The effectiveness of safety management systems implementation in aviation maintenance

Abstract

Safety management system (SMS) program is a comprehensive, systematic and continuous process for recognizing hazards and managing risks for a viable aviation business to enhance safety.  With proper guidance and planning from current literature, it recognizes the explicit complexity to distill more insights to the aspects of an SMS implementation.  Real rigor must be in place for the underlying mechanism to detect the weaknesses within the defense mechanism, fix it before they are manifested as an undesired event.  This is a shift from the traditional reactive systems to proactive/predictive systems.

SMS is not a process to solve a specific safety issue, but rather an explicit, consistent and structured protocol which can resolve many issues to reduce risk realistically or as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).  The four essential constituents- safety policy and goals, risk mitigation management, safety assurance and safety promotion, represents the foundation for SMS.  This article delineates the SMS processes and the integration of human factors perspectives with the intent to propose an initial implementation program for a maintenance organisation into four phases.  Ultimately, the effectiveness of an SMS implementation means the organization can manage the complexity of these mechanisms to defend against risk incubation to ALARP.

Introduction

Safety overview and definitions

Safety is the vigorous outcome of a trademark that is almost a myth deeply rooted in the aspiration of almost all aviation personnel to always endeavor for goal zero despite the ongoing obstacles.  Due to the ubiquity nature of human errors, accidents and incidents strike upon us inevitably and the ambition is seldom achievable.  Therefore, it is logical to alleviate the vulnerability of human factors errors by managing them through recognizing the hazardous peripheral, implementing adequate defenses and planning effective countermeasures (Reason &Hobbs, 2003).

There is a continuing trend that the aviation accident risk rates have reached a plateau for airlines (Federal Aviation Administration, 2007).  Whilst the aviation industry boasts a proliferated list of new technologies and getting the right human interface, reducing the risks in aircraft maintenance continues to be a real challenge for safe and efficient operations (Latorella &Prabhu, 2000).  Nevertheless, a reliable, formal and systematic methodology of safety orientation must be established for a sustainable, everlasting business and for the peace of mind.

Aviation maintenance is a crucial part of the aviation operations.  Marx and Graeber (1994) estimate about twelve percent of aircraft accidents were directly attributed to unsafe aviation maintenance error-provoking practices and flawed organizational processes.  Exemplars in past fatal accidents were Aloha Airlines Flight 243, Continental Express Flight 2574 and Air Midwest Flight 5481 put the spotlights on issues such as inadequate resources, ineffective monitoring system and slack organizational culture (National Transportation Safety Board [NTSB], 1989; NTSB, 1992; NTSB, 2004).

The International Civil Aviation Organisation ([ICAO], 2009) defines safety as the condition in which the causal of harm to people or equipments is decreased to, and kept at or below an allowable baseline through an ongoing process of hazard avoidance and risk analysis.  That said, the objective is to attain an acceptable safety outcome rather than zero goal, which is reasonably realistic to achieve through a process of identifying hazardous peripherals and applying controls that intrude safety and managing risk factors.  Moreover, viability and profitable of the business outfit is not affected.

Risk is defined as the product of the breakdown/failure probability of unintended occurrences and the resultant cause of that breakdown/failure (Sheridan, 2010).  Likewise, ICAO (2009) defines risk as a measurement of the expected losses caused by undesired occurrences (severity) and its prediction of the event (likelihood) occurring.

In a well-defined SMS (ICAO, 2009), traits such as accountability, empowerment and reporting of failures without punitive actions are encouraged to promote a safety culture within the aviation maintenance and repair organization (MRO).  Safety culture is socially engineered as a set of assumptions of practices, norms, attitudes, and beliefs which involves in reducing the exposure to danger in a perpetual manner (Pidgeon, 1998).  Within the MRO, there must exist a just culture (fairness of treatment); informative culture (information sharing) and reporting culture (readiness to report mistakes) [Reason &Hobbs, 2003].

The SHELLO Model-The importance of an organisational subset

Chang and Wang (2010) with their empirical studies expand their findings from Hawkins’ (1993) SHELL model to develop the SHELLO model.  It demonstrates the preponderance to the addition of the newest subset, ‘L-O’. ‘L’-Liveware(aircraft maintenance technicians [AMTs]) interacting with ‘O’-organization(group of people and facilitities).  This demonstrates a shift from an individual level to the management or organizational related responsibilities for accidents and incidents (Reason &Hobbs, 2003).  With this philosophy, an organizational approach views that all human errors can be managed within the context of risk factors management (Wiegmann &Shappell, 2009).

An introduction to Safety Management Systems (SMS)

The ICAO (2009) has introduced Annexes to the Convention which recommends the States’ Safety Program to encourage service operators (e.g., airlines and MROs) to develop and implement SMS.  The SMS approach adds value in prodding its current level of safety strategy to actively engage in a systematic process of rigorous hazards recognition and risks analysis related to safety management in flight operations, ground activities and aircraft maintenance (Stolzer, Halford &Goglia, 2008).  The aspects of planning, investigation, safety assurance and reporting are proposed and further elaborated in a piecemeal approach.

This initial SMS implementation plan for a large MRO is proposed to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and board of directors.  Furthermore, the relevance and prominence they bring forward for the adoption of an integrated SMS to manage the human factors perspectives within an organizational context in an effective and principled methodology is elaborated.

SMS Personnel selection

The safety committee is established as the heart of SMS operation to create a system description, drafting the SMS manual, analyse hazards, incidents and recommends corrective action (Stolzer et al., 2008).  The committee consists of the Accountable executive (AE), board of directors, safety manager, union members, and subject matter experts.  The AE is in a position of the higher hierarchical chain in command within the MRO (e.g., the CEO or the board nominated executive) [Bryon, 2007].

Gap Analysis

The system description is created and gap analysis is conducted to elicit whether the existing MRO system (e.g., quality management system) matches with the constituency elements of an SMS (ICAO, 2009).  Elements are checked against an analysis template and adjusted to meet SMS requirements.  A correctly planned gap analysis can result in making SMS processes run smoothly and manageable.

At this stage, buy-in or commitments from higher management level as well as AMTs (i.e., top-down supportive role) is an integral part of the SMS (Stolzer et al., 2008).  Effective communication together with a shared vision of SMS is an important ingredient within the group in the committee.

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