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A Troika of perceptions. The influence of Bush, Powell and Rumsfeld on the Creation of the USA Patriot Act of 2001

Elaboration 2007 23 Pages

Politics - International Politics - Region: USA

Excerpt

The researcher was confronted with so many challenges on how the previous research proposal (Western perceptions about political Islam will lead to Western policies against Muslim or not) will be defended in oral and written. In light of the previous meetings and discussions with suggestions taken from Dr. Carlos and fellow colleagues, the researcher has come up with a definite proposal.

AFTER 9/11: A TROIKA OF PERCEPTIONS OF PRESIDENT GEORGE WALKER BUSH, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE COLIN LUTHER POWELL, AND

FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD HENRY RUMSFELD

ON THE CREATION OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT OF 2001

What are you investigating? Why?

The researcher is investigating on the perceptions of the three leaders in maneuvering and speeding up the legislation of the controversial USA PATRIOT Act that after the infamous Sept. 9, 2001 event, this act was enacted in less than one month and thirteen days in the Senate and approved (Oct. 26, 2001)[1] by Pres. Bush immediately.

The purpose of this study is to assess the schema of the three US leaders using Operational Code analysis through the Verbs In Context System method of content analysis in influencing in the creation of the said law. This will also serve if the perceptions of the three US leaders are consonance with a certain pattern of political belief[2], that somehow affect the thinking of other leaders as manifested in creating anti-terrorism laws worldwide.

Problem:

Are perceptions of political leaders specifically by Pres. Bush, former Sec. of State Powell and former Sec. of Defense Rumsfeld enough to influence in the process of legislating the USA PATRIOT Act during the heights of 9/11 attack?

The study will concentrate on how these three political leaders focuses on a set of beliefs in response to the 9/11 event, which paves the way for the creation of an anti-terrorism law—the USA PATRIOT Act (U niting and S trengthening A merica by P roviding A ppropriate T ools R equired to I ntercept and O bstruct T errorism Act of 2001).[3]

Hypothesis:

If the perceptions of these three leaders (Pres. Bush, former Sec. of State Powell, & former Sec. of Defense Rumsfeld) have influenced in the creation of the USA PATRIOT Act after the 9/11 catastrophe.

Putative relationship of the independent and dependent variables:

IV DV

Perceptions of Pres. Bush,

Sec. of State Powell, & ---à USA PATRIOT Act

Sec. of Defense Rumsfeld of 2001

What have others done within the subject area?

A number of literatures that were surveyed which resulted to take operational code in analyzing and conceptualizing the schemata of political leaders. It suggests reliability in using content analysis as the technique for assessing these leaders and in the prediction of their leadership.[4] (Survey of Literature)

- Samuel Berwyn Robison had done an empirical research on U.S. foreign policy that has largely assumed of president’s influence is subordinate to global and domestic political constraints. This idea is given further weight by the fact that, even within the political psychology literature, there is scant large-n, quantitative evidence supporting the notion that leaders matter. This study is an attempt to explore the influence of U.S. presidential psychological characteristics on foreign policy actions through assessment of two operational code constructs: “image of the political universe” (P-1), and “strategic preferences” (I-1). This is assessed through an extensive sample of operational code beliefs for every president from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush. The dependent variable of policy actions is measured with event data. Findings show that previous actions by the U.S. toward the Middle East, previous actions by Middle Eastern states toward the U.S., and the president’s perceived image of the political universe are significantly related to foreign policy outcomes. This supports the policy continuity argument that pre-existing policies influence U.S. policies in the present, the policy reciprocation/escalation argument that the U.S. is influenced by what other states do, and the psychological argument that elites influence outcomes based on their personal belief systems.

- In Stephen G. Walker and Mark Schafer on “The Operational Codes of Bill Clinton and Tony Blair: Belief Systems or Schemata?” they explore whether leaders matter in re-enforcing, qualifying, or undermining the assumption of the cultural explanation for the democratic peace. Do the beliefs of leaders make a significant difference as causal mechanisms in determining if democracies are more pacifistic than non-democracies and in explaining why democracies (almost) never fight one another? The examination of Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Bill Clinton reveals evidence that undermines the monadic version and qualifies the dyadic version of the democratic peace argument. Monadically, Blair’s general operational code does not exhibit unabashedly pacifistic orientations toward any states, and Clinton’s general operational code is unconditionally pacifistic in dealing only with some states. Dyadically, it is likely that both leaders will take the initiative in moving toward a settlement in a deadlocked dispute with other democracies. The analysis suggests that operational codes as causal mechanisms are better conceptualized as schemata than as belief systems.

- In another expound domain of study as investigated by Stephen G. Walker and Mark Schafer, “Democratic Leaders and the Democratic Peace: The Operational Codes of Tony Blair and Bill Clinton.” It reveals that both leaders view democracies as more friendly than non-democracies, and they have significantly less cooperative beliefs toward the latter than toward the former, a difference that extends to the behavior of their respective governments during the Kosovo conflict. They also find that individual differences in the operational codes of the two leaders matter in the management of conflict with non-democracies; the leaders’ exhibit opposite leadership styles and behavior associated with the domestic political culture of the two states. Overall, these results support the dyadic version of the democratic peace and suggest that the conflict behavior of democratic states depends upon the beliefs and calculations of their leaders in dealing with non-democracies.

- In “Systematic Procedures for Operational Code Analysis: Measuring and Modeling Jimmy Carter’s Operational Code” by Walker, Schafer and Young, they introduce a new scoring system for doing operational code analysis and test its reliability and validity by measuring and modeling President Jimmy Carter’s operational code. Using speeches from public record, they construct indices for the operational code construct. Based upon the valences and scaled intensities of verbs uttered in the speeches. President Jimmy Carter’s views of the political universe and approaches to political action in different issue areas are identified and compared. The results of the analysis provide reasonable support for the face, construct, and content validity of the operational code indices. They found out that there’s statistically significant shifts occurred in his views of the Soviet Union and others in the political universe and his approach to political action regarding the conduct of US-Soviet relations and other issues.

- “The Operational Codes of Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung: The Last Cold Warriors?” by Akan and Johnna Malici, assumed that important mechanisms of continuity and change in communist states are situated in the belief systems of their leaders and that the years between 1985 and 1991 were a catalytic period. What did Fidel Castro of Cuba and Kim Il Sung of North Korea learn from the end of the Cold War? Their belief systems are examined prior to 1985 and after 1991, i.e., before and after the collapse of other communist regimes. If learning has occurred, it should be reflected in a comparison of their beliefs for these time periods. The results from ANOVA analyses indicate that Fidel Castro engaged in some learning but Kim Il Sung did not. This finding is complemented by the results of a MANOVA analysis, which indicate that the end of the Cold War had only a modest impact on Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung, independent of their specific personalities. They conclude by drawing attention to the ensuing debate between structural- and agent-level theorizing and by giving some suggestions for future research.

- A study presented by Devlen, “Coercive Diplomacy and Operational Code Analysis: The Case of Slobodan Milosevic.” In this preliminary research which is a very sketchy analysis of the study. He investigated Milosevic’s operational code to determine to what extent the subjective schema overlap with other leader’s schema. Furthermore, a more detailed analysis of sub-episodes within the broad phases may provide a valuable insight about specific moves or tactics adopted by Milosevic. Such an analysis requires additional data which are not available at this stage. Overall, the author believed that operational code analysis provides a useful tool in getting into the minds of the leaders and see the world as they see it.

- Serif Mardin’s “Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today: Continuity, Rupture and Reconstruction in Operational Codes,” he profoundly investigated the modernization of Turkey which usually covered a process primarily generated after the foundation of the Turkish republic. This is a clearly simplistic image that neglects to bring in the continuities between the nineteenth-century Tanzimat reforms and the Republic itself. These continuities may even be traced to the earlier rise of a Turkish bureaucratic class (1780). Another aspect of this simplification is that it neglects the type of institution building policy that goes back to the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876–1909) and the type of synthesis between Islam and modernity that was promoted by intellectual elite between 1908 and 1923. He used the operational code analysis in determining the schemata of Turkish leaders as to how Islam and modernity compromise each other.

[...]


[1] As stated in Charles Doyle’s sketch on the USA PATRIOT Act.

[2] Further discussed by Robert E. Lane in the book of Jeanne N. Knutson’s Handbook of Political

Psychology.

[3] Also observed in Charles Doyle’s sketch on the USA PATRIOT Act.

[4] Take a look on compiled articles and journals edited by Margaret G. Hermann in her book entitled:

“A Psychological Examination of Political Leaders.”

Details

Pages
23
Year
2007
ISBN (eBook)
9783640243877
ISBN (Book)
9783656766322
File size
537 KB
Language
English
Catalog Number
v121027
Institution / College
Technological University of the Philippines – Political Science
Grade
A+
Tags
Political Psychology Perceptions George Walker Bush United States Presidents Colin Luther Powell United States Secretary of State Donald Henry Rumsfeld United States Secretary of Defense Terrorism War on Terror USA PATRIOT Act f 2001 9/11 11 September 2001 Operational Codes Verbs In Context System VICS OC Schema Theory Nassef M. Adiong

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Title: A Troika of perceptions. The influence of Bush, Powell and Rumsfeld on the Creation of the USA Patriot Act of 2001