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The elusive quest for security continues - The European Union's foreign policy and it's implications to transatlantic relations

Master's Thesis 2007 96 Pages

Politics - International Politics - Topic: European Union

Excerpt

Table of contents

List of abbreviations

List of figures

I Introduction
1.1 Object of research and structure
1.2 Main questions
1.3 Method

II General definitions and theory
2.1 Security and the concept of the state
2.2 The international state system
2.3 Global and regional institutions in the security domain
2.4 Security strategies
2.5 Security and integration: the political idea of a community

III The elusive quest for security in Europe
3.1 Realist and liberal conceptions of security
3.1.1 A realist rationality
3.1.2 A liberal argument in a post Cold War era
3.1.3 The theory of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism
3.2 Towards a European cooperation in political matters
3.2.1 From EPC to a CFSP
3.2.2 From Maastricht to Nice
3.3 Institutionalization processes
3.3.1 Major motivation for a CFSP
3.3.2 A European Common Foreign and Security Policy
3.3.3 Structure of the CFSP and the legal background
3.3.4 Development and evolution of the ESDP
3.4 The legal framework of the EU – legal personality disputes

IV Security challenges and transatlantic relations
4.1 CFSP’s structural (institutional) deficits
4.2 Transatlantic relations and security approches
4.3 European defense: a vain endeavor?
4.4 The European Union as a global actor – ESDP missions
4.5 Regional or global power? A segmentary analysis

V Concluding remarks and outlook

Bibliography

Appendix 1: Police missions and military operations since 2003

Appendix 2: Extended Atlantic Alliance

Appendix 3: Extended Atlantic Alliance – direct military influence

List of abbreviations

illustration not visible in this excerpt

List of figures

Figure 1 Change in a Risky System

Figure 2 U.S. Military Spending in comparison to World Military Spending (in absolute numbers)

Figure 3 Global Military Spending,

Figure 4 European Union defense budgets: segmentary, 2004 (in billion USD)

Figure 5 Segmentary Analysis of Global Power

I Introduction

1.1 Object of research and structure

The title of this analysis is based on a book by Simon Duke dealing with the theoretical implications of a common European foreign policy in security and defense matters. The content of the book differs from the content of this paper and is not related to the questions posed in this research.[1]

Part II of this research gives a detailed overview of what security actually means in global politics and how key players understand it. General definitions and theory allows us to understand the major parts of this thesis (part III and IV). Part III describes different approaches to security in IR theory and explains it on the basis of European political integration. The historio-political analysis in this part shows the evolution of a CFSP and the ESDP. Institutionalization processes within the European Union explain the current status of the EU’s foreign policy, which is a status in process without having a clear and defined goal. This part includes the legal dimension of the EU’s foreign policy as well and describes the problematic situation Europeans currently have to face, namely disputes about the legal personality of the European Community and the European Union. Part IV is the second major part of the paper and deals with security challenges and the impact of the EU’s foreign policy on transatlantic relations and/or vice versa. This part has a closer look on the practical side of what the European Union is able and willing to do as a key player in the political, security and military domain in the world. It shows the relations between Europe and the United States and gives a segmentary analysis of Europe’s power in global politics.

1.2 Main questions

The main hypothesis of this research states that the European Union currently is in a phase of creating a real foreign policy, which will let Europe become a major player in global politics, though transatlantic relations remain of essential importance. In short, only cooperation with the United States allows Europe to become a key player in the political spheres of influence worldwide.

This research should answer the following questions:

- What is security in the international state system?
- Does security matter for European integration at all?
- How does different conceptions of security look like and what political guideline do they involve in order to create a secure environment?
- How has European political integration developed and how does foreign policy of the European Union look like today (CFSP/ESDP evolution and development)?
- How important are transatlantic relations in general and with the United States in particular, now and in the future?
- What are the differences and similarities between Europe and the United States regarding security conceptions?
- Is the European Union likely to become a global player or will it remain a powerful, but regional player?

1.3 Method

It is useful to handle this topic based on the relevant academic literature because the topic as a whole is very theoretical. The sources I will use for this paper seem to be very appropriate to the topic dealing with international relations theory and transatlantic relations. Interdisciplinarity is given due to the fact, that there will be a focus on European and international, incorporated in a political science approach. Furthermore, a historio-political analysis shows the development and evolution of the CFSP and the ESDP in the broader context of Europen Union integration from the early 1950s. With reference to European defense, an economic analysis shows the importance of globalization in general and Globalization of Production (GoP) in particular for transatlantic relations, the European Union and the United States as the primary and most developed high-tech player in the field of the defense industry. Political Science (International Relations Theory) provides for the pattern, in which a legal, historical and economic analysis is embedded. On this basis, primary and secondary literature will be used. Primary literature is documents worked out by governments addressing the subject of this research. Secondary literature is academic books and articles in political science journals.

It is essential in a theoretical paper to underline what kind of methodology is going to be used. It is the “theorists’ visions of the world around them are filtered through and colored by their own preferences and perceived interests, expectations, normative commitments, and personal experiences and memories … Facts themselves have no meaning until the theorist has organized them into patterns that themselves may not exist apart from the theorist’s own imagination.[2] Ad hoc adjustments in the form of not recognizing nonpatterns in a theory have to be used rarely, if they does not fit the existing data.[3] This methodological part shows what kind of patterns I intend to set up according to a theoretical progress based on relevant evidence under the assumptions of accumulated knowledge. In international relations, which could be seen as a part of political science to a certain extent under certain aspects, learning about a theory is primarily learning about new facts. It anticipates in a Popperian empiricism, understood as a sophisticated falsificationism, in which the only relevant evidence for a certain problem is the evidence anticipated in a theory or in a theoretical process.[4] Contradictions in the form of suggestions, which may not be true after a certain event took place, are not obstacle to the theorists vision or even inconsistent with a falsified theory, if the analytical character prevails under the new assumption.[5] This may be considered for a theoretical paper in IR and transatlantic relations including a legal analysis.

The overall goal of a paper dealing with theories in progress or in “process”, is not only to answer single questions around which theorists’ interest converge, but to increase knowledge by bringing new standpoints into the theory, which may or may not become relevant evidence.[6] Through the claiming of something to be or even to become relevant evidence under the above mentioned criteria, “theories prove to be constitutive of the research activity.[7] Under this assumptions a theoretical paper is able to answer single questions, related or not related to each other, in an analytical way.

This research identifies the following specific hypotheses subordinated to the main hypotheses:

1. The European Union will become a global key player in the political and military domain, but will remain at the lower end of high politics for a while (ESDP police missions and military operations).
2. Transatlantic relations in the form of the Atlantic Alliance (or extended atlantic alliance) will remain of essential importance in order to achieve the EU’s foreign policy goals.
3. Cooperation in the military domain with the United States will remain the only way for Europe during the process of building up a European military.

II General definitions and theory

2.1 Security and the concept of the state

Security and the concept of the state are closely related to each other in the theory of international relations. Security in short is “the preservation and protection of essential values over time.” The outcome and the time frame is important. This means that security should be achieved to a maximum (the highest degree as possible) and as long as possible (permanent).[8] A permanent condition of security can never be achieved because of what Klaus von Schubert calls “the uncertainty about the future and the lack of trust in the cooperation with other members of the international state system.[9]Uncertainty” furthermore is “something we cannot quantify, we do not know what is going to happen and we don’t know what the probabilities are.”[10] Therefore trust as a value is one of the most basic concepts in international relations theory.[11]

But what is much more important in this case is the definition of essential values, that have to be protected by a security policy. Security Policy can be defined as political goals, strategies and procedures with the effect to prevent war and to keep self determinating policies in your own country.[12] A ‘good’ security policy (strategy) achieves a maxmimum effect with minimum means.[13] In this analysis the term “strategy” will be used instead of “policy” because it makes the substance of the work clear. “A strategy” in fact “is a set of contingency instructions concerning moves in the game, designed to cope with all possible moves, or combination of moves, of the opponent.[14] A policy on the other hand only gives us the information of what the goals and contents of this procedure are.

As we have found out, a security strategy’s task is to protect essential values of a community or society, the political authority in the form of the Westphalian state. The most fundamental values that have to be protected by a state are those which are definining the state per se. Therefore a security strategy is there to protect the physical integrity of the population, the territorial integrity and the political independence (sovereignty).[15] Going back to the the Westphalian Peace as a watershed in inter-state relations, the modern international state system is based on the European system of 1648.[16] With the globalization of the European state system, rules, norms and decision making procedures became relevant for the interaction of all states in the MSS. Sovereignty as a concept was first used in political terms. In short, the principle of sovereignty combined with the impacts of the Westphalian order include the principle of non-intervention (rex est imperator in regno suo), it is only the sovereign who decides upon the religion in his state (cuius regio eius religio) and the principle of the equality of states[17] (each state, no matter if the entitiy is powerful or weak has to be seen as Equal in the state system).[18] In fact, cuius regio eius religio was laid down in the Peace of Augsburg going back to 1555 and gave Lutheranians official status in the Holy Roman Empire. This principle was repeated in 1648.[19] So some elements of statehood have a legal foundation before 1648, but Westphalia is the watershed one can refer to as the formal creation of the state system. Since then the state is the core element of the international state system.[20] This is shown and laid down in the United Nations Charter. Article 2/1 of the UNC says “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.[21] The equality of states therefore is always with us in security strategies and has to be considered as the most basic factor. Changes in the constellation of the system automatically conclude changes and challenges in the security strategies, may it be on the state or on the global level of analysis. Affected by changed security strategies, the question is how and to what degree the interaction of states in the system will be altered.[22]

The term security, as we already have argued, is the protection of essential values, which are the same in each states of the system but political entities show fundamental differences in the way these values are protected.[23] For example, Western style democracies according to the theory of democratic peace are not willing to go to war with each other because the majority of the population is not willing to bear enormous costs and human suffering at the highest degree.[24] Failing States on the other hand are more willing to risk something in order to achieve a higher degree of power in relative terms.[25] The quintessence of this argument is that both could not afford to risk lifes, some states more and some states less. Due to overextension failing states run the risk of becoming failed states and lose the monoploy of violence domestically.[26]

Essential values are used commonly but differentiated. The same is true with the perception of security. According to Critical Security Studies, we have to distinguish between objective and subjective security. Objective security is the absence of threats and dangers under control,[27] while subjective security is the perception, the believe or intution that no such threat or danger exists.[28] The United States after having won the Cold War at the same time created soil for fears that in the end led to 9/11. The U.S. felt secure, indeed security was subjective.[29] The result out of this psychological component is manifold. Two major aspects are. First, you feel secure though you are not and second, you feel in danger though you are relatively safe because of the perception that in IR real safety never exists. The first case is commonly associated with appeasement policy, the latter with the security dilemma.[30]

In the next chapters the international state system, organizations in security and security strategies will be described in further detail.

2.2 The international state system

The term “state system” is very often used but seldomly defined. For this paper a clear-cut definition is essential for further understanding. A more general and very often used definition is that the state system is “a group of states, that shows common political interests and values, geopolitical affiliation, psychological closeness or ideological community as a basis but there is no binding legal order behind it.[31]

I would like to give a more precise definition of the state system: It is important only to speak of a state system, if the collection (of states) is at maximum. That means that the room of transaction between states cannot be contained in another bigger room of the same type. If there would be a bigger and similar room of transaction, the system could only be seen and analyzed as a subsystem.

The second important criterion means that the political and diplomatic elite must have at minimum two problems, direct or indirect, of high politics in international relations like security, capability or power differences or dissimilarities.[32] Problems could also be on an indirect way (not everybody directly involved but via a third party), the third criterion makes clear that all the political and diplomatic elite must show problems of this fashion.[33]

2.3 Global and regional institutions in security

After World War II (WWII) a so-called political universalism set in with the United Nations Organization (UNO) as figurehead.[34] The structure of the state system started to reorganize itself after WWII by regionalization in military and political respect. Regional organizations like the European Community (EC), the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Organization of African Unity (now African Union), the Organization of American States (OAS) or the CSCE started to involve states in their region next to the universal involvement of being a member of the UN. The self-determination of peoples after WWII was an important part of regionalization in an emerging bipolar world order.[35]

The first Gulf War and the wars in former Yugoslavia started to crumble the euphoria of peace in a globalized world with a new market economy in the 1990s.[36] What happens today is that the state system faces more crises and conflicts, but to a higher degree within than among states. Civil wars are on the rise and quite often it is not the state that controls the armed forces anymore, but it is so-called warlords or modern mercenaries.[37] These crises altogether have common features. They could escalate very quickly after being latent for a very long time. This realistic view is comparable with a Hobbesian state of nature, where the worst thing that could ever happen is right under the surface and ready to erupt.[38] The second feature is that most of the crises occur in very poor, mostly Sub-Saharan African states, which are not of geopolitical and economic importance for the dominant world powers.[39] The third element these conflicts have in common is that they are fought in an asymetric way. One power is often much better equipped than the opponent (the conflict in Sudan is one example of asymetric warfare).[40]

The division between the Global North and the Global South could be best explained next to economic issues arguing with asymmetries in global politics.[41] This is the challenge for regional and global security organizations like the EU, NATO and the OSCE in the 21st century.

2.4 Security strategies

As argued above, the outcome of subjective security is a security dilemma.[42] In this chapter three models will be elaborated to show the fundamental differences of strategies in IRT.

Collective Security is one type of strategy – a coalition has to be built – in which a group of nations agree not to attack each other and to defend each other against an attack from outside or from another state, if such an attack is made and regarded as lawful under IL (the Falklands crisis was one of the last wars where the classical reason to fight a war was the invasion of another sovereign state’s territory). Martin Griffiths sums the principle of collective security up with the musketeer phrase “an attack against one, is an attack against all”.[43] The UN is the most important organization being built on collective security. With collective security the organization’s collection of states should be at maximum to give a sufficient base of the security concept. Not every state, especially smaller ones, cannot afford to protect their own from an overwhelming powerful aggressor. Those will be protected by the others.[44]

Collective security differs from Collective Defense. Collective defense is a coalition of states, which agree to defend their own group from an outside attack by another state or by another group of coalition. In this case the coalition couldn’t be at maximum collection on a global level because there must be an outside aggressor. NATO and the Warsaw Pact are examples of collective defense security organizations.[45]

The next security strategy differs from the above mentioned in the general perception because it is not based on the idea of a security dilemma. The security concept of Cooperative Security is based on the idea of common security. Security in this case need not be a value for which states have to compete in the classical sense or to protect each other from losing security to someone else. Cooperative security is mainly about all approaches through which competitors in global politics can achieve security with each other and not against each other.[46]

There are three approaches to enhance security within the framework of one of the above listed security strategies:[47]

- Enhance your own potential to cope with dangers and threats. The classical response would be an arms race.
- Reduce the damage potential of the others. The classical response in this case would be to engage in disarmament or arms control.[48]
- Reduce uncertainty and provide space for negotiations, integration and cooperation.

2.5 Security and integration: the political idea of a community

My argumentation is that security and integration are objects and subjects at the same time. Both function reciprocal. If we look at integration, the theory of democratic peace is a cornerstone for integration of any kind.[49] Rules, norms and procedures are guaranteed by common institutions and overcome the security dilemma.[50] But what constitutes integration and what does it mean in the European context?

A definition by A.J.R. Groom best shows what integration in the European context means and how important it is for a European Security Strategy (ESS). It is worth quoting the whole passage:

Integration can be best understood as a process. It incolves (a) a movement towards increased cooperation between states [structural functionalist approach]; (b) a gradual transfer of authority to supranational institutions; (c) a gradual homogenisation of values; (d) the coming into being of a global civil society and with it, the construction of new forms of political community.[51]

Integration can take place on the system or on the regional level. The European integration is an example of regional integration in the spheres of economics, politics and security. For further integration in the political part, safety and security is absolutely needed. The making of security is important for integration.[52] Integration and security therefore go hand in hand. This is the starting point for the next chapter, which deals with the historical background and the development of the European Union.[53]

Within the context of the European Union, a essential distinction between the EU’s external relations and the EU’s foreign policy shall be conducted. The traditional terminology within the EU system describes external relations as the sum of all economic relations with non member states of the Union and international organizations. Foreign policy is described as the rest of all foreign relations, including the security dimension after the establishment of a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Because of the missing of a security, defence, political and military dimension in “external relations” before Maastricht, economic relations have been referred to external relations of the European Community.[54] With the treaty on the European Union, the European Political Cooperation was replaced by a CFSP.[55] Now a security dimension was consciously integrated, but the terminology did not change. As far this thesis is concerned, it will exclusively deal with the foreign policy of the European Union.[56]

III The elusive quest for security in Europe

3.1 Realist and liberal conceptions of security

In the following, a realist and liberal path for security is shown in the context of European integration and transatlantic relations. After this, the difference between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism will be explained, not necessarily only dealing with the European integration. Part 3.1 elaborates what security conceptions, understandings and perceptions became manifest in IR theory. Parts 3.2 to 3.4 especially have a focus on the European integration and show major aspects of the “elusive quest for security in Europe.” Why “elusive” will be seen in part IV by having a focus on what Europe can do in global politics.

3.1.1 A realist rationality

The realist path to peace or road to security as it is sometimes referred to, was really dominant during the Cold War period.[57] In this view, states are the only important and therefore major actors in global politics and their behavior is directed through their interests such as the maximization of security or the increase of power, speaking in power political terms according to Morgenthau in a world after the shock of the Second World War. So maximizing power and self-interest are the decisive drifing forces.[58] Furthermore, sovereignty is the essential mean and basis of power for the only actor, namely the state in the form of the Westphalian authoritative political entity.[59] Tendencies that sovereignty is eroding as postinternational politics suggests (extraterritoriality, increasingly powerful private companies such as TNCs or eroding state authorities)[60] are not included because the state remains the final decision maker. In short, the principle of sovereignty combined with the effects of the Westphalian order include the principle of non-intervention, it is only the sovereign who decides and the principle of the equality of states[61] Under these states act in an “anarchical environment.” According to Hedley Bull, there is no order in this society or system. The only thing that is important is self-help for self-interested actors by having a complete absence of trust.[62] From that point of view, we are back with the Hobbesian idea of a state of nature. A “bellum omnium contra omnes[63] would be the result in a world with no rules, norms or laws. This can always happen to each society.[64]

Neorealists on the other hand argue that there are other actors as well, though the states remain the most important and powerful[65] in terms of capabilities, influence and power.[66] Two different approaches are important for a neorealist conception. In very short, we distinguish between offensive defensive neorealism. The former argues that states have to do everything according to their national self-interest[67] with the aim to increase power in the international state system with a focus on power- and geopolitcs.[68] Preventive strategies in economics and warfare could be seen as such approaches.[69] This is especially true for the WMD debate in recent years.[70] The latter sees things quite different. The objective is not to increase power through offensive means (sometimes closely related to Machiavellistic ideas), but to increase security. Offensive approaches do involve the use of military power to achieve goals. Defensive approaches does not necessarily.[71]

In the Waltzian view, the balance of power system does not necessarily provide peace, but order and stability. By definition, the balance of power is far more than – as often argued – a European policy to reduce violence during a certain period of time. It became a model of creating stability in the system. A bipolar system is more stable than a multipolar systems because each actor knows who or what the target is and what the capabilities in military respect are. In contrast, power transition will always occur because of military, social or economic changes. This then creates a multipolar structure.[72] In the Waltzian model, an equilibrium certainly is achieved through a balance, but grand players are not always of the same power. Their structural position changes and from time to time actor A becomes more powerful than actor B or any other actor in the system. Though actors are not of the same powers in relative terms, no actor will get too powerful in order to overthrow any other.[73] The system therefore remains bipolar (in the Cold War context) because power and stability create polarization around only two poles. So the polarity does not change due to dynamics in power relations, may the polarity be bi- or a stable multipolar world.[74] In a “risky” system or “risky environment”, change definitely occurs. Things are not that stable. Transferring the Waltzian system model into a non zero sum game with the assumptions of using preemptive and preventive strategies in that game, the Waltzian model of change can be used in the context of explaining the 2002 U.S. NSS as well (ceteris paribus) in a long history cycle model by excluding Modelski’s original argument that change in the cycle can only occur through a “general war resulting in a new world order.” This would be a system transforming war.[75] That the opposite was (at least once) true showed the bloodless end of the Cold War.

With regard to the 2002 U.S. NSS, anticipatory self-defense is claimed. It states clearly that the U.S. will not allow another political authority to become of “equal” power.[76] Stephen Brooks argues (by quoting Robert Gilpin) that “MNCs can lead to the dispersion of advanced technologies from the leading powers, thereby allowing rising powers to catch up more quickly.” Furthermore he argues the only power in territorial size, economy and population today, which could become equal to the United States is China (state A in figure 1).[77] Globalization of Production (GoP) comes in, which allows the argumentation that states remain the key players in global politics,[78] but MNCs in the security domain gain power in the form that they are influencing security behavior of states.[79] GoP in the defense industry says that also Great Powers can no longer afford (in money terms) to build each high tech weapon system autonomously on their own. This creates risk and accelerates weapon production. Though some influences from other worldviews are integrated in the transformed Risky System, the overall assumptions are still in line with Waltz. Figure 1 shows the above mentioned ideas in a graph. It also states the basic idea of a foreign policy including anticipatory self-defense in the form of preemptive and preventive action. In the following chapters of part IV about transatlantic relations, further detail about the U.S. NSS will be provided and prevention and preemption will be described in detail in that section.

Figure 1: Change in a Risky System

illustration not visible in this excerpt

Power and the balance of power are the central concepts in a realist worldview with an “inadequate account of change in international relations.”[80]The stability of a bipolar” world during the Cold War created a leadership in the West (a benign hegemon) and in the East (a malign hegemon ).[81] Each hegemon must be concerned with alliance building, which makes the system stable and makes it unnecessary and unimaginable to become a tri- or multipolar world.[82] Shifts in the perception(s) of the hegemon may lead to shifts in the polarity of the world order.[83] In the West the dominant military, security and defense strategy was with the United States and the Atlantic Alliance.[84] Under this special circumstances, the European Community institutionalized more in favor of economic cooperation than in political integration. According to a basic assumption by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, the political cooperation – with it’s beginnings in the 1950s – didn’t work because interdependence was not high enough in the military domain because European states mostly relied on the transatlantic alliance with the United States as the hegemonic power.[85] The genuine “liberal” idea of complex interdependence has close ties to the neorealist school.[86] Complex interdependence is a good indicator in a chapter on realism, but will be elaborated in the next chapter on the liberal concept in a world after the Cold War.

[...]


[1] Simon Duke (2000), The Elusive Quest for European Security, From EDC to CFSP, Hampshire.

[2] Yale H. Ferguson, Richard W. Mansbach (2004), Remapping Global Politics, History’s revenge and future shock, Cambridge, p.35.

[3] Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, Sidney Verba (1994), Designing Social Inquiry, Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, New Jersey, p.21.

[4] Imre Lakatos, Alan Musgrave (1970), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, London, p.123.

[5] Stephen Edelston Toulmin (1958), The Use of Argument, New York, p.238.

[6] Imre Lakatos, Alan Musgrave (1970), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, London, pp.120-127.

[7] Thomas S. Kuhn (1970), The Structure of Scientific Revolution, 2nd edition, Chicago, p.109.

[8] Stephen G. Brooks (2005), Producing Security, Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the Changing Calculus of Conflict, Princeton, p.58.

[9] Klaus von Schubert (1992), Von der Abschreckung zur gemeinsamen Sicherheit, Baden-Baden, p.11.; A definition of the state system will be given in the next chapter.

[10] Robert J. Samuelson (2002), “The erosion of confidence”, in: Newsweek, June 17, p.45.

[11] Andrew H. Kvdd (2005), Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, New Jersey, p.34.

[12] Emanueal Adler, Michael Barnett (2000), “Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective”, in: Emanuel Adler, Michael Barnett, Security Communities, Cambridge, 3-29, pp.15.

[13] Means in that case are monetary and human. Casualties should be low or near zero.

[14] Robert O. Keohane, Stanley Hoffmann (1993), “Structure, Strategy, and International Roles“, in: Robert Keohane, After the Cold War, Harvard, p.392.; See Harald Löberbauer (2007), The EU as a global player: External Relations – CFSP and ESDP from a theoretical point of view, Seminar Paper, Diplomatic Academy Vienna.; Charles Kegley, Eugene R. Wittkopf (2004), World Politics: Trend and Transformation. 9th ed. Belmont/London, Keyterm: strategy.

[15] Michael Akehurst (1989), A modern introduction to international law 6th ed., London, Chapter 2.

[16] Antonio Cassese (2001), International Law (handbook), Oxford, pp.33-42.

[17] The equality of states is still most important in the UN system, no matter of power, size in territory and population or economy.; W. Gordon East (1967,1999), The Geography behind History, How physical environment affects historical Events, London, p.180.

[18] Hendrik Spruyt (2000), “The End of Empire and the Extension of the Westphalian System: the normative basis of the modern state order”, in: James A. Caporaso, Continuity and Change in the Westphalian Order, Oxford, 65-93, pp.72-77.

[19] Kalevi J. Holsti (1991), Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989, Cambridge Studies, New York, p.34.

[20] With the French Revolution the aspect of the “natio”, which means tribe in the original meaning of the word, came in. It is commonly argued that the concept of the “sovereign” state has been replaced by the concept of the “nation-state”. Indeed, a sovereign state according to the Westphalian order can be a nation-state or not, but – and what is much more important – a nation can also be without a state. A state per definitionem and a nation per definitionem are slightly different. It is often the case that in the territory of one state many nations could be found and on the other hand one single nation could be spread amongt different states. The importance of the French Revolution is to show that since then (again as a watershed) most states are also defined as nations in the international state system. This is from where the term inter-natio comes from instead of inter-state. Fancis Fukuyama (2004), State Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st century, New York, p.ix.

[21] United Nations Charter at URL: http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter1.htm

[22] Hedley Bull (2002), The Anarchical Society, A Study of Order in World Politics, New York, pp.123,124.

[23] This is even true for so-called rogue-states, failing or failed states. The most essential values have to be protected by authoriatarian regimes as well.

[24] Edward D. Mansfield, Jack Snyder (1995), “Democratization and War”, in: Foreign Affairs, Volume 74, Number 3, May 1995, 79-98, pp.79-83.

[25] A failed state has no control of the state anymore. The monopoly of violence is no longer in the hands of the government. Due to political, economic and social mismanagement people are no longer willing to act in the state’s or the government’s interest and try to destabilize the political system. This very often ends up with an ethnic division of the country. A failing state on the other hand is a state, in which the monopoly of violence and the ability to act within the society is still there but is considered to decline in the near future. A failing state therefore is on the way to become a failed state. Failed states very often cause conflicts and crises, which sometimes didn’t stay local but spill-over to other countries. See Charles Kegley, Eugene R. Wittkopf (2004), World Politics: Trend and Transformation. 9th ed. Belmont/London, pp.242,282.

[26] Herfried Münkler (2006), Der Wandel des Krieges, Göttingen, p.266.

[27] Threats include additional psychological volitional elements. The will to damage or destroy values is included. This lies in the future. Dangers and risks are security problems without psychological problems. See: Hanspeter Neuhold: presentation on international terrorism. The difference between threats and dangers. Diplomatic Academy Vienna (2006).

[28] Barry Buzan, Ole Waever (2003), Regions and Powers, The Structure of International Security, Cambridge, pp.6-10.

[29] Zbigniew Brzezinski (2007), Second Chance, Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower, New York, p.89.

[30] Martin Griffiths, Terry O’Callaghan (2003), International Relations: The Key Concepts, London, pp.4-5,291-293.

[31] Brockhaus Encyclopedia at URL: http://www.ubs.sbg.ac.at/ubs/cdrom/net/ key word: state system.

[32] In IRT high politics is usually considered as security politics and policies. Low politics on the other hand deals with economy, culture or Soft Power. The structure of these two is usually different. High Politics has an hierarchical order with a clear-cut preferential treatment of values, actors and the means of politics. Low Politics has no clear-cut hierarchical order. Elements can be used interchangeable between and within certain policy measures, actors and values. See: Anselm Skuhra (2001), International Relations Theory, Salzburg, p.13.; Joseph S. Nye Jr. (2004), Soft Power, The means to Success in World Politics, New York, pp-1-33.

[33] This definition is part of several papers I wrote in IR studies.

[34] The United Nations was formally created as the successor of the League of Nations, but in reality it was the continuation of the so-called Anti Hitler Coalition of the Big Three (The Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States of America). This coalition was also known in the U.S. and GB as United Nations against Germany during WWII. See Antony Best (2005), International History of the Twentieth Century, London, pp.123-144.

[35] United Nations Charter. Article 1/2: Self-Determination of Peoples … to strengthen universal peace.

[36] Kenneth M. Pollack (2002), The Threatening Storm: The Case für Invading Iraq, New York, pp.36-42.

[37] Luc Reychler (1998), “The Art of Conflict Prevention: Theory and Practice” in: Werner Bauwens, Luc Reychler, The Art of Conflict Prevention, New York, 1–21, pp.16,17-21.

[38] Richard Tuck (2002), The Rights of War and Peace, Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant, Oxford, p.114.

[39] Paul Rogers (2000), Losing Control, Global Security in the Twenty-first Century, London, pp.109,110.

[40] Herfried Münkler (2005), The new wars. Hamburg, pp.35-41.

[41] Charles Kegley, Eugene R. Wittkopf (2004), World Politics: Trend and Transformation. 9th ed. Belmont/London, pp.202-219 (Global South vs. Global North), 424-433 (Characteristics of Wars within States).

[42] Andrew H. Kvdd (2005), Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, New Jersey, pp.34,35.; The basic idea behind the security dilemma is that states do not trust each other. They are not sure what the other state is doing and what the opponent will do in the future. This mistrust leads to precautionary measures which are in general a buildup of the state’s armed forces. Armament of the state A becomes the threat of the state B. Therefore also the second starts armament. The result is an arms race.

[43] Martin Griffiths, Terry O’Callaghan (2003), International Relations: The Key Concepts, London, p.38.

[44] Nico Krisch (2001), Selbstverteidigung und kollektive Sicherheit, Berlin, pp.122-134.

[45] Martin Griffiths, Terry O’Callaghan (2003), International Relations: The Key Concepts, London, p.39.

[46] Martin Griffiths, Terry O’Callaghan (2003), International Relations: The Key Concepts, London, p.41.

[47] See Barry Buzan, Ole Waever (2003), Regions and Powers, The Structure of International Security, Cambridge; Craig A. Snyder (1999), “Regional Security Structures”, in: Craig A. Snyder, Contemporary Security and Strategy, New York, 102-120.; Craig A. Snyder (1999),”Contemporary Security and Strategy”, in: Craig A. Snyder, Contemporary Security and Strategy, New York, 1-13.; Anselm Skuhra (2001), International Relations Theory, Salzburg.; Luc Reychler (1998), “The Art of Conflict Prevention: Theory and Practice” in: Werner Bauwens, Luc Reychler, The Art of Conflict Prevention, New York, 1–21.

[48] Disarmament is the elimination of military significant numbers of weapons in quantity and quality. Arms control on the other hand is characterized as a measure designed to slightly reserve the arms race, to “freece your arsenals” as it was used to be called during the Cold War. See Martin Griffiths, Terry O’Callaghan (2003), International Relations: The Key Concepts, London, pp.6,81.

[49] Martin Griffiths, Terry O’Callaghan (2003), International Relations: The Key Concepts, London, p.66,67.

[50] These three elements constitute at the same time the basic characteristics of international regimes. Klaus Faupel (1984), "Internationale Regime als Gegenststände für sozialwissenschaftlich Forschung“, in: Jahrbuch der Universität Salzburg 1981-1983, Salzburg, 94-105, pp.99.

[51] A.J.R. Groom reader on IRT, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna (2006).

[52] Heiko Borchert (1999), Europas Sicherheitsarchitektur, Erfolgsfaktoren- Bestandsaufnahme- Handlungsbedarf, Baden-Baden, pp.136-138.

[53] See Harald Löberbauer (2007), The EU as a global player: External Relations – CFSP and ESDP from a theoretical point of view, Seminar Paper, Diplomatic Academy Vienna.

[54] Neil Winn, Christopher Lord (2001), EU Foreign Policy beyond the nation-state, Joint Actions and institutional Analysis of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, New York, pp.15-21.

[55] Treaty on the European Union (Maastricht Treaty) at URL: http://europa.eu/scadplus/treaties/maastricht_en.htm

[56] Anthony Forster, William Wallace (2000), “Common Foreign and Security Policy”, in: Helen Wallace, William Wallace, Policy-making in the European Union, 4th Edition, Oxford, 461-492, p.465.

[57] Charles Kegley, Eugene R. Wittkopf (2004), World Politics: Trend and Transformation. 9th ed. Belmont/London, p.531.

[58] Morgenthau, Hans (1946). Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York. Hans J. Morgenthau (2006), “Six principles of political realism”, in: Phil Williams, Donald M. Goldstein, Jay M. Shafritz, Classic Readings and Contemporary Debates in International Relations, 3rd edition, Belmont, 57-63, p.59.

[59] Yale H. Ferguson, Richard W. Mansbach (2006), Postinternationalism and IR theory, Paper prepared for the Millennium Conference 2006: “Theory of ‘the international’ today”, London School of Economics and Political Science, 21-22 October 2006, p.2.

[60] On postinternational worldview see James N. Rosenau (1995), "Sovereignty in a Turbulent World”, in: Gene M. Lyons, Michael Mastanduno, Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention, Baltimore, 191-227, p.193.

[61] Hendrik Spruyt (2000), “The End of Empire and the Extension of the Westphalian System: the normative basis of the modern state order”, in: James A. Caporaso, Continuity and Change in the Westphalian Order, Oxford, 65-93, pp.72-77.

[62] Hedley Bull (2002), The Anarchical Society, A Study of Order in World Politics, New York, p.8.

[63] A war of each against all.

[64] An example would be the numerous conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s. The Hobbesian state of nature erupted in a very brutal form due to nationalism after having suppressed ‘nations’ for more than 40 years by the Tito regime. Nationalism in that particular case was always under the surface ready to erupt in a very brutal and misanthropical way. Edgar Hösch (2002), Geschichte der Balkanländer, Von der Frühzeit bis zur Gegenwart, München, p.264.

[65] Michael C. Williams (2005), The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations, Cambridge, p.134.

[66] Power can also be defined and compared to money. It is simply an instrument that is used for the achievement of goals or the defending of other goals that can only be achieved if you have power. Goals can be prestige, territory, or security. Influence is with the others and not a decision that is enforced upon the others by one power. Influence and capability means that a state can do something in the direction the state want this to be but the outcome is uncertain. More on Power and influence in chapter 4.5.; See Klaus Faupel (1999), "Zum Stellenwert der Macht in der internationalen Politik. Eine systematische Übersicht über den Objektbereich", in: Peter R. Weilemann, Hanns J. Küsters, Günter Buchstab, Macht und Zeitkritik, Festschrift für Hans-Peter Schwarz zum 65. Geburtstag (Studien zur Politik, Band. 34), Paderborn, 477-492, p.484.

[67] From a critical theory standpoint, a national interest is more or less an instrument of defining what the interest of a country is. Has it always been the national interest of the United States to overthrow the Saddam regime in Baghdad? Certainly not. From a standpoint of national and homeland security, a national interest in vital interests of a state such as military means, sovereignty, defense or for some countries neutrality, is a good thing in order to create a regime based on one argument, namely, who is against the national interest in vital interests of the sate could be seen as a traitor. Assumptions are based on Stephen D. Krasner (1978), Defending the National Interest, Raw materials investments and U.S. foreign policy, New Jersey, pp.35-55.; See The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002) at URL: http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.

Condoleezza Rice defines the national interest as to be “replaced with ‘humanitarian interests’ or the interests of the ‘international community’. Her idea that power matters underlines my argumentation. Hence, the national interest as she would interpret it is equal to self-interest of states in an anarchical environment. See Condoleezza Rice (2000), “Promoting the National Interest”, in: Foreign Affairs, Volume 19, Number 1, January/February 2000, p.47.

[68] John J. Mearsheimer (2001), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York, pp.32-43.

[69] Preventive and preemptive attempts are sometimes used interchangeably. There is a distinction between preventive and preemptive attempts according to the time frame and the probability. This is often used in the context of anticipatory self-defense. On the one hand, preemptive means immanent (time wise) and with high propability (if not certainty). This requires an obvious intention and a military intervention. Preventive self-defense is against an attack in the future. Here it is less certain that an attack will take place. In general this form of intervention is regarded as unlawful under IL. See David Tucker (1997), Skirmishes at the edge of Empire, The United States and International Terrorism, Westport, pp.99-102 (prevention defined), p.103 (preemption defined).; Francis Fukuyama (2007), America at the Crossroads, Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy, New Haven, p.83.

[70] John G. Ikenberry (2002), “America’s Imperial Ambitions”, in: Foreign Affairs, Volume 81, Number 5, September/October 2002, 44-60, pp.44,45.

[71] Kenneth N. Waltz (2006), “The origins of war in neorealist theory”, in: Phil Williams, Donald M. Goldstein, Jay M. Shafritz, Classic Readings and Contemporary Debates in International Relations, 3rd edition, Belmont, 63-73, pp.64-66.

[72] Kenneth N. Waltz (2000), “Structural Realism after the Cold War”, in: International Security, Volume 25, Number 1, Summer 2000, 5-41, p.13.

[73] John J. Mearsheimer (2001), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York, pp.366-371.

[74] A distinction between polarity and polarization is necessary. The first is the degree to which the global system revolves around one or more extremely powerful states, or poles, as power concentrates in a single power, is distributed between two main powers or among three or more great powers. The second means the degree to which states cluster (in alliances) around the most powerful members of the state system. Charles Kegley, Eugene R. Wittkopf (2004), World Politics: Trend and Transformation. 9th ed. Belmont/London, p.541.

[75] Charles Kegley, Eugene R. Wittkopf (2004), World Politics: Trend and Transformation. 9th ed. Belmont/London, p.423.

[76] Alan M. Stull (2005), “A strong NATO is essential to the United States National Security Strategy”, in: Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Philadelphia, 1-24, p.3.

[77] Stephen G. Brooks (2005), Producing Security, Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the Changing Calculus of Conflict, Princeton, p.55.; Harm de Blij (2005), Why Geography Matters, Three Challenges facing America: Climate Change, The Rise of China, and Global Terrorism, New York, p.133.

[78] Stephen G. Brooks (2005), Producing Security, Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the Changing Calculus of Conflict, Princeton, p.51.

[79] Susan Strange (1996), The retreat of the state, The diffusion of power in the world economy, Cambridge, p.6.

[80] John Barkdull (1995), “Waltz, Durkheim, and International Relations: The International System as anAbnormal Form”, in: The American Political Science Review, Volume 89, Number 3, September 1995, 669-680, p.669.

[81] Christopher Layne (2006), The Peace of Illusions, American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present, New York, p.97.

[82] Kenneth N. Waltz (2006), “The stability of a bipolar world”, in: Phil Williams, Donald M. Goldstein, Jay M. Shafritz, Classic Readings and Contemporary Debates in International Relations, 3rd edition, Belmont, 98-106, p.103.

[83] Barry Buzan (December 2006), „An English School Perspective on ‚What kind of World Order?’”, in: Cooperation and Conflict, Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, Volume 41, Number 4, December 2006, 364-370, p.366.

[84] Zbigniew Brzezinski (2004), The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership, New York, p.95.

[85] Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye (2001), Power and Interdependence, Harrisonburg, pp.20,21.

[86] Indeed both Keohane and Nye have been traditional realists over a long period of time. In the 1980s and 1990s both did show elements of liberalism in their argumentation. Robert Keohane later became a neoconservative. As we will discuss later, neoconservativism shows elements of traditional liberalism.

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2007
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Title: The elusive quest for security continues - The European Union's foreign policy and it's implications to transatlantic relations