Collective Identity in Japan´s Security Relations: The Case of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements

Abstract

Abbreviations

List of Figures

Chapter 1 - Introduction

Chapter 2 - Analytical Framework
1.1 Methodology
1.2 National Identity
1.3 Collective Identity
1.4 Security Communities
1.4.1 Tier One
1.4.2 Tier Two
1.4.2.1 Structure
1.4.2.2 Process
1.4.3 Tier Three

Chapter 3 - Case Study
Part 1 - Collective Identity Formation 11/2001-03/
2.1 Bilateral Cooperation
2.1.1 United States-Australia Relations
2.1.1.1 The Howard Administration
2.1.1.2 Australia's 2003 Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper
2.1.1.3 The Iraq War
2.1.2 Japan-United States Relations
2.1.2.1 9/11 andtheWar in Afghanistan
2.1.2.2 The Iraq Invasion 2003 and the “War on Terror”
2.1.2.3 Two SCC Meetings in
2.1.2.3.1 The February Meeting
2.1.2.3.2 The October Meeting
2.1.3 Japan-Australia Relations
2.1.3.1 John Howard's Visit to Japan in
2.1.3.2 Cooperation in Iraq
2.1.3.3 2006 Developments
2.2 Trilateral Cooperation
2.3.1 ROK-AustraliaRelations
2.3.2 ROK-United States Relations
2.3.3 ROK-Japan Relations
Part 2 - Japan's Evolving Security Framework 05/2006 - 03/
3.1 The “Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century”
3.2 The Security Treaty with Australia
3.3A Quadrilateral Relationship with India?
3.4 BMD Cooperation with the United States
3.5 ACSA with Australia
3.6 Convergence with the Obama Administration?
Part 3 - The Greater Strategy
4.1 The Strategy: Multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific
4.2 The Foundation
4.3 The Bush Administration
4.4 Australia's Participation
4.5 Japan's Participation and the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity”

Chapter 4 - Conclusion

Bibliography

Acknowledgements

This thesis is thankfully dedicated to my parents.

Special thanks go to Brian Melican for proofreading. I am grateful for Kai Schulze's valuable critique and insightful discussions on constructivism.

I thank Prof. Dr. Heberer for frequent support and inspiration.

Abstract

This study is an exploration and analysis of the ideational drivers of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) that was concluded in March 2006, between Japan, Australia and the United States. Turning away from materialist explanations of security cooperation, the questions of this study are: Can the conclusion of the TSD and its subsequent evolution be accounted for by a perceived collective identity between the three countries? And what is the Japanese Government's motivation to expand its alliances architecture? The last decade provides the timeframe for a qualitative analysis. The findings of this study show that the agreement and its following deepening is the result of a strong collective identity constituted by shared norms and democratic values. Moreover, Japan targets with the United States and Australia the establishment of a multilateral community of democratic states in the Asia-Pacific. The results also indicate, however, that collective identity promises peace between liberal states but is hostile towards non-liberal ones.

Abbreviations

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

List ofFigures

Figure 1: The Development of Security Communities 10

Figure 2: Outline of the “Arc of Freedom and Democracy” 74

Chapter 1 - Introduction

“Wenn irgendwo zwischen zwei Mächten ein noch so harmlos aussehender Pakt geschlossen wird, muss man sich sofort fragen, wer hier umgebracht werden soll.”¹

- Otto von Bismarck

This quote by Germany's first Chancellor gives an indication of the way security cooperation has been analyzed in 19th century European concert of monarchic powers. Even though Von Bismarck's days are almost 150 years behind us now, research on security ties or alliances still typically subscribes to a perspective that focuses on material terms and the international balance of power.

In the East Asia of the 21st century an important change to the local balance of power, the so-called “San Francisco System” of alliances between the American “hub” and it’s allied “spokes” has happened². This system and the bilateral character of the relationships dominated security policy in the Asia Pacific region since its inception in 1951-52. The change is displayed in the conclusion of a trilateral security relationship, the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue between the liberal democracies of Australia, the United States and Japan. As explaining security relations between states on materialist grounds is the general trend in international relations (IR) scholarship, the TSD was quickly perceived as an act of “neo-containment” to confront a economically and militarily rising China. Consequently, Post-World War II IR theory has paid little attention to non­material factors such as national identity and culture. Theory has become increasingly structuralist and has drifted toward largely unvarying systemic properties of the international anarchic system, deducing from which is assumed to be national interests of state actors. Kenneth Waltz' Theory of International Politics is the vanguard of this tradition, which assumes states to be rational unitary actors, pursuing accumulation of power, and whose actions are governed by the structure of international anarchy. In this sense, weak states band together against a common foe ³. As a consequence, realism, with its focus on power, national interest, and the systemic environment, has reigned as the orthodoxy in explanations of Japanese foreign policy. And Sino-Japanese rivalry; contentious territorial and resource disputes; the North Korean nuclear threat; the seemingly eternal presence of the U.S. 7th Fleet in the Taiwan Strait; the wrangling over U.S. military bases; the expansion of security arrangements between Japan, Australia, and India - all seem to validate the appropriateness and strength of the realist explanation of interstate relations in East Asia. Realism does not produce a uniform picture of Japan, however. Diverse variations of realism can be identified, including realism that Eric Heginbotham and Richard Samuels call “dual hedging” mercantile, Jennifer Lind’s militarily strong “buck-passing,” Michael Green’s “reluctant,” Michael Blaker’s diplomatically “coping,” Kent Calder’s economically reactive, Christopher Hughes’s on-the-verge-of-normality, Daniel Kliman’s born-again, and Kenneth Pyle’s never-died classical realism.⁴

While realism doubtlessly delivers cutting-edge analyses of security policies, the schools of thoughts’ tenets nevertheless fail to address most non­material factors that drive security relations between states. And Japan’s (evolving) security relations have been mostly left, to be explained by the realist school of thought.

Constructivist IR scholarship fills the gap of addressing those non-material factors of security policies, and casually challenges the hegemony of rational structuralism in IR theory too. Alexander Wendt and Peter Katzenstein popularized the main tenets of the school of thought in the 1990s. Moreover, the majority of current constructivist IR scholarship on Japan’s identity is mainly focused on Japan's security policy and its sources. As such, constructivist research has been largely driven by the question as to why Japan has been reluctant to use military force since the end of the Pacific War.⁵Constructivists argued that post-war Japan had developed a uniquely antimilitarist identity of purely domestic origin, which constituted or constrained the national security agenda.⁶However, the Koizumi administration's (2001-2006) security posture has not only seriously undermined assertions of deep-rooted cultural norms as the foundation for Japanese anti-militarism, the active shaping of security policy of the following administrations also rendered Japan's reliance on the United States as the one and only security partner obsolete. The swift enactment of laws that enabled Japan's participation in the “War on Terror”, the U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq, the signing of landmark security treaties with Australia and India as well as the adoption of various national security-related legislation in the face of strong resistance from the opposition demonstrates that Japan's reluctance to resort to force cannot be traced primarily to certain cultural or normative structures alone. Such an approach presupposes a relatively stable and static effect of those ideational factors⁷⁸- and neglects foreign influences. Moreover, constructivist IR theory in Japan is still very historical and theories including identity are not very popular. Foreign-language works by researchers like Peter Katzenstein and Thomas Berger tend to be met with mild bewilderment because ideas on both the government and people's level are much more complicated than simply pacifism or anti-militarism. This is an important question for Japan's security identity which is left unanswered in the scholarship. Japan's post-war “Peace Constitution” for example, which is seen as one of the main manifestations of Japan's antimilitarism was drafted by the Occupation authorities, an external actor. Therefore, drawing borders between the domestic and the international obscures the origins and structure of Japan's foreign and security identity. An examination of the relationship between Japan's ideational structures and the “outside” is thus necessary and this study aims to fill this knowledge gap using the concept of collective identity. The questions that are to be answered in this case study thus are: can the conclusion of the TSD and its subsequent deepening be explained by a perceived collective identity between the three governments of Japan, Australia and the United States? And what was the Japanese government's motivation to expand its security framework?

This study is divided into four chapters. Chapter one is the introduction to the topic. I briefly discuss contemporary International Relations (IR) studies regarding security cooperation between Realism and Constructivism. This is followed by chapter two which outlines collective identity, its defining dimensions and its implications for the development of a security community as outlined by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett. The case study, as the main part of the paper, is found in chapter three and is divided into three parts. In the first part, the collective identity formation between Japan, the United States and Australia until the establishment of the TSD in 2006 is analyzed. In order to gain further insight into the process, this analysis will be complemented by a contrasting case study of what normative factors exclude South Korea (like Japan and Australia a democracy and ally of the United States) from the framework. The second part illuminates Tokyo's deepening of its security relations while focusing on collective identity as driver of the process. The third part sheds light onto Tokyo's motivation to expand its security relations. Finally, chapter four offers a conclusion based on the theoretical analysis of the previous chapters. Arguments are limited and possible implications for the future of Japan's security relations are drawn.

Chapter 2 - Analytical Framework

1.1 Methodology

Methodologically, this study belongs to the research field of International Relations and it develops a concept of collective identity by drawing on a constructivist approach based on Adler and Barnett's framework of Security Communities. The method in approaching the questions outlined above is by utilizing discourse and content analysis that surrounded the development of the TSD over the past decade. In particular, it sheds light on the terms of inclusion and exclusion that reside within the texts of international politics.

1.2 National Identity

The concept of national identity negates the presumed uniformity of nation-states as posed by realists. The concept was present in the scholarship in the 1940s and 1960s, and was established by such academics as Hedley Bull or Karl Deutsch. Identity is not a static normative or ideational structure. Rather, it is an “ongoing boundary drawing process”⁹in which the cognitive borders of the Self are defined and redefined in opposition to difference embodied in a multiplicity of Others. The fact that identities are shaped in relationship to others is emphasized by Alexander Wendt who poses that egoistic identities are not intrinsic, exogenously given features of human agency but social terms of individuality that are constantly reproduced through practice. If Alter chooses to defect Ego in a social dilemma they are simultaneously choosing to reproduce the egoistic identities that constitute that dilemma. This also applies to prosocial behavior. If Alter chooses cooperation in a social dilemma, Ego implicitly takes a collective identity, acting as if he cares for Alter, expecting him to do the same in return (“altercasting”). Ego's new identity will be reinforced if Alter reciprocates. Over time, the reinforcement will lead to further cooperation and an internalization of collective identity of parties in the end.¹⁰

Identity is an open-ended process, a multi-leveled discursive construction in which the boundaries of the collective Self can expand to include its former constitutive Other (Germany's post-war integration into Europe, for example). Identities are not only personal or psychological. They are also social, defined by the actor's interaction with and relationship to others. Identities can also be constructed around certain, subjectively perceived characteristics and can thus be exclusive. Therefore, any normative identity category (such as democracy or liberalism, for example) presupposes an Opposite. As such, all political identities are contingent and depend on the actor's interaction with others and place within an institutional context. National and state identities are thus formed in relationship to other nations and states. The identities of political actors are tied to their relationship to those outside the boundaries of the community and the territory.¹¹

1.3 Collective Identity

But what constitutes a collective identity between states? For Thomas Risse­Kappen, “values and norms embedded in the political culture of liberal democracies constitute the collective identity of a security community among democracies¹². Because even the most ideologically and politically compatible allies will not be immune to some degree of suspicion and mistrust toward their partner's motives the allies observe predictable patterns, norms, of behavior¹³. For Peter Katzenstein, norms involve “collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity...norms have “regulative” effects that specify standards of appropriate behavior.¹⁴A security community may exhibit formal norms (institutionalized rules, treaty regulations) or informal expectations or obligations. These together become a type of “regime” which mediates relations between the partners, forming a “codification of principles, rules and procedures to govern alliance behavior.”¹⁵Once these norms are established, they develop into symbolic “values” to be adhered to by the allies. Deviating from the established norms carries the risk of undermining the allied trust and might provoke reprisal from the other member states.¹⁶

Collective identities entail that people not only positively identify with other people's fate but also identify themselves and those other people as a group in relation to other groups¹⁷. Alexander Wendt defines collective identity as a „positive identification with the welfare of another, such that the other is seen as a cognitive extension of the self, rather than independent.¹⁸ In this sense, collective identity considers the welfare of the Other as part of that of the Self, being altruistic. While altruistic actors may still be rational, they nevertheless calculate their interests in terms of the group or “team”.¹⁹This implies a willingness to make sacrifices for the Other for his own sake, when necessary.

1.4 Security Communities

Karl Deutsch was one of the first to research the ideational factors that provided friendly security relations among a group of states. His concept of “Security Communities” was reinvigorated with the advent of the constructivist school of IR theory. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett were the ones to offer a reconstructed architecture ofDeutsch's concept²⁰.

Adler and Barnett define a pluralistic security community as a “transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change.²¹ The distinctive feature of a security community is that a stable peace is tied to the existence of a transnational community. A community is defined by three characteristics: first, members of a community have shared identities, values, and meanings. Secondly, those in a community have many-sided and direct relations in several setting. Thirdly, communities display a reciprocity that expresses long-term interest and possibly even altruism. Long-term interest develops from knowledge of those with whom one is cooperating. Altruism can be understood as a sense of obligation and responsibility. Even though actors will come to identify with each other, they also will continue to harbor distinct interests. These create competitive behavior which can lead to conflict. However, while states of a security community possibly display rivalry, they no longer fear the use of violence as a means to settle their disagreements.

The three defining qualities of a community outlined above cannot only exist at the local or domestic but also on the international level. Communities develop around networks, interactions, and face-to-face encounters that do not rely on inhabiting the same geographic area. Security communities do not exclusively emerge between neighboring countries because individuals can define themselves based on markers that are not necessarily tied to a certain space.

The outcome that distinguishes a security community from other communities is that its members entertain dependable expectations of peaceful change. This outcome can be analyzed in its two companion elements. Dependable expectations can be explained by different theories of social interaction. Stable expectations can result from (a) actors with pre-given interests and preferences, such as rationalist theories (neo-realism, neo-liberal institutionalism) or (b) actors with shared identities, whose very identities and interests are shaped by their environment, i.e. interpretative theories such as those offered by constructivists. However, only constructivist theory allows for the possibility that interstate interactions can transform the identities and interests of states and induce dependable expectations of peaceful change. While peaceful change might be explained through the language of Realpolitik and/or the calculation of expected material benefits to be derived from a course of action, Adler and Barnett's approach implemented here isolates knowledge, learning, and the existence of norms that emerge from interstate practices and transnational forces.

Adler and Bamett define peaceful change as “neither the expectation of nor the preparation for organized violence as a means to settle interstate disputes.” States do not undertake and do not consider security actions that can be interpreted by others within the community as militarily threatening. Therefore, security communities can exist in the absence of well-developed strategic ties or a formal alliance. Because security communities can count for compliance on the acceptance of collectively-held norms, a security community that is dependent on enforcement mechanisms is not a security community. Some of these norms are not only regulative, designed to overcome the collective action problems associated with interdependent choice, but also constitutive as a direct reflection of the actor's identity and self understanding. Consequently, security communities will rely for their governance structures not only on an understanding of their member states' behavior in the international sphere but they will also read their domestic behavior and arrangements. A security community's governance structure thus depends on (a) the state's external identity and associated behavior and (b) on its domestic characteristics and practices. As a consequence, it is crucial that states govern their domestic behavior in ways consistent with the community. States comprising a security community are still sovereign in a formal-legalistic sense. However, their sovereignty, authority, and legitimacy are contingent on the security community in two respects. First, a security community does not erode the state's legitimacy but the more closely tied a security community is, the more the state's role will be altered. Secondly, the conditions under which the state is viewed as part of the community and given certain rights, obligations, and duties, depend on its ability to abide by the region's normative structure. States remain “free agents” as long as their own preferences are framed by the common understandings of the community.

Adler and Barnett organized their framework of a security community around three tiers. Tier one concerns the precipitating environment. Tier two examines the positive, dynamic, and reciprocal relationship between the structure of the region. This is defined by material power and knowledge, social processes, organizations, transactions and social learning. The third tier of mutual trust and collective identity formation is shaped by these dynamics.²²

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

Figure 1: The development of Security Communities

1.4.1 Tier One

Technological developments, an external threat, the desire to reduce mutual fear through security coordination, new interpretations of social reality and other developments can move states to turn to each other to coordinate their policies to mutual benefit. These early encounters and first efforts of cooperation create trust or mutual identification. Simply because they are based on the promise of more pleasant and more frequent exchanges, they provide the necessary environment for these very possibilities.

1.4.2 Tier Two

In the second tier, states and their peoples have become involved in a series of social interactions which begin to revise the environment in which they are embedded. This tier is divided into “structural” categories of power and knowledge and the “process” categories of transactions, international organizations (IO) and institutions, and social learning. Collective identity and mutual trust forms under these dynamic, positive, and reciprocal connections between these variables. Without these, there could be no dependable expectations of peaceful change.

1.4.2.1 Structure

The structural binders for the development of a security community are power and knowledge. Power can be an important factor in the development of a security community by virtue of a core-state's ability to push and drive others to maintain a collective stance. Power can be alternatively understood as the authority to determine shared meaning that constitutes the “we-feeling” and practices of states and the conditions which confer, defer, or deny access to the community. As such, power can be a magnet. While powerful states that belong to the core of strength do not create security per se, security communities grow around them because of the positive images of security that are linked with powerful and successful states. Knowledge also constitutes part of the international structure. Part of what constitutes and constrains state action is the knowledge that represents categories of practical action and legitimate activity. Scholars of international politics identified one set of political ideas and meanings that are related to a security community: liberalism and democracy. Common ideas of the role of government, tolerance, and the rule of law enable a shared transnational civic culture. This shapes the transnational identity of individuals of the community. Secondly, liberal ideas promote strong civil societies through intense exchange of people, goods, and ideas. However, other ideas also account for the formation of security communities. A shared project, for example, which increases the number of interactions and the development of common institutions. This shared project promotes collective purpose around which a shared identity and, thereafter, dependable expectations of peaceful change emerge.

1.4.2.2 Process

Social facts do not depend on material resources alone, but also on collective experience and human consensus. The categories of process involve transactions, international organizations and institutions and learning. Ю and institutions contribute directly and indirectly to the development of mutual trust and a shared identity on four issues. First, organizations contribute to the development of trust through the establishment of behavioral norms, monitoring mechanisms and sanctions to enforce those norms. Secondly, organizations are sites of socialization and learning. Political actors learn and perhaps even “teach” others what their interpretations of the situation and normative understandings are. Identities are created and reproduced on the basis of knowledge that people have of themselves and others. Through institutions, lead actors develop positive reciprocal expectations and thus identify with each other. Thirdly, IOs are contributing to the development of mutual trust and collective identities because of their potential to provide conditions that support their development. They are²³able to foster around commonly held attributes, for example, democracy or human rights. They reinforce the belief in a common fate and enhance norms and practices of self-restraint, such as mediation.

Political elites create innovative institutions to promote new possibilities. Communication between peoples, learning processes, and the thickening of the social environment play a crucial role in the evolution of political communities. However, the most profound change is brought about by agents who transform them into political reality through institutional and political power. Such matters highlight the critical role of social learning, which represents the capacity and motivation of social actors to manage and transform reality by changing their beliefs of the material and social world and their identities. This explains why norms and other cognitive and cultural categories that are tied to a collective identity, interests, and practices, are transmitted from individual to individual and state to state. They are internalized by individuals and are institutionalized in governments and society. Consequently, social learning plays a critical role in the emergence of security communities. It is facilitated by transactions that typically occur in organizational settings and core powers. During their transactions, people communicate their self-understandings, perceptions of reality, and their normative expectations. As a result, there might occur possible changes in individual and collective understandings and values.

Transactions are an essential feature for the development of collective learning and collective identities. Learning often occurs within institutionalized settings. Social learning may not be sufficient for the development of a security community unless learning is connected to functional processes that are traceable to a general improvement of the state's condition. This is why core powers are crucial to the process. States that possess superior material power, international legitimacy and have adopted norms and practices that are conducive to peaceful change confer increased material and moral authority to the norms and practices they diffuse. As such, social learning frequently occurs through a communicative exchange in the context of power asymmetries. Nevertheless, even asymmetrical relationships can involve a situation where partners negotiate a new regional collective identity around consensual norms and mutual understandings. Through the development of shared definitions of security, proper domestic and international action, social learning encourages political actors to see each other as trustworthy.

The structural and process conditions are necessary for the development of mutual trust and collective transnational identities. The emergence of collective identities may be prompted by learning processes that occur within institutionalized settings which subsequently lead to changes in cognitive structures. In any event, the processes that develop are critical for the development of a security community.

1.4.3 Tier Three

The dynamic and positive relationships among the variables described above are the source of mutual trust and collective identity. Trust and identity are reciprocal and reinforcing. Because a minimal level of trust is necessary for a collective identity to develop, trust comes prior to identity. A collective identity however reinforces and increases the depth of trust and the more tightly connected security communities are, the shorter is the collective cognitive distance between its members.²⁴

Chapter 3 - Case Study

Part 1 - Collective Identity Formation 11/2001-03/2006

2.1 Bilateral Cooperation

2.1.1 United States-Australia Relations

Australia and the United States look back on a long history of security cooperation. They were allies in every major military conflict of the 20th century (World War I+II, the Korean War, Vietnam, the Gulf War) and created the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and the United States) treaty in February 1951.

The U.S. hence maintained and deepened its security relations with Australia²⁵ while the Reagan administration extricated New Zealand from ANZUS in 1985 due to New Zealand’s ban of nuclear weapons or nuclear powered vessels in its territorial waters.

Government representatives of both countries have enthusiastically incorporated references to culture, values, and traditions in more recent statements and communiqués relevant to security in the Asia-Pacific. Especially in the United States, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 led to an ideological upsurge of emphasis over American values and American national identity vis-à-vis a “savage”, “backward” and “inhumane” foe. Responding to the terrorist attacks with the invasion of Afghanistan, Dick Cheney justified military action because the United States has “always stood for human freedom”, and he constructed the nation as “freedom's home and defender” while terrorists on the contrary are “evil people, who dwell in the shadows, planning unimaginable violence and destruction.”²⁶The Bush administration compared fundamentalist terror to Nazism, Militarism and Soviet Communism which allowed for the construction of a “just” and “righteous” American national identity. The threats of the 20th century were defeated by the “will of free peoples” and the “strength of great alliances” and even though this “asymmetric” threat was new, America’s “duty” was nevertheless “familiar.²⁷ For the Bush administration Islamic terrorism posed “the greatest danger to our free society, to our values and I would say to our lives.²⁸As a consequence, the United States did not engage in defensive warfare of its territorial and political independence but fought “in defense of civilization and humane values²⁹ thus giving moral justification for military action in countries that, from the U.S. government's perspective, would not coerce with those attributes. President Bush stated in 2002 that the United States had no intention of imposing its culture onto other countries. “But America will always stand firm for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the power of the state; respect for women; private property; free speech; equal justice; and religious tolerance.³⁰

2.1.1.1 The Howard Administration

The American values discourse found strong resonance in Australia's government under John Howard of the Liberal Party of Australia. With his 1996 election, the Australian Prime Minister (PM) was intent on strengthening the relationship with the United States, a turn of policy from his predecessor Paul Keating of the Australian Labor Party (ALP). One of the first results of this policy shift was that Canberra reaffirmed the ANZUS alliance in the wake of the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis.

On the day of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 Howard was visiting Washington, D.C. and the attacks had a significant impact on his thinking on foreign and defense policy. “I have to say that of all of the events that I have been in any way touched by in the 27 year that I’ve been in public life, none has had a more profound impact on me than has this.³¹ In his rhetoric, he adapted to the one of the Bush administration with its monochrome view of the world, striking it into “good” and “evil”:

“September 11 was a rare moment when evil emerged to challenge the human decency upon which our democratic societies are built. It was not a local challenge - it was global - and it called for a global response. (...) Passive indifference in the face of evil achieves nothing. (...) We would be foolish indeed, in the very first years of the twenty-first century, to forget the most hard learned lesson of the twentieth century - that evil cannot be 1Λ appeased.³²

Thus the events of September 11 were an attack not only on the United States, but on “all civilized nations” and a world system built on “individual freedom, religious tolerance, democracy, and the international free flow of commerce” which Howard perceived as the “virtues of the modern world.³³ From his perspective, the terrorist attack was not only designed to shatter the faith and the ability to live lives in a “free and open manner”, it was designed to “shake the world’s economic foundations.”³⁴As such would the openness and tolerance of the Australian society be “lethal” for the international terrorist. “I am proud to be an Australian citizen for many reasons, but none seems more relevant in today’s troubled world than our extraordinary achievement of building a single nation drawn from so many cultures and religious traditions.³⁵ John Howard boasted Australia’s “distinctive setting” of the “great bulwarks” of Australia’s liberal democracy: “a vigorous parliamentary system, a free market economy, the rule of law and impartial courts, a free press and a vibrant civil society.”³⁶

While the concurrence in values discourse can be conceived as “mere talk”, first normative drivers in the relationship emerge. On September 14, 2001 John Howard invoked Article IV of the ANZUS treaty. Because the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 happened on the East Coast of the U.S., the Australian government displayed the norm of pacta sunt servanda. Canberra stipulated that the threat of international terrorism had to be taken on by all Western liberal democracies. Howard emphasized Australia’s support for the United States:

“This was not simply an attack on America. We were all the targets. (...) If we left, this contest only to America, we would be leaving it to them to defend our rights and those of all the other people of the world who have a commitment to freedom and liberty³⁷.

Thus, the Australian government justified its participation in the war in Afghanistan (and later Iraq) because Australia has a commitment to act “where appropriate in different parts of the world to defend the values that Britain and Australia and the United States and other countries hold in common, because in the end a nation's foreign policy must be values based³⁸

Already after the war in Afghanistan, United States-Australia security arrangements and the political statements surrounding them had dwelt, as Tow and Albinski argue, on “similar values, shared histories, languages and outlooks within the so-called Western community of states.³⁹

2.1.1.2 Australia's 2003 Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper

This development was further intensified with Australia's 2003 Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper. The notion that the US-Australian alliance is founded upon “shared values” had already found an expression in the 2000 Australian Defence White Paper. Whilst acknowledging that the white papers emerge from different ministries which may use different vocabularies, there is a notable increase in the references to values between the 2000 and 2003 papers. This is unsurprising before the background of September 11 and the subsequent intensification of pro­liberal democratic discourses in the U.S. and Australia.

Advancing the National Interest, the 2003 Foreign and Trade policy White Paper under patronage of the Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer, and the Minister for Trade Mark Vaile, placed a premium on the fight against international terrorism, the prevention of the proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles, making security policy the centerpiece of the document. In the paper it isapparent how closely Australian policy makers made values a primary driver of their defense and security policy. The authors identified that the international terrorism was not only a threat to Australian security but it would pose “a deliberate challenge to the values of the Western world”.⁴⁰The document emphasized Australia's liberal values as a driving force for the country's policy making with democratic partners:

“Australia is a liberal democracy with a proud commitment to political and economic freedom. That freedom is a foundation of our security and prosperity. We have a long tradition of working with other liberal democracies around the world to defend and promote it.⁴¹

The government positioned Australia's place in the world as part of the Western system of liberal democracies, pointing to the goal of strengthening the alliance with the United States:

“Australia and the United States share values and ideals that underpin our strong relationship. We both have deep democratic traditions and aspirations, elements of a common heritage and a lasting record of cooperation and shared sacrifice. Our security alliance is a practical

manifestation of these shared values⁴².

While security relations with Japan find no reference at all, the importance of liberal values moved to the forefront of the White Paper is striking. This is also addressed by Alan Gyngell who notes that although the word “interest” was in the title of the document, it was “overtly about values”. As such, the “vital” relationship with the United States (the only country on which “vital” is used) is underpinned by the fact that Australia and the United States “share values and ideals”⁴³

Importantly, the strong emphasis on values as a driving force of Australia's foreign and security policy underpinned the Howard government's willingness to the utilization of military force in order to defend the country's liberal values. Kelly concludes that John Howard's approach to politics was driven by his “beliefs and style”, among them the belief in the traditional value of a close security relationship with the United States, a “penchant to project national power including military power to achieve political goals” and a “sanctioning of foreign policy positions by invoking Australian values”.⁴⁴As such, the use of force was considered a legitimate tool to shape the regional and global security environment.⁴⁵

2.1.1.3 The Iraq War

This development found its practical manifestation in Australia's participation in the wars in Afghanistan and, to a greater extent, in Iraq. While the invasion of Afghanistan was welcomed with little criticism, the 2003 invasion of Iraq received international repudiation and helpless cynicism over American military supremacy.

The contribution of the Australian Defense Force (ADF) to heavy combat operations in these war theaters was limited in comparison to U.S. or British forces. ADF contributions during the combat phase in Iraq totaled less than one percent of the coalition's combat force.⁴⁶As such, Australia's contribution to the Iraq military operation was seen by many as another example of military- diplomatic “symbolism” in the country's alliance relationship with the United States⁴⁷. However, pacta sunt servanda is obvious. The Howard government was a firm supporter of the Bush administrations action against Iraq at a fairly early stage in the run-up to the war. One year before the invasion, Howard stated: “Most of all, we value loyalty given and loyalty gained - the concept of mateship runs deep within the Australian character. We cherish and where necessary will fight to preserve the liberties we both [Australia and the U.S.] hold so dear.⁴⁸ As such Howard boasted that “Australia is a liberal democracy with (...) a proud history of defending freedom against its enemies.”⁴⁹This was not mere rhetoric. Canberra dispatched troops to Iraq despite strong dissent from the Australian public. Moreover, Canberra participated with 1500 ADF troops in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and with 2000 troops in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). This is a significant obligation for Australia considering the relatively small ADF. After the invasion, the Australian government stood firmly behind the Bush administration and boasted its support for the “War on Terror”:

“Australians will also take their place within that coalition as highly respected and highly prized comrades in arms. Through decades of close military co-operation, in peacetime and in war, America has grown to respect the quality of our soldiers, our sailors and our airmen.”⁵⁰

Before this background it is evident that Australia's participation in the military actions in Iraq was not mere symbolism but a firm example of pacta sunt servanda. The Howard administration kept its word even in the face of overwhelming public and international opposition. This is also highlighted by Michael Wesley. He points out that most crucial for the Canberra-Washington dyad's positive development was Australia's support for the United States after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and during the Iraq War: “Canberra's solidarity in the face of opposition, especially as the enunciated pre-war case for invasion unraveled, was a gesture that resonated strongly in Washington.”⁵¹However, the relationship is not a zero-sum game for Australia. Reciprocity is also a strong driver because the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement of 2005 was “widely viewed as a reward for Australian loyalty in the war on terrorism.⁵²

Further collective norms shaped the cooperation of both militaries in Iraq. Nevertheless the small Australian contribution, the U.S. military command was willing to take advice from the Australian force commander, Maurice McNarn, on operational issues. McNam served at the military headquarters in Qatar and vetoed U.S. military planners on a number of occasions and was thus able to influence the coalition's operations. The U.S. representatives always respected Australia's vetoing⁵³. This would not have been possible if the norms of cooperation and consultation and information between the two allies who greatly differ in military strength and who do not oblige to constitutive norms of a legal treaty outside of ANZUS where non-existent.

Cooperation in war theaters has been alleviated by the fact that U.S. and Australian forces regularly conduct joint military exercises, ranging from full- scale joint maneuvers to unit-level operations. Joint training exercises sponsored by the Australian Defense Force Joint Operations Command and the U.S. Pacific Command include sea, air, and land mock battle, a computer-simulated war, paratroop and amphibious insertions, live-fire exercises, and anti-submarine warfare.⁵⁴In addition to bilateral exercises, the two countries work together on missile defense. Cooperation between the Australian Defense Science and Technology Office and the Pentagon Missile Defense Agency has gained significant momentum since July 07, 2004, when the United States and Australia signed a memorandum of understanding outlining future Australian participation in missile defense activities. The 25-year agreement commits Canberra to Washington’s missile defense program, including cooperative development of advanced radar technology capable of providing early detection of hostile ballistic missiles.⁵⁵

2.1.2 Japan-United States Relations

Japanese foreign and security policy preceding the 9/11 terrorist attacks was characterized by reluctance towards change. It was only with the election of Koizumi Jun'ichiro as Prime Minister of Japan in 2000, that the Japanese Government became a proactive shaper of security and alliance politics. This was spurred by two external factors: most obviously the terrorist attacks in New York and to a lesser extent, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the repellent neighbor for Japan.⁵⁶In December 2001, the Japanese Coast Guard sank a spy ship from North Korea, marking the incident to be the first since World War II with Japanese hostile fire. For the newly elected Japanese administration, the terrorist attacks provided an opportunity to not only justify further institutional change of Japan’s security norms, but to expand Japan’s security posture.

2.1.2.1 9/11 and the War in Afghanistan

The Koizumi administration’s response to the 9/11 attacks displays norm obedience to pacta sunt servanda. On September 19, 2001 Koizumi explained his position in a press conference and his words resemble those of John Howard. He stated that the terrorist attacks in New York

“represent not only attacks on the United States, but attacks on freedom, peace and democracy of the whole of humankind. Recognizing this, I was resolved for Japan to take its own initiative

[...]

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¹Authors provisional translation: “When somewhere two powers conclude an even seemingly harmless pact one has to question who is supposed to be killed here.”

²The most important “spokes” are Japan, Australia, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and Taiwan. See Kent Calder, "Securing Security Through Prosperity: The San Francisco System in Comparative Perspective," ThePacificReview 17, no. 1 (2004) p. 135-157

³See for example Glenn Snyder (1997), Alliance Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; and Stephen M. Walt (1997), “Why alliances endure or collapse”, Survival, vol. 39, no. 1, who represent the vanguards of these ideas.

⁴Eric Heginbotham, "Japan's Dual Hedge. Not Another Britain," Foreign Affairs 81, no. 5 (2002), Jennifer Lind, "Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy," International Security 29, no. 1 (2004). Michael Blaker, "Evaluating Japanese Diplomatic Performance," in Japan ’s Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Coping with Change, ed. Gerald L. Curtis (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), Kent E. Calder, "Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State," World Politics 40, no. 4 (1988), Christopher Hughes, Japan's Re-Emergence as A "Normal” Military Power (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004), Daniel M. Kliman, Japan's Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World: Embracing a New Realpolitik (Westport: Praeger, 2006), Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan Rising (New York: Public Affairs, 2007).

⁵Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1996). and Thomas U. Berger, Cultures ofAntimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998). p. 193

⁶Berger, Cultures ofAntimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan, Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, Peter J. Katzenstein/Nobuo Okawara, Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms and Policy Responses in a Changing World (Ithaca: Cornell University, East AsiaProgram, 1993).

⁷Okawara, Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms and Policy Responses in a Changing World. p. 98f and Berger, Cultures ofAntimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan. p. 167

⁸Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security. p. 116

⁹Bahar Rumelili, "Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the Eu's Mode of Differentiation," Review of International Studies 30, no. 1 (2004). p. 31-33

¹⁰ Alexander Wendt, Social Theory ofInternational Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999). p. 346

¹¹Emanuel Adler/Michael Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," in Security Communities, ed. Michael Barnett Emanuel Adler (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998). p. 47

¹²Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community," in The Culture of National Security, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). p. 370

¹³Charles Kegley, Gregory Raymond, „When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics” (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990)

¹⁴Ronald L. Jepperson/Alexander Wendt/Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in The Culture ofNational Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1996). p. 54

¹⁵Muthiah Alagappa, Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford, CA: StanfordUniversity Press, 1998). p. 54

¹⁶Thomas S. Wilkins, "Towards a “Trilateral Alliance?” Understanding the Role of Expediency and Values in American-Japanese-Australian Relations," Asian Security 3, no. 3 (2007). p. 259

¹⁷ Adler/Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities." p. 47

¹⁸Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," TheAmerican Political ScienceReview 88, no. 2 (1994). p. 386

¹⁹Wendt, Social Theory ofInternationalPolitics. p. 229

²⁰Emanuel Adler/Michael Barnett, Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998).

²¹Barnett, "A Framework forthe Study of Security Communities." p. 30

²²Ibid. p. 34

²³This is the central claim of the argument of the “Democratic Peace”. See, for example, Bruce Russett, GraspingtheDemocraticPeace (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1993)

²⁴Adler/Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities." p. 37-48

²⁵Hiroyuki Umetsu, "The Birth of Anzus: America's Attempt to Create a Defense Linkage between Northeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific," International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 4 22004). p. 173

²⁶The White House, Vice President Cheney Delivers Remarks at the 56th Annual Alfred E. Smith Memorial Foundation Dinner (2001 [cited August 20 2010]); available from http://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20011018.html.

²⁷George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (January 28, 2003) (Miller Center of Public Affairs, [cited September 5 2010]); available from http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/4541.

²⁸The White House, The Vice President Participates in a Media Availability with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon (2002 [cited August 20 2010]); available from http://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20020319.html.

²⁹The White House, Remarks by the Vice President at Celebrationfor the Marine Corps Birthday (2001 [cited August 20 2010]); available from http://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20011110.html.

³⁰George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (January 29, 2002) (Miller Center of Public Affairs, [cited September 5 2010]); available from http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/4540.

³¹John Howard, Pm's Address to the Australian Defence Association October 25, 2001 (2001 [citedJuly 1 2010]); available from http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/21243/20030411- 0000/www.australianpolitics.com/news/2001/01- 10-25.html.

³²Ibid.([cited).

³³Ibid.([cited).

³⁴Ibid.([cited).

³⁵Ibid.([cited).

³⁶John Howard, The Lowy Lecture: Australia and the World (The Lowy Institute for International Affairs, 2005 [cited August 6 2010]); available from http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=396. p. 4

³⁷Howard, Pm's Address to the Australian Defence Association October 25, 2001 ([cited).

³⁸Parliament of Australia, Transcript ofjoint Press Conference: The Prime Minister the Hon John Howard with British Foreign Secretary, JackStraw (2003 [cited September 9 2010]); available from http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Source%3A%22PRIME%20 MINISTER%22%20Author_Phrase%3A%22straw,%20jack%22;rec=0.

³⁹William Tow/Henry Albinski, "Anzus - Alive and Well after Fifty Years," Australian Journal of Politics andHistory 48, no. 2 (2002). p. 171

⁴⁰Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "Advancing the National Interest: Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper 2003," (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2003). p. 16

⁴¹Ibid. p. 32

⁴²Ibid. p. 86

⁴³Allan Gyngell, There’s Rhetoric and Dinner Talk, but Little Debate on Foreign Policy (The Sydney Morning Herald, 2003 [cited May 27 2010]); available from http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/08/24/1061663672744.html?from=storyrhs.

⁴⁴Paul Kelly, "Howard's Decade," in Lowy Institute Paper 15 (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2006). p. 2f

⁴⁵Benjamin Schreer, The Howard Legacy: Australian Military Strategy 1996-2007 (Frankfurt: Lang, 2008). p. 182

⁴⁶Russell Parkin, "Coalition Operations: The Australian Special Forces Task Group Operations in Iraq," Journal ofthe Royal United Services Institute ofAustralia 55, no. 3 (2004).

⁴⁷See, for example Mark Thompson, "Punching above Our Weight? Australia as a Middle Power," StrategicInsights 18 (2005).

⁴⁸ John Howard, Address at the Joint Meeting of the U.S. Congress (2002 [cited August 13 2010]); available from http://australianpolitics.com/news/2002/06/02-06-12.shtml.

⁴⁹John Howard, Australia Day Address to the National Press Club January 25, 2006 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2006 [cited July 18 2010]); available from http://australianpolitics.com/news/2006/01/06-01-25_howard.shtml.

⁵⁰Howard, Pm's Address to the Australian Defence Association October 25, 2001 ([cited).

⁵¹Michael Wesley, "The Trilateral Strategic Dialogue's Institutional Politics," in Asia-Pacific Security. Us, Australia and Japan and the New Security Triangle, ed. Mark J. Thomson William T. Tow, Yoshinobu Yamamoto & Satu P. Limaye (London: Routledge, 2007). p. 40

⁵²Joseph Siracusa, "John Howard, Australia, and the Coalition of the Willing," Yale Journal of International Affairs 1, no. 2 (2006). p. 45

⁵³Greg Sheridan, Secrets oftheAlliance (The Australian, July 26, 2006 [cited May 27 2010]); available from http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/secrets-of-the-alliance/story-e6frg6v6- 1111112143535.

⁵⁴Asia-Pacific Defense Forum, Australian and U.S. Forces Strengthening Regional Security (United States Pacific Command, May 30, 2010 2006 [cited Fall/Winter 2005-2006]); available from http://foram.apan-info.net/2005-2006_fall-winter/australia/Lhtmf

⁵⁵United States Department of Defense, United States and Australia Sign Missile Defense Agreement (2004 [cited July 12 2010]); available from http://www.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=7529.

⁵⁶Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan. Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007). p. 148