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Export Facilitation through Banking Products and Services in the Eurasian Economic Union

Master's Thesis 2015 116 Pages

Economics - International Economic Relations

Excerpt

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements

Abstract in English

List of Figures

List of Tables

List of Abbreviations

1. Introduction
1.1. Background
1.2. Research question, objectives and purpose
1.3. Structure of the thesis

2. Literature Review
2.1. Current Economic Developments
2.2. The role of Exports in the Economy of Kazakhstan
2.3. Characteristics of SMEs and Their Role in an Economy
2.4. The role of Banking Industry in Facilitating Exports
2.5. Conceptualized Model

3. Methodology
3.1. Research Method
3.2. Questionnaire Design

4. Results
4.1. Summary of the findings
4.2. Generalizability of the results

5. Discussion
5.1. Answer to the research question

6. Conclusion
6.1. Practical implications and contribution to the existing knowledge
6.2. Limitations
6.3. Recommendations for future research

Bibliography

Appendices

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest appreciation and gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Otter Nils, for his invaluable support, guidance and encouragement, which made the completion of my thesis possible. I would like to thank Nils for being not only my supervisor, but also my friend with whom I was allowed to talk about different topics. I am extremely grateful for his support throughout my studies at Carinthia University of Applied Sciences, to which I was recommended also by him in 2013.

I would also like to extend my gratitude to MMag. Hofferer Meinrad, the second assessor of my work. I thank him for inspiring me to choose the topic of my master thesis. It is through his classes that I became interested in the topic of exports and became aware of how important it is nowadays to support exporting companies in order to gain competitive advantage in the global market.

My sincere and deepest gratitude also goes to all lecturers of Carinthia University of Applied Sciences. I thank them all for being generous in sharing their experience and their knowledge, for finding time to talk to me whenever I needed their support, and simply for being the best lecturers.

I would like to thank the heads of trade finance departments Saltanat Almukhanova from Kazkommertsbank and Ainur Tuyakbayeva from Halykbank for their assistance in increasing the response rate of my survey. Without their support, it would have been much more difficult to increase the number of respondents to my online questionnaire.

For the enjoyable moments, for moral support, for true friendship, I would like to thank my friends from Carinthia University of Applied Sciences. I thank them all for being with me all these years. Without them, the two years of master studies would not have been as pleasant.

Finally, I dedicate my special thanks to my wife, my family and my parents- in-law. Without their support and encouragement, I would not have been able to reach this far. I am grateful for having you all.

Abstract in English

Small and medium enterprises contribute to more than 50 % of GDP in the developed economies. Yet, in developing markets, such as Kazakhstan, this sector remains untapped since SMEs are considered risky and not transparent enough to be financed by banks.

Meanwhile, there is a lot of discussion whether SMEs in Kazakhstan can withstand the rivalry from their competitors within the newly formed Eurasian Economic Union. Remaining a threat for weak SMEs, the economic union is also a great opportunity for exporting SMEs in Kazakhstan to expand their businesses through exporting their products and services to the member states of the union.

The study aims at identifying the challenges that are faced by the exporting SMEs in Kazakhstan when applying for banking products. Out of these challenges, a number of recommendations are developed for the banking industry in Kazakhstan.

The results of the quantitative analysis applied in the study reveal that high interest rates and bank fees, documentary requirements and communication issues are the main challenges that are faced by the exporting SMEs in Kazakhstan. Therefore, banks are recommended to improve their risk assessment methodologies, to provide the SMEs with training programs and to improve their communication with the exporting SMEs.

The findings of the study and the proposed recommendations can be applied both by the private and state banking institutions. Moreover, banks and other financial institutions can develop their own measures based on the findings revealed in this study. The measures can then be implemented in order to make the banking products more accessible for the exporting SMEs in Kazakhstan.

Keywords: exports, banking products for exports, challenges of SMEs.

Dedication

This Master Thesis is dedicated to my soul mate and lovely wife, Lola Shildebayeva. She has
been a source of inspiration, motivation and support for me.

List of Figures

Figure 1: Chain of reasoning

Figure 2: The structure of mutual trade among the EEU members

Figure 3: The structure of Kazakhstan's exports to the EEU

Figure 4: The structure of Belarus' exports to the EEU

Figure 5: The structure of Russian exports to the EEU

Figure 6: Changes of mutual trade structure, in percentages

Figure 7: Kazakhstan’s exports and economic growth in terms of GDP

Figure 8: The dynamics of annual number of registered companies in Kazakhstan

Figure 9: Concentration of SMEs in industries

Figure 10: The structure of Kazakhstan GDP, 2005-2013

Figure 11: The structure of GDP of developed economies, 2013

Figure 12: Number of commercial banks in Kazakhstan, 1994-2000

Figure 13: Role of banking sector in Kazakhstan’s economy

Figure 14: Geographical distribution of bank branches per 1000 SMEs by regions

Figure 15: Proposed conceptualized model

Figure 16: Distribution of responses about high interest rates and other fees

Figure 17: Distribution of responses about documents required by banks

Figure 18: Export destinations of companies regardless their sizes

Figure 19: Export destinations of SMEs in Kazakhstan

Figure 20: Export destinations of large companies in Kazakhstan

List of Tables

Table 1: Number of SMEs per bank

Table 2: The research question and supporting questions

Table 3: Cross tabulation results for willingness of companies to recommend their banks ...

Table 4: Descriptive statistics for challenges companies face when dealing with banks

Table 5: Cross tabulation results for responses about interest rates

Table 6: Cross tabulation results for responses about documents required by banks

Table 7: Recommendations received from survey

Table 8: Cross tabulation results for responses about main source of finance

Table 9: Cross tabulation results for responses on the reason of application for a product ..

Table 10: Cross tabulation results for the frequency of interactions with banks

Table 11: Cross tabulation results for intensity of export related banking products usage

Table 12: Cross tabulation results for main banking products used by companies

Table 13: Generalizability of the findings

List of Abbreviations

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

1. Introduction

The importance of facilitating exports in the current economic developments in Kazakhstan and in the post-Soviet region is explained in this chapter. Further, the research question, objectives and the purpose of the research are presented. The chapter ends with the description of the structure of the thesis.

1.1. Background

The year of 2015 is a special year for the economies of at least three post-soviet countries. On the 1st of January, the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) between Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus started functioning. This union is the next step of economic integration between post­Soviet countries after the formation of Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) in 2010.[1] It implies free movement of goods, labor and capital among the member countries, eliminating trade barriers between them and establishing supranational regulatory institutions, such as already functioning Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC).[2]

There have been many discussions regarding economic rationality of the decisions taken by Kazakhstan and Belarus to join the union. Some studies suggest that post- soviet economies could benefit more through integrating with the outside world rather than with each other.[3] However, according to the official statistics of the ECU, since the formation of the Customs Union in 2010, the trade volume between the member states increased by 29% and 32 % in 2010 and 2011 respectively.[4]

As any economic union, the EEU will also have both negative and positive impacts on local businesses. Among the classical advantages of such unions for local businesses is an increased market size, which will usually have a positive impact on the cost of production due to the effect of economies of scale.[5] Moreover, an increased market size can encourage innovation because of the increasingly fierce competition. Additionally, innovation can be driven by the companies’ expectation to distribute its cost to a larger market.[6]

Besides the base for economies of scale, an economic union can act as an arena where companies can share their production among each other. In other words, each member state can focus on the area of their comparative advantage to produce certain products and export the finished products out of the union. This was successfully practiced within the ASEAN Free

Trade Agreement (AFTA) where countries traded among each other with semi-finished products and exported the finished products out of the ASEAN region.[7]

Another advantage of an economic union is the fact that the elimination of administrative and tariff trade barriers will ease and facilitate exports within the union. According to the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) conducted in 2008-2009, more than 30 percent of the small and medium enterprises (SME) surveyed in Kazakhstan, Belarus and Russia viewed the procedures related to customs clearance as one of the main obstacles for doing business across borders.[8]

Finally, the union could serve as an experimental field for the member states, all of which have relatively weak market institutions, to get used to operate under free trade conditions before opening to trading with the world.[9] Specifically, Kazakhstan who has been negotiating for joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 1996[10] could benefit from the harsh conditions under the economic union through training its local businesses for a more competitive environment before it accedes to the WTO.

However, there is a lot of discussion whether SMEs in Kazakhstan will be able to withstand the competition within the newly formed economic union.[11] SMEs, which represent more than 90% of all the enterprises registered in Kazakhstan, contributed to only around 18 % of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 2014.[12] To compare, Russian SMEs contributed up to 20- 25 % of the GDP according to the estimations for 2013.[13] Considering the size of the Russian market, which is 10 times bigger than that of Kazakhstan[14], being within the same playground will definitely be a huge challenge for the SMEs of Kazakhstan.

Taking into account the share of SMEs among registered companies, the contribution of 18% to the total GDP is definitely a paltry number. For the sake of comparison, in Austria, for instance, SMEs contribute to more than 58 % of national GDP and to around 62 % of all employment.[15] This number is obviously not comparable with the average contribution of SMEs within the newly formed EEU member states.

The inefficiency of Kazakhstani SMEs has been concerning the government for quite a long time. However, this sector can become even more inefficient, if measures to raise their competitiveness and to support their exporting activities are not taken.[16] These measures, however, do not only comprise of the cooperation of the SMEs with the government, but also with third parties such as financial institutions, i.e. banks.

Banks have always played an important role in facilitating exporting activities of companies. Through the variety of export- related products, banks mitigate the risk of nonpayment, reduce the payment period and provide finance for the production of export goods.[17] There are many studies on what kind of benefits the banking industry brings to exporting SMEs. However, the studies on the challenges the SMEs have to deal with when accessing to those benefits still seem to be insufficient.

In other words, in order to serve the exporting SMEs more effectively, banks need to know the challenges the enterprises face when using or applying for the export-related banking products. This will let the banks shape their existing products and develop new ones in accordance with the needs of the SMEs. Knowing the needs of exporting SMEs is important to facilitate their export activities and thus to contribute to their competitiveness.

1.2. Research question, objectives and purpose

This thesis attempts to develop a better understanding of the role of the banking industry in facilitating export activities of SMEs. In addition, it analyzes the accessibility of export related banking products by the SMEs in Kazakhstan. Therefore, it looks at what kind of challenges are faced by the SMEs using those export-related banking products in the region. Finally, the main aim of the thesis is to develop a set of measures that should be taken by banks to make export-related banking products and services meet the needs and expectation of SMEs. For this reason, the research question for the thesis was defined as follows:

What measures should be taken by banks to make export-related products more accessible
to small and medium enterprises in order to facilitate their export activities?

The main purpose of the research is therefore to consult financial institutions on what should be considered in order to meet the needs of the Kazakhstani export-oriented SMEs. Based on the findings of the thesis, banks can shape their export-related products to the expectations and the requirements of the enterprises to support their export activities more optimally.

1.3. Structure of the thesis

The thesis consists of six chapters. The next chapter, which is literature review, consists of five subchapters. The first subchapter, as Figure 1 illustrates, is devoted to describing the current economic developments in the Post-Soviet region. Next, current situation of export activities of Kazakhstani SMEs and state-of-the-art literature on the importance of export facilitation for the economy of Kazakhstan are discussed. This is then followed by the discussion of the literature on the characteristics of SMEs and their role in an economy. Lastly, the role of banking industry in facilitating export is discussed.

Figure 1

Chain of reasoning[18]

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

The literature review part ends with a proposed conceptualized model of facilitating export through banking products and services. This model is then used to discuss potential challenges that are faced by SMEs when using the export-related banking products and how these challenges could be avoided. Additionally, out of the literature, the content of the questionnaire is designed.

Chapter 3 of the thesis is solely devoted to the description of the methodology that was used for conducting the empirical research. It discusses the methodological approaches that were employed and explains why a certain method was preferred over others. Moreover, the chapter describes the design of the questionnaire and presents what kind of supporting questions are essential to be answered in order to obtain a satisfactory answer to the main research question.

Chapter 4 presents the results of the empirical research and assesses the effectiveness of the methods that were employed. A more detailed discussion on the limitations and shortcomings of the chosen research method takes place in Chapter 5. Chapter 6, the conclusion, sums up the key findings of the thesis and discusses the limitations of the study. The concluding chapter ends with a recommendation for future research.

2. Literature Review

In this chapter, a brief overview of the current economic developments in Kazakhstan is presented. In the following subchapters, the state-of-the-art literature on the role of exports in economies, characteristics of SMEs and their contributions to economic growth and the role of banking industry in facilitating exports are discussed. Each of the subchapters starts with a brief description of the current situation in Kazakhstan. A conceptualized model based on the literature review is presented in the last subchapter.

2.1. Current Economic Developments

After the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the early 1990’s, it was clear for Kazakhstan that being isolated was not the best way that would lead the country to a prosperity. Moreover, the interdependencies of the economies of the former members of the Soviet Union did not let the countries separate one from another.[19] For instance, Kazakhstan was considered as a metallurgical center of the union, while Belarus was best known for mechanical engineering. As a result, the independent but still interdependent states of former Soviet Union decided to reunite under the so-called Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The treaty on the formation of the CIS was signed in Almaty in December of 1991 by Kazakhstan, Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Moldova, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Georgia.[20] The emergence of such an institution allowed the former Soviet states to reestablish the mutual trade among each other.[21]

The CIS was among the first establishments to liberalize trade within the territory of the former USSR. Later, there were many attempts to minimize not only the trade barriers among the states but also the borders between the states as such. However, now independent, the states were reluctant to reunite under any circumstances, apart from purely economic reasons.[22] Therefore, the reintegration attempts were mostly unsuccessful.

Nevertheless, the attempts of economic integration were gradually becoming more and more fruitful. However, the deeper the integration, the fewer members were participating in the unions. For instance, the CIS consisted of 11 members including Georgia when it was formed in 1991, while Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC)[23] in 2000 and the EEU in 2015 had only 5 and 3 members respectively.[24]. One of the main reasons why the states were reluctant to reunite, according to Obydenkova, was that the states were not willing to transfer their powers to supranational institutions without which almost no integration is possible.[25]

As can be seen, the formation of EEU was preceded by a number of attempts and failures of regional integrations among the Post-Soviet states. Since the formation of the CIS, it took more than 20 years for the regional cooperation to grow into a regional integration. Frightened by their past, the members states, Kazakhstan and Belarus, had to make sure the union is purely economic and not a political project of reestablishing Russian superiority.[26]

Yet, the union started functioning on January 1,2015. Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus formed the union with the headquarters in Moscow, court in Minsk and financial regulator in Almaty. The law on the formation of the union had been ratified by the states a month before - in December of 2014.[27]

Clearly, it needs time to estimate the economic impact of the membership in the union for Kazakhstan. However, there is already a lot of discussion whether the union with Russia is a “fair game” for Kazakhstan. The Russian economy is 10 times as big as Kazakhstan’s.[28] Only applying the principles of economies of scale, it is clear that a producer in Russia would be much more productive than a producer in Kazakhstan. Moreover, for Russian producers, expanding production capacity would not be as a big issue, as it would be hard for the Kazakhstani companies to compete with cheap goods from Russia.[29]

Moreover, the Russian and Belarussian economies are more diversified than the economy of Kazakhstan is. For instance, the share of minerals and metals in the export of Russia represent around 50% of the total export, while the same indicator for Kazakhstan stands at 71%.[30] The stronger and more efficient economies are threatening Kazakhstani enterprises. According to them, the competitors from Russia and Belarus are more attractive to the customers due to lower prices and higher quality.[31]

Surely, the concept of the Eurasian Economic Union has a strong economic base, regardless of different parties trying to connect it with geopolitical ambitions of Russia. Starting from the most obvious advantages of the union, the union is expected to have a positive impact on the local producers through expanding the market size. As a result, the cost of production for the business is expected to decrease. This, in turn, will benefit the consumers of the products due to higher competition among producers and lower prices.[32] According to the official statistics, the trade volume after the creation of the Customs Union in 2011, increased by 34% between the member states, compared to 2010, while trade with third countries and the members of the Customs Union increased from USD 913 bn. in 2011 to 939.3 bn. in 2012.[33]

The union is also expected to be an attractive arena for foreign direct investment (FDI). According to Eurasian Development Bank (EDB), Chinese FDI into the Customs Union increased from USD 11.2 bn. in 2009 to USD 24.7 bn. in 2013. The vast majority of the Chinese FDI, around 91%, was invested in Kazakhstan.[34] The attractiveness of Kazakhstan among the member states can be explained by a milder taxation policy and China’s expansion to Central Asia within the framework of the Silk Road Economic Belt project that aims to connect China with the Western world.[35]

Free movement of goods, service and capital within the union could create an all-sufficient market of around more than 170 mil. people, without any administrative and physical borders.[36] This, in turn, creates tax competition among member states in order to attract foreign companies into the country. The member state, which turns out to be the most attractive, wins the FDI and contributes to decreasing unemployment within its borders.[37]

However, it is easier said than done. Statistically, the unemployment rate in Kazakhstan rose by 1.6% in 2014 compared to the similar period in 2013, while the same indicator for Russia and Belarus fell by 9.5% and 3.6% respectively.[38] It is quite an impressive number, especially considering Russian population.

Another important advantage of the union, according to some opinions, is that the union can act as a training field for those members that do not belong to the World Trade Organization,[39] namely, for Kazakhstan and Belarus, since Russia and Armenia have been participating in the organization since 2012[40] and 2003[41] respectively. The union would let Kazakhstan and Belarus integrate into worldwide trade gradually avoiding a sharp and tough competition within the organization.

Kazakhstan has been negotiating on accession to WTO since 1996. Back then, it had not even been recognized as a market economy yet.[42] In 2013, the ministry of economic integration of Kazakhstan was quite optimistic about the accession by the end of 2014.[43] This, however, has not come true yet, due to Kazakhstan’s nonconformance with phytosanitary and veterinary standards.[44] Belarus has been on negotiations since 1993 and they are still going on.

The idea of cross border production sharing is another advantage of being a member of an economic union. For instance, in their study, Ng & Yeats find that East Asian economies, that are members of Association of East Asian Nations free trade area, have been successfully utilizing comparative advantages of each member state as a motivation for production sharing.[45] However, as can be seen from Figure 2, the structure of the mutual trade between the member states of the Eurasian Economic Union is far from being industrial. According to the official statistics of the Eurasian Commission, mineral products constitute 30.7 % of the mutual trade volume, while machinery represents 20.7%.[46]

Figure 2

The structure of mutual trade among the members of EEU, January - November 2014[47]

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

According to the same statistical database, Kazakhstan seems to have been so called “raw material appendage” of the union. Around 42.5 % of Kazakhstan’s total export to the union member countries were mineral products. This is 2% more than Russia’s mineral export to the union, which stood at 39.2%.[48] Moreover, as Figure 3 illustrates, Kazakhstan has been the largest exporter of metal and articles made of metal to the union members. Metal and articles made of metal contributed to more than 27% of total Kazakhstan’ export to the union member states.

Figure 3

The structure of Kazakhstan's exports to the EEU, January - November 2014[49]

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

Overall, Kazakhstan has been the largest exporter of mineral products and metal. These two contributed to more than 70% of the export. Manufactured products from the category of machinery, equipment and vehicles contributed to only 6% of the total export to the union. Chemical products were responsible for around 8%, while wood, fur and articles thereof contributed to almost 0% of the export.

Figure 4

The structure of Belarus' exports to the EEU, January - November 2014[50]

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

Meanwhile, Belarus turned out to be the largest exporter of machinery, equipment and vehicles among the member states. This category contributed to around 27% of the total Belarus’ export. The largest portion of Belarus’ export, as Figure 4 shows, was taken by food and agricultural raw material, and this contributed to 30% of the total export. Unlike Kazakhstan, mineral products and metal contributed to only 9% and 7% respectively. Wood, pulp and paper products were among the smallest export categories from Belarus, however this category is still significantly higher than that of Kazakhstan’s: Belarus’ was 2.4 %, while Kazakhstan’s was 0.1% of the total export to the union. Overall, the structure of Belarus’ export to the union member states seems to be exactly the opposite of that of Kazakhstan’s. While Kazakhstan’s main export portion, which is around 70% of the total export, consisted of raw materials, such as metal and mineral products, Belarus’ main export, also around 70%, consisted of machinery, equipment and food.

The structure of Russian export was somewhat in the middle of those of Kazakhstan’s and Belarus’. As Figure 5 shows, mineral products dominated the overall export portfolio with 39%, however the portion of metals and articles thereof were significantly lower than that of Kazakhstan’s, - this category contributed to merely 12% of the total export.

Figure 5

The structure of Russian exports to the EEU member states[51]

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

Moreover, the export of machinery also played a significant role in the economy of Russia. As can be seen from Figure 5, this category represented 20% of the total export to the EEU. This is far higher than that of Kazakhstan’s, which is 6%. Food and agricultural raw materials represented around 8% of the total export, while textile and wood contributed with 3% each.

As can be seen from the structure of the mutual trade between the three member states, it was mainly dominated by the trade of mineral products, which contributed to around 30%. Among the three economies, Belarus turned out to have the most diversified export portfolio, while Kazakhstan has the least. Russia, despite its efforts to become a diversified economy[52], still seems to be a natural-resource-dependent economy. However, it is clear that Russian economy is much more diversified than Kazakhstan’s.

Figure 6

Changes of mutual trade structure, in percentages (2011-2014)[53]

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

In fact, the predominance of mineral products in the mutual trade between post-soviet republics also shows that little has changed since the collapse of the USSR. As Dobrowski & Antczak mention, the energy resources were among the top trading positions and constituted 61% of the total trade volume between the republics, according to the statistics of 1990.[54] However, as can be seen from Figure 6, the share of mineral products has been steadily changing since 2011 from 41.1% to 30% in 2014. The decrease in the share of mineral products was caused by the real decrease in the trade volume of mineral products from USD 25,5 billion in 2011 to USD 21,1 billion in 2013 and by an increase in the trade of manufactured goods such as machinery and equipment from USD 6,4 billion in 2011 to USD 7,2 billion in 2013.[55]

Obviously, the benefit of economic union in terms of possibility to create a cross-border production arena is still blurred. There is still a high dominance of mineral products in the mutual trade portfolio. In addition to this, the trade with mineral products does not foster creating jobs due to the lower labor-intensity of the industry.[56] Moreover, the geographical characteristics of the union, namely longer distance between the most populated cities of the member states, can have a negative influence on the development of cross border production, due to high cost of transportation.[57] In these terms, the union between Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus is definitely incomparable with the European Union (EU) and ASEAN where states are located more densely. This situation is worsened by the overall underdeveloped infrastructure in the post-soviet republics, including Russia itself.[58]

One of the long-term aims of the EEU is creating a common currency.[59] Implementing common currency has both positive and negative consequences for the member economies. Among the classical benefits of such a development within the EEU would be elimination of foreign currency exchange losses. According to the official data, around 50% of the payments within the union are conducted through Russian Ruble, 40% are made through US dollars, 9% - through Euro, the rest, which is less than one percent, are conducted through other currencies.[60]

The domination of US Dollar in the trade transactions between Kazakhstan and Russia has recently hit the Kazakh economy. The recent devaluation of Russian Ruble relative to the US Dollar has caused a mass outflow of US Dollars from Kazakhstan, thus putting pressure on Tenge. As Bloomberg reports, Kazakh citizens are finding purchasing imported goods from Russia more attractive, due to cheaper prices and perceived higher quality, making local production less competitive.[61] This made Kazakh economists worry about the situation with the import from Russia. As a result, even the re-introduction of customs border with Russia was suggested to save local production from competition.[62]

Clearly, introduction of common currency would smoothen the trade between the member states through eliminating cross border speculations, exchange losses and risks. However, this would also mean losing the instrument of monetary regulation, which is crucial for manipulating exchange rates, thus controlling the import and stimulating export from the country.[63]

Despite many advantages of establishing a common currency zone within the framework of the union, it still seems to be a challenge for the union. A monetary union would require many developments in payment infrastructure among the member states. This would also need harmonizing different payment systems that are currently being used by the states.[64] Therefore, there is still no official claim on creating such a union.[65]

Among the most important shortcomings of the EEU for the economy of Kazakhstan has been the introduction of common external tariffs. Agreements on the common external tariffs forced Kazakhstan to raise its tariffs up to the level of Russia. Despite the abolition of intra-state tariffs and the increase in the trade volume among the member states, the external tariffs caused a decrease in importation of cheaper products from Europe and China.[66] This, in turn, has caused a decrease in competition and a rise in prices.[67]

Among the member states, Kazakhstan turns out to be affected by the so-called trade diversion effect the most. This was caused by a decrease in import of cheaper products from China and an increase in imports from a less efficient economy such as Russia.[68] Russia turns out to be the least affected by this. This is because Russia did not have to change its external tariffs much; it rather stayed with its own tariffs, while Kazakhstan had to raise more than half of its customs tariffs.[69]

Moreover, the elimination of tariffs between the member states did not eliminate non-tariff barriers such as sanitary standards. This resulted in a number of trade-related conflicts between Belarus and Russia. As a Belarusian economist suggests, there are certain systemic reasons for these conflicts: Russia has been doing its best to develop a market economy, while Belarus has an economy mainly stimulated and supported by the government. The conflicts are caused by the export of Belarusian products that are produced in free economic zones of Belarus and that are positioned as “Belarusian” despite being made by third country companies.[70]

These tensions resulted in mutual exchanges of various import bans between Russia and Belarus. In 2012, Russian Transportation Ministry threatened Belarus’ largest airline, Belavia, to ban the flights from Belarus to Russian regions such as Kaliningrad and Yekaterinburg.[71] The response to this threat was Belarus’ ban for Russian Aeroflot to undertake flights to Minsk.[72]

The most high-profile case of the trade-related conflict between Russia and Belarus happened in 2014 when Russian Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary introduced its ban on products made by a number of Belarusian companies. These companies mainly came from agricultural industry; accordingly, the motivation for the ban was incompliance of the products with the requirements of Russian phytosanitary and veterinary legislation.[73]

However, these conflicts between Russia and Belarus are not based solely on the trade relationship between the states. In August of 2014, as a response to Western sanctions, Russia introduced a full embargo on import of meat, poultry, fruits and vegetables from the EU.[74] Being within a customs union with Belarus, Russia was not able to implement successfully its embargo on the EU products, due to various efforts of the counterparts to re­export the products to Russia through Belarus.[75] This resulted in Russia’s negotiations with the members of the Customs Union on cooperation to increase the effectiveness of the embargo through restricting re-export from Belarus and Kazakhstan. Moreover, Russian Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance even reported the possibility to restrict the transit of food to Kazakhstan through Belarus, since, in their opinion, in most cases, the food transited through Belarus to Kazakhstan ends up in Russia.[76]

Clearly, there is a lot of internal issues to solve for the members of the EEU. The recent events between the West and Russia, such as economic sanctions, have even more complicated the relationship between the union members. As Mkrtchyan suggests, the elimination of non-tariff barriers has played a more important role in facilitating the trade between the member states than elimination of customs duties.[77] Therefore, there is still a lot to improve for the union in terms of eliminating non-tariff barriers such as sanitary and veterinary norms.

It is important to mention the social aspect of the EEU. Especially, the social reaction of the Kazakhstani to the formation of the economic union. As it was mentioned above, within the world community, there is a strong association of the union with the political ambitions of Russia.[78] This has also affected the way Kazakh people react on this development. According to Atilgan et al, the union has found a huge support by the ethnic Russians living in Kazakhstan that represent around 22% of the whole population.[79] However, according to other opinion poll results, more than 50% of the Kazakhstani population support the integration within the Eurasian Economic Union, while around 30% are against any unification with Russia.[80] This group was also supported by an official appeal of a group of Kazakhstani journalists and representatives of different civil organizations to the government of Kazakhstan in 2013. In their opinion, Kazakhstan had been losing its market share within the already existing customs union with Russia and Belarus. They continue arguing that Kazakhstan’s trade share in the union had decreased from 20% in 2011 to 17% in 2012. Moreover, they claim, Kazakhstan’s export to the union dropped by 3%, while the import from Belarus and Russia into Kazakhstan rose by 12% in the same year.[81]

Clearly, the society needs more than just promises. Statistically, Kazakhstan has been experiencing losses from being a part of the union. Therefore, the government needs to act in order to bring more evidence of profitability of doing business within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union.

To sum up, Kazakhstan’s participation in the customs union and further in the Eurasian Economic Union with Russia and Belarus has not been able to justify itself yet. Together with all the advantages, such as a larger market for Kazakhstani business, there are too many shortcomings of the union specifically for Kazakhstan. One of the biggest problems of the union, as mentioned above, is its over politicized nature. This has created a negative social attitude towards the EEU, and as a result has put a risk on its realization.

Another issue for Kazakhstan’s participation is its role as a raw material appendage of the union. As it was discussed above, the decrease in trade with third party countries and the increase of trade with the union members has put risk on Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy.[82] Moreover, the rise of Kazakhstan’s customs duty with third party countries up to the level of Russia’s has caused a decrease in import of cheaper products from China and EU. This, in turn, contributed to the social pressure in Kazakhstan due to the import of high-price and low-quality substitute products from Russia. Additionally, according to the World Bank’s estimations, Kazakhstan has been losing around 0.3% of its annual GDP after the implementation of the common external tariffs.[83]

Incapability of Kazakhstani business to compete with the companies from the member states is probably one of the clearest proofs that Kazakhstan is not yet ready for integrating with Russia. This issue was even more complicated after the devaluation of Russian Ruble relative to the Tenge, which, as mentioned above, caused an outflow of foreign currency from Kazakhstan to Russia, thus putting pressure on the national currency. These difficulties even made Kazakh business representatives appeal for measures to be taken by the government to save their businesses.[84]

2.2. The role of Exports in the Economy of Kazakhstan

The formation of Customs Union and later of the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015 has created both the risks and opportunities for the economy of Kazakhstan. The elimination of customs borders between Kazakhstan and other member states has caused an inflow of highly competitive in terms of both price and quality goods from Russia and Belarus to Kazakhstan, thus threatening local businesses. This, as mentioned previously, resulted in a collective appeal of Kazakhstani business for a support from the government.

The economy of Kazakhstan has been dependent on the exports of oil and gas. In fact, it is through the exports of oil that Kazakhstan was able to obtain a sustainable economic growth during the first decade of 21st century. However, the attempts of the government to diversify its economy through decreasing the share of oil and other natural resources in its exports have not been successful so far. The oil sector still represents around 60% of the total exports and contributes to 25% of the country’s GDP.[85]

One of the government’s attempts to force economic diversification was the State Program on Forced Industrial and Innovative Development (SPFIID) for the years of 2010 - 2014, which was launched in 2010. The first years of functioning of the program, according to the study of Development Bank of Kazakhstan, were considerably fruitful resulting in growth of almost all the manufacturing industries, such as pharmaceuticals with a growth of 191,7%, machinery- 152%, chemical industry - 122%, metallurgy -112% and light industry with a growth of 105%. However, during the period of 2008 -2013, the share of manufacturing industry in total exports of Kazakhstan decreased from 11,8% - 10, 5%, while the share of non-oil products declined from 27, 8% to 23, 2%.[86]

Such disproportion in the structure of exports has been keeping the economy of Kazakhstan dependent on the prices of fossil fuels. The recent fall in oil price has also made the government of the country reconsider the budget for the years 2015-2017. The unexpected fall of oil prices has brought considerable changes to the state budget for the abovementioned period of time that was based on the price level of USD 80 per barrel. The new budget will be based, as the minister of National Economy of Kazakhstan said, on the price level of USD 50 per barrel.[87]

However, the oil price at the level of USD 50 per barrel seems to be too optimistic. Analysts at Meryl Lynch forecast a fall in the oil price down to USD 31 per barrel by the end of March 2015. This, according to them, will be caused by the high amount of oil that is being stocked by the traders and the likelihood that the price of oil will hike is very low.[88] However, the yearly average will still remain within the range of USD 50-52 per barrel. In any case, according to estimates, the state budget of Kazakhstan will be experiencing a loss of around USD 6 billion, every year between 2015 and 2017.[89]

The intention of Kazakh government in case of the oil price lower than USD 50 was made clear in February 2015 when the head of central bank of Kazakhstan, Kairat Kelimbetov, declared that the exchange rate will be adjusted by the bank. However, compared to the last devaluation, this time it will have a smoother nature.[90] The devaluations of the national currency in 2009 and in February of 2014 both had a so-called “one-step” nature, dropping the rates of the currencies by 20 and 18% respectively. Such a behavior of the national bank of Kazakhstan was assessed as acting not according to the central bank’s primary purpose, which is maintaining price stability and stable financial sector, but aiming merely at maintaining USD/Tenge exchange rate.[91]

The periodicity of devaluation has also made the Kazakhstanis anxious about another exchange rate hike in 2015. This has caused an increase in dollar deposits, decreasing demand for the tenge, increasing the probability of the next devaluation.[92]

Clearly, Kazakhstan’s dependence on the exports of oil has been causing many issues for the economy. The drop in the oil price has decreased the inflow of foreign currency. The government, in turn, is trying to stabilize the exchange rate through selling its foreign reserves. The shrinkage of foreign reserves pushes the government to devaluate the national currency, which usually results not only in economic consequences but also in social ones. Therefore, there is an urgent need in increasing the share of exports of other product categories through identifying the problems and challenges of the exporting companies in Kazakhstan.

The importance of exports for the economy has been broadly discussed in the literature. In order to be able to effectively survey the literature on the impact of exports on economic growth, the concept of export-led growth (ELG) is used as a keyword for the literature review. According to Palley, the concept of ELG was popular until 1970’s and it is an economic development strategy that is based on the idea of increasing productivity through focusing on external markets.[93]

There are many arguments among authors regarding in which direction the concept works: whether from exports to economic growth, meaning that exports causes economic growth or in the opposite direction from growth to exports. Segerstrom, for instance, mentions the extraordinary growth that was experienced by a group of economies of so-called “Asian Tigers” from the mid 1960’s up until 1997’s Asian Crisis. While other economies were oriented towards substitution of imported products, he argues, the “tiger” economies were pursuing an export- oriented policy. This, in turn, let the economies grow with a rate of around 8-9% while others were only growing with a rate of 2-3 % annually.[94]

Segerstrom also suggests that elimination of trade barriers leads to higher profits from exporting goods abroad. Since the higher profits act as a reward for innovations and product development of the exporting companies, they are motivated to continue innovation. This leads to a stronger commitment to resource devotion and innovate more. As a result, liberalization of trade brings a faster technological change to the economies with open economic policies.[95]

A long-term positive effect of exports on the economic growth was also suggested by Chemeda. Using econometric methods, he analyzed the data on the economy of Ethiopia within the period of 1950 and 1986. The results of his study showed that there is a strong positive relationship between the increase of real growth of exports from Ethiopia and the real growth of the economy. However, he states, the positive effect of the exports on the growth of the economy is better seen in a long run rather than in a short-term period.[96]

Another African state, Egypt, also experienced the same investigation on its development. A professor of economics at Helwan University Abou-Stait conducted a study based on historical data for Egyptian economic performance from 1977 to 2003. He conducted the study to check whether exports, imports and economic growth of Egypt were co-integrated. Moreover, the author aimed at checking whether exports caused growth in investment into the economy. The results of the study showed that despite Egypt’s dependency on exports of raw material, the exports of goods had played a more important role in the economic growth of Egypt. In other words, the increase in exports has definitely caused economic growth in case of Egypt. However, the increase in exports did not cause an increase in investment. In addition, the author suggests that there is a need to increase competitiveness of Egyptian goods in order to be able to benefit from international trade. The author also points out a relatively higher competitiveness of Egypt in textile industry.[97]

A number of sub-Saharan African states were also assessed on the matter of existence causal effect between exports and economic growth. Based on the data of 21 sub-Saharan African states, the study was conducted to check whether changes in the state strategies from import substitution to export promotion had impact on the economic growth of the states. The results of the study showed that 5 states out of 21 had a unidirectional causality from economic growth to export growth, exports of manufactured goods caused the reverse effect from exports to economic growth. Three countries experienced bidirectional causality between exports and GDP growth during the period when the states were following import substitution strategy. However, the results showed that the change in strategy from import substitution to export promotion caused an increase in the number of unidirectional causality from export growth to economic growth. The results revealed that out 21 countries only three states experienced bidirectional causality, while the rest show unidirectional causality from exports to GDP growth.[98]

The effect of exports of banana, cocoa and coffee on the economy of Cameroon was studied by Gilbert et al. The findings from the analysis of the data from 1976 to 2009 revealed mixed results depending on the type of products exported. The exports of coffee, for instance, had positive and significant impact on economic growth. The same impact on the economy of Cameroon was observed from the study of the effect of banana exports. However, the exports of cocoa shows a negative significant impact on economic growth. Moreover, the results showed that inflation and increase in the number of labor force have a positive impact on the growth of the economy.[99]

The positive effect of exports on the economy in a long run also found a support in Stiglitz. He argues that unlike South East Asian “tigers”, China was able to utilize the globalization much more effectively than their neighbors were. In the author’s opinion, China was able to reduce poverty through opening its doors for import slowly. The author also suggests that the careful approach to globalization was the main success factor for China, and even today, China is still reluctant towards letting in investments that seek high return within a short period of time.[100]

Interestingly, Dreger and Herzer, based on the study of 45 developing countries, suggest the opposite to the results of the above-mentioned studies. Based on the data from 1971 to 2005, they found that the export-led growth hypothesis is supported in short-term period. However, in a long-term period they find that an increase in exports will usually result in a decrease in the economic growth. More precisely, they find that 69% of the sample countries experienced a decrease in the growth of economy while their exports increased and 31% of the sample showed the opposite results.[101]

In their study on measuring the effect of export-oriented policies on the growth of Chinese economy, Tingvall and Ljungwall also found that Chinese export-led growth model of economy had positively contributed to the economic growth. The study was based on the analysis of 68 export-oriented economies. The results showed that China had benefitted from export-oriented model of economy more than other states.[102]

A result with more precise numbers for the impact of exports on the economic growth of China was proposed by Lin and Li. Using data for the time period of 1981-2000, the authors found that for every 10% increase in exports there is a causality of 1% increase in GDP in case of China. The authors also suggest that there is an indirect effect of exports through an increase in consumption and investment. They argue that only through taking into account these two indicators, can one obtain a more precise number on the impact of exports on economic growth.[103]

Palley, however, has found that the model of export-led growth economy has lost its functionality. Based on the observation of emerging markets such as China and Mexico, he suggests that due to changed conditions, the idea of growing through exports has been exhausted and the economies are mistakenly continuing with the same growth model. The author also suggests that the economies that have been reliant on exports have to develop a domestic demand-led economic growth model. Otherwise, as the author suggests, the global economy will face an asymmetric stagnation due to slow growth in developing economies and stagnation in the developed countries.[104]

The causality link between the economic growth of Shanghai and its export performance was also studied by Shan and Tian. Basing their study on the time series data for the period of 1990 -1996, they found that the causality in case of Shanghai worked in the direction from GDP to exports. In other words, the growth of Shanghai economy resulted in the growth of exports from Shanghai, thus disproving the direct link between the growth in exports and economic growth, at least particularly for Shanghai. Also, they believe that the growth of Shanghai economy was mainly caused by a several economic reforms, such as foreign investment policies and the Pudong special economic zone, that were undertaken by the local government.[105]

The reverse causality between exports and economic growth was also mentioned by Xing and Pradhananga. They suggest that strong economies initially produce more products and services that are then exported abroad. They also argue that rapidly growing economies attract more in FDI thus increasing the output of the economy. In other words, economies that are growing with a higher rate, in their opinion, attract more funds, which in turn leads to a more output, which is then exported outside the state.[106]

Studying the causality link between exports and economic growth in Asian economies such as India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand, Ekanayake also found a reverse causality, particularly for Sri Lanka, that comes from economic growth to exports. However, for the rest of the economies studied, he observes a bi-directional causality link between exports and economic growth. In other word, the author finds that the growth in exports causes growth in economy, while growth in economy causes a growth in the volume of exports. Ekanayake also finds that Malaysia was the only economy among the sample that seems to have experienced an export-led growth.[107]

A causality link from export growth to the growth of economy of Pakistan was also observed by Ismail et al. In their study, the authors assess the impacts of exports, inflation and investment on the economic growth. The result of the study reveals significant positive impacts of exports and investment on the economy of Pakistan. However, the impact of inflation on the economy was negative.[108]

A similar study was conducted by Shirazi and Abdul Manap. In their research, they examine the effect of export-led growth hypothesis relative to South Asian economies. The results of their research support the export - led growth hypothesis relative to Bangladesh and Nepal. However, their research also was not able to support the same relative to India and Sri Lanka, thus confirming Ekanayake’s findings.[109]

A more recent study on the causality effect on the economy of India conducted in 2014 by Rajput et al, however, suggests the opposite. In their study, they attempt to assess export-led growth hypothesis through employing quarterly time-series data from 1990 to 2013. The results of their study show that there is a unilateral causality from export growth to GDP growth, showing a positive effect of exports growth to the growth of the Indian economy.[110]

A study conducted by Anwer and Sampath in 1997 showed that there is little connection between economic growth and export growth. The study is based on the investigation of economic data for the period of 1960- 1992 for 96 countries. The results show that out of 96 countries, only 20 countries show a causality between the two variables. Out of these 20, 12 show a unidirectional causality from GDP to export growth, six countries show causality from exports to GDP growth and 2 showed bidirectional causality between the two variables.[111]

Export-led growth hypothesis was also tested on the economy of Costa Rica. Medina-Smith, using the data for the period of 1950 - 1997, tests whether exports has had any impact on the growth of the economy in both short and long period of time. The results of the study suggests that the hypothesis worked in case of Costa Rica, however the growth of the economy was mainly affected by a significant growth in population and increase in physical investment into the economy during the abovementioned time period. Moreover, the author expresses doubts regarding the efficiency of export promoting policies that are seen nowadays as a comprehensive strategy of economic development. All in all, the study, however, suggests that exports does have a positive impact on economic growth. They also suggest that it can definitely be considered as an “engine of economic growth”. However, as the author continues, the effect can vary from economy to economy.[112]

The role of exports in the economic growth of a number of South American economies such as Brazil, Argentina and Mexico was examined by Maneschiold in a research paper of 2008. In their study, the author found that there is a direct causality between GDP and export growth for Mexico and Argentina, however, the results did not show such for Brazil. Moreover, the results showed that there is a bidirectional causality link for Mexico and Argentina after the introduction of North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and unidirectional causality link from exports to GDP growth before the introduction of NAFTA. A unidirectional but a short- run causality link from exports to GDP for Brazil was also observed. Thus, the findings for the economies of South America also support the link between exports and GDP growth.[113]

The impact of export destination on economic growth was also examined by Razmi and Hernandez. In their study conducted in 2011, they state that the pursuit of export -led growth policy made the economies of South East Asia a success in the 1960’s rather that an import substituting strategy that they followed before 1960’s. The authors try to assess whether a certain type of exports to a certain destination have a more significant impact on the growth of output. The study is based on a variety of data both on the economies of developed and developing countries. The authors found that the exports of manufactured goods particularly to the industrialized Western economies might have played a more important role for the economic growth of South East Asian economies rather than other factors, such as the share of manufactured goods in exports.[114]

The role of exports in the economic growth of East Asian economies is also studied by Fukuda and Toya. The study is based on the data for the years from 1986 to 1991. The results of the study revealed that the East Asian economies, in this case namely Singapore, Taiwan, Korea and Hong Kong were able to implement export-oriented policies successfully. As a result, the growth of exports from above-mentioned economies had a positive impact on economic growth in these countries.[115] However, the authors claim that they do not exclude the impact of foreign direct investment from Japan during that period of time and the impact of relatively stable political situation in the region.[116]

Finally, the impact of exports on the economies of Kazakhstan and other post-Soviet states was also recently investigated. Using secondary data for a period of 1998 -2008 and ordinary least squares technique, Azam assessed the impact of exports from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan on the growth of their economies. The results of the study revealed that, among the three economies, Kazakhstan’s economy turned out to be the least affected by the exports. However, for all the three economies, the causality from exports to GDP growth was both positive and significant. The author found that every single percent growth in exports resulted in a 0,268 percent growth in the economy of Kazakhstan. Therefore, the author suggests that the policymakers should keep promoting export activities in all the three economies.[117]

The impact of exports on the economy of Kazakhstan was also mentioned in the study of Amiri. In their study, the author studies the causality link between exports, import and economic growth for the economies of 116 countries. The author finds that for the majority of the economies, there is a bidirectional causal link between exports and GDP growth. The results revealed that Kazakhstan experiences a bidirectional causal link between its exports and economic growth. Moreover, the results showed that there was no causal effect between import and economic growth for Kazakhstan.[118]

[...]


[1] cf. Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2012, p. 5.

[2] cf. Dreyer & Popescu, 2014, p. 2.

[3] cf. Dreyer & Popescu, 2014, p. 4.

[4] cf. Eurasian Economic Commission, 2011, "Mutual trade statistics" [online].

[5] cf. Blockmans et al., 2012, p. 5.

[6] cf. EBRD, 2014, "Transition report" p. 49 [online].

[7] cf. Ng &Yeats, 1999, p. 40.

[8] cf. EBRD, 2012, p. 70.

[9] cf. Khatibi, 2008, p. 2.

[10] cf. WTO, 2015, "Accessions" [online].

[11] cf. The world Bank, 2012, "Kazakhstan in the Customs Union: Losses or Gains?" [online].

[12] cf. The World Bank, 2014, p. 2.

[13] cf. Ernst and young, 2013, p. 8.

[14] cf. Isakova & Plekhanov, 2012, p. 8.

[15] cf. Spitzlburger- Platner & Gladysz, 2011, p. 2.

[16] cf. Kazinform, 2014, "Necessary to raise competitiveness of Kazakh companies" [online].

[17] cf. Dorsey, 2009, p. 18.

[18] Proposed by author.

[19] cf. Efegil, 2010, p. 75.

[20] cf. CIS, n.d., "Sodruzhestvo nezavisimyh gosudarstv" [online].

[21] cf. CIS, 1993, "Dogovor o sozdanii ekonomicheskogo soyuza" [online].

[22] cf. Obydenkova, 2011, p. 97.

[23] cf. Sputnik News, 2008, "Uzbekistan suspends Eurasec membership" [online].

[24] cf. UPI, 2011, "Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan sign pact" [online].

[25] cf. Obydenkova, 2011, p. 97.

[26] cf. Ross Smith, 2014, "Russia's Unpragmatic Turn in its Near Abroad" [online].

[27] cf. Russia Today, 2014, "Russia completes ratification of Eurasian Economic Union" [online].

[28] cf. Ernst and young, 2013, p. 8.

[29] cf. Labykin, 2015, "Bazar Bayev" [online].

[30] cf. EEC, 2014, "Vzaimnaya Torgovlya" [online].

[31] cf. The Dairynews, 2012, "Rossiya i Belarus's zahvatyvayut Kazahstanskii rynok" [online].

[32] cf. Blockmans et al., 2012, p. 5.

[33] cf. Eurasian Economic Union, 2013, p.15.

[34] cf. Sapargaliyeva & Mzareulov, 2014, p.1.

[35] cf. Pantucci, 2015, "Central Asia: the view from China" [online].

[36] cf. Global Security, n.d., "Eurasian Economic Union" [online].

[37] cf. Haufler& Wooton, 1999, p. 137.

[38] cf. EEU, 2014, "O bezrabotice gosudarstvah- chlenah Tamozhennogo Soyuza", p.1.

[39] cf. Khatibi, 2008, p. 2.

[40] cf. WTO, n.d., "Russian Federation and the WTO" [online].

[41] cf. WTO, n.d., "Republic of Armenia and the WTO" [online].

[42] cf. Kuanov & Amirbekova, 2002, "Kazakhstan po-prezhnemu ne gotov vstupit' v WTO" [online].

[43] cf. Nur.kz, n.d., "Ministr Aitzhanova rasskazala na kakih usloviyah Kazakhstan voidet v WTO" [online].

[44] cf. Nur.kz, n.d., "Ministr Aitzhanova rasskazala na kakih usloviyah Kazakhstan voidet v WTO" [online].

[45] cf. Ng &Yeats, 1999, p. 40.

[46] cf. EEC, 2014, "Vzaimnaya Torgovlya" [online].

[47] Adapted from EEC, 2014, "Vzaimnaya Torgovlya" [online].

[48] cf. EEC, 2014, "Vzaimnaya Torgovlya" [online].

[49] Adapted from EEC, 2014, "Vzaimnaya Torgovlya" [online].

[50] Adapted from EEC, 2014, "Vzaimnaya Torgovlya" [online].

10

[51] Adapted from EEC, 2014, "Vzaimnaya Torgovlya" [online].

11

[52] cf. Malle, 2013, p. 98.

[53] Adapted from EEC, 2014, "Vzaimnaya Torgovlya 2011 -2014" [online].

[54] cf. Dobrowski & Antczak, 1995, p. 10.

[55] cf. EEC, 2014, "Vzaimnaya Torgovlya 2011 -2014" [online].

[56] cf. Gumede, n.d., p. 3.

[57] cf. Fujimura & Edmonds, 2006, p. 2.

[58] cf. Rodeheffer, 2013, "Russia's Customs Union is the Wrong Turn for Central Asia" [online].

[59] cf. TASS, 2014, "Creating currency union next phase of Eurasian economic integration — official" [online].

[60] cf. Alekseevskih, 2014, "Evraziiskii ekonomicheskii soyuz nameren otkazatsya ot dollara i evro" [online].

[61] cf. Gizitdinov, 2014, "BofA Sees Kazakh Devaluation as Ruble Woes Hit Putin Allies" [online].

[62] cf. Urazova & Kuzmina, 2015, "Kazakh expert suggests reintroducing customs border with Russia" [online].

[63] cf. Dudley, n.d., p. 2.

[64] cf. Alekseevskih, 2014, "Evraziiskii ekonomicheskii soyuz nameren otkazatsya ot dollara i evro" [online].

[65] cf. Bayramov, 2013, p. 15.

[66] cf. Wolffgang et al., n.d., p. 95.

[67] cf. Rakhmatulina, 2011, pp. 154-155.

[68] cf. Tarr, 2012, p. 2.

[69] cf. Isakova et al., 2013, p. 2.

[70] cf. Petrovskaya, 2012, "Moskva, Kiev, Minsk: obrechennye torgovye konflikty" [online].

[71] cf. Haldevang, 2012, "Battle Over Minsk-Moscow Air Route Escalates" [online].

[72] cf. Petrovskaya, 2012, "Moskva, Kiev, Minsk: obrechennye torgovye konflikty" [online].

[73] cf. Belarusian News, 2014, "MP: Restrictions on Belarusian exports to Russia contradict" [online].

[74] cf. Deutsche Welle, 2014, "Russia announces 'full embargo' on most food from US and EU" [online].

[75] cf. Alexandrova, 2014, "Russia determined to prevent banned food re-export via third countries" [online].

[76] cf. Tashkinbayev & Satubaldina, 2014, "Russia cannot limit food transit from EU to Kazakhstan" [online].

[77] cf. Mkrtchyan, 2013, p.1.

[78] cf. Baumgartner, n.d., p. 6.

[79] cf. Atilgan et al., 2014, pp. 22 -23.

[80] cf. Zona KZ, 2011, "Kazhdyi tretii Kazahstanec protiv ob'edinenia strany s sosedyami" [online].

[81] cf. Respublika, 2013, "Nam ne nujen Evraziiskii soyuz!" [online].

[82] cf. Eurasian Council, 2014, p. 3.

[83] cf. World Bank, 2012, "Kazakhstan in the Customs Union: Losses or Gains?" [online].

16

[84] cf. Konstantinov, 2015, "Biznes prosit zashity ot devalvacii rublya" [online].

[85] cf. Bendini, 2013, p. 5.

[86] cf. Development Bank of Kazakhstan, 2014, pp. 8-10.

[87] cf. Reuters, 2015, "Kazakhstan sees slower growth, to revise budget on cheap oil -source" [online].

17

[88] cf. Reuters, 2015, "Oil settles down despite promising mid-day rally" [online].

[89] cf. Urazova & Kuzmina, 2015, "Kazakh Budget Revised Amidst Dropping Oil Prices" [online].

[90] cf. Kassenova, 2015, "Tenge exchange rate adjustment possible if oil prices go below $50" [online].

[91] cf. IMF, 2011, p. 12.

[92] cf. Dettoni, 2015, "Kazakhstan Anxious About Another Devaluation" [online].

18

[93] cf. Palley, 2011, p. 3.

[94] cf. Segerstrom, 2011, p.1.

[95] cf. Segerstrom, 2011, p. 3.

[96] cf. Chemeda, 2001, p. 16.

[97] cf. Abou-Stait, 2005, p. 14.

[98] cf. Njikam, 2003, pp. 11-14.

[99] cf. Gilbert et al., 2013, p. 67.

[100] cf. Stiglitz, 2006, pp. 10-11.

[101] cf. Dreger & Herzer, 2012, p. 21.

[102] cf. Tingvall & Ljungwall, 2010, p. 5.

[103] cf. Lin & Li, n.d., pp. 18-19.

[104] cf. Palley, 2011, p. 20.

[105] cf. Shan & Tian, 1998, p. 11.

[106] cf. Xing & Pradhananga, 2013, pp. 16-17.

[107] cf. Ekanayake, 1999, p. 51.

[108] cf. Ismail et al, 2010, p. 7.

[109] cf. Shirazi & Abdul Manap, 2005, p. 484.

[110] cf. Rajput et al, 2014, pp. 40-41.

[111] cf. Anwer & Sampath, 1997, p. 15.

[112] cf. Medina-Smith, 2001, p. 36.

[113] cf. Maneschiold, 2008, p. 300.

[114] cf. Razmi & Hernandez, 2011, pp. 35-36.

[115] cf. Fukuda & Toya, 1995, p. 251.

[116] cf. Fukuda & Toya, 1995, p. 249.

[117] cf. Azam, 2009, "Comparative Analysis of the Impacts of Exports on Economic Growth" [online].

[118] cf. Amiri, n.d., p. 7.

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Pages
116
Year
2015
ISBN (eBook)
9783668500860
ISBN (Book)
9783668500877
File size
2.1 MB
Language
English
Catalog Number
v372169
Grade
1
Tags
export facilitation banking products services eurasian economic union

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Title: Export Facilitation through Banking Products and Services in the Eurasian Economic Union