The Refugee Crisis. Threat to or Driver of Cosmopolitan Europe?

Contents

Introduction

1. Theoretical background: Democratic and empirical cosmopolitanism
1.1 Seyla Benhabib’s democratic cosmopolitan right to political membership
1.1.1 Democratic cosmopolitanism
1.1.2 The right to political membership
1.1.3 Democratic iterations and jurisgenerative politics
1.2 Anti-cosmopolitanism and communitarian state-centrism
1.3 Ulrich Becks empirical (risk-) cosmopolitanism
1.3.1 Cosmopolitanism vs. cosmopolitanization
1.3.2 Cosmopolitanization is ‘banal cosmopolitanism’ but not globalization
1.3.3 Common risks and the cosmopolitan outlook lead to institutionalized cosmopolitanism

2. Political membership in the EU: towards a postnational and cosmopolitan society
2.1 Comparing the political rights of EU citizens, refugees, and third-country nationals
2.1.1 Political Rights of EU citizens
2.1.2 Political rights of Refugees and asylees in the EU
2.1.3 Political rights of third-country nationals in the EU
2.2 Access to political membership through naturalization
2.2.1 The German model of naturalization
2.2.2 The French model of naturalization
2.3 Conclusion: There are cosmopolitan and postnational dynamics in the EU
2.3.1 Benhabib’s point of view on the EU as cosmopolitan entity
2.3.2 Soysal’s point of view on the EU as a postnational entity

3. The Refugee Crisis as a driver of cosmopolitan Europe?
3.1 Contradiction to cosmopolitan dynamics: Anti-cosmopolitan responses to Refugee Crisis
3.1.1 The Refugee Crisis
3.1.2 Anti-cosmopolitan answers to the Refugee Crisis
3.2 Following Beck, a cosmopolitan response should be the EU’s response to the Refugee Crisis
3.2.1 The Refugee Crisis creates a European global public
3.2.2 The European global public creates an institutionalized cosmopolitan European solution
3.2.3 The European cosmopolitan solution as a product of cosmopolitan realism
3.3 Towards a cosmopolitan solution for the Refugee Crisis driving cosmopolitan EU?
3.3.1 The failure of the Dublin III regulation
3.3.2 An institutionalized cosmopolitan European asylum policy as solution
3.3.3 If member states cooperate, the Refugee Crisis is a driver of cosmopolitan Europe

Conclusion:

References and bibliography

Introduction

It is the year 2016 and the Refugee Crisis is omnipresent in the media, in public debate as well as in politics, and even in university seminars the ethical challenge of refugees is discussed. The big attention that this topic gets is not limited to one European Union member state but is outlined in the whole European Union. The discourse is not homogenous, neither at the national, nor the civil society level. The spectrum ranks from wholehearted welcoming of asylum seekers by governments and individuals to hostile, xenophobic counter-movements. What? Xenophobic movements? Haven’t quite a few scholars, Seyla Benhabib^[1] and Ulrich Beck^[2] among them, alluded to connections between the EU and cosmopolitanism? Why then are there member states rejecting refugees instead of welcoming them in a hospitable way like they should be doing as cosmopolitan actors? This is confusion leads to the question: Is the Refugee Crisis a threat to, or could it be, in contrast, also be a driver of cosmopolitan Europe? This question has until now not been investigated in academia and shall be outlined in this paper. Research from philosophy, sociology, political science, and law each discusses parts of this paper’s question and will be put together in order to get the puzzle solved: Philosopher Seyla Benhabib reflects in “The Rights of others”^[3] the dynamics of cosmopolitan political membership in the European Union and its member states, sociologist Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal supports in her paper “Changing citizenship in Europe”^[4] the notion of postnational citizenship. Sociologist Ulrich Beck formulated in “Cosmopolitan Vision”^[5] a theory of cosmopolitanization and applied it to the EU in “Cosmopolitan Europe”^[6]. The political scientist Stefan Luft gives in his monography “Die Flüchtlingskrise”^[7] an overview on the Refugee Crisis, the EU asylum policy and the failure of the Dublin III regulation. Not on its failure, but on the unequal concept of the Dublin III regulation focusses Jürgen Bast, jurist, in his article “Solidarität im europäischen Einwanderungs- und Asylrecht“^[8] [solidarity in the European immigration and asylum right] and proposes some reforms. And here is how the findings of these researchers, the focus being clearly on Benhabib and Beck, will be put together in order to find a solution to the question “The Refugee Crisis: Threat to or Driver of Cosmopolitan Europe?”

In the first third of this paper a theoretical background in cosmopolitan thought will be given, focusing on Benhabib’s democratic cosmopolitan right to political membership and Beck’s empirical cosmopolitanism. In order to be able to better analyze the above-mentioned xenophobic responses to refugees, the concept of anti-cosmopolitanism and communitarian state-centrism will also be presented in this first third. In the second third, it shall be shown that from Benhabib’s point of view, the EU is no ideal, but a real existing cosmopolitan entity: After having analyzed the political rights of EU citizens, refugees, and third-country nationals as well as the access to political membership through naturalization, it shall be concluded that there can be found cosmopolitan and postnational dynamics in the EU. Having this in mind, it is contradictory that the member states of cosmopolitan Europe respond to the Refugee Crisis with anti-cosmopolitan answers as outlined in the last third of this paper. Therefore, following Beck’s theory of cosmopolitanization, it shall be argued how the cosmopolitan EU should react to the Refugee Crisis. Finally, it will be assessed if there can be noticed first steps towards such a cosmopolitan solution of the Refugee Crisis driving cosmopolitan Europe.

1. Theoretical background: Democratic and empirical cosmopolitanism

1.1 Seyla Benhabib’s democratic cosmopolitan right to political membership

1.1.1 Democratic cosmopolitanism

One branch of contemporary cosmopolitanism is democratic cosmopolitanism. Seyla Benhabib is among its most important advocates.^[9] In order to mitigate the tensions “between human rights declarations and states’ sovereign claims to control their borders as well as to monitor the quality and quantity of admittees”^[10], that are enhanced by transnational migration, she argues for a renegotiation and reiteration of the dual commitments to human rights and sovereign self-determination.^[11] What exactly she means with these iterations will be explained later in this chapter. Concerning hospitality, entry and membership in the framework of migration, Benhabib ranks individual human rights higher than communal rights and endorses an equality between the importance of insiders’ and outsiders’ interests.^[12] Consequently, she favors “open and porous borders which enable the free movement of peoples, goods, and services across state boundaries.”^[13]

Nevertheless she admits that there could be an exclusion of outsiders seeking membership of a state, but this exclusion has to be based on a well-founded justification. This justification has to undergo a process of discourse ethics: inspired by Jürgen Habermas^[14], Benhabib asks “which norms and normative institutional arrangements would be considered valid by all those who would be affected if they were participants in special moral argumentations called dicourses.”^[15]

This means that reasons for exclusion must be justified with “grounds that you would accept if you were in my situation and I were in yours.”^[16] Only some specific forms of possible harm justify exclusion, such as a threat to democracy itself. This grants states the right to individually exclude extremists, but not, for instance, Muslims as a whole “on the grounds that Islam is claimed to be incompatible with democracy.”^[17]

1.1.2 The right to political membership

Furthermore, for Benhabib it is important that people, that have been welcomed in a political society, have the possibility of getting “political membership”^[18], even if they reside just temporarily.^[19] She sees civil and political rights itself as a human right and not letting people, that got admission to a state, participate in political life would be a denial of the principles of a universalistic morality^[20], of the person’s “communicative freedom and moral personality”^[21] In Benhabib’s view, if the migrants don’t get granted the right to political membership in their new community, there is a danger of ‘permanent alienage’. A manifestation of this permanent alienage could be a group of migrants in society that on the one hand has property rights and participates in civil society, but on the other hand doesn’t have access to political rights.^[22] Consequently, for her it is political membership that distinguishes people as members or aliens in a state. In addition, she is of the opinion that the concept of single citizenship bundled together with residency in a particular territory is at an end.^[23]

She argues that political integration of migrants, aliens, and refugees from a wide variety of cultural origins can happen easily, as long as they stick to the essential “values of liberal democracies and agree to mediate their disagreements with other citizens according to the rules of secular discourse ethics.”^[24]

In her view, political integration isn’t pendent on a cultural-ethnic identity^[25] and Western democracies’ human rights “have a context-transcending, cosmopolitan character” and “[t]hey extend to all of humankind”^[26]

Liberal theorist Michael Ignatieff doesn’t see cultural roots and basic values that disconnected as Benhabib does: he argues that Asian and Islamic political values and conceptions of rights contradict Western notions of the autonomous individual. Therefore, according to Ignatieff, political integration into liberal democracies could be a bit harder for migrants than Benhabib’s presented relative ease of integration.^[27]

Whereas Benhabib favours a policy of open borders and easy admission, she is OK with reasonable requirements on political membership and thinks that, for instance, written language exams are agreeable with the fundamental human right to citizenship as long as there exists “(…) any procedure or possibility for foreigners and resident aliens to become citizens at all”, and if naturalization is not “(…) restricted on the basis of religious, ethnic, racial, and sexual preference grounds, [which] would violate the human right to membership”^[28]

1.1.3 Democratic iterations and jurisgenerative politics

As it has been outlined, for Benhabib “first admittance does not imply automatic membership.”^[29] It is the democratic people that decides on rules of membership, using legislation and discursive will- and opinion-formation to “adopt policies and laws consonant with the cosmopolitan norms of universal hospitality.”^[30] But who is the democratic people? Defining this is a perpetual procedure of constitutional self-creation. The dilemma, that those who are excluded never can be the ones that devise the rules of exclusion and inclusion can never be resolved. Nevertheless, the democratic people can (and should) let the distinction between being included or excluded be “fluid and negotiable through processes of continuous and multiple democratic iterations.”^[31]

Also the ‘paradox of democratic legitimacy’ can be solved by democratic iterations. The paradox of democratic legitimacy consists, according to Benhabib, of the tensions between universal human rights claims and particularistic cultural and national identities including the particularism of political rights.^[32]

Democratic iterations, according to Benhabib, are continuous processes of public argument in which universalist rights claims and principles such as human rights are discussed, negotiated, contextualized and positioned in the legal and political institutions (legislative, judiciary, and executive) as well as in civil society and the media.^[33]

A consequence of democratic iterations is jurisgenerative politics: the democratic people or in other words the political members of a society are “(…) not only the subject but also the author of law.^[34] So they change not only established understandings through reappropriating and reinterpreting certain guiding norms and principles, “but also transform what passes as the valid or established view of an authoritative precedent.”^[35] To put it in a nutshell, through democratic iterations and jurisgenerative politics the democratic cosmopolitan right to political membership can be extended to former outsiders.

1.2 Anti-cosmopolitanism and communitarian state-centrism

In Contrast to Benhabib, the Anti-cosmopolitan Michael Walzer doesn’t discriminate between cultural integration and political integration.^[36]

Additionally, anti-cosmopolitans reject the notion of the moral universalism that underlies cosmopolitanism and claim, instead, for a local, contextual and cultural morality. (Consequently, in their opinion, a particularistic community, e.g. nationality, has precedence over all abstract connections between members of mankind.)^[37] This communitarian understanding of morality means for migration that outsiders don’t have a right to universal hospitality, but it are the states that have the right to decide the terms of entry and membership. A clear example of the anti-cosmopolitan argumentation of communal self-determination is Michael Walzer saying that states should only take in refugees that are in some way connected with the receiving state’s culture.^[38] So for anti-cosmopolitans, the state should take care that the nation’s culture remains unchanging by defending it against any external influence: a Christian state could reject Muslim migrants, without taking care of their needs, and vice versa.

For anti-cosmopolitans the needs of insiders have a higher priority than the needs of outsiders, since every human is from his first day of life on a member of a community which provides its identity in any meaningful sense. They see it as the community’s right to defend this identity against outsiders.^[39] Anti-cosmopolitan John Rawls doesn’t see ‘peoples’ as a (cultural) construction, but as “(…) a complete and closed social system (…) entry into it is only by birth and exit from it is only by death”^[40]

This communitarian state-centrism can also be noted in anti-cosmopolitan’s language and plays a role in the legitimization of the rejection of asylum seekers: Thinking and speaking through a state-centric, anti-cosmopolitan perspective creates a feeling of defense for the orator. ‘They’, the refugees, are not part of ‘us’, of our state. The discrimination between ‘us’ and ‘them’ fuels, like in the postcolonial orientalism theory by Edward Said,^[41] the perception of the ‘other’ (the refugees) as a depersonalized, dehumanized, and undifferentiated mass instead of individuals. It is due to this discrimination, that the European targets of migration perceive ‘them’, the refugees as a threat or risk. Thus, it is this mechanism that leads from communitarian thought to the legitimization of anti-cosmopolitan rejection of refugees.^[42]

Even if for anti-cosmopolitans the needs of insiders have a higher priority than the needs of outsiders, in some cases they accept a duty of hospitality to particular outsiders. This would be the case if an outsider is at risk of great harm or death, or if the state he seeks admission to has a causal responsibility for the harming situation of the refugee.^[43]

1.3 Ulrich Becks empirical (risk-) cosmopolitanism

1.3.1 Cosmopolitanism vs. cosmopolitanization

Sociologist Ulrich Beck distinguishes between cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitanization. In the following the differences between these concepts will be outlined.

Whereas Beck sees cosmopolitanism as a normative idea that combines universalism with a particularistic dimension, cosmopolitanization lacks this philosophical-normative dimension. Cosmopolitanization is social scientific cosmopolitanism, that focuses on empirical facts and asks “(…) what is cosmopolitanism? And less the question, what should cosmopolitanism be?”^[44]

Analytical-empirical cosmopolitanism is ‘value-free’ and delimits itself from, but doesn’t neglect normative-political cosmopolitanism.^[45] Furthermore, (Beck pretends that cosmopolitanization is realistic, since) it doesn’t oppose to universalism, relativism, nationalism and ethnicism, but is a summation or synthesis of them.^[46]

Cosmopolitanization is the half-conscious and passive process of the becoming cosmopolitan reality that is shaped by global threats or global trade. Interdependences produce and accelerate cosmopolitanization: One’s life, one’s body, one’s “’individual existence’ become part of another world, of foreign cultures, religions, histories and global interdependencies, without [oneself] realizing of expressly whishing it.”^[47] Since this process is mostly unconscious and unintended, national attitudes and identities remain predominant.

1.3.2 Cosmopolitanization is ‘banal cosmopolitanism’ but not globalization

Cosmopolitanization is ‘banal cosmopolitanism’ in which the internal and external, the national and the international intermingle in concrete, everyday ways. An illustrating example for this ‘banal’ cosmopolitanism are poor people, often from developing countries, selling their organs to rich westerners. This example shows the strong, but wordless, anonymous contact-free relation between the organ recipient and the donor that is mediated by the world market. An example for a cosmopolitanization that includes an interactive, dialogical connection are binational marriages.^[48] In both the case of organ trade and the case of binational marriage, the provincial becomes a place where possible worlds overlap which requires mankind to “(…) rethink the relation between place and world.”^[49]

Cosmopolitanization is not actively imposed on the world but consists of uncontrollable events that happen. Cosmopolitanism in the Kantian sense would “(…) come into the world as progress with the reflected moral authority of the Enlightenment”^[50] Becks’s social scientific cosmopolitanism acknowledges the fact that cosmopolitanization, the factually existing cosmopolitanism, is coming into the world as an achievement of struggle or choice, but as deformed (unintended) side effect.^[51]

At this point the difference between globalization (or globalism) and cosmopolitanization has to be made clear.

With globalization, according to Beck, is primarily a one-dimensional economic globalization meant that favours the neoliberal economic growth of the global market.^[52] While the international economic interconnection is growing, the people perceive the nation state as remaining unchanged as they have the feeling that “(…) globalization is occurring somewhere ‘out there’ (…).”^[53]

Cosmopolitanization, in contrast, has to be understood as a process in which global interdependences shape the nation-states from below and transform it from within.^[54] Regarding the aforementioned example of organ trade, the concept of globalization would only capture the economic dimension, cosmopolitanization goes beyond this and includes also social, ecolocigal, and organizational interconnections. Also, like described above, this process increases diverse forms of transnational life.

1.3.3 Common risks and the cosmopolitan outlook lead to institutionalized cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanization and its (forced) mixing of cultures is not something new, but has a long history. (Beck mentions, among others, the conquest of America, colonialization, and slave trade)^[55] What is new is the increasing awareness of this side effect cosmopolitanization that leads to what Beck calls a cosmopolitan outlook. Cosmopolitan outlook (in contrary to the ‘national outlook’) questions the view that “’modern society’ and ‘modern politics’ can only be organized in the form of national states.”^[56]

Now it will be explained, how the cosmopolitan outlook leads to an institutionalized cosmopolitanism.

As the cosmopolitan outlook, the awareness of cosmopolitanization, rises, logically simoultaneously rises the awareness and recognition of cross-border risks that are “culturally produced, interdependent insecurities and dangers”, such as transnational terrorism, climate change, epidemics and diseases, and global poverty. Since often it is hard to specify who or what has the original or causal responsibility for these civilizational threats, they are deterritorialized. Consequently, it is difficult to control these interdependency crises, that Beck calls ‘world risk society’,^[57] within the framework of nation states.^[58] The rising awareness of these cross-border threats manifests itself in the “reflection and recognition before a global public via the mass media (…)”^[59] and generates a global public. But also the other way round fuel the civilizational risks global normative consciousness and global public promoting a cosmopolitan outlook.^[60] The global public discusses the causes and consequences of these threats and realizes, according to Beck, that these conflicts over civilizational risks and their long-term transnational impacts can be best solved with cosmopolitan solutions. Since cosmopolitan solutions can be best achieved through global institutions and rules, these conflicts play an integrating role in the global public, in the world society. Thus, world risk society is involuntarily politiziced, the global perception of global risk is a source of new commonalities and interaction networks.^[61] Examples for the beginnings of an institutionalized cosmopolitanism would be the International Court of Justice, the United Nations, the European Union, non-state actors such as Amnesty International, global protest movements against (neoliberal) globalism, and “campaign[s] for the worldwide recognition of human rights, for the right to work, for global protection of the environment, for the reduction of poverty, etc.”^[62]

2. Political membership in the EU: towards a postnational and cosmopolitan society

2.1 Comparing the political rights of EU citizens, refugees, and third-country nationals

In chapter 1.1 Seyla Benhabib’s notion of democratic cosmopolitanism was presented. Besides her claim that outsiders seeking access to a state can only be excluded based on well-founded justifications, one of the central elements of her democratic cosmopolitanism is the right to political membership for people that have been admitted into a political society. In the following it shall be assessed in what way this aspect of democratic cosmopolitanism can be found in the European Union. For this purpose, the voting rights^[63] of three groups in the EU will be compared^[64]: EU citizens residing in an EU country other than that of their own nationality for over six months, refugees and asylees whose applications are in the process of being considered and whose status is indeterminate, and third-country nationals who are residing in an EU country with an official residence permit.

2.1.1 Political Rights of EU citizens

The European Citizenship is defined in the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) and the not yet ratified “Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe” (2003). In the Treaty of Maastricht it is said that “Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every Person holding the Nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union,”^[65] this citizenship is additional to national citizenship.

In the European Union Citizenship can be noticed first steps that are in accordance with Benhabib’s demand that people that have been welcomed in a political society, e.g. a German living for over six months in Spain, should have the possibility of getting political membership: European Union Citizens that reside in a EU member state other than their own can, even if not on a national level, “vote, run for, and hold office in local as well as union-wide elections” in this country.^[66]

This means that the EU is the world’s first mini-cosmopolitanism in which Benhabib’s notion of the right to political membership is partly applied: for EU citizens, some privileges of political participation in other EU member states they are foreign to are no longer tied to cultural and national membership and some political rights are no more bundled together with residency in a particular territory.

2.1.2 Political rights of Refugees and asylees in the EU

The political rights of refugees and asylees in the EU is standing in a strong contrast to the political rights of EU citizens: they don’t have any political rights in the EU, they can’t run for, hold, and vote for office at any level as long as their applications are in the process of being considered.^[67]

Sometimes the process of considering their application takes a long time, thus they remain for a long time in this indeterminate state without political membership. Benhabib would argue that this is problematic since she considers the right to political membership as a human right. For her, not letting people, that got admission to a state, participate in political life is a denial of the principles of a universalistic morality and of communicative freedom.^[68] Furthermore, applicants that don’t get granted asylum after their applications have been processed remain in the indeterminate condition without political rights, which Benhabib would criticize since they remain in a permanent state of alienage. In her point of view, refugees and asylum seekers are “completely dependent upon the will of the sovereign state which grants the temporary sojourn (…)” and concludes that “(…) [t]hey exist at the limits of all rights regimes and reveal the blind spot in the system of rights(…)”^[69]

Even if the EU has one of the most elaborated rights regimes of the world, refugees and asylum seekers are treated like “quasi-criminals”. Their human rights are deeply injured, since they have no civil and political rights of association and representation. Benhabib therefore urges mankind, for the sake of cosmopolitan justice in the world, to extend full human rights to these individuals and to decriminalize their status.^[70]

If the application of a refugee or asylum seeker is admitted, his status in a European country is comparable to the status of a third-country national residing in the EU. Therefore, now the political rights of third-country nationals residing in an EU country with an official residence permit will be outlined.

[...]

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^[1] Benhabib, Seyla (2004): The Rights of Others. Aliens, Residents, and Citizens. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press (The John Robert Seeley lectures, 5).

^[2] Beck, Ulrich; Cronin, Ciaran (2006): Cosmopolitan Vision. Cambridge: Polity Press and Beck, Ulrich; Grande, Edgar (2007): Cosmopolitan Europe. Cambridge UK, Malden MA USA: Polity.

^[3] Benhabib, Seyla (2004).

^[4] Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoglu: Changing citizenship in Europe. Remarks on postnational membership and the national state. In: Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in Europe.

^[5] Beck, Ulrich; Cronin, Ciaran (2006).

^[6] Beck, Ulrich; Grande, Edgar (2007).

^[7] Luft, Stefan (2016): Die Flüchtlingskrise. Ursachen, Konflikte, Folgen. 1. Aufl. s.l.: Verlag C.H.Beck (Beck'sche Reihe, v.2857).

^[8] Bast, Jürgen (2014): Solidarität im europäischen Einwanderungs- und Asylrecht. In: Solidarität in der EU, ed. by Michèle Knodt and Anne Tews, Baden-Baden 2014, S. 143–161.

^[9] Cf. Shapcott, Richard (2013): International Ethics. A Critical Introduction. 1., Auflage. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.p. 96

^[10] Benhabib, Seyla (2004), p. 2.

^[11] Cf. ib., p. 47

^[12] Cf. Shapcott, Richard (2013), p. 96-98.

^[13] Benhabib, Seyla (2004), p. 88.

^[14] Habermas, Jürgen; Lenhardt, Christian (1991): Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. 2. print. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press (Studies in contemporary German social thought).

^[15] Benhabib, Seyla (2004), p. 131f.

^[16] Ib., p. 138.

^[17] Shapcott, Richard (2013), p. 98.

^[18] Cf. Benhabib, Seyla (2004), p. 1.

^[19] Cf. ib., p. 42.

^[20] Cf.ib., p. 42.

^[21] Ib., p. 140.

^[22] Cf. ib., p. 146.

^[23] Cf. ib., p. 178

^[24] Osborn, Ronald (2010): Seyla Benhabib, Wendell Berry, and the Question of Migrant and Refugee Rights. In: Humanitas 23 (2), p. 123.

^[25] Cf. Benhabib, Seyla (2004), p. 121.

^[26] Ib., p. 175.

^[27] Cf. Osborn, Ronald (2010): Seyla Benhabib, Wendell Berry, and the Question of Migrant and Refugee Rights. In: Humanitas 23 (2), p. 123.

^[28] Benhabib, Seyla (2004), p. 141.

^[29] Ib., p. 177.

^[30] Ib., p. 177.

^[31] Ib., 177f.

^[32] Cf. ib., p 44.

^[33] Cf. Ib., p. 179.

^[34] Ib., p. 181.

^[35] Benhabib, Seyla (2004), p. 180.

^[36] Cf. Benhabib, Seyla (2004), p. 120.

^[37] Cf. Shapcott, Richard (2013), p. 50f.

^[38] Cf. Walzer, Michael (1983): Spheres of justice. A defense of pluralism and equality. New York: Basic Books. p. 21.

^[39] Cf. Shapcott, Richard (2013), p. 100.

^[40] Rawls, John (1999): The law of peoples. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press., p. 41.

^[41] Said, Edward W. (1979): Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books.

^[42] Cf. Turton, David (2003): Conceptualising Forced Migration, RSC Working Paper No. 12, Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, p. 14f.

^[43] Cf. Shapcott, Richard (2013), p. 99.

^[44] Beck, Ulrich; Cronin, Ciaran (2012): The European Crisis in the Context of Cosmopolitization. In : New Literary History 43 (4), p. 642.

^[45] Cf. Beck, Ulrich; Cronin, Ciaran (2006): Cosmopolitan Vision. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 24.

^[46] Cf. ib., p. 58.

^[47] Beck, Ulrich; Cronin, Ciaran (2006), p. 19.

^[48] Cf. Beck, Ulrich; Cronin, Ciaran (2012): The European Crisis in the Context of Cosmopolitization. In: New Literary History 43 (4), p. 643f.

^[49] Beck, Ulrich; Cronin, Ciaran (2006): Cosmopolitan Vision. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 10.

^[50] Ib., p. 20f.

^[51] Cf. Beck, Ulrich; Cronin, Ciaran (2006): Cosmopolitan Vision. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 20f.

^[52] Cf. ib., p. 8f.

^[53] Beck, Ulrich; Cronin, Ciaran (2012): The European Crisis in the Context of Cosmopolitization. In: New Literary History 43 (4), p. 645.

^[54] Cf. Beck, Ulrich; Cronin, Ciaran (2012), p.645.

^[55] Cf. Beck, Ulrich; Cronin, Ciaran (2006): Cosmopolitan Vision. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 21.

^[56] Ib., p. 24.

^[57] Beck, Ulrich (1999): World Risk Society. Cambridge: Polity Press. This concept was mentioned here the first time by Beck.

^[58] Cf. Beck, Ulrich; Cronin, Ciaran (2006): Cosmopolitan Vision. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 22.

^[59] Ib., p. 21.

^[60] Cf. ib., p. 23.

^[61] Cf. Beck, Ulrich; Cronin, Ciaran (2006), p. 23/35.

^[62] Beck, Ulrich; Cronin, Ciaran (2006), p. 9.

^[63] Of course the political rights go beyond voting rights and include for example also the freedom of assembly and the freedom of speech. Nevertheless, in this paper it shall be focused only on voting rights.

^[64] It could also be made at least two more comparisons between EU citizens, third-country nationals and refugees/asylees in order to assess the cosmopolitan dimension of the EU. First the different extensions of social rights (unemployment compensation, health care, and old age pensions) and second, the variety of right of movement inside the Schengen area could be compared. Furthermore, the legal acts of Dublin III agreement concerning refugees and asylum seekers could be analyzed from a (democratic) cosmopolitan point of view. In the context of this work this won’t be done.

^[65] Treaty on European Union (Maastricht text), July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. C 191/1 [hereinafter Treaty of Maastricht], Article 8 of C. Part Two.

^[66] Cf. Benhabib, Seyla (2004), p. 155.

^[67] Cf. ib., p. 158f.

^[68] Cf. Benhabib, Seyla (2004), p. 140.

^[69] Cf. Benhabib, Seyla (2004, p. 163.

^[70] Cf. ib., p. 168.