Excerpt
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Definitions
2.1 Definition of Fiscal Federalism
2.2 Definition of Fiscal Decentralisation and Fiscal Centralisation
3. Fiscal Federalism in Austria
3.1 Decentralisation in Austria compared to other OECD countries
4. Theoretical Perspectives on Fiscal Federalism
4.1 First Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism
4.2 Public-Choice Perspective of Fiscal Federalism
4.3 Second Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism
4.3.1 Centralization and Decentralisation in the Second Generation Model
4.3.2 Potential dangers of Fiscal Decentralisation
4.3.3 Risk- Sharing and Interjurisdictional Insurance
4.4 Conclusion
5. Fiscal decentralisation and size of the government
5.1 Introduction
5.2 The Leviathan hypothesis
5.2.1 Empirical studies on the Leviathan hypothesis
5.2.1.1 The control variables
5.2.1.2 The original test
5.2.1.3 The inseparability of taxing and spending decision
5.2.1.4 Evidence from Swiss state and local governments
5.2.1.5 References on panel data of 18 OECD countries
5.2.1.6 References on panel data of 29 OECD countries
5.2.2 Summary and Conclusion
5.2.3 Critical assessment on the empirical tests
5.2.3.1 Conclusion
5.3 Tax competition
5.3.1 Introduction
5.3.2 Definition of tax competition
5.3.3 Tax competition and output of local public goods
5.3.3.1 Summary
5.4 Local benefits with federation-wide costs
5.4.1 Introduction
5.4.2 The model
5.4.2.1 Summary
5.4.3 A simplification of the model
5.4.3.1. Summary
5.4.4 A model of tax sharing and tax illusion
5.4.4.1 Summary
5.4.5 Conclusion
6. Conclusion
7. Literature
7.1 Articles
7.2 Internet sources
8. Equations
9. Figures
10. Tables
- Quote paper
- Ina Walcherberger (Author), 2015, Fiscal Federalism-Decentralisation and the size of government, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/316869
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