Excerpt
2
ABSTRACT
Africa's challenges in implementing the New Partnership for Africa's Dev
elopment (NEPAD)
have address fundamentals of the idea of NEPAD and its dependency underpinning. Some
of these challenges include inter alia structural, endogenous and exogenous factors which
continue to constrain Africa's endeavours. So the argument is that Africa failed to implement
or was initially destined to fail.
Deploying the
dependency theory, the thesis delves deeper into Africa's
development
trajectory to reflect that NEPAD, just like preceding developmental plans such as the Lagos
Plan of Action (LPA), was destined to fail as long as there was no clear paradigm shift from
the long standing and perpetual asymmetric donor-recipient relationship although NEPAD is
espoused as a partnership but it is still steeped within weakened neo-colonial relations that
are incommensurate with Africa's developmental path.
Through this paper, Africa accelerates an African Agenda by embracing the philosophy of
African Renaissance premised on the renewal and re-birth of Africa. This paper therefore
focuses on a continent aspiring to engage in dialogue and forge a partnership with the rich
Global North to implement the millennium developmental plan like NEPAD. The primary
lesson from this paper is that the continent must ensure that it has the full support of 54
states and that continental plans cannot be implemented by a single country whose
leadership is contested.
3
1.
Introduction
The paper looks into the challenges faced by Africa in implementing the New Partnership for
Africa's Development
. It is important to understand that NEPAD has been perceived by other
African states the west's especially G8 countries imposition of their neo
-liberal ideas into
Africa. Matters are aggravated by the fact that South Africa which has been at the forefront
to conceive NEPAD is being negatively perceived by other African states trying to usurp
continental power by endeavouring to impose her foreign policy of democracy and good
governance in Africa. That was evident when Francophone countries under the leadership of
Senegal presented a parallel developmental programme, Omega Plan at the African Union
challenging the Millennium Africa Recovery Programme (MAP). This
confirms Waltz' idea
that the anarchical international system operates within an arena of conflict and competition,
where states pursue power for survival and security (Waltz in Betts, 1994).
The paper commences by explaining the trajectories undertaken to develop NEPAD
Throughout the paper, the reader is gravitated towards developing a deeper understanding
of the role played by numerous leaders, for example President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa
to produce NEPAD which has been regarded as an Afro-centric developmental programme.
Furthermore, the paper presents numerous challenges confronting African states to
implement NEPAD. Inter-alia these challenges comprise the search for sustainable
development, sectoral priorities and mobilisation of resources. The last section focuses on
critiques of NEPAD whose views focus on the asymmetric relationship between the donor
countries and Africa regarding implementation of NEPAD.
2.
Dependency Theory
According to Le Pere, van Niewkerk and Lamprechts (1998) a theory is a wide thought
providing the basis for understanding a phenomenon .In this regard, the researcher utilises
dependency theory to expound the phenomenon under investigation.
4
According to Genest (2004), dependency theory explains and reflects an uneven
development of wealth between the rich and poor countries. This form of development is
highlighted as the propensity of capitalism creating and perpetuating an unequal dispersal of
global wealth and prosperity. Marsh and Stoker (2002) add that Dependency theory
emphasises that trade, foreign investment and even foreign aid between advanced,
industrialized countries, poor as well as less developed states are highly exploitative;
disadvantaging poor nations; and perpetuating the dependency of poor countries to rich
ones. Furthermore, Ebegbulem, Adams and Achu (2012) explain dependency theory as a
situation in which a certain group has their economy conditioned by the development and
expansion of another economy, to which the former is a subject.
Todaro (2000) argues that dependency theory refers to the school of thought highlighting
the underdevelopment of poor countries to the dominance by rich countries in the
international system. This creates a system of the core and the periphery, the latter being
developing countries in the South and the former being rich industrialised countries in the
North. In this context, dependency theory becomes an exploitative relationship aimed at
ensuring that weaker countries are entirely dependent on developed countries for their
prosperity and well-being. It provides endeavours by poor countries to be self-reliant and
independent in their development, but such an effort is difficult and impossible.
Dependency theory characterises the international system to be comprising of two sets of
states which are described in the formats of dominant / dependent; center / periphery; and
metropolitan / satellite. The dominant, center or metropolitan states are in the Organisation
of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The dependent, periphery or satellite
states are those in Africa, Asia and Latin America which have low per capita Gross National
Products
(GNP's) and rely heavily on the export
of a single commodity for foreign exchange
earnings. The other assumption of dependency theory is that external forces are of singular
importance to the economic activities within dependent states. These external forces include
Multinational Corporations (MNCs), internal commodity markets and other means through
5
which the industrialised countries represent their interests abroad. The relationship between
dominant and dependent states is dynamic since the interactions between them reinforce
and intensify the unequal pattern. Dependency theory presents the current state of
underdeveloped nations in the world by examining the patterns of interactions among
nations by arguing that inequality among nations is the core of those interactions (Adams,
2006).
Dependency theorists realise that underdevelopment results from asymmetrical relationship
between the poor countries located in the South, and rich developed countries located in the
North. Such a relationship is characterised by the ruthless incorporation of the South into the
global economy which is controlled by Western capitalism. It lies in the position of influence
that foreign aid accelerated by the North is harmful than beneficial to economic development
of the recipient countries, and it remains an instrument of exploitation of the recipient
countries by developed states (Posthumus, 2009).
The above mentioned explanations are relative to the position of NEPAD and its
dependency on Western capitalists whom they welcome to extend their aid services to
Africa. The conditions attached to aid are always unpalatable and this makes their
repayment difficult and overstretched to perpetuate dependency. The countries in the South
are not really poor because they lagged behind in the scientific transformations or
enlightenment values of the developed states, rather because they were coerced into the
European community system only as producers of raw materials or to serve as the
repositories of cheap labour, by being denied the opportunity to market their resources in a
way that competed with dominant states. In this regard, significant development will only be
possible if countries in the South attempt to isolate themselves from the capitalist world
economy and establish independent socialist societies (ibid).
Olaopa (2006) argues that dependency theory is appropriate to analyse NEPAD, because
many sections of its document (NEPAD) portray dependency on exogenous bodies for the
6
development of Africa. This is encapsulated in Section V, sub section (C) of NEPAD
document
Mobilisation of Resources which
emphasises that "Africa needs to fill an annual
resource gap of 12 % of its GDP or US $64 billion. This will require increased domestic
savings, including improvement on the public revenue collection." However, the bulk of th
e
required resources will have to be obtained externally. Paragraph 41 of NEPAD document
also speaks of Africa's dependence on the international community for the continent's
development by emphasising that: "
We hold that, it is within the capacity of the international
community to create fair and just conditions in which Africa can participate effectively in the
global economy and body politics
".
The NEPAD document lays out a clear role for the international community to assist African
development. It inter alia advocates for debt relief of African countries participating in the
NEPAD programme. In its pursuit of debt relief, the programme proposes a two way
approach which is: debt service ceilings are fixed as a proportion of fiscal revenue while in
the long run and debt relief be linked with costed poverty reduction outcomes. Apart from
debt relief, the international aid is another area recognized by the NEPAD document where
the international community plays a leading role. In this context, the dossier seeks increased
Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) flows in the medium term as well as the reform of
the ODA delivery system to ensure that flows are more effectively utilised by recipient
African countries (Ezeoha and Uche, 2005).
NEPAD's major flaw is it
s reliance on exogenous forces for the realization of its goals. The
NEPAD dossier maintains that in order to achieve a 7 % annual growth, the rate of US $64
billion is required, acknowledging that the bulk of the resources will be obtained externally,
outside the continent. However, African leaders presented NEPAD to the G-8 Summit held in
Kananaskis, Canada in 2002 to solicit funds from the rich industrialised countries. The two
parties formed a "partnership"
which became known as the G8 Africa Action Plan in which
the G-8 pledged to inject US $55 billion annually to the continent for debt relief and aid.
Subsequently, the continent managed to receive US $7 billion. (Karuuombe, 2003). The
7
amount injected by the G8 is far lesser than the original amount req
uired by NEPAD's
progenitors. The major challenge in this regard, is where will other funds come from because
the continent is engulfed in the quagmire of debt?
The G-8, potential donor states and IFIs impose certain conditionalities, for injecting aid in
any part of the world. Much of the conditionalities are gravitated towards a commitment to
the promotion of peace and security and adherence to principles of good governance.
Myriad African leaders are highly concerned about the dichotomy in which Africa rests. They
are eager to affirm its independence from the West and so called neo
colonialism and yet
entirely depended on northern countries for the realisation of their initiative. Former Nigerian
President Obasanjo remarked at the UN sponsored International conference for
Development in Monterrey, Mexico in March 2002 that there must be guarded endeavours
against NEPAD not developing into a tool for new conditionality (Bala et al, 2003).
It is inevitable for NEPAD to evade these conditionalities from the donor countries because
the programme depends on foreign funds for its operationalization. In this regard the donor
countries impose conditions to ensure that their interests such as economic investment are
preserved and safeguarded. The conditions applied to NEPAD will result in skewed
development of African states. Those adhering to conditions will be rewarded while those
reneging will suffer the wrath of unavailability of funds. However, this approach divides
African states and push people, especially skilled people to countries which are prospering.
The architects of NEPAD are convinced that African development can be accelerated by
more aid and credit, both of which have been granted to Africa for almost about forty years
without significant impact on poverty eradication. A particular problem with aid as indicated
above is that it is accompanied by certain stringent conditions. Borrowing countries are often
obliged to purchase input from corporations that are based in the countries that are granting
loans. In other cases, certain conditions such as the liberalisation of markets and other
conditionalisties are attached, even though the donor countries are sometimes the worst
8
violators of every prescription they attach to aid. One classic example is their inability for
democratising Multilateral Organisations
According to Landsberg (2003), NEPAD attempts to forge an agreement between two
unequal partners in global politics which are the rich, developed and industrialised North as
well as poor and underdeveloped Africa. The foundation of this pact is based on the
exchange for Africans and Africa's governing elite becoming more accountable and
embracing the politics of democratic accountability, transparency, and good governance.
Conversely, the West and the industrialized North will re
engage Africa in the following
three areas, renewed commitments on ODA, market access for Africa and Africa's trading
routes to the North and the world debt relief. The implementation of NEPAD depends on
external capital whereas African resources are ignored. The issue of market access remains
a talk shop because rich countries are adamant about it. This rhetoric is utilised to appease
Africa and encourage Africans to implement the conditions attached to NEPAD. These
conditions remain favourable for the North for dumping their products in Africa. These
products are not exposed to any competition because of Africa's weak production base.
The implementation of NEPAD depends on domestic resource mobilisation and foreign aid
which is attached by certain strict conditions such as reduction of state intervention on trade
related issues. The relationship between Africa and the international community has been
characterised by the failed lip service translating into the failure by the donor community
reneging on their commitments. Subsequently that resulted in a litany of failed
developmental programmes which did not yield any results and plunged the continent into a
developmental quagmire.
The problem with domestic resource mobilisation is that some of the African states are
unable to generate enough revenue because of weaknesses in tax collection revenue as
well as corruption resulting from revenue generated from mineral deposits. Over and above
African states export raw materials and foodstuff which do not generate sufficient revenue
9
because of the stringent measures such as tariff barriers and less money generated from
raw materials. Africa's inability to industrialize creates a serious lo
ss of revenue necessary
for NEPAD because between a finished product and raw materials lies a multiplier which is
industrialisation. The latter demands knowledge, mechanization, technology and increased
returns. Over and above industrialization creates employment which is a source for revenue
(Boateng, 2011).
Generally speaking, NEPAD is positioned for Africa to "catch up"
with the rich north
countries, and for this to be possible the latter countries should assist Africa. This is succinct
in the provisions of paragraph 66 of NEPAD document which states: "
The new long tern
vision will require enormous and heavy investment to bridge existing gaps. The challenge
ahead for Africa is to be able to increase the required funding under the best conditions
possible. We therefore call on our development partners to assist in this endeavour".
3.
New
Partnership for Africa's Develop
ment (NEPAD)
According to Cilliers (2002a), the last years of the last century witnessed African leaders
searching for appropriate strategies aimed at releasing Africa from socio-economic and
political malaise. That energetic endeavour resulted in the production of the New Partnership
for Africa's Development (NEPAD)
in the 21
st
century. NEPAD results from the merger of two
prominent initiatives aimed at addressing Africa's underdevelopment that was caused by
unfavorable terms of trade, lack of good governance and the entire dependency of African
development from Western funding. Those two initiatives have been, the Millennium
Partnership for African Recovery (MAP) and the Omega Plan. The two widely known
documents have incorporated the little known document called Compact for African
Recovery produced by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA, 2010).
The production of three separate developmental plans by the African leadership reflected
the burning desire of an African experience of unfulfilled missions over the last decades of
political independence. Those leaders were motivated by a common vision and shared belief
10
that they (leaders) had an obligation for eradicating poverty and placing their countries, both
individually and collectively on a path towards sustainable growth and development in the
21
st
century. Those initiatives were highly based on the determination and desire by Africans
to extract themselves from the quagmire of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalizing
world.
In that regard, MAP resulted from separate mandates given to three African leaders,
Presidents Obasanjo of Nigeria, Mbeki of South Africa and Bouteflika of Algeria to engage
with the rich North countries and the IFIs regarding economic and financial situation of poor
countries in the South generally and Africa in particular. That crusade began at the Extra-
Ordinary Summit of the OAU held in Sirte, Libya in 1999, when Presidents Mbeki and
Bouteflika were m
andated in consultation with the OAU's Contact Group on Africa's External
Debt to engage with Africa's creditors regarding the cancellation of the continent's external
debt cancellation (Ikome, 2007).That mandate directed both Presidents to engage with
Afr
ica's creditors for the cancellation of
Africa's debt which caused
socio-economic and
political malaise.
OAU's demand
of
debt eradication has been influenced by Plato's writings.
In his
dialogues with numerous people, Plato referred his interlocutors to the once famous
legislator, Selon whose resolution of the conflict between the rich and the poor amazed
Plato. Selon delivered a win-win solution to both parties where he inter alia, ordered the
cancellation of all debts owed by the poor. This is supported by Machiavelli who explained
that "
history is a sequence of cause and effect, whose course can be analysed and
understood by intellectual effort, but not directed by imagination"
(Carr in Betts, 1994). The
OAU did not imagine its demand but applied historical cause and effect to seek solution to its
problems as that has been possible in Athens, in 593 B.C.
In seven months, at the South Summit comprising Non Aligned Movement (NAM) and the
G77 and China, held in Havana, Cuba Mbeki and Obasanjo, chairpersons of NAM and G77
11
and China respectively were mandated to convey the concerns of the South to the G8 and
IFIs. Those two separate mandates given Mbeki and Obasanjo were aimed at addressing
the continental plight and the marginalization of the South in a rapidly globalising world.
Poverty eradication and debt reversal, common factors in those mandates, culminated in the
production of MAP (Kanyegirire and Ndangam, 2006). Both poverty and debt escalation
have been common enemies confronting developing countries. NAM and G77 emboldened
Africa to engage rich countries to reverse the continent's marginalisation from the rapidly
globalising economy. That demand became the cornerstone of MAP and subsequently
NEPAD. The problem regarding the mandate given to both Presidents was that it did not
include any time-frames and actions to be undertaken if the donors did not cooperate. Those
meetings became pies in the sky platforms for the South to raise their common frustrations.
Both leaders began their meetings with the G8 countries in Okinawa, Japan, in July 2000
(Sidiropoulos and Hughes, 2004). Gelb (2002) explains that African delegation dominated
representation of the South at that meeting. There was a red herring on the agenda of the
meeting which ignored debt cancellation and focussed on development, especially African
development in particular. It transpired that the meeting culminated in the G8 requesting
African leaders to develop a plan of action succinctly explaining
Africa's expectation from the
rich and developed countries.
After the Okinawa meeting, Obasanjo and Bouteflika mandated Mbeki to develop African
expectations encapsulated in the developmental plan. Mbeki responded by producing MAP
which was by presented by African leaders at the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos in
2000. The envisaged African Development Plan was initially presented publicly outside the
continent, at Davos
, and that explained Africa's high respect and regard
for the rich,
developed, and donor countries at the expense of the masses they lead. African scholars
and development specialists were not consulted in developing that plan. They then
perceived MAP as a top-down initiative imposed to African masses.
12
Obi (2001) explains that after presentation of the plan, the developed countries,
especially the G8 the countries instructed African leaders to incorporate components of
"partnership and ownership"
in the developmental programme. That was because, the
programme was proudly owned by Africans in partnership with the rich developed countries
to develop the continent
. Perceptions were that South Africa's Foreign Policy Objectives
diluted the hijacked the continental developmental programme because of the mandate
awarded to Mbeki
. "
That explained why the early drafts of the early MAP document were driven by a Deep
South African reading of the development problems facing Africa and the prognosis for
Africa extricating itself out of development quagmire".
It should be understood that Mbeki used the opportunity presented by the mandate to
solicit support continental support for the principles of democracy, promotion of human rights
and good governance, cornerstones
for South Africa's f
oreign policy. That presented South
Africa with an opportunity to asserts itself in the continent and globally
Adesina (2001a) disagrees that the 35
th
Ordinary Session of the OAU, 3
rd
Ordinary
Session of Africa's Economic Community
and the Declaration and Programme of Action of
the G77 in Havana, 2000 did not award any mandate to anyone to engage rich countries.
However, the OAU Session focused on:
I.
A commitment to exclude those who came to power by coup d `etat from attending
OAU sessions; and
II.
The adoption of a proposal submitted by President Obasanjo on peace and security
issues.
Furthermore, the G77 Summit focused primarily on debt eradication and poverty in the
South and no mandate was issues to whomever, and that raised questions concerning who
gave the mandate to the three Presidents; however a workable developmental programme
was produced after those high level engagements. Lack of clarity regarding the mandate
13
provides reasons why several Presidents such as Gadhafi and Mugabe heavily criticized
NEPAD which originates from MAP.
MAP, which prioritised promotion of democracy, protection of human rights, and good
political as well as economic governance as cornerstones
of Africa's development, differed
from previous African development initiatives. It is because it acknowledged both exogenous
and endogenous factors as impediments to African recovery. However its origin raised
suspicion because it involved three Presidents and excluded the rest. Matters were
exacerbated by the fact that President Mbeki presented it publicly outside the continent, at
the WEF in Davos, Switzerland where he emphasised that participation in the programme
has been open to all African countries that were prepared and ready to commit themselves
to the underlying principles guiding that initiative.
Mbeki's
external announcement of MAP caused angst among African leaders such as
Abdoulaye Wade, who attended the WEF ga
thering. After Davos, worried about Africa's
dominance by the three Presidents, Wade produced a counter document, the Omega Plan
because he was worried that that it was entrenching Anglophone Philosophy in the continent
(Adesina, 2001a). Mbeki's action and Wade's retaliation
resuscitated the Anglophone and
Francophone competition in the continent. Wade felt that other African leaders were
undermined and consulted to deliver MAP. Boko and Seck (2008) add that the Omega Plan
has been perceived as a symptom of the deeply anchored Francophone-Anglophone divide
in African politics. Senegalese diplomats defended the Omega Plan and argued that that it
was an original and independent idea long developed by Wade before he became the
President. That plan focused on developing Africa by constructing regional infrastructure and
educational projects.
Omega Plan focussed on development of infrastructure and human resources, including
investment in agriculture basic elements of any renewal plan. It emphasised that after
African states achieved investment in infrastructure and human resource development, then
14
they would possess resources necessary for improving quality of their economic
governance. The Omega Plan was initially presented by Wade at the Franco-African Summit
held in Yaoundé, Cameroon in January 2001 (Bala and Vickers, 2002).
Continentally, both the Omega Plan and MAP presented at the Extraordinary Summit of
the OAU in Libya in March 2001. The Summit endorsed both initiatives and decided that
every effort should be undertaken to merge them. That was because both plans pursued
similar objectives to recover and develop the continent. African leaders realised that, for the
continent to be taken seriously, it had to present a single, coordinated initiative to its
international partners and that more initiatives
would confuse Africa's partners. Therefore,
the main motive for mer
ging the initiatives was to ease Africa's dealings with its external
partners (Ikome, 2007).
Regardless the problem surrounding the secrecy of MAP and counter measures from
Francophone countries by producing Omega Plan. African leaders took initiatives necessary
for the development of the continent. It was a wise move by the OAU to recognise both
initiatives and merged them. That was a unifying action aimed at resolving various
perceptions held by many countries in the continent. That merge was unanimously accepted
by the continent.
Numerous endeavours were undertaken by African leaders and development specialists
to merge MAP and Omega Plan and that culminated in the production of New African
Initiative (NAI) presented at the OAU Summit, in Lusaka in July 2001. Before presentation of
NAI, Presidents Mbeki and Wade held a serious meeting in Pretoria and Dakar to iron out a
few differences and consolidate their presentation for the Summit. NAI was finally presented
at the OAU Summit in Lusaka on 11
July 2001, where it was unanimously accepted as the
declaration of the Summit. 15 member Heads of State and Government Implementation
Committee (HSGIC) chaired by Obasanjo, assisted by Wade and Bouteflika, with Mbeki as
the secretary was appointed to drive NAI forward. (Akokpari, 2004b).
15
Diescho (2002) explains that on 11 July 2001, 15 members
'
HSGIC was elected and
mandated to steer the NAI framework forward. Complementing the executive were three
Heads of States each from the 5 OAU regions. Those three comprised: Central Africa
represented by Cameroon, Gabon, and Sao Tome and Principe; East Africa represented by
Ethiopia, Mauritius and Rwanda; North Africa represented by Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia;
Southern Africa represented by Botswana, Mozambique and South Africa while West Africa
was represented by Mali, Nigeria and Senegal. Election of 15 member HSGIC and three
additional members from each of the five regions symbolized unity and acceptance from all
African heads of states that they were ready to engage with the rich countries to develop the
continent.
Tawflik (2008) highlights that African leaders perceived NAI as
"Africa's strategy for
achieving sustainable development in the 21
st
century"
. In that context, it was important to
recognise the contribution of the little known document called Compact for African Recovery
produced by the Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) indicated earlier. It presented an
important component of UNECA's response to the implementation of the United Nations
Millennium Declaration
(MDG's) and called for African countries to foster partnership with
developed countries by investing in the necessary resources through aid, debt relief, and
market access necessary to
"jump start"
African economies in their recovery effort. Through
the Compact, Africa was encouraged to develop necessary political reforms ensuring that
their economies would take off. The Compact became the valuable document incorporated
into NAI. It brought the international dimension to the developmental programme in Africa
confirming suspicions that NAI was originally African.
African leaders worked hard to garner support for the new initiative from the continent's
external and international partners. On 20
July 2001, some members of HSGIC presented
NAI to the G8 Summit in Genoa, Italy. The G8 leaders appreciated NAI and endorsed it as
the Genoa Plan for Africa. G8 committed itself to be forging a new partnership with Africa to
address the conti
nent's developmental problems. The G8 also undertook to help in
16
promoting the initiative in multilateral forums. The Summit then appointed its representatives
to work with the African leaders to develop a plan of action to be adoption by the G8 at its
following Summit scheduled for Canada in June 2002 (Malcolmson, 2004).
During the OAU Summit in Abuja, Nigeria on 23
October 2002, it was resolved to rename
NAI to
New Partnership for Africa's Development
(NEPAD). NEPAD has been an innovative
Afro-centric developmental framework. It had sought to address current challenges facing
the African continent. Those challenges included inter alia poverty, underdevelopment and
continued marginalisation. It has been premised on African countries making commitment to
good governance, democracy and human rights while attempting to prevent and resolve
situations of conflict and instability on the continent (Ramsamy, 2004).
3.1.
Goals for NEPAD
The following goals have been identified:
Promotion of growth and sustainable development. By enrolling all children of school
going age in schools by 2015; progressing towards gender equality by through
women empowerment and elimination of gender inequalities in schools by 2015;
reduction of infant and child mortality ratios by two
thirds by 2015; increasing
access to reproductive health services by 2015; and reversing the loss of
environmental resources by 2015;
Eradication of the widespread and severe poverty: To develop programmes which
will educate people, skill them and allow them to contribute to the labour of the
continent in order to eradicate poverty; and
Halting the marginalization of Africa in the globalization process-Active participation
and involvement at all multilateral levels to change multilateral regimes in order to
incorporate Africa into a rapidly globalising world (Spicer, 2002).
17
The anticipated achievement of these goals is categorized into seven initiatives have
been:
I.
Peace, Security, Democracy and Political Governance: That has bee subdivided
into two categories: Peace and Security initiative which ensured peace and
security through conflict prevention and resolution, peacekeeping and post conflict
reconstruction and the democracy and political governance initiative aimed at
promoting the principles of democracy, transparency, accountability, integrity,
respect for human rights and the rule of law;
I.
Economic and Corporate Governance: Aimed to deliver sound, stable fiscal and
macroeconomic management, investor friendly systems of commercial law, sound
banking and insurance as well as sound government fiscal management;
II.
Bridging the Infrastructure Gap: That included roads, ports, railroads, electricity,
water, sanitation and facilities for health and education. This would incorporate
information and telecommunications areas;
III.
Human Resource Development: Envisaged to incorporate all development themes
to include inter alia: health, education, poverty reduction, agriculture, gender
development;
IV.
Capital Flows: Looked at investment promotion, debt reduction, increased aid and
aid reform;
V.
Market Access: Focussed on increased resource beneficiation, diversification of
agriculture and increased manufacturing; and
VI.
Environment: Focussed on all matters relating to climate change, global warming,
preservation of wetlands and transnational parks to pursue sustainable
development (NEPAD Document, 2001).
18
4
Implementation of Peace and Security Initiative
4.1
Role Played by People in Power to Exacerbate Conflicts: The Case of Darfur
Since 2003, Darfur has been engulfed in a series of catastrophic conflicts. The AU and its
predecessor, the OAU failed to find a sustainable and lasting solution for resolving that the
calamity. Darfur region experienced conflict between the Arab nomads and the African
farmers. That conflict resulted from competition over land and scarce resource such as oil.
The government backed militia, the Janjaweed (known as devils on horseback) continued
committing horrendous atrocities such as: torture, murder, rape, destruction of villages and
ethnic cleansing against Africans, to exacerbate that conflict (Wakabi, 2006). The
government-backed militia fought a proxy war waged by the Government of Sudan (GoS) on
ordinary civilians to seize and control wealth produced in their area.
Patterson (2008) explained that the conflict resulted from local rebel groups who attacked
the military posts in their region because GoS ignoring their regions and discriminated its
inhabitants from accessing the accruals from mineral deposits. GoS retaliated by unleashing
the Janjaweed who attacked rebel forces looted from the affected villages. With the
government's support and arsenal, the
Janjaweed employed brutal and horrendous tactics
by burning, raping girls and women and destroying villages.
That has been a poignant state of affairs because of the government utilised its authority
to allow one group to act ruthlessly against unprotected civilians. The point in case was that
the government was supposed to provide an indiscriminate secure environment for its
citizens. Abuse of power by GoS including state apparatus to oppress one group by the
other is unacceptable as enshrined in the universal declaration of human rights. That posed
a serious challenge to
NEPAD's implementing peace a
nd security initiative because of the
involvement of the state in the armed conflict. Matters were exacerbated by the Constitutive
Act of the AU, which advocated for the principle of non-interference in the affairs of member
states.
19
By late 2006, the Janjaweed managed to destroy about 2000 villages in Darfur. Both the
USA and the EU labelled atrocities in Darfur as genocidal. It was for first time since World
War II Holocaust of the Jews, the USA mentioned the concept of genocide. However, it was
surprising as to why the USA and two EU members in the Security Council, France and the
UK failed to sponsor a draft resolution aimed at addressing the situation in Darfur. As
enshrined in the International Criminal Court's dossie
r (2007), President AL Bashir has been
alleged to have orchestrated the conflict by waging a political and military struggle against
the groups in Darfur. Al Bashir explained that the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups were
socially, politically and economically weak in the region. Those groups retaliated and
mobilised by launching an armed rebellion to challenge their economic and political
exclusion. President Al Bashir apportioned Carte Blanche orders to his subordinates to crush
and quell that rebellion.
The government forces connived with the Janjaweed and attacked small towns occupied
by those groups. Those attacks became systematic in such a way that the armed forces
were delivered in trucks and land cruisers mounted with Dshkas. On the other hand, the
Janjaweed would arrive on camels and horseback. The joint forces would then surround a
village where occasionally the Air Force would be called to drop bombs on that village as a
precursor to the attacks. The forces on the ground would then invade a village or town and
attack civilian inhabitants. They would then kill men, children, elderly, women and subject
women and girls to massive rapes. Thereafter they would burn and loot the affected village
(ICC, 2007).
According to Polgreen (2006), the results of those unlawful activities were devastating
and destructive to the Darfurians. The targeted groups ran away from the region to
neighbouring Chad. By December 2007, the total number of Darfurians exiled in refugee
camps in Chad stood at about 235 000. Of those, there were approximately 110 000
Zaghawa, 103 000 Masalit and 7 750 Fur. It is imperative to note that these tribes were not
only externally but internally displaced.
20
The situation in Darfur was not ignored by the international organisations, especially the
UN. As the custodian of international peace and security, the United Nations Security
Council adopted numerous resolutions, presidential statements and press releases for
resolving the crises in Darfur. Among resolutions were, resolutions 1556 (30 July 2004),
1591 (29 March 2005), 1672 (25 April 2005); resolution 1590 (24 March 2005), 1769 (31 July
2007) to impose sanctions against GoS and deployed peacekeepers. Al Bashir refused any
UN intervention because foreign forces harboured negative agendas against his
government. Al Bashir continued complaining that the UN forces were not bringing any
peace but recolonising country. GoS remained recalcitrant to cooperate with the UN
because many government officials were likely to face war crime charges from the ICC
(Doria et al. 2008).
In 2005, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1593 referring the situation in Darfur to the
International Criminal International Court (ICC). That referral exacerbated the situation in
Darfur. That was because investigations pointed that leaders such as Al Bashir, Muhammad
Harun and Ali Kushayb were responsible for the crimes such as:
I.
Genocide under article 6 (a) of the Rome Statute by systematically killing
members of the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups, causing serious bodily
or mental harm to those groups and deliberately inflicting on those groups
conditions of life calculated to bring about their physical destruction;
II.
Crime against humanity under article 7 (1) of the Statute. Crime committed
formed part of a widespread and systematic attack directed against the civilian
population of Darfur with the knowledge of the attack through the acts of murder,
extermination, forcible transfer of the population, torture and rapes;
III.
War Crimes under article 8 (2)(e)(i) of the Statute for intentionally directing attacks
against the civilian population by pillaging a town or place (ICC Document, 2008).
21
According to Gentile (2010), the ICC has in April 2007 issued warrants of arrest for Harun
and Kushayb and dispatched the message for their surrender to GoS. Charges to be faced
by both men related to war crimes and crimes against humanity. On 14 July 2008, the Chief
Prosecutor of the ICC, Luis Moreno-Ocampo allegedly linked President Al Bashir to
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed since 2003 in Darfur.
Allegations against Bashir do not involve him physically or directly to those crimes. He was
alleged to be indirectly involved through members of the state apparatus, the army and the
militia Janjaweed according article 25 (3) (a) of the Statute which means indirect perpetration
or perpetration by means. In July 2009, the ICC issued a warrant of arrest against Al Bashir
GoS rejected ICC allegations against its senior officials
' involvement
in Darfur. GoS
explained that it is not a party or signatory to the Rome Statute and therefore it would not
comply by apprehending its officials. Some international and regional bodies such as the
African Union, Arab League and Organisation of Islamic Conference supported Sudan not to
cooperate with the ICC (Slomanson, 2006).
In supporting GoS, those organisations complained and labelled ICC to be a Western
creation aimed at incriminating African leaders. In a statement presented to the Security
Council on 5
June 2005, Luis Moreno Ocampo complained GoS was intransigent to comply
with resolution 1595 and failed to cooperate with the court. Pre-eminently GoS emphasised
that
"the ICC has no jurisdiction over Sudan"
(ICC, 2008). The reaction by GoS created
problems for NEPAD to promote peace and security in Darfur and matters were aggravated
by the jurisdiction and
AU's principle non
-interference enshrined in the Constitutive Act.
The AU has further aggravated matters when on 29 and 30 January, at the 18
th
Assembly
of Heads of State and Government held in Addis Ababa resolved not to cooperate with the
ICC by arresting Al Bashir when visiting any member. The AU criticised the ICC by labelling
it to be a Western institution aimed at destroying African leadership.
AU's action has been
unfortunate to the Darfurians who lived under constant fear and attack, where basic
democratic rights were threatened by GoS. The continental organisation was formed to
22
promote peace and security; however it openly supported GoS at the expense of ordinary
citizens.
4.2
Rejection of the Outcomes of Negotiated Settlements: The Case of
Ethiopia-Eritrea Border Crisis
It becomes important for the reader to realise that NEPAD places a high importance on
peace and security as the cornerstones of successful development. However border conflict
between Ethiopia and Eritrea harmed
NEPAD's quest for sustainable development
. That
was because state resources supposed to develop daily lives of ordinary citizens were then
redirected to sustain the war. Even though NEPAD is far beyond resolving the impasse
between these two states, their actions and attitudes from finding lasting peace stifle the
successful implementation of the programme.
During the decolonisation of Africa which gathered pace and momentum during the fifties,
Italy which colonised Eritrea relinquished power from the latter in 1952 but Ethiopia annexed
her in April 1962. That resulted in a conflict between those two states in the horn of Africa.
The conflict began when
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
(EPRDF) led by
Meles Zenawi, former Prime Minister of Ethiopia and the
Eritrean People's Liberation Front
(EPLF) led by Issayas Afwerki, who is the current leader of Eritrea overthrew the
government of Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia. EPRDF merged with other political groups
in Ethiopia to establish the transitional government, meanwhile in Eritrea the EPLF
established another transitional government that lasted in 1993.However, Eritreans voted for
self-determination in a UN monitored plebiscite (Ewing, 2008).
According to Kaarsholm (2004) the problem regarding the referendum and the newly
established government in Ethiopia failed to demarcate and define the borders between the
two neighbouring countries. Eritrea continued to refuse Ethiopia access to its ports of
Massawa and Assab. The matter has been so contentious to an extent that both countries
are unable to compromise on those issues. On 12
May 1998, Eritrean forces invaded the
23
border area of Badme because of a shooting incident between the Ethiopian militia and the
Eritrean border patrol. The international community launched concerted endeavours to
address the impasse but failed. The USA and Rwanda tabled a quick proposal to cajole the
two forces to withdraw their forces from Badme (Healy, 2008).
Zondi and Rejouis (2006) emphasise that both countries exercised differences when they
responded to these international endeavours. In the first instance, Ethiopia accepted the
USA/ Rwanda proposal but Eritrea rejected it. Conversely, during another round of conflict in
1999, Eritrea accepted the diplomatic initiative rejected by Ethiopia. After those differences,
the two countries continued fighting for two years. During that conflict, heavy artillery, tanks
and warplanes were utilised. Rivalry reflecting history, peoples, ruling elites and leaders
between the two countries accelerated and exacerbated the war that resulted in casualties
and economic costs incurred. About 70 000 - 100 000 people lost their lives where about 1
million have been displaced.
In June 2000, an unprecedented breakthrough was reached when an agreement about
ending hostilities was signed. One of the conditions aimed at resolving the impasse was the
creation of a 25 kilometre wide demilitarised Temporary Security Zone (TSZ). Another
breakthrough was reached on 12 December 2000, when both parties signed the Algiers
Agreement to end their hostilities officially. The agreement called for the official adjudication
of the disputed border, settlement of all compensation claims between the two countries as
well as the deployment of 3 800 peacekeepers under the auspices of the United Nations
Mission for Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). The mandate of the peacekeepers was to monitor
the TSZ. Pre-eminently, the mandate was neutral:
Ethiopia
Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC) was established to
"delimit
and demarcate the colonial treaty border premised on colonial treaties from
1900, 1902 and 1908 that are applicable to international law"
(UN Security
Council Resolution, 2008).
Excerpt out of 109 pages
- Quote paper
- Ignatius Mabula (Author), 2013, Africa's Development. Challenges Confronting Africa to Implement NEPAD, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/375635
Similar texts
Publish now - it's free
✕
Excerpt from
109
pages
Comments