been forged through air corridors, electromagnetic waves and light pulses. As a result, global communications allow every individual anywhere in this world to have nearly instant contact with each other, despite territorial distances and territorial borders that lie between them. As far as telecommunications is concerned, the telegraph, telephone, facsimile, telex, videoconference and computer networks allow signs, text, images and sound to move immediately between people, regardless of their territorial position or the territorial distances and borders between them (Scholte, 2000: 51). According to Sunter (in Harsant and Duvehage, 2000: 15), diversification and development in communications have become vital parts of technological advancement.
This information technology has assisted to create a unified and integrated global economy. For example, industrial production in some industries like motor cars, televisions, electronics and computers, is largely being organised on a global scale. This process has been accelerated by the growth in strength of the transnational corporations (TNC’s). For example, Ford produces different parts of the Ford motor car in different parts of the world. This means that the Ford motor car is a “global car” on the basis that it is produced by workers all over the world and not by workers in one country only. This does not only bear evidence to the fact that production in sectors is organised globally, but also that the products we buy have a global identity and no longer a national identity (Isaacs, 1997: 12-14). We have witnessed the end of the polarised communist planned economy versus capitalist market competition of the Cold War era and now see the emergence of the “one world” economy (Gelb and Floyd, 1999: 2).
The globalisation of information technology and production has serious implications for security. Reference can be made here to the beginning of the Internet and the impact of the computer on security technology. The Internet began during the late sixties as a project in which research computers at American universities were linked to the American Deference Force’s computer network which was developed by the Advanced Research Project Agency (APRA). The Pentagon’s original idea with the Internet was to share research results with American universities which were linked to the advanced research project agency (ARPANET) to use the same protocol to communicate with one another. So, it is common knowledge that the Internet emerged from a Pentagon network built to survive nuclear war (Norris and Arkin, 2001: 1). What effect does it have on state security in a computer-wired world where no one owns or controls the Internet?
There is a possibility that terrorist groups can gain access to sensitive state security information. This new breed of terrorists are called “cyberterrorists”. The Federal Bureau of Investigation defines terrorism as the illegal use of force against civilians or property to intimidate or force a government to accede to political or social objectives. Cyberterrorism could thus be defined as the use of computing technology to intimidate or force others. A typical example of cyberwar could be hacking into a hospital computer system and changing someone’s medicine prescription to a lethal dosage as an act of revenge. Most of the evidence reveal that military installations, power plants, air traffic control centres and the police are the most common targets (Mohlala, 2000: 28).
Global threats existed before the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attack against the United States. But the major concern is, of course, physical attack. But according to a U.S Congressional Commission examining weapons of mass destruction (WMD) used by terrorists the possibility that cyberattacks can be used in conjunction with physical attacks cannot be discounted (Thibodeau and Verton, 2001 1-2).
Global communications, global production and globalisation of military industry have all promoted, and had been accelerated by the globalisation of financial markets. For one thing, the “American” dollar, the “Japanese” yen, the “German” mark (before the changeover to the Euro) and other major “national” currencies have undergone a significant degree of deterritorialisation. They move globally, being used anywhere on earth at the same time and moving (electronically and via air transport) anywhere on the globe in effectively no time. Moreover the Special Drawing Right (SDR) and the euro have emerged through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU), respectively as supra-state monies with a Transworld use (Scholte, 2000: 52). The globalisation of financial markets has triggered this growth of world financial activities (Eng et al., 1998:3). This is evidenced by flows of money and capital across national borders. These markets shift billions of dollars around the world daily in a way that influences national economies through its impact on foreign exchanges, interest rates, the stock market, employment levels and government tax revenues (Holton, 1998: 80). For example, it has been estimated that every single day, more than a trillion US dollars exchange hands throughout the world. For many national economies, this represents a fundamental change towards a globalising economy, and it implies that governments are increasingly losing control over the money and capital that flow in and out of their economies (Isaacs, 1997: 11).
The globalisation of the military industry has witnessed the advent of global weaponry. In a similar way, unpiloted missiles can in short spaces of time carry shipments across any territorial distance and past any territorial borders. (Indeed, one such weapon has been appropriately named “Minute-man”). Inter-continental ballistic missiles, spy satellites, and the likes have in a way turned the globe as a whole into a single strategic realm.
The Gulf War of 1990-1991 was fought on the ground in Iraq and Kuwait. During the war the allies used satellite remote sensing, supersonic bombing raids, and electronic transborder financial transactions to sponsor the war. Furthermore the allies used propaganda against Baghdad in a war which was supported by the United Nations (Scholte, 1998: 16).
Gains and losses as a result of globalisation: a two-edged sword
Despite the fact that globalisation has affected almost every country in the world and that no one has been left completely untouched, its impact has been perceived differently by different states because some states are rich and others are poor. (Davies, 1996: 39). On a positive note, the level of economic integration and transformation is so huge that it has resulted in a new world order. States have lost control over their economies and the world economy is more interdependent that ever before (Smith and Baylis, 1998: 9).
According to Ostry (1998: 5), consumers would be in a position to buy quality products at the lowest prices anywhere and everywhere. As a result of removing trade limitations and barriers, foreign investments will be attracted. In this process jobs will be crated. The globalisation of the world economy has, without doubt, brought tremendous achievements in the area of the movement of skilled labour and the rapid spread of innovation from or between countries. Of utmost value are the non-economic benefits: freedom of choice associated with the international movement of goods, capital, people and freedom of thought associated with the movement of ideas. Global capitalism brings along with it freedom and prosperity (Soros, 1997: 14). But as will be shown later in this study, there are reservations relating to the democratic accountability of these big companies. Their undemocratic practices relate for example to the elections for their management members (Board of Governors).
Jaffer (1999: 1-2), concurs that globalisation has had a positive impact on civil and political rights of the citizens. This is not to discount its limitations on democracy mentioned above. Presently there is a lot of pressure put on dictatorships to adopt democracy forms of government, to remove trade barriers, to free the media and to end one-party rule. These are progressive measures that have developed new leadership capacity like Nigeria under Obasanjo to curb rising authoritarian misgovernance.
For other countries such as America and Japan, the greatest gain of globalisation is the diffusion of technology or more broadly, of knowledge. Knowledge is the basic source of productivity growth and hence of rising living standards. This situation does not, however, apply to the weakly integrated countries, particularly in Africa (Ostry, 1998: 5). While globalisation is creating unparalleled opportunities for the creation of wealth, the world is becoming increasingly polarised between the rich and the poor – both between and within countries. Abject poverty is a growing problem that is posing a grave challenge to the world at the dawn of the new Millennium (Commonwealth Heads of Government Ministers, 1994: 4).
According to Makhijani (in Falk, 1999: 13) the structure of the global political economy is in its most essential respects like that of apartheid in South Africa – a kind of global apartheid. Mbeki (2001: 15), argues that our globe is divided into North and South, the developed and developing worlds. The North is relatively rich and the South poor. This is a consequence of a long history that has included genocide against native populations, slavery, colonialism and white minority domination. There is also no doubt that there is a resurgence of racism in the developed North. This is driven by the inevitable population movement from the South to the North, as blacks try to escape poverty and underdevelopment. Gill (1999: 70) argues that globalisation is contradicting itself, in the sense that on the one hand it has set in motion a process of the dismantling of territorial barriers in the movement of commodities, information and capital across countries. But on the other hand it has retained barriers that are rather made more stringent for the movement of people, especially from the developing world to the advanced countries. A multinational company making an investment abroad can deploy its personnel in the host country without facing any discrimination, but the host country cannot do the same without facing some limitations.
The conclusion emanating from these examples is the ambivalent and often contradictory nature of globalisation. It has shown itself to be like a double-edged sword-benefiting and marginalising at the same time.
This uneven impact of globalisation is finding expression particularly in the views of the opponents of globalisation. Many people in the developing world do not benefit from technological developments and improvements in mass communications. Phenomena like the Internet, global companies and electronic media have been mainly concentrated in North America, the Pacific Rim and Europe. Furthermore, globalisation has generally affected city dwellers, professional people and younger generations relatively more than other groups, although as previously outlines, the process has left no one totally untouched (Scholte, 1998: 18). In 1990 according to Tooze (1998: 223), these countries accounted for 64 per cent of both the total world exports and imports of manufactured goods. In the 1980’s, the Triad of South-East Asia, Western Europe and North America accounted for nearly 80 per cent of all international capital flows.
The volume of money traded each day is huge and through modern communications, this finance has great mobility. The value of their currencies is subject to fluctuations. This money also does not follow economic logic or rationality. According to Peter Drucker (in Fraser, 1999: 18), it is volatile and easily panicked by rumour or unexpected events. The process of globalisation recommends market related economic systems with the full knowledge that markets favour the powerful, the united and the strong and that markets can overwhelm and destroy smaller players. Sometimes smaller players are entire nations. Fraser (1999: 18) discounts the view that market forces left on their own can solve socio-economic problems. The liberalisation of capital flows and the deregulation of financial markets have slowly eroded the scope for national monetary and fiscal policies. As it has been reflected in the Asian crisis, this erosion has been greatly magnified and has raised doubts about the benefits and costs of financial flows and the legitimacy of the IMF and its Structural Adjustment Programmes (Ostry, 1998: 2). Today financial markets and investment funds shift capital so rapidly that governments in both developed and emerging markets fear of capital and speculative attacks by the market: all governments live in some fear of markets and all are susceptible to a speculative attack (Woods, 1999: 23; Tandon, 1999: 16).
A related objection views globalisation as the latest stage of Western imperialism, because it is fundamentally a Western phenomenon which elevates and advances Western culture and values at the expense of other cultures. (Smith and Baylis, 1998: 10). Although the Asian Tigers had globalised, they did not adopt Western value systems. In global terms life is increasingly being determined in consumerist terms. Life is becoming a commodity or product to be shaped and re-shaped at the expense of economic convenience and the profit motive. As a result our values, beliefs, socio-cultural structures and the essence of justice, equity and goodwill to humankind is threatened (Jaffer, 1999: 3).
The multiplication of non-state actors or global gladiators on the scene of global governance raises concerns about democratic accountability. If for example, companies such as Shell or IBM become too powerful, they will actually raise the question of democratic accountability that is as to whom they are accountable. The fact of the matter is that most of the emerging non-state actors in a globalised world are precisely not democratically accountable. This issue has a spill-over effect as it applies to seemingly “good” global actors like Amnesty International and Greenpeace (Smith and Baylis, 1998: 10).
Up to this stage this work has posited two opposing positions: what can be called a pro-global perspective and an anti-globalisation perspective. Since both perspectives suffer from a tendency to overestimate or underestimate the extent, depth, causes and consequences of globalisation and also to oversimplify or exaggerate, it is imperative to formulate a more balanced position attempting to integrate elements of both opinions. The assertion that globalisation “divides vertically but unites horizontally” is relevant here. The vertical gap between North and South or rich and poor is increasing while transnational process (horizontally) is bringing people closer.
As already mentioned, the impact of accelerated globalisation ever since the end of the Cold War has affected all parts of the world – particularly the poor and the marginalised, with the greatest impact being felt by women, children, the disabled and the elderly. This impact has been felt most in the countries of the South – especially in sub-Saharan Africa and this impact has been greatly negative (Jaffer, 1999:1).
Globalisation has not eliminated the significance of place, distance and territorial borders, but has added other supra-territorial dimensions of geography, such as cyberspace and communication via electromagnetic waves (Scholte, 1998: 18). It has been vividly explained that globalisation brings a relative rather than a total deterritorialisation of social life. Global relations have substantially rather than completely transcended territorial space (Scholte, 2000:59). For example, distance retains important restraining and buffering effects when dealing with matters like terrestrial travel, merchandise trade, access to mining and landing rights. Meanwhile, state borders continue to halt movements of people and drug trafficking although border guards can do nothing to stop missile attacks or electronic money transfers (Scholte, 1998: 18).
Globalisation cannot be regarded as an outcome of a single driving force, namely Western capitalism. Although this is partly true, there are many other influences in dimensions other than the economic for example, political, cultural, ecological and psychological forces. Brought together, all these forces interact and mutually complement one another, thus making globalisation a complex and dynamic process (Scholte, 1998: 18).
There are not automatic associations between globalisation and emancipation as its proponents, such as Ohmae (1990), would like us to believe. They argue that it has brought a new unity in the world associated with universal equality, peace, freedom and democracy (Scholte, 1998: 18). This is not true, as the impact of globalisation particularly on the smaller and weaker economies of the South is felt even more deeply. Many southern economies remained devastated by war and fierce civil strife (e.g. Mozambique, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guatemala, Nicaraqua – to name but a few) or by natural disaster (El Salvador, Bangladesh) (Jaffer, 1999: 2).
Hurrel (1999: 266-267) raises the issue of developed and underdeveloped countries that do not respond uniformly to the matter of globalisation and security. Take military technology and economic resources. Because of the availability of modern military weapons on the global market, unstable states in the developing world that do not have the resources, are often at risk from mercenaries and dissident groups which manage to procure sufficient arms to threaten the security of the state. Rich and developed countries usually command sufficient resources, militarily and economically to stave off threats to the security of the state. More-over, radical understanding of the politics of globalisation recommends that those few developed states that provide their inhabitants with a good deal of security can do so only because of their dominant, privileged status within the structure of the global political economy. Furthermore, the very structure of this global economy enhances and reinforces the gross inequalities in wealth, the environment, class, ethnic and gender disparities that are sources of great insecurity in the South (Wyn Jones, 1999: 99).
At this stage one can argue that while globalisation has brought tremendous changes to the way in which world affairs are being conducted and cannot be ignored as a phenomenon, its effects should not be over-emphasised. Now it is imperative that a brief discussion on the implications of globalisation for the states-system should be given, that is, to establish whether globalisation has affected the traditional notion of sovereignty and statehood.