NBC terrorism since the end of the Cold War – myths and realities

NBC terrorism since the end of the Cold War – myths and realities

It seems to be only a matter of time until the first terror group will develop the capabilities to utilise weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in large scale assaults, killing ten or hundred thousands of people. This assumption is often underscored by the sarin gas attack in Tokyo 1995, causing 12 fatalities and more than 5000 casualties, or the efforts of Al Qaeda to obtain WMD. Moreover, the large-scale attack of 9/11 proved that the former generally accepted maxim of “terrorists want a lot of people listening and not a lot of people dead” (Jenkins, 1985, p. 6) is not meeting the reality anymore. However, it is in question if these incidents really point towards a trend among terror groups to obtain and use WMD in order to achieve their political or religious aims. Nonetheless, WMD-terrorism became a political priority, particularly in the United States since the Clinton administration declared “(t)he acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by a terrorist group is unacceptable. There is no higher priority than preventing the acquisition of this capability or removing this capability from terrorist groups” (Clinton, 1995). Regardless of this political development, there is an extensive scholarly debate whether WMD-terrorism poses a new apocalyptical threat due to the “availability of information and expertise, heightened frustration of terrorists, demonization of target population, or messianic vision” (Ivanova & Sandler, 2007, p. 274) or whether the use of chemical, biological, nuclear or radiological agents (CBRN) by terrorist groups is exaggerated by the media or governmental and law enforcement agencies. However, it is necessary to recognize the differences between radiological / nuclear and chemical / biological agents since “these weapons differ greatly in their ease of production, in the challenges they pose for deterrence, and in the effectiveness of defensive measures against them” (Chyba, 2002).

The purpose of this paper is not to present a comprehensive survey of the possible threat assessments or potential counter measures. Rather, it will analyze what kind of terrorist groups are more likely to use CBRN for their purposes and what motivation determines the decision either to use or to restrain from the use of CBRN agents. Furthermore, this essay will examine the actual capabilities necessary to weaponize chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear material and the difficulties for terrorists to get to this stage.

Since “all wars are inherently asymmetric to some degree” (Hoffman, 2005, p. 918) it is the main interest of the inferior conflict party to equal its disadvantage adverse the superior one. Certainly, terrorism is not always a war in the traditional meaning, however as a form of conflict “terrorism in all of its forms is by its very nature an asymmetric response to superior force and terrorists always have used their capabilities as a force multiplier” (Gearson, 2002, p. 23). Since CBRN are often considered to be a proximate way of equalizing disproportional force capabilities “increasingly they will be the weapons of the weak states or groups that militarily are at best second class” (Betts, 1998, p. 27), a strategy that has occurred in the international system with countries like Iran or North Korea that may “have no conventional means by which to contest American military power” (ibid.) seeking to develop WMD. Likewise it is assumed that terrorists will increasingly try to gain access to CBRN in order to equalize force disadvantages for „nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological weapons are seen as 'great equalizers', ideally suited for an asymmetric response to Western military powers equipped with superior conventional capabilities“ (Davis & Gray, 2002, p. 269). Yet “of all asymmetric threats that could be levied against a military force, terrorist incidents, involving weapons of mass destruction are the most serious” (Gaskill, 2005, p. 43). Therefore, there is an actual abstract incentive for terrorist groups to procure WMD.

Indeed, the imagination of terrorist groups, being in the possession of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons (CBRN) “conjures deeply fears and insecurities” (Gressang IV, Daniel S., 2001, p. 83). However, it is questionable whether terrorist groups would employ CBRN in a terrorist assault even though they are capable to weaponize such agents or if it is more likely that they are used as a means of menace in order to enforce their postulations. Initially it is necessary to consider the paucity of knowledge and data facing that “of more than 8000 incidents since 1968 […] less than 60 evidenced any indication that the terrorists plotting such attacks attempted to use chemical or biological agents or intended to steal, or otherwise fabricate their own nuclear devices” (Hoffmann, 1997a, p. 46). Therefore, the analysis of this development is difficult, “especially when there is such a poor ratio of fact to speculation on the matter” (Frost, 2004, p. 402). In order to explain possible motivations, many analysts use a dichotomy between ‘old terrorism’ such as Social-Revolutionary and Nationalist-Separatist terrorists and ‘new terrorism’ which is caused by the “emergence of religious and millenarian terrorists in contrast to political terrorists who dominated the old terrorism” (Stohl, 2005, p. 146). According to Post ‘Radical Fundamentalist Terrorism’ and ‘New Religion Terrorism’, both are attributed to new terrorism, are most likely to use CBRN, since “the constraints against CBRN mass terrorism are not present” in these groups (Post, 2005, p. 149). This lack of constraints results from “the terrorist groups aim to transform the reality of the conflict with their adversary by the very act of terrorism, such as using weapons of mass destruction represented by CBRN, to physically destroy as much of their adversary as possible and, thus, remove the source of the conflict itself” (Sinai, 2005, p. 151). Since most of these groups pursue a transcendent-religious goal, they “are not constrained by Western reaction; indeed, they are driven to expel secular modernizing influences and achieve revenge against the West” (Post, 2005, p. 149). Consequently, in some instances “their aims go far beyond the establishment of some theocracy amenable to their specific deity (i.e. the creation of an Iranian-style Islamic nation either in Algeria, Egypt, or Saudi Arabia). Their goals embrace mystical, almost transcendental, and divinely inspired imperatives or a vehemently anti government of ‘populism’ reflecting far-fetched conspiracy notions based on a volatile mixture of seditious, racial, and religious dicta” (Hoffmann, 1997a, p. 47).

Moreover, as violence “becomes a sacramental or divine duty [it] arguably results in a loosening of constraints on the commission of mass murder” (Hoffmann, 1997b, p. 6). Since the number of these “new terrorist groups without the constraints of using WMD increased significantly” (Hoffmann, 1997b, p. 6), it seems “almost certain that more and more non-state actors will become capable of NBC (nuclear, biological, and chemical) acquisition and use” (Falkenrath, 1998, p. 53).

Therefore, many scholars assume that “(r)eligious cults and groups with a transnational orientation pose the largest threat” (Ivanova & Sandler, 2007, p. 292). Yet, since the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult is “the only example of a terrorist group that has attempted to carry out mass murder with biological toxins and human pathogens” (Rosenau, 2001, p. 290) analysts often concentrate on this case to explain possible motivations for terrorists to use WMD. However, this group is assumed to be “exceptional among terrorist groups” (Cameron, 2000, p. 166). In fact, “no group, before or since Aum have possessed its combination of financial strength, technological capability, and apocalyptical intent” (ibid.) leading not only to the development of operational capabilities to apply CBRN in terrorist assaults, but a “willingness to use it” (Sinai, 2005, p. 152). The latter resulted from the cults religious fundamentals, based on “syncretic mixture of Buddhist, Shinto; Hindu and New Age doctrines” (Rosenau, 2001, p. 291). As the cult’s leader Shoko Asahara taught that “contemporary society was hopelessly decadent and beyond reform, and so it was necessary to create a new alternative to the existing order” (ibid.) Aum adopted an “apocalyptic vision in which it looked forward to the time when the corrupt world of the present would be rightfully destroyed and when a utopia would emerge” (Reader, 1996, p. 90). In order to reach the cult’s ultimate goals, such “were the creation of Armageddon, the toppling of the Japanese government, the subjugation of the Japanese population, and, finally, the establishment of its own form of governance” (Zanders, 1999, pp. 29–30), Asahara believed in “the duty of Aum members to hasten Armageddon” (Gomez, 2005, p. 32). Therefore the believers “saw their mission in saving mankind after Armageddon. Perversely though, they believed that in order to achieve this salvation it was first necessary to destroy the corrupt elements of the world: everyone except themselves” (Cameron, 2000, p. 167). The use of CBRN agents was not only considered as effective, but as a “near mystical” (United States Congress, 1995a) way to reach the cult’s ultimate goals. However, as already mentioned, Aum is considered to be exceptional and “contrary to the views of some experts (e.g. Hoffman 1995; Cameron 1998; Post 2005) religious fundamentalists and antinationalist separatists do not present a significant CBRN concern” (ibid.).

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