Table of Contents
Scotland and the rUK
The Future of the UK’s Nuclear Deterrent
Why an IS and the rUK Will be Less Secure
IS: Armed Forces
IS: NATO and the EU Membership Prospects
Catalonia and Madrid
Why the Security Implications of an IC are More Problematic to Assess
Why an IC will be Less Secure
IC: Lack of Consensus
IC: NATO and the EU Membership Problematic
Insights from Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia
Word Count (excluding footnotes): 4302
On 18 September 2014, Scotland votes on whether or not to remain part of the United Kingdom; Catalonia decides on 9 November 2014. The potential security consequences of separatist movements within these NATO countries have received relatively little analysis, with discussions often taking a back-seat to economic issues. An independent Scotland (IS) or Catalonia (IC) presents unprecedented situations for the EU and NATO. Never before has an EU or NATO country split with both parts seeking continued membership.1 The ramifications of a “yes” vote will have repercussions not only in the not-so-united Kingdom but also across Europe and other international institutions.
This essay analyzes the security implications of a “yes” vote on these regional independence movements in Spain and the UK. Even if the “no” votes outnumber the “yes” votes, the security issues will remain relevant if the underlying reasons for the divorce remain, making the British author William Hickson’s words, “if at first you don’t succeed, try, try again”2 ironically relevant. Would a “yes” vote on Scottish independence be “cataclysmic in geopolitical terms for the world,” as former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson has argued, or would independence be no more than a “‘storm in a teacup’—an internal issue for the United Kingdom with few consequences for the international community?”3 This essay argues that secessionist movements in Catalonia and Scotland are likely to result in short-term reductions in security for the secessionist states and their former governments.4 Therefore, to mitigate security vulnerabilities for all polities, secessions should be managed in a rational and levelheaded manner. This essay supports this argument by analyzing the security implications through the lens of three security dilemmas. First, it analyzes the impact Scotland’s independence will have on the rest of the United Kingdom’s (rUK) nuclear deterrent.5 The potential loss of the nuclear asset, in addition to the loss of a credible means of deterrence, will diminish world influence for both sides and incur significant short-term costs that limit funding available for conventional forces. Second, it argues that secession will severely limit the capability of the armed forces for the dyads in the UK and in Spain. Third, this essay contends that the potential relationships between these would-be independent states and international security organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) are more problematic than independence leaders suggest and explores whether Kosovo and Czechoslovakia’s velvet divorce shed light on this debate.
Scotland and the rUK
The Future of the UK’s Nuclear Deterrent
The most prominent security issue regarding Scotland’s secession is the potential loss of the rUK’s nuclear deterrent.6 As Malcom Chalmers and William Walker point out, Scottish voters have the ability to shape whether or not the UK will remain a nuclear weapons state.7 While the nuclear proliferation concern is not as significant an issue as it was in the case of nuclear weapons in former Soviet Republics, where their control and security was a major concern, there will likely be a strong impetus from both the Scottish National Party and the international community to expeditiously relocate the rUK’s nuclear assets. Her Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde, which is comprised of the Faslane naval base and the Coulport missile servicing facility, is only existing nuclear support structure for the UK’s Trident missile submarines.8 Scotland’s secession will force the rUK to seek the following main alternatives: relocation abroad, relocation in the rUK, or decommissioning.
Even if the rUK decides to keep the Trident platform, establishing or converting a naval base in England with similar capabilities as those in Faslane and Coulport is likely to take years and cost about three billion pounds.9 The time and cost associated with relocation are likely to endanger Trident’s short-term readiness. Temporarily relocating the rUK’s four Trident submarines to Kings Bay, Georgia is likely to be politically feasible. Yet Kings Bay will be hard-pressed to maintain current levels of availability for either the U.S. or the rUK, given existing support and training facilities.10 Even if the four trident submarines only use Kings Bay for missile servicing, as Malcom Chalmers and William Walker suggest, de- conflicting support facilities will not be trivial and will likely reduce the operational tempo of the rUK’s submarines. Using Brest, France as a servicing facility for the Vanguard-class submarines will likely minimize operational downtime due to its close proximity, but three problems arise. First, unlike in Kings Bay, France’s support facilities and personnel will have to be certified to conduct repairs on Trident, not a trivial matter given that all Trident maintenance publications are in English. Second, the political situation may prove more complex than relocating Britain’s arsenal to the United States. Third, the facilities at Brest may be even more limited than Kings Bay for accommodating British submarines.11
Considering the difficulty of these alternatives, the loss or early retirement of the UK’s nuclear asset is a real possibility. While some observers such as John MacDonald argue that the loss of the UK’s nuclear deterrent will “bolster, and not diminish, the UK’s ‘international prestige,’”12 the loss of the UK’s nuclear status, at least in the short-term, is likely to diminish security in both Scotland and the rUK’s for three reasons.
First, nuclear weapons continue to play a necessary, however undesirable, role in deterrence and stability. If Ukraine had still possessed nuclear weapons or if it were part of NATO—a nuclear alliance—it is unlikely that Russia would have violated its territorial integrity. The loss of the UK’s nuclear fleet may embolden Russia to take more aggressive actions, such as incursions within Scotland’s Exclusive Economic Zone. Possessing one’s own nuclear deterrence force is more credible than relying on extended nuclear deterrence.
Second, even if the UK does not lose its seat at the United Nations Security Council, as some have hinted, both the rUK and an IS will be smaller actors on the world stage, arguably limiting their influence. An IS will no longer have access to the UNSC as it did via its association with the UK. Furthermore, with both the rUK and an IS managing a new and uncertain geopolitical situation, power projection abroad and internal defense may fall lower in the list of priorities, creating a vulnerability that could be exploited by both state and non- state actors.
Third, the costs of either relocating or decommissioning Britain’s nuclear assets, while saving money in the long-term, will prove expensive in the short-term. The cost to relocate the Trident nuclear force has been estimated at nearly 4 billion pounds13 —a burden which may be shared by both Scotland and the rUK.14 Not only will the UK and Scotland lose their nuclear deterrence capability, but this financial strain will undoubtedly restrict the amount of defense spending that will go towards maintaining or upgrading any conventional armed forces.
Why an IS and the rUK Will be Less Secure
IS: Why an IS’s Armed Forces will be Less Capable
The security implications of a Scottish secession will not be limited to the nuclear question; Scotland will face several immediate reductions in conventional security. While Scotland’s long-term security situation could be arguably improved, the first five years after its independence (2016-2021) could have three significant impacts on Scotland’s security. First, Scotland will lose all of the associated security benefits it currently enjoys as being part of the United Kingdom, such as joint procurement—which achieves economy of scale, joint intelligence sharing as a part of the five eyes intelligence alliance, and joint training and logistics. The cost of relinquishing these benefits and establishing new capabilities are not accounted for in Scotland’s proposed £2.5 billion budget—a budget which is only 7% of the combined UK budget.15 Furthermore, while this budget has been estimated to account for “between 1.7 and 2.0” percent of an independent Scotland’s GDP—higher than most NATO countries, it does not sufficiently allocate resources for the expected high startup costs of establishing an independent defense capability. 16 Without a larger initial defense budget, Scotland’s armed forces, as Professor J.R. Deni from the US Army War College indicates, “would most likely lack deployability, lethality, and/or depth, severely limiting its ability to protect an independent Scotland’s interests and those of its potential NATO allies.”17 Second, the Armed Forces will be facing an uphill battle to establish any significant defense capacity within the first five years after independence. By Scottish estimates, the total number of regular personnel in land forces is an estimated 3,500.18 While Scotland possesses several military installations, 19 many will have to be repurposed to accommodate an independent Scottish military. The potentially long-term negotiations regarding the future status of Britain’s nuclear assets could prevent or limit the ability to repurpose the naval bases at Coulport and Faslane towards conventional maritime capabilities.20
More importantly as Andrew Doorman points out, nearly the “entire military training infrastructure for all three armed services is based outside Scotland,” making it difficult to conclude that Scotland can effectively train its armed forces by 2016.21 Many of the assets that Scotland seeks in its 10 year transition plan will likely incur long start-up times and potentially be more costly as the rUK will likely inherit a preferred trading status with the United States, relocating any remaining defense industries in an independent Scotland south of the border.22 The combination of these difficulties will significantly limit Scotland’s ability to protect itself from the myriad of global threats.
IS: NATO and the EU Membership Prospects
If an independent Scotland has a weak defense capability at its outset but remains a member of NATO, Scotland’s vulnerability to a range of security threats could be mitigated. Yet, despite the SNP’s recent change in support for joining NATO, reflected in Alex Salmond’s statement that “it is right that Scotland continues our NATO membership,”23 continuous membership within NATO is likely to prove problematic for three reasons. First, the SNP’s rejection of nuclear weapons may cause NATO, a nuclear alliance of 28 member- states, to view Scotland’s entry with suspicion, particularly if the negotiations on the future of the Trident become problematic.
Second, the leaders of member-countries with internal secessionist movements will likely oppose Scotland’s membership in order to deter similar movements within their own countries. Third, Scotland may be more of a liability than an asset, particularly in its first years after independence. Even if Scotland were to possess deployable forces, which are able to contribute in crisis management operations, Scotland’s political will to deploy its forces may be questioned by both allies and enemies alike. The SNP’s support for NATO only changed from no to yes in 2012. Moreover, as indicated by the Scottish white paper on independence, participation in military operations will have to be perceived to be in accordance with United Nation principles and agreed upon by the Scottish Government and Parliament.24
Catalonia and Madrid
Why the Security Implications of an IC are More Problematic to Assess
The referendum on Scottish independence to be held on 18 September 2014 is similar to Catalonia’s ‘referendum’ on 9 November 2014. However, there are three important differences between the two which make the security implications of an IC harder to assess. First, the Spanish government regards the Catalonia referendum as unconstitutional and thus illegal. In contrast, the British government is allowing the Scottish referendum to take place. While both the Scottish National Party and the British government have released official information to persuade voters to vote “yes” or “no” respectively, the official debate in Spain is absent given that Madrid does not recognize any Catalonian push for independence. This lack of substantive debate fails to deal with the tense situation.
Under Article Eight of the Spanish constitution, the Armed Forces have a mission to defend Spain’s territorial integrity and constitutional order.25 While Miquel Sellarès, director of the Center for Strategic Studies of Catalonia, argues that the Spanish Army would “not dare to do such a thing,” referring to deploying the Army to intervene in Catalonia, statements made by Spanish government officials do not seem to rule out this possibility.26 Spain’s foreign minister, José Manuel García Margallo, has stated that Madrid has the right to use the “full force of the law” to ensure the referendum is not held and does not deny that Spain maintains its constitutional right to suspend Catalonia’s regional government.27 While Spanish intervention in Catalonia might not be a “massacre” as Sellarqs argues, it could theoretically be deployed to uphold Article 155 of the Spanish constitution. This article states that the Spanish national government, if unable to reach a satisfactory resolution with the autonomous community, maintains the right to forcefully compel the autonomous community to comply with Spanish national interest.28 If the Spanish Constitutional Court deems a Catalonian referendum illegal but Catalonia proceeds anyways, the situation will become increasingly problematic and make security analysis even more challenging. Second, Spain’s refusal to recognize Catalonia’s referendum provides little insight into Madrid’s future relations with a newly independent Catalonia as relatively few authoritative documents or statements exist regarding the security implications of secession. In the UK, the Scottish National Party has released a white paper addressing certain details of independence while the British government has published a document analyzing the security aspects of the referendum. The Catalan government has promised to release a white paper in September 2014 addressing the referendum while Madrid, understandably, has not published a security analysis on a sovereign Catalonia as Catalan independence defies the Spanish constitution.29 While the most recent Spanish National Security strategy identifies Gibraltar as a source of friction among Spain and the United Kingdom, the potential secession of Catalonia is not explicitly mentioned.30 Likewise, the Spanish Strategic Studies Institute (Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos), has no publications that directly address the security implications of a potential Catalonian secession. Thus, statements regarding the security implications of Catalonian secession are limited to non-governmental sources, such as Spanish newspapers, think-tank publications, and journal articles.
The only official Catalan regional government source that discusses security and defense matters regarding independence is a document published in Catalan on 28 July 2014.31 The Catalan National Assembly (ANC), a political organization advocating for independence, has published a defense analysis of an IC, but it hardly touches on any specific defense or security issues. 32 The Catalan Security Studies Institute has published documents regarding security aspects of independence, but it remains unclear who authored these documents and whether or not consensus exists within Catalonia for its proposals. The state of the Catalonian Armed forces is hard to judge as comparatively fewer sources than in the UK have been published regarding the defense capabilities of an independent Catalonia. Even publications and statements from leading experts within Catalonia have widely differencing views, from whether or not there should be an Army to whether or not Catalonia should even seek to inherit any military forces from the Spanish state.33 Furthermore, as discussed before, the more problematic relationship between Madrid and Barcelona makes it harder to predict the likely outcomes. The referendum in November 2014 is also non-binding with regards to independence. If the referendum goes through and a majority of Catalonians vote for an independent state, one might expect that formal independence will be advocated by politicians in the run-up to the next Catalonian parliamentary election. Thus, independence shortly after Scotland’s potential 2016 divorce might be expected.
Third, the nature of the relationship between Madrid and Catalonia leads to more exaggerated and very one-sided assessments, from all sides.34 Because there is no open, frank, or effective discussion between Barcelona and Madrid, the nature of the relationship has gone from problematic to hostile. While Scotland’s first minister, Alex Salmond has debated with pro-union politicians, allowing citizens to make more informed assessments, Catalonia’s potential secession has led to inaccurate accusations. Alex Calvo and Pol Molas, two Catalan security analysts, characterize Spain as a rogue state, asserting that Spain is “Europe’s North Korea.”35 Sellarès argues that the Spanish government is deliberately infiltrating Catalonian police forces to foment trouble in Catalonia.36 Accusations such as these, which can likely be found in unofficial sources that oppose Catalonian secession make any potential divorce more complicated and uncertain. The distribution of assets and liabilities may be an indicator of future complications as well. A group of Catalonian lawyers working for the Catalan National Congress, or Asamblea Nacional Catalana (ANC), published a report rejecting payment for any burden of Spanish debt, arguing that Madrid has long plundered Catalonia financially with nothing in return.37 To make things more contested, these lawyers argue that Catalonia should still receive 16%—a number corresponding to Catalonia’s percentage of Spain’s population— of state property, including military assets.38
Why an IC will be Less Secure
IC: Lack of Consensus
Nonetheless, and perhaps more so than in the case of an independent Scotland, an
independent Catalonia and the rest of Spain will be less secure for three main reasons. First, Catalonian politicians have not made defense or security issues a priority when discussing Catalonian independence and when these issues are discussed, there is no consensus. Among the Catalan public, there is even less of an awareness of the security implications of an independent Catalonia.39 Artur Mas, President of the Generalitat de Catalunya, suggests that Catalonia does not need an Army since, Catalonia will remain part of both the EU and NATO, organizations which he emphasizes share defense resources.40 The leftist independence-seeking Catalan party, the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), on the other hand, is debating whether to establish an army of 35,000 regulars, a more specialized force which can contribute to collective security, or to establish security guarantees with countries such as France.41 The only official Catalan government report that mentions security and defense issues remains vague on plans for a Catalan military indicating the following potential options: militarizing the Catalan police forces, creating a national guard that takes on both civil and military functions, or creating an army.42 While having various options to pursue is a benefit, if Catalonia secedes from Spain without even having an agreedupon defense plan, it will be in an extremely vulnerable position.
IC: The Difficult Prospects of Building an Autonomous Defense Capability Second, Catalonia will face building up an entirely new defense establishment, even more so than Scotland. If Catalonia refuses to pay a proportional share of their debt to Spain, however justified this position is, Madrid is unlikely to give moveable defense assets, such as naval platforms, to Catalonia. Even if Catalonia spends the NATO benchmark of 2%,43 as the Catalan defense think-tank Societat d'Estudis Militars suggests, this will likely be insufficient to establish a credible maritime deterrent, particularly if an IC receives no assets from Madrid. While Catalonia has two large ports in Barcelona and Tarragona, it possesses no naval bases. Assuming the political will to build up naval bases in these ports, there will still be several issues. If Catalonia inherits naval platforms from Spain, it will likely take years to establish support structures, such as skilled maintenance workers, support facilities, and training facilities to maintain the ships deployable. To its credit, the Catalan defense think- tank Societat d'Estudis Militars (SEM) recognizes, though perhaps underestimates, the enormous challenges Catalonia will face given potential independence. In a publication entitled “Dimensions of the Catalan Defence Forces I: Naval Forces,” the unknown authors recognize that in the first several years Catalonia will “have to improvise with the available resources and personnel.”44 The authors recognize that the Armed Forces of an IC will be largely dependent on foreign advisors. Yet, while countries such as the United States, France, and even the UK, might be willing to send advisors and assistants to build up an IS’s defense forces, they will likely hesitate given the political nature of the contested. An IC will also have to create an independent intelligence capability, which could make it more vulnerable to threats in the short-term, particularly if Madrid does not share its intelligence. These authors also recognize that it might take 10-15 years to project “force within a multinational framework.”45 While having a clean slate is potentially a benefit, in the transitional period to a theoretical end state, Catalonia will remain vulnerable to security threats.
IC: NATO and the EU Membership Problematic
Third, any unilateral declaration of independence will almost certainly leave Catalonia outside the collective security guarantees of NATO and the EU. The ANC argues that because Spain is part of the EU, Catalonia will remain a member of the EU and will be integrated into the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) with some assistance from the European Defense Agency.46 Likewise, this document argues that Catalonia, according to prevailing legal doctrine, will automatically retain NATO membership since Spain is a NATO country.47 These assumptions are problematic at best. Some Catalan security analysts including Alex Calvo and Pol Molas have argued that NATO needs Catalonia as much as Catalonia needs NATO, insisting that Catalonia will be a vital pillar of NATO.48 Similarly, Miquel Sellarès argues that because of Catalonia’s geostrategic importance, it will be hard for NATO to exclude an IC.49 His statements seem to discount numerous assertions, from the president of the EU Council to the NATO secretary general, who have unequivocally stated that an IC will fall outside of the EU and NATO, respectively.50 While the EU has the potential to “conclude international agreements” with states that are not universally recognized, any such association agreement with Catalonia is not likely to be any sure sign of future membership.51 While the EU’s recent association agreement with Ukraine, arguably a country with greater strategic importance for the EU, may establish closer economic ties between the two, any official membership prospects are likely to take decades, given Ukraine’s unresolved territorial disputes. While the EU and NATO have no explicit policy on internal secession of member states,52 the more likely situation is that Catalonia’s accession into NATO and the EU will be even more problematic than Scotland’s.
Insights from Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia
The dissolution of Yugoslavia, though not an exact comparison, sheds some light on the current debate in Catalonia. When Spain provided its opinion to the international court of justice regarding Kosovo’s declaration of independence, it argued that “Kosovo’s declaration of independence was not in accordance with international law because it ignored Serbia’s right to sovereignty and territorial integrity.”53 Thus, Spain and several other states in the European Union used this as a basis to oppose Kosovo’s recognition—a basis that continues today. However, while Kosovo is still not recognized by the European Union, other polities that existed within Yugoslavia were recognized. For example, Slovenia, a former republic in Yugoslavia was admitted to the EU in 2004.54 Richard Caplan argues that the European Community’s (EC) arbitration commission on the dissolution of Yugoslavia provided a legal framework on distinguishing between Kosovo and Yugoslav republics like Slovenia.55 The commission argued that Yugoslavia was in “the process of dissolution” which meant that the republics fighting for independence were not “rebel entities” but “new states…created on the territory of the former” Yugoslavia.56 However, Kosovo was not a former republic of Yugoslavia and thus did not fall under the commission’s legal definition of a new state.
While the Kosovo to Catalonia comparison might be somewhat relevant in Catalonia given the unilateral nature of the independence, it is hard to argue that Spain, despite its strong regional identities and fiscal challenges, and the UK, are experiencing a Yugoslavia-style dissolution. Even if this were true, it is problematic to argue that Catalonia and Scotland, despite their significant autonomy, are republics.
Czechoslovakia’s velvet divorce, despite the lack of a referendum,57 may be a more apt comparison to Scotland’s potential secession. The nature of the breakup in Scotland is not nearly as problematic as in Spain. Both sides have agreed to the referendum and the UK has agreed to respect Scotland’s decision. In the peaceful breakup of Czechoslovakia, both the Czech Republic and Slovakia were admitted “into the UN in January 1993” and were later admitted into NATO and the EU.58 However, in the case of an IS, it is likely only Scotland that will seek to join NATO and the EU given that the rUK will likely be the recognized successor state, in a similar way that Russia was the recognized successor state to the Soviet Union.
An IS and an IC will undoubtedly face numerous challenges to maintain their current defense and security capabilities. Despite the SNP’s opposition to nuclear weapons, Scotland’s associational relationship with the UK provides it significant security benefits. Any short-term uncertainty in the UK’s nuclear asset will lead to a less reliable deterrent at best. In addition, the costs associated with any short-term change in status will likely impact conventional military capabilities on both sides of the divide, even if relocating or decommissioning the UK’s Trident submarines will save money in the long run. The SNP and the rUK will be best positioned to mitigate their short-term security vulnerabilities by establishing transparent discussions that take into account the concerns of both sides and by refraining from politicizing or using the nuclear issue as a bargaining chip.
Catalonia’s more problematic situation has the potential to destabilize security and defense in profound ways. Even if Madrid blocks the November referendum, the Catalonian independence movement is unlikely to subside given the current nature of debate in which both sides remain entrenched and fail to communicate effectively. An IC will have more trouble mitigating its short-term security vulnerabilities due to more precarious relationship, which increases the uncertainty regarding Catalonia’s future. If Kosovo serves as a precedent, recognition and admission into the EU is very unlikely for Catalonia, though an associational agreement could be a possibility. Membership in NATO for Catalonia will also be unlikely, though a partnership agreement could be plausible. The potential independence of Scotland and Catalonia will not only impact the UK and Spain but will inspire other secessionist movements to follow their examples, undermining years of European integration and security cooperation.
1 Graham Avery, “Independentism and the European Union,” European Policy Brief (May 2014), 2.; NATO has never faced such a situation because the Czech Republic and Slovakia separated and only subsequently joined NATO and the EU.
2 Norman Vincent Peale, You Can If You Think You Can (Englewood Cliff, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1974), 8.
3 Andrew M. Dorman, “More than a storm in a teacup: the defence and security implications of Scottish independence” International Affairs 90: 3 (2014), 1.
4 This essay does not take any normative position, but rather seeks to focus exclusively on the security implications of independence, whether it is mutually agreed upon or not. This essay does, however, argue that the nature of divorce, whether civil or not, will impact post-independence security for both sides.
5 The acronym rUK (rest of UK) is adopted from Malcom Chalmers and William Walker article “Will Scotland Sink the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent?” in the Washington Quarterly (Summer 2013).
6 Even if Scotland votes for maintaining its union with the UK, Westminster may still be faced with the Trident issue; John MacDonald, “A blessing in disguise? Scottish independence and the end of the UK nuclear posture,” European Security (2014): 335.
7 Malcolm Chalmers and William Walker, “Will Scotland Sink the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent?” The Washington Quarterly (Summer 2013), 107.
8 John MacDonald, “A blessing in disguise? Scottish independence and the end of the UK nuclear posture,” European Security (2014): 327.
9 Andre Walker, “Britain May Move Nukes to America if Scotland Votes ‘Yes’ to Independence,” Breitbart, 15 September 2014; Malcolm Chalmers and William Walker, “Will Scotland Sink the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent?” The Washington Quarterly (Summer 2013), 112.
10 Kings Bay currently hosts six ballistic missile submarines and two guided missile submarines. http://www.public.navy.mil/subfor/csg10/Pages/organization.aspx. Existing facilities include one drydock, two explosive handling wharfs, and three refit maintenance piers. Additional berths are available, but have no strategic support capabilities. http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/kingsbaysubmarine/. The average age of the ballistic missile submarines based in Kings Bay is 23 years. While the Trident life extension program will maintain the weapons system reliability, it is likely that SSBNs will require more frequent testing, certification, and non-nuclear repairs, further stressing King Bay’s support facilities.
11 “Arsenal de Brest, France” accessed 15 September, 2014, http://www.naval- technology.com/projects/arsenaldebrest/
12 John MacDonald, “A blessing in disguise? Scottish independence and the end of the UK nuclear posture,” European Security (2014): 340.
13 David Torrance, The Battle for Britain: Scotland and the Independence Referendum, (London: Biteback Publishing, 2013), 150.
14 Andrew M. Doorman, “More than a storm in a teacup: the defence and security implications of Scottish independence,” International Affairs, Vol. 90, no. 3 (2014): 691.
15 David Torrance, The Battle for Britain: Scotland and the Independence Referendum, (London: Biteback
Publishing, 2013), 140.; UK Ministry of Defence, The Rt Hon Michael Fallon MP, Cabinet Office and Scotland Office, “Scotland analysis: Defence,” 28 February, 2014, 3.
16 The Scotland Institute, “Defence and Security in an Independent Scotland” (June 2013), 28, http://www.scotlandinstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Defence_Report_-_Scot_Inst.pdf
17 The Scotland Institute, “Defence and Security in an Independent Scotland” (June 2013), 31, http://www.scotlandinstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Defence_Report_-_Scot_Inst.pdf
18 The Scottish Government, “Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland,” (2013), 240, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0043/00439021.pdf
19 Colin M. Fleming and Carmen Gebhard, “Scotland, NATO, and Transatlantic Security,” European Security, Vol 23, No. 3, (2014): 320.
20 The Scotland Institute, “Defence and Security in an Independent Scotland” (June 2013), 25, http://www.scotlandinstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Defence_Report_-_Scot_Inst.pdf
21 Andrew M. Doorman, “More Than a Storm in a Teacup: The Defence and Security Implications of Scottish Independence,” International Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 3, (2014): 690.
22 Andrew M. Doorman, “More Than a Storm in a Teacup: The Defence and Security Implications of Scottish Independence,” International Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 3, (2014): 689.
23 David Torrance, The Battle for Britain: Scotland and the Independence Referendum, (London: Biteback Publishing, 2013), 146.
24 The Scottish Government, “Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland,” (2013), 251, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0043/00439021.pdf
25 The Spanish Constitution of 1978,
26 Miquel Sellarqs, “Security and Defense” Interview. See minute 9:55, http://ambindependencia.cat/en/seguretat-i-defensa-2/
27 Matt Mofett, “Spain Vows to Fight Independence Vote in Catalonia,“ The Wall Street Journal,
28 The Spanish Constitution of 1978,
29 Generalitat de Catalunya, “White Paper on self-determination process to be published by the Government of Catalonia in September,” 24 July 2014, http://afersexteriors.gencat.cat/en/detalls/noticia/El-Govern-de-la- Generalitat-publicara-un-Llibre-Blanc-de-la-independencia-de-Catalunya-aquest-setembre-00001; The Spanish Strategic Studies Institute (IEEE) does not appear to have published any document that explicitly identifies Catalan separatism as a security dilemma.
30 Spanish Government, “National Security Strategy: A Shared Project,”
31 Generalitat de Catalunya, “The Internal and International Security of Catalunya: Informe núm. 17,” http://presidencia.gencat.cat/ca/ambits_d_actuacio/consells- assessors/consell_assessor_per_a_la_transicio_nacional_catn/informes_publicats/ These documents are published first in Catalan, then in English, and finally in Spanish.
32 Catalan National Assembly, “A Strategic Analysis,”
33 The 17th published document by the ANC, which deals with defense and security, has yet to define whether Catalonia should have an Army or not. See
34 The debate on independence is not only between Madrid and Barcelona, but also within Catalonia itself. Purportedly Catalonian websites such as http://dolcacatalunya.com/ provide a pro-unification voice to the debate.
35 Alex Calvo and Pol Molas, “Asset splitting: Should Catalonia Take Over Spanish Air and Naval Systems?,” Center for Strategic Studies of Catalonia, http://www.ceec.cat/catala/articles/asset-splitting-should-catalonia- take-over-spanish-air-and-naval-systems/
36 Miquel Sellarqs, “Security and Defense” Interview. See minute 10:58, http://ambindependencia.cat/en/seguretat-i-defensa-2/
37 Antonio Fernández, “Los juristas de la ANC reclaman a España un 16% de su patrimonio y rechazan la deuda,” El Confidencial, 2014
38 Antonio Fernández, “Los juristas de la ANC reclaman a España un 16% de su patrimonio y rechazan la deuda,” El Confidencial, 2014
39 Center for Strategic Studies of Catalonia, “La Futura Forca de Defensa de Catalunya,”(April, 2013): 2, http://www.ceec.cat/data/0504130400_ceecfuturaforca.pdf
40 Enrique Morales and Óscar Cavadas, “El entorno de ERC apuesta por un ejército fuerte y Artur Mas cree que no es prioritario” 3 July 2014, https://es.noticias.yahoo.com/el-entorno-erc-apuesta-por-un-ej-rcito- 185000116.html
41 Enrique Morales and Óscar Cavadas, “El entorno de ERC apuesta por un ejército fuerte y Artur Mas cree que no es prioritario” 3 July 2014, https://es.noticias.yahoo.com/el-entorno-erc-apuesta-por-un-ej-rcito- 185000116.html
42 Generalitat de Catalunya, “The Internal and International Security of Catalunya: Informe núm. 17,” http://presidencia.gencat.cat/ca/ambits_d_actuacio/consells-
assessors/consell_assessor_per_a_la_transicio_nacional_catn/informes_publicats/ These documents are published first in Catalan, then in English, and finally in Spanish.
43 Societat d'Estudis Militars, “Catalonia, Committed to Collective security,”4 September, 2014, http://sem- cat.blogspot.com/
44 Societat d'Estudis Militars, “Dimensions of the Catalan Defence Forces I: Naval Forces,” https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B8W0FX7ueB2lSEpVQkZ4RURtN2M/edit
45 Help Catalonia, “Dimensions of the Catalan Defence Forces: Naval Forces (Executive Summary),” 1 August 2014, http://www.helpcatalonia.cat/2014/08/dimensions-of-catalan-defence-forces.html
46 Catalan National Assembly, “A Strategic Analysis,”
47 Catalan National Assembly, “A Strategic Analysis,”
48 Alex Calvo and Pol Molas, “Catalunya, un pilar imprescindible de l'OTAN,” 4 January 2014, http://www.vilaweb.cat/opinio_contundent/4165225/catalunya-pilar-imprescindible-lotan.html
49 Miquel Sellarqs, “Security and Defense” Interview. See minute 10:58, http://ambindependencia.cat/en/seguretat-i-defensa-2/
50 BBC News, “Scottish or Catalan vote 'torpedoes EU', says Spain's Rajoy,” 17 September 2014,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29234242; NY Daily News, “An independent Scotland would also mean an exit from EU, NATO,” http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/independent-scotland-exit-eu-nato- article-1.1940110
51 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on a Feasibility Study for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Union and Kosovo,” Brussels, 10.10.2012,
52 Article 4.2 of the Treaty on European Union does state that the Union “shall respect…the territorial integrity of the State.” However, this theoretically allows the EU to maintain a nuanced position, accepting a potentially IS, since it is agreed upon by Westminster, and to also respect Madrid’s refusal to recognize an IC. http://eur- lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012M004; Graham Avery, “Independentism and the European Union,” European Policy Centre, 7 May 2014
53 Christopher J. Borgen, “From Kosovo to Catalonia: Separatism and Integration in Europe,” (2010), Faculty Publications, Paper 114, http://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/faculty_publications/114
54 European Union, “Slovenia,” http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/slovenia/index_en.htm
55 Richard Caplan, “International Diplomacy and the Crisis in Kosovo,” International Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 4 (1998): 747.
56 Richard Caplan, “International Diplomacy and the Crisis in Kosovo,” International Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 4 (1998): 747
57 Milica Z. Bookman, “War and Peace: The Divergent Breakups of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 31, No. 175 (1994): 176.
58 Milica Z. Bookman, “War and Peace: The Divergent Breakups of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 31, No. 175 (1994): 180.