E-Diplomacy Capacities within the EU-27: Small States and Social Media

Table of Contents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:

1. INTRODUCTION

2. LITERATURE AND DATA REVIEW

3. METHODOLOGY
3.1 Limitations
3.2 Theory
3.3 Practice
3.3.1 State-ranking of ‘Traditional’ Diplomatic Capacities (TDC)
3.3.2 Prestige-level
3.3.3 Social Media

4. CASE STUDY: E-27 E-DIPLOMACY CAPACITIES
4.1 Italy
4.2 France
4.3 Germany
4.4 Spain
4.5 United Kingdom
4.6 Sweden
4.7 Denmark
4.8 Netherlands
4.9 Belgium
4.10 Austria
4.11 Finland
4.12 Greece
4.13 Portugal
4.14 Poland 24
4.15 Romania
4.16 Hungary
4.17 Czech Republic
4.18 Cyprus
4.19 Slovakia
4.20 Ireland
4.21 Bulgaria
4.22 Estonia
4.23 Malta
4.24 Luxembourg
4.25 Lithuania
4.26 Latvia
4.27 Slovenia

5. CONCLUSIONS

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX B

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abstract (English):

The argument that this thesis broaches is that extended use of the Internet not only poses challenges, but also new possibilities for diplomatic actors in the European Union, especially those of small states. This study aims at the creation of a nexus between a lack of ‘traditional’ diplomatic capacities, as shown by tangible diplomatic infrastructure, and an increased use of public diplomacy in cyberspace, or ‘e-diplomacy’. The hypothesis holds that small states pursue higher efforts to leave a larger ‘digital diplomatic footprint’ in social media, aiming at a projection of a positive image inside the public sphere. In order to prove the hypothesis, this work combines both a qualitative and a quantitative approach, connecting metadata of three diplomatic actors per state with three social media platforms. As a theoretical backbone, Joseph Nye’s “Soft Power” concepts are problematized as well as Nazli Chucri’s approach on Cyberpolitics in International Relations (2012). However, since this research project is the first of its kind, theoretical lacuna becomes apparent during the performance of a large-N study of the EU-27 member states. Although this dissertation provides an extensive overview on capacities of Heads of State, Government and respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs, future research should be aimed at depicting the increasing role of national cultural institutions and transnational power diffusion towards non-state actors.

Abstract (Spanish):

El argumento que aborda la presente tesis es que el uso prolongado de Internet no sólo plantea desafíos, sino que también abre nuevas posibilidades para los actores diplomáticos de la Unión Europea, haciendo especial hincapié en los pequeños Estados. Esta tesis tiene como objetivo la creación de un vínculo entre la falta de las capacidades diplomáticas 'tradicionales', como lo demuestra la infraestructura diplomática, y un mayor uso de la diplomacia pública en el ciberespacio, o "e-diplomacia". La hipótesis sostiene que los pequeños Estados realizan mayores esfuerzos que los mayores con el fin de dejar una "huella diplomática digital" más grande en los medios sociales y con la intención de proyectar una imagen positiva dentro de la esfera pública. Para demostrar tal hipótesis este trabajo combina un enfoque cualitativo y cuantitativo, conectando los metadatos de tres agentes diplomáticos por Estado y se realiza a través tres plataformas de medios sociales. Como columna vertebral teórica, el concepto de "Soft Power" de Joseph Nye se problematiza, así como el enfoque de Nazli Chucri de la ciberpolítica en las Relaciones Internacionales (2012). Sin embargo, dado que este proyecto de investigación es el primero de su tipo, la laguna teórica se hace evidente durante la realización de un estudio de tal amplio tamaño, en donde se estudian los 27 Estados miembros de la UE. Aunque esta tesis recoge una amplia descripción de las capacidades de los Jefes de Estado, de Gobierno y de los respectivos Ministerios de Relaciones Exteriores, la futura investigación debería orientarse al estudio del creciente papel de las instituciones culturales nacionales y de la difusión transnacional de la energía hacia los actores no estatales.

Acknowledgements:

First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor César de Prado for his continuous and patient help throughout the writing process of this dissertation. Moreover, I would like to thank my dear brother Jascha Tutt, (Helmut-Schmidt-University Hamburg), and my cu ñ ado Toni Millan Fernandez, (Universitat Politécnica de Catalunya), for helping me with calculations for the classification of the size of the EU-27. Also, I would like to thank my dear friend Emilia Atanassova for crossing some Eastern European language barriers for me. Special thanks also go to my beloved girlfriend Carlota Ferré Vaquer for eliminating grammatical errors. Last but not least, I would like to extent my great sense of gratitude to my family, especially to my father Heinz Tutt, for making my academic experience in Barcelona possible in the first place. To him, I dedicate this work.

1. Introduction

The creation of the Internet and its consistent development reshaped the dimensions of information and its dissemination around the globe. Cyberspace has not only become an omnipresent channel of communication, it also has become a significant part of international relations; both in friendly and hostile ways. Many governments have become “major players in cyberspace”, aiming at exerting their powers and creating new “instruments of sanction and leverage” (Chucri, 2012, p.37).

In conjunction with our society, theories of International Relations (IR) as well as practices of international diplomacy changed fundamentally. Europe’s diplomatic history shows that diplomacy was restricted to state envoys, talking to each other behind closed doors; so-called “club diplomacy” (Heine, 2013). Notably, due to their higher international significance and financial possibilities, larger states enjoy a comparative advantage in this sphere vis-à-vis smaller states. However, by virtue of new possibilities in the virtual conduct of diplomatic relations, small size does not necessarily translate into less diplomatic significance in the international arena.

These new realities of diplomatic practice raise questions about a shift in diplomatic significance of nations. In 1973, Melvin Small and David Singer conducted research on “The Diplomatic Importance of States”, inter alia measuring diplomatic capacities by means of the amount of state’s diplomatic missions. Nowadays, this approach still proves helpful, yet worthy of re-assimilation to the post-Cold War era and developments owed to the enhancement of information and communication technology (ICT).

Apart from ‘traditional’ diplomatic practices, ‘public diplomacy’, -”the diplomatic engagement with people”-, over time occupied a palpable place in the diplomat’s toolbox (Melissen, 2013, p. 704-05). Public diplomacy also has been characterized as “a new field of practice and scholarship” which “attracted attention in the previous century when diplomacy fell under the scrutiny of the media and public opinion” (Gilboa, 2008, p.55).

Public diplomacy deals primarily with the interaction between the state and its citizens, and it extends the reach of traditional diplomatic practice (Melissen, 2013, p.705). Hans Morgenthau already touched on the matter in his seminal work Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, stating that “a subtle diplomacy aiming not at the conquest of territory or at the control of economic life, but at the conquest and control of the minds of men” would be one of the most powerful “instruments for changing the power relation between nations” (Morgenthau, 1973[1948], p.74).

As already implied by the title of this thesis, a certain kind of public diplomacy is to be dealt with in particular: ‘e-diplomacy’. For the purposes of this research project, the term ‘e-diplomacy’ is defined as:

The virtual conduct of public diplomacy, using digital information and communications technology (ICT), namely cyber-tools such as Social Media (Twitter, Facebook, Youtube etc.), in order to communicate and to project a nation ’ s image into both the national and international public sphere.

By using this definition, this study intends to shed light on the new challenges of public diplomacy in the Internet Age and the capacities of EU member states to address the same. This dissertation aims at the creation of a nexus between ‘traditional’ diplomatic capacities, shown by physical diplomatic infrastructure, and an increase of e-diplomacy.

In order to achieve this, the main parts of this dissertation follow a fourfold structure. The first part consists of an overview over sources in both literature and data, followed by the tapestry of theoretical and practical methodology to be employed. In a second step, special attention will be paid to the evolution of diplomatic practice in cyberspace, while introducing the concept and ramifications of the measurement of diplomatic importance of states.

The argument that this thesis broaches is that extended use of the Internet not only poses challenges, but also new possibilities for diplomatic actors in the European Union, especially for small states. The hypothesis of this research asserts that smaller EU member states are making increased use of e-diplomacy via social media networks in order to make up for their comparative disadvantage in the field of “club diplomacy” (Heine, 2013).

During the third part of this work, a large-N case study is performed, measuring e-diplomacy capacities (EDC) of the EU-27 member states in order to compare ‘traditional’ diplomatic importance with ‘digital diplomatic footprints’ in social media. Finally, the findings are summarized and analyzed, giving an answer to the question whether smaller size or less diplomatic importance of states evoke an increased use of e-diplomatic practice.

2. Literature and Data Review

The tenet of diplomatic practice combines a high diversity of theories and analytical frameworks of IR, History, Politics, Economics and International Law. The knowledge of certain parts of these tenets forms part of almost every diplomat’s training and practice. Therefore, both literature and data concerning public diplomacy stem from a variety of sources connected to different tenets.

In order to obtain a comprehensive view over diplomatic practice, the Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy (Cooper et al, 2013) provided valuable information of both its theoretical and practical ramifications. Notably, both Jan Melissen and Joseph Nye contributed to the handbook, elaborating on their previous examinations of public diplomacy (Melissen, 2012) and Soft Power (Nye, 2011; 2010; 2009; 2008; 2004). Alluding to the latter, Nye dedicates parts of his seminal work on ‘Soft Power’ on the past, present and future of public diplomacy (2004, p.100-25). Melissen, in return, underlines “the importance of ‘soft power’ and its implications for contemporary statecraft” and public diplomacy (Melissen, 2013, p.705).

Moreover, the impact of information and telecommunication technology (ICT) on international politics shall be taken into account, as extensively dealt with by the work of Nazli Choucri, who elaborates on theory and practice of Cyberpolitics in International Relations (2012). Among other approaches to the matter of cyberspace in IR, Chucri subdivides states into several profiles in order to their individual preferences, making use of the ‘master variables’ “Technology”, “Resources”, and “Population” (Chucri, 2012, p.34-5). Inspired by Chucri’s work, this dissertation will follow a similar approach, connecting state-size with the capability to make use of new technological tools like social media.

For the quantitative part of the dissertation, a wide-ranging set of data is to be employed in order to conduct the large-N case study. Since the case study conjuncts the examination of three major variables, namely the size of a state, its diplomatic importance and its e-diplomacy capacities, underlying data has to be gathered from various sources.¹

Apart from self-performed data-gathering and -analysis within social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and Youtube, statistical sources as provided by the World Bank, Eurostat, and Twitonomy, are to be used. Moreover, valuable information on e-diplomatic efforts on Twitter is provided by the research institution Burson-Marsteller (2013). Classical diplomatic capacities, i.e. the number and location of embassies and consulates, are made available by embassypages.com (2013), a comprehensive online-directory of diplomatic missions. In order to identify foreign policy goals of individual states, the database of the Federal Foreign Office of Germany (Ausw ä rtiges Amt, hereafter: AA, 2013) proved to be an authoritative source of information about foreign policy and, moreover, a router to relevant governmental websites. Definitional work of Kaplan and Haenlein (2010) was used in order to classify and understand different social media platforms.

During research for this dissertation, it became clear that several researchers had worked in certain ways on the importance of state-size (e.g. Alesina, 2003), diplomatic importance (Small and Singer, 1973) and technological implications (e.g. Chucri, 2012). However, a connection of these concepts in order to assert e-diplomatic importance of states has never been done.

3. Methodology

3.1 Limitations

Before stating the theoretical and practical framework of this research project, the work’s frame has to be pointed out. It would go beyond of the scope of this research project to perform an exhaustive analysis of all 28 European member states. Therefore, the analysis of Europe’s e-diplomacy capacities takes place at a macro level, taking into consideration general variables for distinction, as further explained in the third section of this chapter.

Another crucial point in order to clarify the limitations of this work is to spell out what is not going to be measured. This research does not aim at the analysis of economic, military or political influence of one state on others. Although these characteristics of a state certainly affect its diplomatic importance, they are not congruent with it (Small and Singer, 1973, p.579).

In order to provide both equitable and assessable results, metadata from social media platforms was analyzed in the course of July 2013 (Twitter) and August 2013 (Facebook, Youtube). Although Croatia accessed the European Union on July 2013, it will not be part of this research project. This is due to its relatively new member status which might distort intra-European public relations efforts.

Another relevant point is that the dimensional limitations of this dissertation make an analysis of governmental cultural organizations (e.g. Instituto Cervantes, Goethe Institut etc.) impossible. That is why only three main diplomatic actors are dealt with, as indicated by the subdivision in ‘prestigelevels’ (see subchapter 3.3.2).

Further limitations of this study are evoked by ‘data-avarice’. Twitter, for instance, allows a thorough analysis of its metadata, while Facebook does not provide any access to it; at least not for non-business or non-governmental actors. As a result, three equitable variables were chosen from each platform: (1) amount of profiles, (2) represented prestige-level, and (3) the platform-specific indicator for public support (see 3.3.2 and 3.3.3). Due to the singularity of this research project, no comparative data could be obtained from earlier years. Therefore, the results of this part of research serve as a “snapshot” of European E-diplomacy capacities. Under these circumstances, and in order to also provide results of EU-27 diplomatic actors over time, one Twitter account is analyzed in particular, examining the timeframe of one year (March 2012 - March 2013).

3.2 Theory

Choosing an appropriate framework out of all theoretical tenets of IR is a difficult task to perform. At first glance, the theoretical school of classical realism offers an appropriate framework for the analysis of e-diplomacy, since persuasiveness and state influence is situated at the very core of it (Dunne and Schmidt, 2011). However, apart from the fact that there is “a lack of consensus in the literature as to whether we can (…) speak about realism as a single coherent theory” (Dunne and Schmidt, 2011, p.93), today’s realities of state collaboration (at least in the European area) refute most of the classical realist assumptions regarding zero-sum games.

In chorus with neo-realism, classical realism’s ‘milder offspring’, little significance is given to non- state actors, which arguably distorts both interpretation and perception of the current political reality and moreover offers little predictive value by failing to recognize and present critical interconnections among social and cyber systems of interaction. From a neo-realist point of view, states behave as rational power maximizers (i.e. offensive realism), -a stance initially held by Waltz (1979)-, or security maximizers (i.e. defensive realism), as theorized 2001 by John Mearsheimer (Dunne and Schmidt, 2011, p.92-3).

Liberalism, realism’s counterpart, offers by far more theoretical space for assumptions concerning ideational factors, i.e. the approximation to and/or the shaping of public opinion through e- diplomacy. Although 20th-century-variations of liberal-institutionalism, -notably those elaborated by Nye-, did not cover the ideational impact of power diffusion towards non-state actors, recent works by Nye (2010; 2013), Chucri (2012), and Cooper (2013) proclaim not only an increasing significance of non-state actors, but also suggest a need for a “definitional refinement” of ‘diplomacy’ (Cooper, 2013, p.100).

Special attention will be paid to Nye’s concepts of “Soft Power” (2013 [2008; 2004]) and “Cyber Power” (2010). The former concept forms a crucial part of the “complex interdependence” school of thought, as established by Keohane and Nye (1998), the latter can be seen as a theoretical add-on to it (Lamy, 2011, p.120-1).

In order to describe today’s diplomatic practice and reality, a liberal-institutionalist stance will be taken, aligned with Nye’s Soft Power concepts.

In the quantitative part of this dissertation, however, theoretical lacuna appears. Although the matter of diplomatic importance of states is dealt with in various studies, analysis of e-diplomacy lacks preliminary research. Therefore, this research project follows new approaches especially in terms of research practice.

3.3 Practice

Applying her conception of lateral pressure theory, Chucri looks at major driving forces (“master variables”) like “population dynamics, resource endowments, and levels of technology and skills” in order to depict a state’s capability in ‘cyber-politics’ (Choucri, 2012, p.27). However, as stated above, this work does not primarily aim at a depiction of a states economical, technological or other resources-related importance, but merely on its (e-)diplomatic capacities. Variables like economic performance (GDP), population, and geographical size (km2) are solely used in order to classify the respective state as a small, a medium-sized or a large one. Respective calculations and results are shown in the following table:

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Calculating the size of the EU-27, the population was weighted 50% because it represents the most visible factor of a countries size. Moreover, since the Social Media platforms are to be analyzed as well, the society should be taken into account in particular. By dividing the population by the land area of the state, the population density is calculated. Population density serves as a key factor for public services (e.g. public transport, medical services etc.) of a state. Therefore, the size of a state was weighted with 40%. The 10%-weighting of the gross domestic product (GDP) was chosen because it reflects economical well-being of states.

A weighting of EU-Council voting-rights could have also been cogitable for the computation of the index. However, this variable was omitted because these voting-rights again consider the population of states, wherefore the population would have been calculated into the index twice.

Major determinants of this study are the relation of traditional and e-diplomatic importance of states. After establishing a ranking of traditional diplomatic importance of the EU-27 states, the order is maintained while examining and comparing diplomatic importance within cyberspace.

3.3.1 State-ranking of ‘Traditional’ Diplomatic Capacities (TDC)

Following Small and Singer’s (1973) approach, a classification of the EU-27 traditional diplomatic importance is built by the addition of tangible diplomatic institutions both hosted domestically and stationed abroad. Conforming with Heine’s (2013) description of “club diplomacy”, diplomatic missions form a crucial part of ‘classical’ diplomatic interaction between states (p.128-130). The following graph renders absolute traditional diplomatic capacities of the EU-27.

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Source: www.embassypages.com (2013), [Accessed 4 August 2013].

3.3.2 Prestige-level

In order to map the e-diplomatic footprint of state actors, it does not suffice to merely count and add the numbers of profiles a state maintains in social media platforms. Therefore, in order not only to quantify diplomatic actors’ profiles, a self-created threefold subdivision into ‘prestige-levels’ is employed (see fig. 1 in appendix A). The justification for the choice of the following actors is dictated by the dimensional limitations of this dissertation. Initially it was planned to include both national cultural institutions and non-state actors. Nonetheless, both temporally and dimensionally it would have been impossible to deal with them all. Therefore, those profiles have to be subject to further research.

3.3.3 Social Media

For the purpose of depicting the e-diplomacy landscape within the European Union, a large-N case study is employed, using different sources of data, which mainly are gathered from three social media platforms: Twitter, Facebook, and Youtube. The last two mentioned social media platforms were chosen not only because they epitomize the world’s largest social media communities, but also because they serve as prime examples for platforms with a high level of “self- presentation” (Facebook), and a low level of “self-disclosure” (Youtube), while both are representing a medium level of “Social presence” in comparison to Virtual social worlds (“high presence”) and collaborative projects like Wikipedia (“low presence”) (Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010, p.62; see fig. 2 in appendix A).

The choosing of the micro-blogging platform Twitter was not only inspired by its operating range but also by the coining of the term “Twiplomacy” by the global public relations and communications firm Burson-Marsteller (2013).

The profiles examined in the quantitative part of this research are either discovered by virtue of a link on the respective governmental website, and/or through manual research within social media platforms. Relevant activity within these social media platforms is classified and measured as follows:

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4. Case Study: E-27 E-diplomacy Capacities

In the following, Europe’s e-diplomacy capacities are to be examined. The EU-27 states are dealt with in order of their traditional diplomatic importance, as established above. The analysis of every country follows a threefold approach. After a general synopsis of the country’s EDCs, a short analysis of the respective country’s most visible level-3-actor on Twitter is presented, outlining e- diplomatic activity over a time-period of one year (March 1st 2012 - March 1st 2013). In order to summarize the country’s e-diplomacy capacities, a table at the end of each subchapter provides information about individual capacities on Twitter (CT)², Facebook (CF) , and Youtube (CY), as well as the total capacity within Social Media (CSM).³

4.1 Italy

Italy serves as a bridge between Europe and its Southern Mediterranean neighbors, including Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, and Israel (AA, 2013a). Italy’s main diplomatic actors are the MFA, lead by Emma Bonino, its Prime Minister Enrico Letta and its Presidency, as held by Giorgio Napolitano. All three institutions are well represented on Twitter, Facebook, and Youtube, while Emma Bonino only maintains a Facebook-profile concerning her candidacy for president in 2010.

The Twitter account of the Italian MFA (@FarnesinaPress) is operated seven days per week, however mostly in the afternoon. From March 2012 until March 2013, the MFA sent 434 tweets, amounting to approximately 1.19 tweets per day. The operators prove to be savvy with the platform, as indicated by a high number of hashtags⁴. Mostly, hashtags such as #italia, #cooperazione, and #twiplomacy are used, marking the institution’s determination to project Italia’s image into the public sphere (Appendix B, Fig. 2).

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4.2 France

French efforts in public diplomacy are directly connected to its efforts for stability in the MENA region, since France accommodates 4,5 million people from North African descent and more than 600.000 Jewish people (AA, 2013b). E-diplomatic efforts are multifold with Twitter accounts of all three prestige-levels, the MFA tweeting in French, English, Arab, and Spanish language. Also, e- diplomatic endeavors are pursued on Facebook and Youtube. The high variety of audiences calls for a high amount of e-diplomatic efforts, which are mirrored in France’s purchase of the second- highest rank in EDC of the EU.

The French MFA maintains Twitter-profiles in French, English, Spanish, and Arab language. The MFA’s most visible profile (@francediplo) sent 2866 tweets in one year (7,83 tweets/day). Only 0.01% of those tweets did not contain a hashtag. An indicator for the MFA’s awareness of public information efforts is also mirrored in tweets such as: “The release of French hostages in #Cameroon cannot be confirmed. We caution against the spread premature information”⁵ (Appendix B, Fig. 3).

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4.3 Germany

Surprisingly, Chancellor Angela Merkel, one of Germany’s most visible diplomatic actors, does not maintain a Twitter-account. However, the Federal Government (Bundesregierung) does appear with multiple profiles both on Facebook and Youtube. The German MFA (Ausw ä rtiges Amt) not only appears in all three social media networks, it also maintains Youtube-channels in seven languages (German, English, French, Spanish, Arabic, Chinese, and Russian) which is a unique fact of EDC in the EU. Moreover, in order to address new challenges of foreign policy in cyberspace, the German MFA appointed a ‘special representative for cyber-foreign policy’ in August 2013 (AA, 2013c).

Also the German MFA’s Twitter accounts tweet in multiple languages (German, English, French), while the German account (@AuswaertigesAmt) is the most salient one. During a one-year-period, it disseminated 1,159 tweets (3.17 tweets/day) and 1,438 hashtags (1.24 hashtags/tweet), mostly

citing the German Foreign Minister (#westerwelle), updating news on Syria (#syrien), and informing travelers about possible dangers abroad (#reisesicherheit) (Appendix B, Fig. 4).

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4.4 Spain

Despite the fact that the Kingdom of Spain maintains no ‘royal’ accounts on Facebook and Twitter, the appearance of the Spanish Royalty on Youtube enjoys extraordinary support. In March 2012, the Spanish MFA announced that it received 30 million Euros from the government for an amelioration of “the positioning of Spain in Internet search engines and social networks”, especially on Twitter (Puig, 2012).

Considering the fact that the Ministry had not been starting to use its newly-funded Twitter-account (@MAECgob) after one year since its establishment, -a Twitter-user was already complaining (Kalle_BQ, 2013)-, it managed to catch up and to attract a considerable follower-base after a short period of time. However, due to the MFA twitter-account’s dormant state during the period from March 2012 until March 2013, no data could be examined in particular (Appendix B, Fig. 5).

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4.5 United Kingdom

Unlike any other member state of the European Union, the United Kingdom not only summarizes and publishes its digital diplomacy capacities, but it also provides an insight into its internal social media policy for the staff of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO). Within this policy, the FCO “encourages all staff to make full use of the opportunities offered by social media to help deliver FCO objectives” (FCO, 2013a). While taking “full advantage of digital diplomacy”, the FCO also foresees an enhancement of “open policy formulation and transparency” while following its “Digital Strategy” (FCO, 2013b). 2.1 million followers of the UK’s Prime Minister’s Twitter account (@Number10gov) can be interpreted as a contemporaneous sign of the Digital Strategy’s success (Burson-Marsteller, 2013). A success, which is also mirrored in UK’s leading of the European Union EDC ranking.

The British FCO’s main Twitter-account (@foreignoffice) also mirrors considerable efforts in the realm of social media. In the course of one year, the FCO sent 2,694 tweets (7.36 tweets/day), mentioning its Foreign Secretary William Hague (@WilliamJhague) 455 times. It generated hashtags for information on #Syria, the #UK and the Olympic Games in London (#london2012) (Appendix B, Fig. 6).

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4.6 Sweden

Alec Ross, Senior Adviser for Innovation of the US State Department, underlined “[w]ell-justified praise for @CarlBildt”, the Swedish Foreign Minister, and called him “one of the most effective” worldwide (Ross, 2013). This may be true when it comes to Twitter and Facebook appearances, however, the EDC on Youtube seems to lack efforts of Sweden’s public diplomatic actors.

The Swedish MFA (Uitrikesdepartementet) produced 884 tweets from March 2012 until March 2013, sending 2.42 tweets per day. Approximately every second tweet contained a hashtag, while the hashtag “#utrdek” was used the most, in order to signal active participation in social media (the hashtag was mostly followed by the hashtag #ediplomacy) (Appendix B, Fig. 7). All in all, Sweden ranks moderately-high in EU EDCs.

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4.7 Denmark

On Facebook, Denmark is represented by Helle Thorning-Schmidt, Denmark’s PM, the MFA, and its Minister Villy Søvnal. The Danish Royal House is not represented on Facebook, however, it begets the highest quota on Youtube (293 subscribers) compared to the MFA (Udenrigsministeriet) which has 141 subscribers of its Youtube-channel.

Villy Søvndal, is the only diplomatic actor who practices “Twiplomacy” (Burson-Marsteller, 2013). However, his “twiplomatic footprint” is not sizable at all: only 47 tweets in one year, amounting to 0.13 tweets per day. Moreover, the Minister does not reply to anyone, nor does he mention another user; facts that, together with overall EDC, brings Denmark only rank 20 on social media capacities (Appendix B, Fig. 8).

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4.8 Netherlands

In relation to its size and diplomatic importance, the Netherlands show extraordinary efforts in appearing on social media platforms. Dutch diplomatic actors appear on all three levels. Especially on Twitter significant public diplomatic efforts are made. Jointly with its EDCs on Youtube and Facebook, the Netherlands occupy the third rank in European e-diplomacy capacities.

The Dutch MFA’s Twitter-account (@minbuza) sent 1,540 tweets in one year with a daily dissemination of 4.21 tweets. Statistically, the Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken tweeted 24 hours a day, seven days a week, while making use of ten different applications to tweet from (inter alia: twitterfeed, Twitter website, Tweetcaster for iOS, Twitter for Blackberry and iPhone) (Appendix B, Fig. 9).

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4.9 Belgium

In the year 2000, the so-called ‘Copernicus reform’ did not only alter the organizational structure not of the Belgian MFA, but also its foreign policy directive as a whole: In addition to the Directorates-General "European Affairs", "Multilateral Affairs and Globalization", "Development", "Bilateral Affairs", "Consular Affairs" and "Legal Affairs", the new-formed "Staff directorates" included henceforth a Directorate for "Information and Communication Technologies", aiming at reflecting the “zeitgeist of new priorities” and areas of work (Königreich Belgien, 2013). Thirteen years later, however, the federal monarchy did not create social media capacities on all levels. Notably, Elio diRupo, Belgiums Prime Minister, is the only one who maintains a Youtube-profile.

Didier Reynders, Vice-PM and Minister of Foreign Affairs, proves to be the most visible level-3- twiplomat. Within one year, he sent 2,092 tweets (5.72 tweets/day) and accumulated a sizable number of over 26,800 followers. The Minister (or his employees) made use of his Twitter-account around the clock, sending just as many tweets at 5 a.m. as at 3 p.m. (Appendix B, Fig. 10).

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4.10 Austria

Heinz Fischer, Federal President of Austria, represents Austria in its international relations and “serves as guarantor (…) of Australia’s predictability of action within the international community” (Österreichische Präsidentschaftskanzlei, 2013). Foreign policy, however, is made and administered by the Federal Government, as presided by Federal Chancellor Werner Faymann.

Austria’s e-diplomacy capacities span through all three levels: Heinz Fischer has social media appearances on Facebook and Youtube, Chancellor Werner Faymann maintains profiles on Twitter, Facebook, and Youtube. On the third level, not only the Austrian Foreign Ministry but also its Minister Michael Spindelegger are represented on Twitter. The Austrian MFA (@Minoritenplatz8) provides the lion’s share of Austrian Twitter-activity; however, the total share is not very extensive. In the course of one year, the Austrian MFA publicized only 575 tweets (1.57 per day), 43.1% of which merely were forwarded tweets from other origin (so-called ‘re-tweets’) (Appendix B, Fig. 11).

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4.11 Finland

In order to promote not only external economic relations but also the Finnish “country brand”, a performance-network called “Team Finland” was created. Main actors are the Finnish Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Economy, and the Ministry of Education and Culture (MFA Finland, 2013). However, since the entire “Team Finland”-program is coordinated by the Foreign Ministry only, it was included into the mapping of Finnish EDC.

Finland’s foreign service apparatus is widely faceted, as primarily shown by the existence of three Ministers in the MFA. Notably, one of those three Ministers, Alexander Stubb (Minister for European Affairs and Foreign Trade), ranks as the 12th best connected practitioner of “Twiplomacy” worldwide (Burson-Marsteller, 2013). With 2,566 tweets a year and 7.01 tweets a day, Alexander Stubb pursues effective public diplomacy while he “[t]ries not to take himself too seriously...” (Appendix B, Fig. 12).⁶ It is also because of him that Finland ranks among the Top 10 e-diplomacy actors in the EU.

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4.12 Greece

Notably, Greece’s first representative, President Karolos Papoulias, does not appear in any social media platform. However, the Greek government, lead by PM Antonis Samaras, makes up for this e-diplomatic lacuna by maintaining profiles on Twitter, Facebook and Youtube both on the governmental and individual level. An balanced representation on all social media platforms also allows Greece to rank among the Top 10 of European EDC.

The Greek MFA, however, does not follow such an apollonian approach with its Twitter account: From March 2012 until March 2013 only 321 Tweets were distributed, all of whose were links to videos or other websites. No hashtags were used, no users were mentioned (ergo no interaction with other Twitter users), and no tweet was sent before 10 a.m., which could signify that all ‘twiplomatic’ efforts rested on one person who was not able to start to work before (Appendix B, Fig. 13). The fact that all 321 tweets were sent via the Twitter website (and not from mobile devices), solidifies this claim (Appendix B, Fig. 13).

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4.13 Portugal

Portuguese efforts in e-diplomacy are particularly visible while looking at the project “PortugalGlobal” funded and organized by Portugal’s MFA and conducted by the International Association of Portuguese-Speaking Communications (AICEP). This public diplomacy campaign especially aims at projecting an image of Portugal which emphasizes both its natural beauty and prospects for business investments (portugalglobal.pt, 2013).

Portugal’s President Aníbal Cavaco Silva appears on Facebook, Twitter, and Youtube and provides the greatest part of Portugal’s EDCs. The Foreign Ministry, however, only appears through its campaigns but not as an institution; even the Foreign Minister’s Facebook profile is private and thereby not eligible for further examination.

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4.14 Poland

Poland leaves a large digital diplomatic footprint, especially on both Twitter and Youtube. Within the confines of the latter, Poland maintains profiles on all three levels, each one of which is subscribed by more than 1,000 interested users. On Twitter, Poland own seven profiles on all three levels, presenting views and information of both impersonal and personal institutions.

The Polish MFA maintains three Twitter-profiles: one of the Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski (@sikorskradek), a Polish MFA account (@MSZ_RP), and an anglophone account of the Polish MFA (@PolandMFA), which was Poland’s most visible account from the time-period of March 2012 until March 2013.⁷ Within this timeframe, the Polish MFA sent 2,315 tweets (6.33 tweets/ day), confidently making mostly use of the hashtag #poland, a sign for intensive efforts on projecting the nation’s image abroad (Appendix B, Fig. 14).

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4.15 Romania

Romanian e-diplomatic efforts appear to be middling and weak. Traian Basescu, Romanias President does appear neither on Facebook nor on Youtube. Since the creation of his Twitter-profile in October 2009, the President merely sent 0.1 tweets per day (Burson-Marsteller, 2013). Romania’s PM Victor Ponta, however, maintains active accounts on all three examined social media platforms. On the third level, the Romanian MFA is also represented on Facebook, Twitter, and Youtube.

Although the Romanian MFA joined Twitter on mid-October 2009 in order to “communicate efforts of Romanian Diplomacy” and to “inform the public”, the profile was left practically dormant until mid-2013 (Burson-Marsteller, 2013; Appendix B, Fig. 15). From March 2012 until March 2013, the Romanian MFA only tweeted nine times (0.02 tweets/day) (Appendix B, Fig. 15). Nevertheless, due to increased efforts of all three diplomatic actors, Romania remains in the midfield of EU EDCs.

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4.16 Hungary

The Hungarian Government not only bundled its online-appearances in one website, but it also tries to bundle both outward an inward directed e-diplomatic action into one governmental Twitter, Facebook and Youtube account. The preceding website of the Hungarian MFA seems to be more and more integrated into the governmental website and it has not been updated since July 2012 (MFA Hungary, 2012).

In fact, the Hungarian MFA does not appear on any social media platform, leaving e-diplomatic efforts entirely to level 1 and level 2-actors (Burson-Marsteller, 2013). This fact leads to an overall lower-scale EDC.

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4.17 Czech Republic

As indicated on its website, the Czech MFA dedicates special attention to ‘regular’ public diplomacy (MFA Czech Republic, 2013). However, the Czech Republic’s diplomatic actors show almost no e-diplomacy efforts whatsoever. Weak Youtube- and Facebook-capacities and entirely lacking Youtube-accounts are the reasons for its penultimate rank in EU EDCs.

Karel Schwarzenberg, Foreign Minister until June 2013, serves as one of the only e-diplomacy actors of the Czech Republic. In the course of one year, the Minister disseminated 393 tweets (1.07 tweets/day), while making prudent use of hashtags (0.82 per tweet) (Appendix B, Fig. 16).

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4.18 Cyprus

Public diplomatic efforts are especially important for a country with an ongoing conflict over its territory and sovereignty.⁸ In the case of Cyprus, a unitary presidential system is to be examined. Nicos Anastasiades leads the Republic of Cyprus both as Head of State and Head of Government. He also fills both roles in conduct of e-diplomacy: As Cyprus EDC indicators suggest, Twitter, Facebook, and Youtube Profiles for both Government and Presidency manage to reach the public sphere quite successfully. Notably, the Cypriot MFA maintains not only a ‘regular’ Twitter and Facebook account, but also particular accounts for its ‘Crisis Management Centre’ (MFA Cyprus, 2013a).

The most visible level 3-actor on Twitter is the Cypriot MFA (@CyprusMFA). It also enhances the visibility of Ioannis Kasoulides, Cyprus’ Foreign Minister, by mentioning his profile more than others. An augmented use of the hashtag #cyprus shows the attempt of promoting the nation’s profile abroad (Appendix B, Fig. 17).

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4.19 Slovakia

Slovakia ranks among the least represented EU countries in cyberspace. Ivan Gašparovič, Slovakia’s Head of State, does not appear on any social media platform. Facebook and Youtube are only used by the level-3-actors on a very low level. Although Twitter is used by the MFA, the Foreign Minister, and Slovakia’s PM Robert Fico, there are no noteworthy capacities elaborated.⁹ In the case of the MFA and Miroslav Lajcak, Slovakia’s Foreign Minister, the low numbers are also connected to young age of their Twitter-accounts. Both were created after March 2013 and thereby cannot be qualitatively examined for a one-year-period (Burson-Marsteller, 2013).

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4.20 Ireland

Ireland shows great endeavors on Twitter, where it is represented by its President, its Prime Minister, its Government, Foreign Minister and his Ministry. However, Ireland focuses exclusively on Twitter and shows reduced interest on Facebook, and no interest in Youtube at all. Because of this downward trend, Ireland only manages to realize a 22nd rank out of all EU members. If Ireland did not only focus on ‘Twiplomacy’ it would probably rank considerably higher.

Ireland’s MFA sent 1,029 tweets in the course of one year, amounting to 2.81 tweets per day. The Twitter-account was being used twenty-four hours a day, especially focussing on the Irish EU Presidency (Appendix B, Fig. 18).

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4.21 Bulgaria

The Facebook- and Youtube-pages of Plamen Orecharski, MP of Bulgaria since May 2013, the Bulgarian Foreign Minister Wigenin, and the Bulgarian MFA are followed on a low scale. The MFA tends to ‘recycle’ its Facebook posts in Twitter, which is not a sign of an active effort to extend its outreach to the public.

The Bulgarian MFA (@MFABulgaria) proves not to be very active on Twitter. With 317 tweets in one year and 0.87 tweets per day it merely grounds its raison d ’ê tre on this platform. During the same period of time, the MFA replied only to one person and retweeted contents from three accounts; a sign of little government-public interaction (Appendix B, Fig. 19).

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4.22 Estonia

Estonia represents a small EU member state whose EDC-score befogs its actual capacities. Estonia ranks as one of the most digitally connected states in Europe (e-estonia.com, 2013); a title which also brought about certain difficulties.¹⁰ Estonia’s President, Government and Foreign Ministry have accounts in all three examined social networks. Being one of the smallest EU member state with a population of only 1.3 million, Estonia manages to occupy a notable 11th rank in EU e- diplomacy capabilities.

Estonia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (@valismin), however, did not quite fulfill high expectations during the investigation of Estonian EDC. In the course of one year, it merely disseminated 26 tweets (0.07 tweets/day) (Appendix B, Fig. 20).

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4.23 Malta

The low ranking of Malta in the overall examination of European EDCs is hard to comprehend in so far as Malta, together with Switzerland, initiated a foundation with the stated ambition to actively investigate and to propel the capacity-development of e-diplomacy: the Diplo Foundation (Diplo, 2013). Facebook-appearances of the Maltese Government and its PM explicitly aim at the promotion of “a proper image of the public service and the country” (DOI, 2013), and the active inclusion of the public in order to “share ideas” (Muscat, 2013). Only Joseph Muscat, the Maltese PM, undertakes considerable efforts in order to pursue digital public diplomacy.

Joseph Muscat’s Twitter-account is the only one that belongs to a diplomatic state actor; and it is a exceptionally active one: 2,593 tweets were send from March 2012 until March 2013, a quota of 7.08 tweets per day. Muscat’s campaigning team and himself are tweeting mostly in English language, outlining the Government’s course of action (Appendix B, Fig. 21).

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4.24 Luxembourg

Luxembourg’s EDCs are sparse. Only the Grand Ducal Family of Luxembourg maintains a Twitter- profile, while the only Facebook-profile is owned by Jean-Claude Juncker, Luxembourg’s fading Prime Minister and the Eurogroup’s fading president. The lack of enthusiasm of Luxembourg to maintain a stronger appearance on social media evades precise explanations. It occupies the last rank on EDC in the EU.

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4.25 Lithuania

The guidelines and policy decisions of the Lithuanian foreign policy are determined by the Lithuanian President Grybauskaite (AA, 2013e). Lithuania’s diplomatic actors maintain profiles on Twitter, Facebook, and Youtube, representing Presidency, Government and Ministry of Foreign Affairs on a comparatively high level. A very high popularity of President Grybauskaite’s Facebook-profile is also connected to her winning of the German Charlemagne Prize of Aachen, which honored her efforts for Eastern European integration (Karlspreis zu Aachen, 2013).

Although Lithuanian Foreign Minister Linkevicius’ Twitter scores are very low (102 tweets in one year; 0.28 tweets/day), he actively engages in e-diplomacy by directly interacting with the Foreign Ministers of Poland (@sikorskiradek) and Sweden (@carlbildt) (Appendix B, Fig. 22).

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4.26 Latvia

Looking at Latvia’s EDC, it becomes evident that the country’s diplomatic actors aim at an equilibrated appearance on social media. All three levels are represented on all three networks. However, Latvia as a whole scores only about half of the possible index-points. One reason for this might be the extremely popular local social media network draugiem.lv (from Latvian “for friends”), which to a certain extent serves a Latvian ‘Facebook-substitute’.

Edgars Rinkēvičs, the Latvian Foreign Minister, tweets personally (@edgarsrinkevics) both in Latvian and in English, sometimes making use of tweets which were already posted by the MFA’s official Twitter-account (@Arlietas). Mr. Rinkēvičs is one of the best connected Foreign Ministers, unilaterally following 53 world leaders and mutually following 16 of his peers (Burson-Marsteller, 2013). During one year, he tweeted on average more than five times a day and over 40% of his tweets are replies to other Twitter users (Appendix B, Fig. 23).

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4.27 Slovenia

It becomes apparent that Slovenia’s efforts in becoming visible on social media are only pursued on Facebook and Twitter. On these platforms, every level of diplomatic actors is represented. Out of all three levels, Slovenia’s President Borut Pahor scores highest on the EDC index. However, his Profiles on Facebook and Twitter only disseminate information in Slovene, while the country’s MFA also writes partially in English.

Although the Foreign Ministry of Slovenia does not interact much with other Twitter users (2% replies, 0.19 user mentions per tweet) it made thorough use of Twitter during the examined one- year-period (Appendix B, Fig. 24). It sent 850 tweets in total, amounting to 2.32 tweets per day, which, compared to Slovenia’s size and diplomatic importance, is a sizable effort (Appendix B, Fig. 24).

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5. Conclusions

The present research project has shown that European E-diplomacy Capacities are more than just the sum of its parts. It is hard to draw generalizable conclusions from the gathered data and analyses. Melissen’s notion, that “[t]heory followed practice in public diplomacy studies” (2013, p. 705-6), seems to apply on e-diplomacy as well. This project’s hypothesis, that small states are making more extensive use of EDC in order to make up for their smaller TDC, does not entirely hold. On the other hand, certain positive TDC/EDC-discrepancies can be witnessed (e.g. Estonia, the Netherlands, Finland, and Lithuania) just as there can be seen negative ones (e.g. Italy, Czech Republic, and Slovakia) (see fig. 3 in Appendix A). In order to explain these differences, focus has to be drawn to specific parts of a nation’s digital public diplomacy.

In some cases, individual actors affect the outcome of a country’s cyber-salience decisively. Prominent examples are efforts undertaken by Finland’s Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb and the UK’s Prime Minister David Cameron. With regard to the UK, the formulation of a social media policy in conjunction with the active encouragement of Government officials to participate in e- diplomacy boosted the country’s salience immensely; and it may be the reason for the UK’s e- diplomatic leadership inside the EU.

The question remains whether e-diplomacy finds its way into the ‘hearts and minds’ of IR scholarship. Although there is no theoretical framework that fully supports the advance of public diplomacy practice in cyberspace, approaches via liberal-institutionalism or assumptions of complex interdependence provide a breeding ground for both new theories and practices. Here, the influence of state-preferences of “population”, “resources”, and “technology”, as analyzed by Chucri (2012, p.34-5), could be expedient in order to enrich EDC-analysis. Nye’s concepts of ‘Soft Power’ and ‘Cyber Power’ depend on context to the same extent as e-diplomacy does.

The current work has set forth an index for e-diplomacy measurement, a comprehensive collection of European capacities inside the realm, and a connection of variables which have never been connected in any research before. It remains unclear, whether or not the practice of e-diplomacy will gain more importance over time. If it does, this thesis may serve as one out of many milestones to a challenging path of dealing with a new phenomenon in diplomatic practice.

6. Appendix A

FIG. 1: CLASSIFICATION OF PRESTIGE-LEVELS

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FIG. 2: CLASSIFICATION OF SOCIAL MEDIA BY SOCIAL PRESENCE/MEDIA RICHNESS AND SELFPRESENTATION/SELF-DISCLOSURE (Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010, p.62).

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FIG. 3: TDC/ EDC-RANKING (IN ORDER OF STATE-SIZE)

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FIG. 4: EUROPEAN E-DIPLOMACY CAPACITIES

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APPENDIX B

Data also available at: http://tinyurl.com/Tutt-EU-EDC

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[...]

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¹ An Excel-table with all underlying data can be downloaded from: http://tinyurl.com/Tutt-EU-EDC.

² Twitter’s metadata for calculating the overall Social Media Capacities was taken from Burson-Marsteller (2013), the individual examination of a country’s most visible level 3-actor was elaborated using the analysis-platform Twitonomy (2013).

³ Detailed information about profiles and figures of the individual state actors are provided in a digital appendix, available at: http://tinyurl.com/Tutt-EU-EDC. The table also indicates, why certain social media profiles were not considered for calculations.

⁴ A ‘hashtag’ helps Twitter-users to find topics of their interest, by words preceded by a hash-symbol (e.g. #e- diplomacy).

⁵

“La lib é ration des otages fran ç ais au #Cameroun ne peut ê tre confirm é e. Nous mettons en garde contre la propagation d ’ infos pr é matur é es. ”

⁶ His attitude especially becomes apparent in messages like: “Finland ranks as the least corrupt country in the world, together with Denmark and New Zealand. We paid the judges well...” (Twitonomy, 2013k).

⁷ Notably, the Polish-spoken Twitter-account of the MFA now (August 2013) supersedes the anglophone (BursonMarsteller, 2013).

⁸ Talks over a solution of the “Cyprus problem” with Turkey ended in 2012, with the beginning of the Cypriot EU presidency and a statement of the new Cypriot president, that “his government’s priority is the current economic and financial crisis” and that a resumption of the stalled process can be expected for the fall of 2013 (AA, 2013o).

⁹ Robert Fico sent five tweets since 2009, the MFA and the Foreign Minister did not exceed 200 tweets in total.

¹⁰ A particular issue were the 2007 cyber-attacks on Estonian infrastructures, for which Russia was blamed by Estonian officials (McMillan, 2008). Since this occurrence, Russian-Estonian diplomatic relations are considered, diplomatically speaking, “pragmatic” (AA, 2013d).