Launching the Temporary Deployment of an Interim Emergency Multinationalforce in Jonathan Area, in the Democratic Republic of X-land, Africa
Legal, Political and Procedural Conditions
Term Paper (Advanced seminar) 2004 8 Pages
On 02 November 2003, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1464/02 (2003) authorising under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the temporary deployment of an interim emergency multinational force in Jonathan Area, in the Democratic Republic of X-land, Africa.
Referring to the request of the High Representative for CFSP, General Secretary Xavier Solana, the Political Planning Unit has prepared a background-paper to be submitted for the Council's discussion and decision on the Secretary-General's request.
The following background paper covers the two main questions to be answered:
1. Should the European Union decide to provide a temporary stabilisation force in the Jonathan Area?
2. What are the legal, political and procedural conditions to take the relevant decision on the launching of the European Union military operation in the Democratic Republic of X-land?
The European Union is a newcomer in the business of military and peace support operations. However, it is true that its member states have long been involved in almost any sort of any - Article 5 (NATO/WEU) or Chapter VI-VII (UNO) mission in the past, and they are still today. Yet they have normally done so under other flags than the EU's proper.
The ambition and the commitment to engage the EU as such in crisis management operations were the first formulated at the Cologne European Council of June 1999, which marks the beginning of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as a definitive part of the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Until then, the potential resort to civilian and especially military means in common external action had been either conferred to other organisations (the Western European Union, WEU) or rather confined to an unspecified future (Art. J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty of the European Union, TEU). At Amsterdam, in 1997, an odd convergence of old and new member states led to the incorporation in the Treaty (Art. 17 TEU) of the so-called 'Petersberg tasks', defined as "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacekeeping". They were literally taken from the WEU conceptual toolbox and covered a very wide range of potential missions, thus meeting the still quite differing expectations of the EU-15.
On the internal EU front, the task of addressing institutional problems was conferred to the Convention on the Future of Europe and the ensuing Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), while the 'security strategy' paper delivered by the High Representative for CFSP, Xavier Solana, in June 2003 - and titled "A Secure Europe in a Better World" - set the new general parameters for future common external action.
At the same time, the scope of the original "Petersberg tasks" is significantly broadened in that it encompasses also "joint disarmament operations, … military and advice assistance tasks, … conflict prevention … and post-conflict stabilisation" (III-205). Furthermore, some new articles seem to entail - as opposed to the current Art. 27 (TEU) that excludes "matters having defence or military implications anyway - as many as five potentially different formats and scenarios for flexibility in the ESDP domain, that is, for policy arrangements including only some, not all member States. They refer to an internal solidarity clause (III-226), armaments co-operation and procurement (III-207), "structured" co-operation based on "high military capability criteria" (III-208), mutual defence proper (III-209), and the implementation of certain tasks by a "group" of willing and able member States (III-206).
In parallel to all this, in 2003 the EU has launched its first peacekeeping operations on the ground. Since January 2003, the EU has been engaged in three missions - in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo - performing different tasks, from law enforcement and cease-fire monitoring to security and humanitarian crisis management.
The military operations, in particular, used to be important test cases for the Union's ability to apply some of the security policy instruments it envisaged under the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal. Although limited in scope and time, the performed engagements were the first hands-on manifestation of the EU's security and defence dimension, which might have led to more ambitious interventions within and beyond its periphery.
The three EU operations launched in 2003 represent a major breakthrough for ESDP. For the first time, the Union has been proactively engaging in security affairs, covering a variety of tasks that stretch from policing to military intervention. The performed missions have shown that the EU is capable of reacting to ongoing or emerging humanitarian/security crises and to contribute to peace enforcement, reconstruction and stabilisation.
The EUPM and Concordia operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and FYROM were examples of where the EU took over responsibilities from other international organisations, in order to increase its commitment to security in its periphery.
Artemis operation, the first EU military operation, represented further tangible evidence of the development of the European security and defence policy (ESDP) and of the EU's contribution to the international community's efforts to promote stability and security.