Links between terrorism and transnational crime groups

Links between terrorism and transnational crime groups

Given today’s existence of hundreds of terrorist groups and thousands of criminal ones (Schmid, 2005) it is not surprisingly that in “some cases a symbiosis between terrorism and organised crime occurred that did not exist before” (Laqueur, 1999, p. 211). In fact, since the early 1990’s “Western law enforcement agencies have noted an increased reliance on criminal activities by terrorist groups” (Mili, 2006, p. 8) a relationship that seems only natural given that terrorism itself is always a crime (Gorka, 2000). Hence, it is assumed that there is a “close connection between international terrorism and transnational organized crime” (United Nations Security Council, 2001). Some even argue that both criminal activities “bleed into one another” (Makarenko, 2003) and that there is a “possibly irreversible trend towards a convergence of these activities” (Williams & Sanova, 1995, p. 28).

In the following this paper will argue that the linkages between criminal and terrorist activities have increased since the end of Cold War in the early 1990’s. However, the structure of these linkages is contested in the scholarly debate. In order to find a conclusion, this paper will analyze major changes in the structure of terrorist and criminal groups. In a second section the prevailing scenarios of a terrorist-criminal nexus will be outlined and critically discussed.

Some argue that the end of cold war and the collapse of “one of the major sources of state sponsorship – the communist government in the Soviet Union and its puppet regimes in Eastern Europe” (Byman, 2005, p. 1) in the early 1990’s forced quite a few terrorist groups to adopt “criminal activities as source of revenue” (McCarthy, 2003). While in the 1980’s the opinion that “almost every important terrorist group had some ties to at least one supportive government” (Byman, 2005, p. 1) prevailed, it is assumed that since then state sponsorship of terrorism has dramatically decreased. This development gained even more acceleration after the devastating terror attacks of 9/11. In the aftermath of these events the United States initiated a comprehensive war on terror including “over 100 countries […] trying to close down sources of terrorist funding” (Sanderson, 2004, p. 50). As a result of a multilateral counter-terror cooperation it is assumed that of the twenty designated foreign terrorist groups who allegedly “had enjoyed significant state support at one point in their history” (Byman, 2005, p. 3) only nine still do today (ibid.) Therefore “in recent years, […] as state sponsorship has become under increased scrutiny and greater international condemnation” (McCarthy, 2003). Since it is hardly possible for a terrorist group to be not involved in criminal activities as “in recent years there has been a major effort made to criminalize most of the organizational activities of these groups” (Dandurand & Chin, 2004, p. 6). Therefore more terrorist groups had to become self sufficient and the “once distinct line between organized crime and terrorism is blurring rapidly” (Chepesiuk, 2007).

Others argue that globalization processes contributed to the increasing nexus between terrorism and criminality. Though connections between terrorists and criminal organisations existed since decades globalization processes changed dramatically “the speed and frequency of their interaction and the intensity of cooperation between these two forms of transnational crime” (Shelley, 2006, p. 43). As a result of globalization processes, such as fading borders, globalization of markets, or large-scale migration across the globe, the “proliferation of cross border flows and transnational networks” (Castles, 2002, p. 1143) skyrocketed. Since these networks are facilitated by improving communication and transport technologies they are “gaining in strength and salience” (Castles, 2002, p. 1150).In particular the large scale migrations “may radically alter the future prospects for cooperation” (Anderson, 2000), providing both groups with the possibility to spread their activity across borders, either by sending members to foreign countries or by recruiting new members in ethnic communities that are based in targeted nations (Makarenko, 2001).

In fact, due to the rising pressure of law enforcements since the 1990’s, network structures became a crucial principle to ensure the survival of many terrorist and criminal organisations. “Much more than in the past, criminal organisations are networking and cooperating with one another, enabling them to merge expertise and to broaden the scope of activities” (United States Government Interagency Working Group, 2000). Furthermore the U.S. National Intelligence Council noticed that criminal networks “will expand the scale and scope of their activities. They will form loose alliances with one another, with smaller criminal entrepreneurs and with insurgent movements for specific reasons” (National Intelligence Council, 2000, p. 41). The organizational structure of networks inherits a whole range of advantages for crime groups, whether they act on a national or international agenda. Generally, these networks are composed as a set of core and peripheral units and “ideally there is no single, central leadership, command or headquarter – no precise heart or head that can be targeted” (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001, p. 9). Therefore, law enforcements might crack down on peripheral units or cells however, it is even more difficult to get into the core of the network (Williams, 1998, p. 156). Besides this high level of security, it is believed that due to their internal flexibility and loose structure networks enhance the criminal’s capabilities to form co operations that vary in scope, duration or intensity as it is convenient or beneficial to them (Williams, 2001, pp. 75–76). The variety of cooperation ranges from “simple buyer-seller deals, involving relatively small investments, little advance planning, and relatively little interactions between the parties [to] strategic cooperation which encompasses the principles of long-term agreements” (Clawson Patrick L. & Lee, III, 1996, p. 84). Furthermore, a network structure enables criminal groups to expand their activities across borders, therefore offering a whole range of prospects to exploit loopholes in differing law enforcements, conquering new markets and guiding their international operations from save havens such as weak or failed states.

It is believed that just like organized crime groups, terrorists changed their organizational structure from hierarchical system towards “flatter, more decentralized, and often changing webs of groups united by a common goal” (Zanini & Edwards, 2001, p. 30).

Since terrorist groups “have aggressively adopted networked structures in the face of intense counter terror actions” (Dishman, 2005, p. 239) it is estimated that today these less hierarchical groups constitute the majority of active terrorist organisations worldwide (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2000, p. 1), relying more on “shared values and horizontal coordination” (Zanini & Edwards, 2001, p. 33) than on strict vertical structures. Similar to criminals, the network structure provides a range of advantages for terrorists. Depending on the immediate aim communication within the network vary between horizontal and vertical relationships likewise (ibid.), a flexibility that provides high operational security for the core of the terrorist network. On the other side, the network structure offers access to sympathisers in foreign countries and therefore creating new and alternative ways of recruiting members. Moreover, terrorists use the network nodes as a convenient way to transport members or material across national borders. Networks serve terrorists not only for operational purposes; they also provide unprecedented ways to advance the group’s propaganda on an international level. (Mathew & Shambaugh, 2005, p. 619).

In addition to the similar structural organizations of many terrorist and criminal groups, there are some other striking similarities between them. As already mentioned, terrorist groups lost significant incomes due to the decline of state support, although some of them still are able to rise substantial funding from states as is shown in the support of Iran for Hezbollah in Lebanon (Burke, 2006, p. 2). However, to uphold their activities, many terrorist groups “require an enduring and reliable income stream to provide its foundations for its operations” (O'Malley & Hutchinson, 2006, p. 7). Therefore, they engage in criminality just like some organized crime groups use “terrorist attacks against the State to disrupt investigations, intimidate and disrupt law enforcements, coerce judges, or create an environment more conducive to criminal activity” (Dandurand & Chin, 2004, p. 27). Hence either group aims at the provision of “a steady reliable income stream both to finance the endurance practices and to generate profit” (O'Malley & Hutchinson, 2006, p. 7). Furthermore, both groups occupy a position contrary to the general societal interests by the nature of their activities. While forced to plan their activities in secrecy, “their members establish micro-societies with their own distinctive values which are common to all members of the organisation” (Mylonaki, 2002, p. 228). Consequently, within both groups the process of networking is based on internal trust relationships (Helfand, 2003, p. 13). Regarding these and other, here not mentioned similarities, some analysts assume that they “indicate that organized terrorist groups are functionally well-placed to engage in organized crime” (O'Malley & Hutchinson, 2006, p. 7). Moreover, “it has become widely accepted that terrorist groups engage in criminal activities as an operational tactic used to both secure financing and to manipulate established criminal process to access material and know-how” (Makarenko, 2006, p. 1).

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