Meaning and cognition - The development of categorisation, concepts and prototypes

Content

1 Introduction

2 The importance of categorisation

3 A traditional form of categorisational processes
3.1 Aristotle’s traditional model of categorisation
3.1.1 Example ELEPHANT
3.1.2 Critics on Aristotle’s model

4 A contemporary theory of categorisation
4.1 Prototype theory
4.1.1 Example: The birdiness of birds
4.1.2 Critics on prototype theory

5 The development of categorisation, concepts and prototypes
5.1 Acquisition in childhood
5.2 The change of prototypes

Conclusion

References

1 Introduction

This term paper deals with the development of categorisation, concepts and prototypes in terms of cognitive psychology.

In recent decades, prototype semantics has begun to gain an important role in linguistics and led to a pardigm shift. This is proved by research in cognitive psychology. People have a command of categorising, all times. Without the process of categorisation, our brain would be overstrained because the flood of information, the brain receives, has to be memorised and, thus, categorised, in a certain way.

First of all, I will explain the importance of categorisation and concepts in everyday life, then I will introduce some forms of categorisations (Artistotle’s traditional view and the prototype theory), explain them by giving examples, analyse and criticise them, insofar as I consider them critisisable. In section three I will describe the development of categorisation, concepts and prototypes with regard to childhood. One important question in this context will be whether prototypes are changeable in the course of life?

2 The importance of categorisation

The process of categorisation by having some concepts in mind, is an important factor in human existence. Human beings categorise what they perceive by comparing the perceived object with their mentally represented concept. All people think categorically because it helps them to establish a certainty and order. People need certainty and order, for not drowning in chaos. Without categorising, human beings would have to store the information of each single element which encounters him. Categories and concepts help us to understand the world, its elements and we establish a form of cohesive network by building up concepts and categories and having prototypical exemplars in mind.

If we see people, we categorise them, whether it is their outward appearance or how they talk or how they behave towards us. By doing this, we sometimes practise a form of pigeonholing other people. This pigeonholing, though, is human, as we cannot cease to categorise what we perceive. “Categorization provides the gateway between perception and cognition. After a perceptual system acquires information about an entity in the environment, the cognitive system places the entity into a category”.^[1] Barsalou explains how perception and categorisation work and that it serves as a measure for perceiving elements and building up meanings or concepts, respectively, in respect to what one perceives.

“We assign everything that enters our mind to one or more categories”^[2] This quotation underlines once more that human beings think categorically, from childhood on. This, for example, applies to children perceiving, getting to know and learning the differences between single animals species, plant species and also beginning to distinguish between good and evil, friends and enemies or love and hate. All of these cognitive and language-based foundations are built up in childhood. “Categorization is only possible if the respective categories are in some way available in the cognitive system, i.e. in our mind.”^[3] Without having built up any concepts, one would indeed perceive an object, but one could not put it into a category, as: “[…] categorizaion requires mental representations of the cateogories”.^[4]

Eleanor Rosch points out that one should not consider human categorisation to be arbitrary historical accidents, for from her point of view they are the results of psychological principles of categorisation.^[5] She distinguishes between two principles. I) […] the function of category system and asserts that the task of the category system is to provide maximum information with the least cognitive effort. II) The perceived world is not arbitrary but structured.^[6] The first principle is fulfilled if the categories correspond to the perceived world structure. Rosch compares the first principle to an organism. She emphasises that material objects possess a high correlational structure which underlines her comparison to an organism. In an organism the entities work together, i.e. are mostly closely connected. If we think of an element, for example a bird, we mostly associate several attributes the bird has. Feathers, a pecker, that it flies etc. None of these properties stands on its own.

In former times, one assumed that it is sufficient to simply state that categories are based on the fact that their entities share common features. The Aristotelian theory is the basic form of categorisation but in many cases, this theory does not apply to more complex subject-matters, thus, one needs a further one: the Prototype Theory. Both views are introduced in chapter 2 and 3.

3 A traditional form of categorisational processes

3.1 Aristotle’s traditional model of categorisation

Aristotle’s model of categorisation consists of ‘necessary and sufficient conditions’^[7], i.e. for categorising an element, one needs adequate conditions. “Categorization depends on a fixed set of conditions or features.”^[8] If just one of these fixed conditions is not fulfilled, one cannot categorise the element in a certain category.

3.1.1 Example ELEPHANT

If one takes, for example, an elephant, one can set up three conditions: it is an animal, it has a proboscis and big ears. If one of these conditions cannot be spotted, one cannot label it as an elephant. Thus, the conditions are binary. Either, for example, our element (elephant) is an animal or not, either it has a proboscis or none, either it has big ears or not.

3.1.2 Critics on Aristotle’s model

On the one hand, Aristotle’s traditional model of categorisation helps to categorise elements in a very simple way, but on the other hand, everyone knows that there are elements which cannot be easily categorised according to Aristotle’s model. Some elements overlap, i.e. they could be both categorised in the one category and in the other one or an element matches no category. Where would we categorise a hermaphrodite? It can be both, male and female. If we take Artistotle’s binary system into consideration, it is impossible to consider a hermaphrodite either male or female. There is also the whale issue. A whale is able to swim and only lives in the ocean, but it is not a fish, though. It is a mammal. Those terms are hedges, that means that they could fit in more than one category or that that do not fit in any category at all.

In everyday life one has different definitions than experts have. For non-experts a whale would be a fish, whereas experts consider a whale a sea mammal. This proves that Artistotle’s theory is not sufficient. In the Aristotelian theory, categories have to have clear boundaries but there are many entities which cannot be as easily put into a certain category as a man or a woman. That either-or-principle does not work with many plants, animals and psychological states. One cannot always make clear distinctions. In natural scienes it is important, of course, to establish clear distinctions but that does not work in social sciences and the humanities. However, Aristotle assumed that categories have fixed/hard boundaries. He, thus, thought that an element only belongs to one category. If one takes a look at very easy examples, that will certainly work but with regard to more complex issues, one has to apply a different form of categorisation: the prototype one, which will be introduced in 3.1. All in all, one can conclude that Aristotle’s model lacks complexity which is, though, found in almost every aspect of human existence, whether the visible elements or the abstract ones.

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^[1] Compare to: Barsalou, L.W. (1993). «Flexibility, structure, and linguistic vagary in concepts: Manifestations of a compositional system of perceptual symbols.“ In A.C. Collins, S.E. Gathercole, & M.A. Conway (Eds.), Theories of memory (pp. 29-101). London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates..

^[2] Compare to: Löbner, Sebastian, 2002, “Meaning and cognition.” In: Löbner, Sebastian, Understanding Semantics, London: Arnold/Hodder, page 171-191, on page 172

^[3] Compare to Löbner, 2002, on page 173

^[4] compare to: 3

^[5] compare to: Rosch, Eleanor, 2004, “Principles of Categorization.” In: Aarts, Bas (ed.), Fuzzy Grammar, Oxford: Oxford University Press. On page: 91.

^[6] Compare to: Rosch, Eleanor, 2004, on page 92

^[7] This model is abbreviated by „NSC model“

^[8] compare to: Löbner, 2002, on page 175