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Strategy and Reality - The EU-Iranian and the EU-North Korean Relations with regard to the Violation of the Non-Proliferation-Treaty by Iran an dNorth Korea

Master's Thesis 2007 39 Pages

Politics - International Politics - Topic: European Union

Excerpt

Table of Content

1. Introduction

2. Foreign Relations
2.1. Relation EU-Iran
2.1.1. Economic Relations
2.1.2. Political Relations
2.2. Relations EU – North Korea
2.2.1. Support
2.2.2. Political Relations
2.3. Main Characteristics

3. The Non-proliferation Treaty
3.1. History and Content of the NPT
3.2. Violation of the NPT by Iran
3.2.1. Formal Violation of the Treaty
3.2.2. Violation Relating to Uranium Enrichment
3.2.3. Main Characteristics
3.3. Violation of the NPT by North Korea
3.3.1. Formal Violation
3.3.2. Violation as Regards Content
3.3.3. North Korea’s Withdrawal from the NPT
3.3.4. Main Characteristics
3.4. Comparison
3.4.1. Common Grounds
3.4.2. Differences

4. The Answer of the European Union
4.1. Liberalism versus Realism
4.1.1. Liberalism
4.1.2. Realism
4.2. With Regard to Iran
4.2.1. The Strategy of the European Union
4.2.2. The Result of the Strategy
4.2.3. Strategy and Theory
4.3. With Regard to North Korea
4.3.1. The Strategy of the European Union
4.3.2. The Result of the Strategy
4.3.3. Strategy and Theory
4.4. Comparison
4.4.1. Common Grounds
4.4.2. Differences

5. Conclusion

6. Bibliography
6.1. Books and Essays
6.2. Internet Sources
6.3. Documents of the International Atomic Energy Agency

7. Abbreviations

1. Introduction

Currently the German daily newspaper „ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung “ reported on the shut-down of North Korean’s nuclear reactor in Yongbyon.[1] Although this is the first good news for a long time concerning the international non-proliferation regime the question whether and in how far North Korea is (still) violating the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)[2] remains. Furthermore, rather than North Korea’s, Iran’s behaviour in the field of uranium enrichment is even more frequently used as a head-line in the newspapers all over Europe. This paper examines how the European Union deals with the nuclear issue in the North Korean and the Iranian case. It is acted on the assumption that the attitude of the European Union is based on the theory of liberalism and that it acts in the same way as regards Iran and North Korea because both states have caused the same problems – both states have violated the Non-Proliferaion Treaty.

This assumption will be checked in examining the following problems: What is the state of the EU-Iranian and the EU-North Korean relations? In how far do Iran and North Korea violate the Non-Proliferation Treaty – against the American view this paper is acted on the assumption that one can not accuse Iran of having violated the NPT because Iran does not have (or at least, it is not proved that it has) any nuclear weapons at the moment[3]. Does the EU share the US-American way of dealing with Iran and North Korea, namely in dealing with them in a way which is mainly marked by realism[4] or does the EU act more in terms of the theory of liberalism[5] ? Does the EU abide by one theoretical concept or does it have different geopolitical strategies and therefore acts in a different way with regard to both states?

These questions should be answered in the chapters two, three and four. Chapter two describes the relations between the EU Iran as well as between the EU and North Korea. It embraces a time frame from the beginning of the 90ies until mid-2007. A short summary of the most relevant facts (and differences) is given at the end of this chapter. The next chapter will deal with the NPT and the violation by both countries. After having given a short résumé regarding the content, the violation of the treaty by Iran and North Korea will be examined since the beginning of their adherences. In addition to that, a comparison will be drawn. Chapter four is going to deal with the consequences of the nuclear standoff for the EU-Iranian and the EU-North Korean relations. Hereunto press releases and Council Conclusions in the time frame from 2005 until mid-2007 have been examined. Finally a conclusion will reflect the most important points mentioned.

The motivation for this paper came from the fact that European newspapers were full of stories about Iran and its enrichment program but gave only little information concerning North Korea. Consequently, this unequal news coverage puts the question of differences with regard to both cases and asks which response the EU gives concerning this challenge. Although this paper will not show a way out of the crisis, it could be loom large because Iran’s and North Korea’s attitude towards the NPT and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could be a direction sign for other states seeking nuclear weapons.

The main sources were the official website[6] of the European Commission, the Chaillot Papers[7], the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs (chapter two), the official documents of the IAEA (chapter three), and the press releases by the Council of the European Union (chapter four).

2. Foreign Relations

2.1. Relation EU-Iran

From the American point of view, Iran has been entitled by George W. Bush a “rogue state”[8] and is part of the “Axis of Evil”[9], together with North Korea and Iraq.[10] Although relations between the European Union and Iran are far from being cleared up[11] – until now there is neither a contractual relation nor exists a Delegation of the European Commission in Tehran (but on the other side, the Iranian embassy in Brussels is accredited to the EC)[12] – Iran has not been given such a dishonourable nickname by the EU. Nevertheless, the grade of exchange is not negligible, especially not in the field of trade. This chapter deals first with the economic relations. In a second step political relations will be examined.

2.1.1. Economic Relations

Prior to the Islamic Revolution[13] which had taken place in 1978/79, there were only minor business between the EEC and Iran, and those relations came to an end even before the breakdown of the Shah´s regime.[14] Currently, the EU is the main trading partner concerning exports and imports. It has a total market share of 35.1 percent with a value of more than €11.86 billion and thus Iran occupies rank number 24th in the EU’s total trade.[15] From the EU´s perspective, the EU25 exports to Iran make up only about 1,2 percent of its total export in 2004, nevertheless, EU exports to Iran have almost doubled since 1999. In general the EU`s Balance of Trade is mostly negative due to the large imports in the energy sector (exceptions are the years 2002 and 2004).[16]

Concerning Iran’s import from the EU, although having been traditionally linked to the Soviet Union and then to Russia, Iran was highly interested in Western military equipment and thus turned to the West ten years after the Islamic Revolution. While, as aforementioned, the EU´s export to Iran is relatively insignificant, Iran’s defence market with an estimated total military budget of around eight percent of GDP in 2005 (around 7.0 billion USD) is not negligible.[17] Additionally, Iran imports not only the EU´s iron and steel but also power generating machinery.[18] For German companies for example, Iran remains an important market in the Middle East: in 2006, Germany exported goods (mainly machines and iron and metal products) to the amount of € 4,11 billion.[19]

As regards the EU´s import from Iran – although Germany as the biggest country imported a rather unimportant quantity of crude oil[20] – more than 80 % of EU imports from Iran are energy related (mainly oil products), which represents 3.9% (€ 6 billion) of the total EU imports in energy products. Hence, Iran ranks as 6th supplier of energy products for the EU representing 11,1 percent of the world oil reserves. Furthermore, agriculture is imported, however to a much lower extent (€401m).[21]

2.1.2. Political Relations

In the beginning of the political relations between the EU and the Islamic Republic of Iran, which started in 1992, the EU focused on a “Critical Dialogue”.[22] In May 1997, the election of Mohammad Khatami, a reformer, as Iranian President led the EU to improve relations with a “Comprehensive Dialogue”,[23] created in 1998.[24] This dialogue which was in fact semi-annual troika meetings envisaged discussions about regional issues, including the Middle East peace process, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), human rights and the fight against terrorism.[25] In 19 November 2001, the Commission approved a proposal for negotiating directives for a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) with the aim to improve trade, business and investment conditions.[26]

The climate changed in summer 2002, when news of hitherto unknown nuclear facilities reached the West. In the following, EU was alarmed by the fact that Iran could achieve the full nuclear fuel cycle and hence demanded Iran to work closely with the IAEA. The crisis was tackled when the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom visited Tehran and swayed Iran to suspend uranium enrichment and allow intrusive inspections of the IAEA (by signing the `Additional Protocol´ to the NPT).[27]

In return the EU offered a huge package of economic incentives to Iran.[28] The Tehran Agreement on 21 October 2003 was defined as E3/EU[29] initiative, which was to become the main policy tool of the Europeans when dealing with Iran.[30] Nevertheless, since June 2004 no further meeting had taken place due to Iranian’s suspension of the “Comprehensive Dialogue”.[31]

As a consequence of the Tehran Agreement,[32] the EU aimed at a long-term agreement on the nuclear issue. In the Paris Agreement[33] in 15 November 2004, both sides reaffirmed their commitment to the NPT and the E3/EU recognised Iran’s right under the NPT[34] without discrimination.[35] Iran “reaffirms that, in accordance with Article II of the NPT, it does not and will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons. It commits itself to full cooperation and transparency with the IAEA. Iran will continue to implement the Additional Protocol voluntarily pending ratification.”[36] Furthermore,

“Iran has decided, on a voluntary basis, to continue and extend its suspension to include all enrichment related and reprocessing activities […]. The suspension will be sustained while negotiations proceed on a mutually acceptable agreement on long-term arrangements […]. The E3/EU recognizes that this suspension is a voluntary confidence building measure and not a legal obligation […]. Once suspension has been verified, the negotiations with the EU on a Trade and Cooperation Agreement [TCA] will resume. The E3/EU will actively support the opening of Iranian accession negotiations at the WTO [World Trade Organisation]”[37]

From the Iranian point of view, the “voluntary confidence building measure” was a success because it was not legally binding and thus Iran soon insisted on the nuclear fuel cycle which appeared unreasonable to the Europeans.[38] Following discussion rounds took place until July 2005. On 1 August 2005 Iran sent a letter informing the IAEA that “enrichment activities in the Esfahan facilities would be resumed the following week.”[39] The Europeans countered with an “even more generous proposal”[40] on 5 August 2005 but Tehran rejected it for having “too many demands and no incentives”[41] and talks over Iran’s nuclear programme ended in impasse.[42]

Not only Tehran’s attitude in the nuclear issue shocked the EU but also the comments made by the new President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad – elected on 3 August 2005 – with regard to Israel. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Commissioner for External Relations & European Neighbourhood Policy, stated:

“Naturally, we must utterly condemn the totally unacceptable remarks about the State of Israel made by the Iranian Head of State, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. […]Regrettably, these kind of hostile official remarks from Iran are not unique. As I have myself reiterated in public Ahmadinejad’s statement on Israel was shocking statement, and completely unacceptable . Has rightly been condemned in the strongest terms across the International Community. What is needed is the rebuilding of confidence between the International Community and Iran. This was just the opposite of what was needed.“[43]

Moreover, the human rights situation in Iran, the increasing erosion of the freedom of expression, opinion, the denial of women’s right and the harassment of minority groups alarms the EU.[44] As a consequence, the EU has supported a resolution of the United Nations (UN), which has brought forward by Canada on the human rights situation in Iran in November 2005.[45]

The current situation is far from being laid-back. The arrest of 15 British soldiers shortly after the determination of the resolution 1747 on 23 March 2007 with harder sanctions heated the quarrel supplementary.[46]

2.2. Relations EU – North Korea

Whereas the relations EU-Iran consist of an economic and a political pillar, EU-North Korean relations in reference to trade are quasi inexistent because the DPRK has no goods of strategic value (such as, for example, crude oil as in the case of Iran). From the North Korean perspective, trade relations with the EU were more important, because it shared 12 percent of its total trade with the European Union.[47]

The EU relation’s to North Korea mainly consists of humanitarian and technical aid. Additionally, political relations have been established since 1998. In this respect, the EU is engaged in the subject of non-proliferation.

2.2.1. Support

Concerning humanitarian aid, the EU is among the largest and most consistent donors of North Korea. After grave floods, the EU intervened first in 1995 and since then has provided a 450 million Euro aid.[48] Its assistance in the humanitarian field mainly consists of support for food security.[49] Since 1997, the Commission has been providing significant food aid and rehabilitation assistance[50], which means inter alia access to safe water and sanitation and their personal hygiene, as well as drugs and medicines to health institutions.[51]

In the field of technical aid EU´s first and only Country Strategy Paper[52] (2002) foresaw cooperation in the fields of institutional support and capacity building, sustainable development, the use of natural resources, a reliable and sustainable transport sector and rural development. Nearly the complete €15 million project was stopped later because of the nuclear standoff.[53] Also the efforts of providing North Korea special access to the European market disrupted because of the nuclear issue.[54]

2.2.2. Political Relations

After the political dialogue with Pyongyang started in December 1998, the Commission began developing some initial guidelines for its policy towards North Korea.[55] Since the first opening of North Korea in 2000/2001, most member states, such as Germany have established diplomatic relations with the DPRK. So did the European Commission as it decided on 14 May 2001 to establish diplomatic relations to facilitate the Communities efforts in support of reconciliation in the Korean Peninsula.[56] Nevertheless there is no European delegation or office in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).[57] The objectives of the external politics of the Commission aimed at providing humanitarian aid to North Korea’s people and bringing the North Korean nuclear program on the agenda. Concerning the last point the EU is not a big player in countering the proliferation efforts of Pyongyang’s leadership because “with the end of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)[58] in May 2006, Brussels had lost its last direct instrument of influence regarding the nuclear ambitions of North Korea.[59] This seems to be obvious, because the EU is not a part of the “six party talks”[60] although it strongly supports this process.[61]

As mentioned above the relations started in 2001 when a European delegation, consisting of Prime Minister Göran Persson,[62] Commissioner Chris Patten and High Representative Javier Solana visited Pyongyang (2-4 May 2001) and received a firm commitment from Kim Jung II concerning the Inter-Korean Joint Declaration[63] signed in Pyongyang at the June 2000.[64] Following this visit, North Korea sent a group of senior officials to Europe to learn about EU economic policy models. However, in November 2002 the relations relapsed when the EU received reports from Washington saying that the DPRK had conducted a clandestine uranium enrichment programme.[65] Nevertheless, a month after the nuclear scandal, the EU initiated a comprehensive review of its relationship with Pyongyang but soon another negative dissension came up when North Korea had expelled the IAEA inspectors in December 2002 and announced its withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003. In April 2003, the complete assistance to DPRK was cut with the exception of humanitarian aid.[66]

The discord could not be arbitrated, and North Korea added insult to injury announcing in August 2005 that the supply of humanitarian assistance to the DPRK should cease and that NGO´s should leave the DPRK by the end of the year. The EU-North Korean relations came to a freezing point in August 2005 when the DPRK detonated a nuclear explosive device on 9 October 2006.[67] Benita Ferrero-Waldner held a speech on 11 October before the European Parliament, saying that the

“nuclear test which North Korea claims to have conducted at Gilju in Hamgyong province on the morning of 9 October is an extremely serious matter, which I unreservedly condemn. Not only does it threaten regional stability in northeast Asia: it also constitutes the latest in a series of challenges by Pyongyang to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.”[68]

Following the universally condemned nuclear test not only the UN Security Council adopted legally binding sanctions against the DPRK but also the EU adopted relevant CFSP decision to implement the sanctions.[69]

2.3. Main Characteristics

Although neither the Iranian nor the North Korean relation to the European Union is far from being of high-quality, it seems that EU-Iranian relations are more far-reaching because trade relations between the EU and North Korea are quasi inexistent. Iranian exports to the EU doubled since the late 90ies and even though Iran is not EU´s major energy supplier the energy sector is an important factor for the good trade relations. Iran has resources that can be important one day for the energy-hungry Europe because “Iran has enormous potential in view of the country's rich endowments of petroleum, natural gas, and minerals, as well as agricultural wealth and industrial potential. Moreover, the EU has an interest in encouraging Iran to base its trade on the rules and obligations of the WTO.“[70] With respect to North Korea the hope for better trade relations can for the next time certainly be buried because of the system’s inability and unwillingness of structural reforms.

Political relations with the EU both from the Iranian and the North Korean side are proved to be easier said than done even if the EU holds a longer diplomatic relation to Iran than to North Korea. Certainly, well-established political relations with Iran are more important to the EU because of its geographical proximity, most notably if one day Turkey – which is a neighbour country to Iran – enters the European Union.

3. The Non-proliferation Treaty

3.1. History and Content of the NPT

The Non-Proliferation Treaty is the fundament of the international regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is the result of a long-lasting negotiation process of a range of states which were concerned with the use of nuclear technology for peaceful and destructive purposes. The main goal was to prevent further nuclear attacks which had taken place in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. In the 1950s, as the Cold War got international, several programs for peaceful purposes were launched, such as “Atoms for peace” in the United States, EURATOM in Europe and a similar program in the Soviet Union; finally in 1957 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was brought into being. Whereas the IAEA was still evolving, the Berlin Crisis in October 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 brought the Soviet Union and the United States to the brink of a real nuclear war. Subsequently, the US and the USSR hold Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) from 1969 until 1972 – with the aim of limiting missile systems and other strategic armament – and the Non-Proliferation Treaty – opened for signature on July 1, 1968 – entered into force on 5 March 1970 when three NPT nuclear states and forty non-nuclear states ratified the treaty.[71]

The Non-Proliferation Treaty which meanwhile 189 states had signed consists of a preamble and eleven articles. In summary, the treaty says that

- (article 1) “Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices […].”
- (article 2) “Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices […]”.
- (article 3) “Each non-nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system […]”.
- (article 6) “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament” […].
- (article 11) Every treaty partner can withdraw from the treaty “if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject of matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice […] three month in advance.”[72] The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the fundament of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Additionally there are safeguards agreements and additional protocols, which complement the NPT. Safeguard agreements are a mechanism for the verification of the NPT by the IAEA, which are signed by non-nuclear weapon states.

3.2. Violation of the NPT by Iran

3.2.1. Formal Violation of the Treaty

This section will examine, in how far Iran is violating the formal aspects of the treaty. Not all violations can be named here due to the relatively small volume of this work. Furthermore, texts (resolutions, INFCIRCs, GOV-papers etc.) are not examined before 2003 because it was not until summer 2002 that news about Iran’s nuclear enrichment program reached the West. In mid-2003 when the nuclear issue was in the headlines of European newspapers, the report by the Director General on 6 June 2003 (GOV/2003/40)[73] found violations “with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of that material and the declaration of facilities where the material was stored and processed.”[74] These failures can be summarised as follows: (a) failure to declare the import of natural uranium in 1991, (b) failure to declare the activities involving the subsequent processing and use of the imported natural uranium, (c) failure to declare the facilities where such material was received, stored and processed, (d) failure to provide in a timely manner updated design information for the facilities and for the waste storage at Esfahan and at Anarak.[75] In the resolution adopted by the Board on 12 September 2003[76] the IAEA expressed concern, that it was not yet able to consider all declared nuclear activities in Iran. In its report of 11 November 2003 (GOV/2003/75)[77] additional failures have been identified such as failures with respect to the reporting of nuclear material and its processing and use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such material has been processed and stored. These failures can be summarized as follows: (a) failure to report, (b) failure to provide design information and (c) failure on many occasions to co-operate. The report of 13 March 2004[78] stated that “Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the development of its enrichment technology to its current extent, and that a number of other questions remain unresolved, including the sources of all HEU[79] contamination in Iran.”[80] Furthermore, the report GOV/2005/67 of 2 September 2005[81] stated that “Iran had failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its safeguards agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, its processing and its use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such material had been processed and stored.”[82] These failures can be summarized as (a) failure to report (for example the import of natural uranium in 1991), failure to declare (e.g. the pilot enrichment facility at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop), (c) failure to provide design information, or updated design information, (e.g. for the facilities where the natural uranium imported in 1991) and (d) failure on many occasions to cooperate to facilitate the implementation of safeguards, as evidenced by extensive concealment activities.

Until now, apart from the violations mentioned above, Iran’s failures are formal and not as regards content – at least as far as it can be examined here. Iran’s main failures have mostly been the lack of information given to the IAEA so that the IAEA cannot judge if there were only formal failures or also failures regarding the content.

3.2.2. Violation Relating to Uranium Enrichment

This section deals with Iran’s uranium enrichment. This is a highly debatable issue, because neither the non-proliferation treaty nor the safeguards agreement including the additional protocol[83] forbid per se uranium enrichment; the main dilemma is the fact that uranium can be used for peaceful purposes[84] or for the construction of nuclear weapons[85]. Consequently it can not be forbidden to Iran to enrich uranium unless it is for peaceful purposes. Hence, the problem is not the uranium or plutonium enrichment itself but Iran’s failure to declare (etc.) its enrichment and its facilities. Both possibilities (that one for peaceful purposes and that one for the construction of nuclear weapons – in the latter case it would be a grave breach of the treaty) will be examined here.

Article 2 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty states clearly that the possession and the construction of nuclear weapons are forbidden for the non-nuclear weapon states to which Iran is a party.[86] Consequently the question remains whether Iran is seeking nuclear weapons or if it is enriching uranium only for peaceful purposes.

These are the arguments for the IAEA and the world community that Iran could reach for nuclear devices:

First, there has been a great uncertainty concerning the role of uranium metal in Iran’s declared nuclear fuel cycle. In 2003, neither its light water reactors nor its planned heavy water reactors required uranium metal for fuel.[87] Furthermore Iran has hidden many documents, facilities and materials for a long time; that’s why one can imagine that this is still the case. It was not until 2003 that the IAEA had revealed the presence of two types of highly enriched uranium at the nuclear facility of Natanz; additionally, the IAEA detected among other things that some of Iran’s statements have undergone significant and material changes.[88] In June 2003 Iran confirmed the receipt of natural uranium in 1991[89] which it should have declared 12 years before. The fact that Iran enriched uranium and separated plutonium in undeclared facilities in the absence of IAEA safeguards – as disclosed in November 2003 by the IAEA[90] – is not confidence-building and thus leads to an increase of suspiciousness against Iran. The feeling among Western countries that Iran is hiding important documents has been boosted in 2007 when Iran has “not agreed to any of the required transparency measures, which are essential for the clarification of certain aspects of the scope and nature of its nuclear programme.”[91] Moreover, the IAEA has been unable to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran unless Iran addresses the long outstanding verification issues through the implementation of the Additional Protocol (which it signed on 18 December 2003, but which has never been ratified and therefore has not yet entered into force) and the required transparency measures.[92]

Officially, Iran does not seek nuclear weapons but uranium enrichment for peaceful purposes; as a consequence one can imagine that Iran – as proposed by Russia at the end of 2007 – enriches its uranium not in the Iranian but in the Russian territory.[93] This accommodation could have appeased the Western world, but Iran rejected the proposal, continued the enrichment related activities and hence did not contradict the suspicions made by the United States. On the other hand, if Iran displaces its uranium enrichment program to Russia, it would be dependent on another state and this is exactly what Iran tries to avoid. Nonetheless, according to some critics, the fact that Iran wants to enrich uranium for energy generation is not to be dismissed because of its high rate of growth of population. The Director General of the Russian Centre of Studies of the Modern Islam, Radschab Saforow, stated that one should not forget the economic aspects of the enrichment. If Iran reaches the same technological level as other countries which use nuclear technology to the full extent, Iran’s industry will be given an enormous boost.[94] In contrast to that, Hans Blix, ancient director of the IAEA suggests that with only two reprocessing plants that Iran has the uranium enrichment would not be rentable from an economic point of view.[95] Furthermore, the fact that Iran suspended its uranium enrichment programme on a voluntary basis between November 2003[96] and August 2005 and also the increased cooperation in August 2003[97] were confidence-building measures. Precisely because of the resumption of the uranium enrichment program Iran brought this peace-building measure to an end. Although the former President of Iran, Muhammad Khatami, was a reformist, he always sought nuclear power; nevertheless it was not until the election of President Mahmud Ahmadinejad on 3 August 2005 that Iran’s wish for the full nuclear fuel cycle got out of control.[98] Besides, Ahmadinejad´s tirades against Israel[99] and the official declaration of 10 January 2006 that Iran has resumed its enrichment program are not confidence-building measures.

3.2.3. Main Characteristics

Even if Iran seeks nuclear weapons and has a successful uranium enrichment program Iran will still need time to construct those weapons, stated the German journal “Spiegel”.[100] Additionally to that, the boss of the Israeli intelligence service, Amos Jadlin, stated that the development could be finished until the end of this decade[101] which could also mean that this could not be reached until tomorrow. All things considered there are no proves that nuclear weapons exist in Iran but only suspicions. Iran has violated the treaty merely with regard to formal aspects but not as regards content – at least the latter one cannot be acknowledged because neither the IAEA nor the US and the EU cannot prove it since they do not have the information they needed to have. Uncertainty[102] plays a significant role, as the Resolution of the Board of Governors of 24 September 2005 notes, “the Agency is still not in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran”[103]. Consequently, further inspections are necessary to confute or to disprove the suspicions. The next time will show whether Iran will still play cat and mouse with the IAEA or if it presents publicly its enrichment programs. In the latter case, there are two possibilities: either Iran renounces the uranium enrichment program or it enriches uranium for peaceful purposes (hence, not more than 5 percent) which is its right due to the NPT.

In any case, the international community cannot forbid Iran to enrich uranium[104] and a ban seems to be even more ridiculous if one takes into account that other non-nuclear weapon states are enriching or also want to enrich uranium. Most recently, Lula da Silva, President of Brazil announced that his country wants to complete the full nuclear fuel cycle – of course with peaceful intentions – and this exactly is the argument which is also used by Ahmadinejad.[105] The problem is that no one will deny that Brazil is not seeking nuclear weapons, whereas Iran’s ambitions are regularly questioned.

Nevertheless the risk of nuclear proliferation grows, because although a grade of enrichment for a “good” nuclear weapon must be between 80 and 90 per cent, a so-called “dirty bomb”[106] can already be produced with a much lower grade of enrichment.

3.3. Violation of the NPT by North Korea

North Korea – in contrast to Iran – has already started shortly after its adherence in 1985[107] violating the NPT. A safeguards agreement, which should be entered into force within 180 days following the signature of the NPT, has been established not until April 1992. Already then the IAEA inspectors detected “undeclared production of plutonium”[108] and therefore sought “further special inspections to determine the scale of undeclared nuclear activities, which North Korea refuses.”[109] Since this time the safeguards agreement has never been fully implemented by the IAEA[110] because North Korea’s intention to withdraw from the NPT on 12 March 1993 let to a “suspension” of effective safeguard controls.

3.3.1. Formal Violation

The most important formal violation concerns the lack of forwarding information to the IAEA. In late 1992, the IAEA discovered more plutonium than North Korea had disclosed to the Agency. Following this detection, the IAEA called for a special inspection of two nuclear waste facilities which North Korea had not declared, but North Korea rejected this request. The IAEA assumed that more plutonium (more than 20 kg) than declared has been enriched.[111] Instead of a disclosure of documents, North Korea announced on 12 March 1993 an intention to withdraw from the NPT.[112] Besides, it was not until October 2002 that North Korea acknowledged having a secret development program to produce enriched uranium.[113] US-Assistant Secretary James A. Kelly who has been in North Korea during this time pointed out that “North Korea had been embarked on this program for several years.”[114] Shortly after North Korea’s affirmation of the enrichment program the IAEA stated that “North Korea's secret nuclear weapons program is a serious violation of North Korea's commitments under the Agreed Framework as well as under the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), its International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreement, and the Joint North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula[115].”[116] Not only the unsafeguarded uranium enrichment program generates “extreme concern”[117] on the part of the IAEA but also North Korea’s statement that it is ”entitled to possess not only nuclear weapons but any type of weapon more powerful than that”[118] which – when this will come true (and has come true) is the gravest violation of the NPT at all. Another significant violation is the deprecative attitude with respect to the IAEA. In mid-May 1994, in violation of North Korea’s safeguards agreement, workers removed the spent fuel from the 5-MW(e) reactor in Yongbyon. The IAEA’s note that inspectors “would need to sample, segregate, and monitor the fuel rods to preserve evidence of past plutonium production”[119] was not respected by North Korea but it allowed two inspectors to watch the process. About two weeks later the IAEA informed the United Nation Security Council that North Korea “had removed all but 1,800 of the 8,000 fuel rods in the 5-MW(e) reactor and that by mixing them up, North Korea had made it impossible to reconstruct the operating history of the reactor.”[120] Again and again the IAEA notes in its reports and conferences that since “1993, the Agency has been unable to implement its NPT comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) fully, because it has been unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the DPRK’s initial declaration of nuclear material subject to safeguards the Agency was unable to conclude that there had been no diversion of nuclear material in the DPRK.”[121]

The summit of North Korea’s derisive attitude has been reached in December 2002, when North Korea disrupted IAEA safeguard measures at its most significant nuclear facility in Yongbyon and expelled all IAEA inspectors by the end of the year.[122] Mohamed El Baradei, Director General of the IAEA “expressed ´deep regret` at the DPRK’s actions of December 21 to cut most of the seals and impede the functioning of surveillance equipment installed at the 5-MW(e) reactor at Nyongbyong.”[123] Cameras and seals lost, the IAEA could not monitor anymore North Korea’s nuclear facilities.[124] On 12 February 2003, the Board of Governors adopted a resolution, saying that “the DPRK has not undertaken to co-operate urgently and fully with the Agency, and has not taken the necessary steps called for in resolution GOV/2003/3, and calls upon it to do so urgently”[125] Furthermore, the Agency expressed “deep concern also that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material subject to safeguards to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”[126], which means that “the DPRK is in further non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the Agency”.[127]

3.3.2. Violation as Regards Content

Concerning the violations with regard to the content, North Korea has violated the treaty more than one time. First of all, North Korea can be accused of having smuggled plutonium from Russia:

“In August 1994, members of Germany’s parliament and Chancellor Kohl’s intelligence coordinator stated that they had been briefed that a German citizen arrested in May 1994 with a small amount of plutonium, smuggled from Russia, had connections with North Korea […]. The most specific claim came in the German news magazine Stern in March 1993, which cited Russian Counterintelligence Service reports that North Korea had smuggled 56 kilograms of plutonium (enough for 7-9 atomic bombs) from Russia.”[128]

Smuggling itself is not a delict according to the NPT. Nevertheless Article 2 of the NPT forbids Non-nuclear weapon states to receive “any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices.”[129] Moreover, on 10 February 2005 the Foreign Ministry of North Korea issued a statement declaring that North Korea possessed nuclear weapons and that the country would “increase its nuclear arsenal to defend the ideas, system, freedom and democracy that were chosen by the North Korean people”.[130] Hence, the above mentioned disclosure of the enrichment program is no longer only a formal violation but a grave violation as regards content. Consequently, the Board of Governors expressed its “serious concern” over North Korea’s statement which means that they had manufactured nuclear weapons. The gravest violation took place in 9 October 2006, when North Korea detonated its first nuclear weapon. The detonation and the abandonment of the sixth round of the six-party talks in mid-March 2007[131] evoked confusion and consternation in most countries.

3.3.3. North Korea’s Withdrawal from the NPT

After strong suspicions on the part of the IAEA and the US, North Korea expressed its intention to withdraw from the NPT on 12 March 1993. It invoked the treaty’s escape clause, saying that:

“Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three month in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.”[132]

North Korea’s reasons for withdrawing were the resumption of “Team Spirit”[133] and the fact that North Korea accuses the IAEA of being a "lackey" of the United States.[134] Consequently, the reasons for the North Korean’s almost-withdrawal form the NPT have not been legal but political ones. However, after talks between the USA and North Korea, the latter had „suspended“ its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, meaning that North Korea officially stayed a party to the Treaty but in fact has not been controlled.[135] The suspension had taken place on 11 June 1993, one day before the end of its three month cancellation period. Such a right, namely the suspension of controls, has not been conceded to any of the parties of the NPT and has been condemned by the IAEA:[136]

“since 1994 the DPRK has sought shelter behind the US-DPRK "Agreed Framework,"[137] claiming a legally untenable "unique status" under the NPT to circumvent compliance with its non-proliferation obligations. This status claimed by the DPRK has been rejected by the Board of Governors and the General Conference, which unequivocally declared the safeguards agreement to be binding and in force.”[138]

Finally, after long-lasting conflicts with the IAEA North Korea declared its definitive withdrawal from the NPT on 10 January 2003, stating then that its withdrawal ”will come into force automatically and immediately” on the next day because it has already given a note of withdrawal in March 1993.[139] However, the generally view held is that North Korea’s withdrawal came into effect three month later, namely on April 10, 2003.[140]

Although North Korea no longer considers itself part of to the Treaty[141] the Board of Governors supposed the safeguards agreement[142] with North Korea to be “binding and in force”[143] not only in the 3 months that followed the 10 January 2003 but also until today.[144] In August 2004 the Board of Governors confirmed that “the Agency’s NPT safeguards agreement with the DPRK remained binding and in force”.[145] The safeguards agreement itself “shall remain in force as long as the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea is party to the [Non-proliferation] Treaty.”[146] It is assumed that the IAEA has not accepted North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT because of its napless reasons for the withdrawal. In fact, North Korea has not mentioned any extraordinary event it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. Indeed, the common resumption of the military exercise “Team Spirit” of South Korea and the United States is a political reason; however this does not mean that with this exercise North Korea is menaced and thus its supreme interests – namely the continuity of the socialist state – has not been menaced. Thus, legally North Korea is still a party to the NPT and hence the safeguards agreement is binding and in force. But, because of the fact that international law is not enforceable by law unless the state in question does not submit to this rules, the view of North Korea itself and the general view held is that North Korea is not a member of the Treaty anymore.

3.3.4. Main Characteristics

The circumstances here are more complicated than as regards Iran. Legally, North Korea is still am member of the NPT, politically it is not simply because the obligation to stay within the treaty is not enforceable by law. If North Korea was still member of the Treaty, it could be accused of the gravest violation, namely the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Since in the opinion of most critics North Korea is due to its withdrawal in January 2003 not a member anymore, it cannot be accused of violating the NPT with regard to the manufacturing of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, violations, which happened before 10 April 2003, are violations of the international law, namely of the NPT. Because North Korea must have started earlier than its withdrawal to enrich uranium or plutonium not only for peaceful purposes but as well for the construction of nuclear weapons (otherwise this would not have been possible because such an enrichment lasts several years[147] ) this was a clear violation of the Treaty. Besides, North Korea has not only violated the NPT but also the Joint North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula ant the Agreed Framework signed with the US.

Finally, while playing the cat-and-mouse game with the IAEA, North Korea makes in the meantime no bones about its enrichment program. The risk remains for Europe that North Korea could sell its nuclear weapons to terrorists to improve its negative economic situation.

3.4. Comparison

3.4.1. Common Grounds

The period of giving the IAEA a runaround is similar in both cases. On the one hand, Iran declared the receipt of natural uranium twelve years later than it had to; on the other hand, North Korea strung the IAEA along as regards its signature of the IAEA safeguards agreement. This cat-and-mouse game leads to the result that the IAEA is still not able to verify the initially declared facilities, materials and document. Consequently, to draw a conclusion from this fragmentary kind of information is mainly impossible for the inspectors of the IAEA (however, whereas the information given by Iran is incomplete, North Korea’s information is quasi non-existent since 2002 because from this point the IAEA had no means of monitoring activities in North Korea’s nuclear facilities.).Both states were asked to sign the Additional Protocol to the NPT and in both states this protocol is not in force though the status is different: while Iran had signed the Additional Protocol in December 2003 but has never ratified it, North Korea has not even signed it at all.

3.4.2. Differences

Whereas North Korea is the problem child of the international community since its adherence to the treaty in 1985 – which came about because of international pressure – Iran shocked the West not before an unknown uranium enrichment program reached the West in 2002. Although both countries did not maintain the best kind of relation towards the US,[148] the United States first suspected North Korea of violating the NPT; nonetheless, due to the US, North Korea got a special status in relation to the NPT because of its suspension of the withdrawal from the NPT. The Agree Framework signed in October 1994 rendered the implementation of controls impossible to the IAEA. With this accommodation on the part the USA, the attitude towards North Korea is a very special und reticent one.

While Iran states – at least officially – that it will enrich uranium only for peaceful purposes (but perhaps enriches more uranium in a secret program), North Korea was declaring publicly that it aims at possessing nuclear weapons and North Korea consequently reached manufacture them. They finally proved it executing a nuclear test in 2006. Furthermore, North Korea removed publicly spent fuel. This leads to the supposition that North Korea wants to use its nuclear weapons for deterrent reasons and for the fact that with nuclear weapons it is in a better negotiation position. In contrast to that such actions in Iran remains hidden; nevertheless it is possible that Iran will have finished a possible nuclear enrichment program (but this is likely to last several years) and hence will browbeat the international community. Anyway, currently North Koreas violation on the NPT as regards content carries more weight than Iran’s proved formal violation (but unproved violations as regards content), especially if one considers the fact that North Korea does already possesse at least one nuclear weapon, whereas Iran is at an outside estimate able to produce a “dirty bomb”, but even this is not as sure as fate.

4. The Answer of the European Union

4.1. Liberalism versus Realism[149]

This chapter will examine the answer the EU is giving to the set of problems observed in the third chapter. Whereas the question “who with whom” plays a significant role if one examines the concepts of unilateralism and multilateralism, this chapter rather asks the question about the kind of the relation. Is the EU´s objective to deal with Iran and North Korea based on dialogue or on confrontation? Hence, which concept does the EU use, the concept of liberalism or the concept of realism?[150] It is assumed here that the EU is – in contrast to the USA[151] – in favour of the concept of liberalism, but before examining that, the different concepts should be illustrated.

4.1.1. Liberalism

Liberalism has its emphasis on the individual and its relation to the state. The term “liberalism” is a very brought one and hence a definition is not easy to give. However, human rights and the inner constitution of a state play a significant role. There are two main concepts of liberalism: the first one is the so-called “Peace-Loving-Democracies-Theory, the second one has its emphasis on trade, interdependence and institutionalism. The concept behind the first one is the assumption that the international system is more peaceful, the more democratic the states are which means that democratic states would less often be at war than non-democratic states. Immanuel Kant supported this theory, saying that democratic peoples themselves would vote against a war because war is not profitable. The most important aspect of this theory is the fact that conflicts are solved by discussion and dialogue rather than by military operations. The second concept has its basis of the assumption that trade crossing borders and exchange at all levels will lead to the integration of not only states but as well of NGO´s, enterprises and social actors. Famous representatives of the theory of liberalism are John Locke, Voltaire and John Stuart Mill.

4.1.2. Realism

The Theory of Realism perceives the state as main (or only) actor in the international system. There are three central aspects: anarchy, survival and a centralised state. Anarchy means that, because the world system is lacking a higher instance which is above the states, the states are the main actor in the international field. The anarchy leads to the necessity of self-defence because otherwise they will be absorbed by another state. The second point implies that implies that international actors decide in that way which guarantees the survival of their states. The third assumption broaches the issue of the central state, which is the only actor in the international system – as opposed to NGO´s and other actors. Famous representatives of this theory are Hans J. Morgenthau, John Mearsheimer and Kenneth N. Waltz.

4.2. With Regard to Iran

4.2.1. The Strategy of the European Union

Because there has never been written a country strategy paper one could assume that Iran does not play such a significant role for the EU. But the absence of such a paper is rather based on the fact that there is no delegation of the European Union in Iran, which is normally engaged in the preparation of this kind of strategies. Nevertheless, if one examines the EU-Iran relations in the last few years, an aim and a strategy behind the attitude of the EU is visible. The goal since the resumption of the uranium enrichment process has been to bind Iran to a long-term agreement[152] with the EU whose content aims at the suspension of Iran’s enrichment program. The geographical proximity to Europe and the fact that one day (if Turkey adheres to the EU) Iran will be in the direct neighbourhood to the EU, leads the EU to a double-track approach which signifies that the EU encourages (a) the process based on the decisions and resolutions taken by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)[153] and (b) Iran to negotiate with the EU.

4.2.2. The Result of the Strategy

That the European Union is highly engaged with Iran is visible in the press releases and the frequency with which Iranian matters are discussed either in the Council on General Affairs or in the Council on External Relations.[154] But the way in which the EU is engaged concerning the nuclear issue is not always obvious. On the one hand, the “European side has […] made clear that it is willing to reaffirm Iran’s right under the NPT”[155] which means Iran’s right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes. On the other hand the EU stated six days later that the “full suspension [of uranium enrichment] is essential if process of dialogue on long-term arrangements is to continue on the basis of the Paris Agreement.”[156] In turn, the Council meeting of General Affairs and External relation – held between 30 and 31 of January 2006 – explained, that the “EU does not question the right of Iran to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with its obligations under the NPT, a right which we [the EU] have consistently reaffirmed”. The aforementioned statement proves that this has not always been the case yet. While the EU has repeatedly reaffirmed that it believes that this issue can still be solved by negotiations[157] the Council threatened Iran once with giving up (or with not resuming) negotiations, saying that the resumption of activities can “seriously jeopardize the possibility of a return to negotiations.”[158]

The EU´s averseness to renewed negotiations seemed to have been temporary. On 20 of March 2006 the EU stated that it „continues to be committed to a diplomatic solution“.[159] Also its double-track strategy has become visible in April 2006 when the Council welcomed the UN Security Council President Statement of 29 March, “which reinforced the role of the IAEA and called upon Iran to take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors”[160] the EU even goes further in the negotiation process in offering a new proposal[161] to Iran in June 2006.[162] Although this proposal – which “would open the way for a new relationship with Iran based on mutual respect and expanded cooperation in political and economic fields”[163] – has been rejected by the Iranian government and hence the Council expressed its “deep disappointment that Iran has not responded positively to the offer of negotiations”[164] the Council stated that “We [the Council] remain committed to a diplomatic solution.”[165] Even though the EU has condemned in its press releases[166] the violation of human rights[167], i.e. executions, and the non-existent freedom of press, the EU stands by the option of negotiation rather than military action. Still in March 2007 the EU was reaffirming its commitments to finding a diplomatic solution that addresses the international community’s concern. Nevertheless the EU implemented the aforementioned UNSC Resolution “which are targeted against the most sensitive parts of the Iranian nuclear missile programmes […].[168] As a consequence of the EU´s implicit strategy of hindering Iran of the enrichment process has clearly been abortive.

4.2.3. Strategy and Theory

As it is mentioned above, human rights and the inner constitution of a state are criteria for liberalism. While Iran has its difficulties in both areas, the EU aims to build institutions for the improvement of both of them. Hence, the theory of liberalism is partially implemented in the International Relations concerning the EU and Iran. Besides, the EU is not in favour of the currant government in Iran; nevertheless it has not tempted and does not aim to effectuate a regime change. “Dialogue”, e.g. “Critical Dialogue“ and „Comprehensive Dialogue“, is the keyword which designates the EU-Iranian relations. Certainly, the EU threatened Iran not to resume talks, and implemented the UNSC resolution (which means that the EU had put one's money where one's mouth was) but on the same time the EU has never threatened Iran with a military option. According to the theory of realism, the states are the main (or only) actors in the international system. Despite the fact that the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is not communitised and thus many states consider this field as one of the last areas which is directly linked to a state, the members of the EU are often in the same opinion (at least as regards Iran) and hence react in a common way/in a common position. Nonetheless, the attitude of the EU shows tendencies of realism: although some members of the EU are enriching uranium, the EU tries to deny Iran the right to uranium enrichment. Indeed, the EU always reaffirms Iran’s right under the NPT, but the EU´s main goal is Iran’s full suspension of the uranium related enrichment. Hence, the EU seems to assume that the international community is dominated by anarchy rather than by rationality.

Finally the EU uses both strategies; however, a general preference for the theory of liberalism can be detected particularly because the EU is million miles away from a centralised state demanded by realists.

4.3. With Regard to North Korea

4.3.1. The Strategy of the European Union

The first and only strategy paper for North Korea has been written for the period between 2001 and 2004. The socialist state faces major economic difficulties, humanitarian catastrophes and it suffers from the fact that it is mostly barred from the World economy. Thus, the strategy of the EU contained three main aspects: firstly, institutional support and capacity building; secondly, sustainable management and use of natural resources; and thirdly, a reliable and sustainable transport sector.[169] A new strategy has not been defined, at least not officially; hence, it is assumed that North Korea had mostly disappeared from the European agenda;[170] in the case that there is something such as a secret or non-defined strategy it is assumed that this strategy is similar to the aforementioned strategy. Three European objectives can be detected in this strategy and in the (not so numerous) press releases:[171] firstly, the mitigation of hunger and misery; secondly, the promoting of the reconciliation process with the Republic of Korea; and thirdly, the stop of the North Korean nuclear weapon program. These objectives should be reached by means of cooperation and support to among other things KEDO and the six-party talks.

4.3.2. The Result of the Strategy

One of the EU´s main objectives has been “the integration of the DPRK into the world economy [which] is a necessary condition for the economic and social development”.[172] This is obvious but the precondition, namely the integration into the world economy, has not been reached. Additionally the question is raised how the EU wanted to integrate North Korea; the communist leader will certainly not only nod and accept a trimming of his powers just as the EU could or will have requested; nevertheless, the EU has never mentioned the option for a military action against North Korea. Concerning the institutional support, the EU aimed to strengthen the capacity of key institutions[173]. Granted that North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Il would accept democratic institutions,[174] the instrument with which the EU could support North Korea is arguable. Certainly the few days of visit of North Korean officials has not been sufficient for the development of democratic and stable institutions. Moreover, the combat of poverty has failed; according to a survey of the World Food Programme in 2004, 37% of children were stunted, 23% were underweight and 7% were wasted.[175] In March 2007 the German journal “Stern” reported that the food situation has worsened because there is a lack of one million tons of food.[176] Additional market access, as foreseen in the country strategy paper, could not be provided until today.[177] Furthermore, the EU aimed to improve relations with the outside world and make a positive contribution to global independence and peace[178] but until now, the Inter-Korean peace process is at a quasi non-existent level. The EU´s strategy was born to die, as in 2005 North Korea expelled non-governmental organisations (NGO´s)[179] which made it nearly impossible to the EU to develop further humanitarian aid. As a result, the EU failed with the totality of its strategy. North Korea after all succeeded in the construction of nuclear weapons which means the end for the time being of the Inter-Korean peace process. Besides, it cannot be excluded that North Korea will sell the nuclear weapons to terrorists to fill the empty treasury. The famine is not yet repressed and North Korea ranks among the countries which violate most of the human rights and which perform worse concerning the freedom of press. North Korea is still separated economically and politically from the rest of the world. -Korea relations

4.3.3. Strategy and Theory

Certainly, the EU is convinced that the world is more peaceful the more democratic the states are. With regard to North Korea, a socialist state, the EU tried to establish stable structures by the means of talks and dialogues, but not by the means of war and military actions. Thus, a regime change is desirable, but should not be encompassed by a military operation. Moreover, that the EU also puts the emphasis on human rights, strengthens the assumption that the EU uses the strategy of liberalism.

Furthermore, trade, interdependence and institutionalism are further attributes to a liberal strategy. However, this does not play any role because the socialist state North Korea has nothing relevant to export. Hence, economic ties between Europe and North Korea are quasi inexistent. As well the fact that there are very few NGO´s and almost no enterprises and social actors involved in the political process leads to the assumption that the theory of liberalism cannot completely be used. The lack of other actors is due to the fact that North Korea rejected the aid rather than the EU does not want to provide it. The theory of realism, which assumes that the states are the main actors in the international field is confirmed in this sector, but is not applicable in its totality.

Although the EU-North Korean relation shows some elements of liberalism and of realism, there is no real strategy and hence no real theory behind the EU-North Korean relations. North Korea is geographically far away from the Europeans; hence, a far-reaching political relation seems to be even not intended.

4.4. Comparison

4.4.1. Common Grounds

Concerning both countries, no actual country strategy papers do exist. There are certainly unofficial papers but those documents cannot be examined because they are not accessible.[180] Nevertheless it was possible in both cases to detect strategies and objectives. However, the objectives set by the European Union have not been achieved. Concerning North Korea, neither a progress of the Inter-Korean peace process, nor the determining of construction of nuclear weapons nor the mitigation of famine have been achieved. The only bright spot has been the cut-off of five nuclear facilities in Yongbyon in July 2007. As regards Iran, nuclear enrichment is continuously pursued and the human rights dialogue has been suspended by Iran at the end of 2006. Pertaining to both states, the EU does not agree with the respective governments. Nonetheless it is exerted to maintain or re-establish talks with both countries. With reference to the theories of the International Relations, the EU is dealing with both countries more in a liberal than in a realistic way. Nonetheless in both cases the theory of realism is used as well, so that one cannot speak about one single theory which is used in praxis by the European Union.

The EU is alarmingly inactive with regard to North Korea if one takes into consideration that North Korea has already succeeded in the construction of nuclear weapons and thus could sell it to terrorists.

4.4.2. Differences

There are some differences in the way of negotiation with both countries. Whereas the EU/E3 negotiated directly with Iran (and, so to speak instead of or commonly with the United States), the negotiation process with North Korea is the opposite: indeed, the EU is a big financial backer of humanitarian aid, but it is (still) not a party to the six-party talks, the organ which negotiates with North Korea. On the other hand it has been a member of the board of KEDO, but since its collapse, the EU has lost a significant zone of influence. As the EU is only an auxiliary partner to the other parties, it negotiates not directly with North Korea. However, the EU imposed sanctions on North Korea (which North Korea condemned as declaration of war[181] ). Consequently one cannot speak about a double-track approach, namely sanctions – imposed by the UN Security Council and on the same time an open door for negotiations – which is used in relation to Iran.

Concerning the frequency and the profundity of the relations, the EU-Iranian relation is much more pronounced or at least the Iranian issue is more essential to the Europeans than the EU-North Korean Relation. Both, the press releases between 2005 and July 2007 and the Council had about ten times more Iran than North Korea on the agenda.[182] Also the European hope for a long-term agreement (which cannot be associated with North Korea) approved this fact.

5. Conclusion

At the beginning the assumption is acted that the attitude of the European Union towards the countries which are violating the Non-Proliferation Treaty, namely Iran and North Korea is based on the theory of liberalism and that the EU acts in the same way concerning both of them.

However, it has been shown that the approach of the European Union towards North Korea and Iran differs from each other although both states are associated with the same problems, namely the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the cat-and-mouse game with the IAEA. Whereas the EU uses a double-track approach towards Iran, namely the perpetual offer to dialog und talks and the instrument of imposing sanctions decided by the UN Security Council, the EU´s approach towards North Korea, although it is the more significant danger, is a more reticent one. This has several geopolitical reasons. Firstly, the political as well as the economic relations between the EU and Iran exist since long ago. Now, it exist an active trade and the trade could even increase in the future when the energy-poor Europe needs the energy-rich Iran, which is after all the sixth biggest supplier for the EU. In contrast to that, North Korea has no goods of strategic value to the EU; in fact, it is the other way round: the EU provides technical and humanitarian aid for the socialist state. Secondly, if one day Turkey enters the European Union, Iran will become a direct neighbour to the EU due to its geographical proximity to Europe. Thus it is important to the EU to establish better or at least maintain relations in the political field to Iran. In the same way the EU is even more bent on the maintenance of human rights in Iran than in North Korea.[183] The EU could avoid a possible move of migration due to the violation of human rights from Iran to the EU. Thirdly, the degree of the violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty differs. Whereas North Korea is violating or has been violating the NPT as regards content as well as regards formal criteria, the Iranian case is special. Violations as regards content are not existing, or better, violations can at least not be proved because there is no legally determined maximum for the percentage of the uranium enrichment. Therefore the EU should not condescend Iran. Instead, the EU should determine one strategy (in contrast to the fact that the EU affirms on the one hand Iran’s right under the NPT but on the other hand does not brook the fact that Iran is enriching uranium). Furthermore this strategy with regard to the Non-Proliferation regime should be maintained not only partially. The EU should bring the different parties to one table to discuss a new treaty to which all states take part in and which determines a maximum with regard to uranium as well as plutonium enrichment. Last but not least the fact, that the international system is not only marked by nuclear- and non-nuclear weapon states, but also by a gap dividing those whose nuclear enrichment program is accepted[184] by other states and those whose enrichment program is frowned upon, leads to an international discord. Israel, which is not a party to the NPT is allowed to possess 200 nuclear weapons[185] and this does not lead to an outcry in the Western world.

Concerning the EU´s attitude towards Iran and North Korea it has been shown that the strategies were not successful. The EU tried to convince both states by talks and dialogues to give up uranium or plutonium enrichment. Hence, one might say that the EU reverts to the theory of liberalism. Nonetheless, it must be stated that this is only one party of the strategy. Indeed, a military operation has never been an option, but the fact that the EU tries to deny Iran’s the right uranium enrichment shows elements of the theory of realism. Besides, since the EU-North Korean relations are very reticent because the EU itself does not directly negotiate with North Korea, one might say that the strategy can mostly not be resulted from one of the both theories. As a consequence, the EU uses elements of both theories, but the assumption that the EU goes mostly back to the theory of liberalism can be confirmed.

The EU could engage more with both states, especially because in the case of North Korea the EU has no special interest at stake and hence could act as mediator between North Korea and the US as well as between Iran and the US. Besides, a well-advised action is demanded and a new treaty should be created providing the same legal conditions for every participating state; otherwise course of action of Iran and North Koreas could get a negative original precedent which serving as an example for other states seeking nuclear power.

6. Bibliography

6.1. Books and Essays

Amstler, B. E. M.: „IAEO – Internationale Sicherheitskontrollabkommen und der Vertrag über die Nichtverbreitung von Kernwaffen (NPT). Universität Wien 1993

Becker, Jasper: „Rogue Regime – Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea“ Oxford University Press 2005

Beeman, Wiliam O.:”After Ahmadinejad: The Prospects for US-Iranian Relations” in: Chaillot no 89 of ISS (2006), pp 87-94

Blix, Hans: “Prospects of Multilateralism in the Non-Proliferation Regime” in: Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik 83: Probleme der Nuklearen Nichtverbreitungspolitik. Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V., Mai 1994

Cha, Victor D./ Kang, David C.: “Nuclear North Korea – A Debate on Engagement Strategies”. Columbia University Press, New York 2003

Choe, Hyondok / Song, Du-Yul / Werning, Rainer (Ed.): “Wohin steuert Nordkorea? Soziale Verhältnisse, Entwicklungstendenzen, Perspektiven.” PapyRossa, Köln 2004

Ehteshami, Anoushiravan: “The Future of Iran´s Defence and Nuclear Policy” in: Chaillot Paper no 89 of IISS (2006), pp.73-85

Einhorn, Robert J.: “A Transatlantic Strategy on Iran´s Nuclear Program” in: The Washington Quaterly 27:4 pp.21-32

Gontscharow, Piotr: „Moskaus Vorschlag für Teheran bleibt in Kraft“ on 30/12/2005. Cf. http://www.uni-kassel.de/fb5/frieden/regionen/Iran/russland2.html

Herrmann, René S. W.: Das Problem des internationalen Gleichgewichts und der Vertrag über die Nichtverbreitung von Kernwaffen. Bonn 1973

Perez, Jean du / Potter, William: “North Korea´s Withdrawal from the NPT- a Reality Check” Cf. http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/030409.htm#fn7

Posch, Walter: “Conclusion: A Triple-track Policy for the EU?” in Chaillot paper no 89 of IISS (2006), pp 127-131

Posch, Walter: The EU and Iran: a Tangled Web of Negotiation” in: Chaillot paper no 89 of IISS (2006), pp 99-114

Reissner, Johannes: “EU-Iran relations: Options for Future Dialogue” in: Chaillot paper no 89 of IISS (2006), pp 115-124

Saforow, Radschab: „Der Westen kann Iran nicht an der Atomforschung hindern“ on 11/01/2006. Cf. http://de.rian.ru/science/20060111/42943058.html

Schmidt, Hans-Joachim: “Peace on the Korean Penisula – What Can the EU Contribute to the Six-party process?” PRIF Reports No. 75. Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. Cf.: http://hsfk.de/fileadmin/downloads/prif75.pdf

Ward, Adam (Ed.): „Iran´s Nuclear Programme – Crisis escalation“ in: IISS: www.iiss.org/stratcom

Ziaeddin, Ziaei: Ein Überblick über die Außenpolitik des Iran in vier Phasen (1939-2995). Diss. Universität Wien 2007

6.2. Internet Sources

NTI

http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/npttutorial/chapter03_03_1992.html

http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/npttutorial/chapter05_north_korea.html

http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pdfs/koreanuc.pdf

http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/npttutorial/chapter03_02.html http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/npttutorial/chapter03_03.html

GLOBAL SECURITY

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/yongbyon-5.htm (07/07/2007)

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/yongbyon-5.htm (07/07/2007)

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/team-spirit.htm

ARMS CONTROL

http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/agreedframework.asp

http://www.armscontrol.org/country/iran/ParisAgreement.asp

SPIEGEL

http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,493700,00.html

http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,411077,00.html

FAZ-Online http://www.faz.net/s/RubDDBDABB9457A437BAA85A49C26FB23A0/Doc~E41DB4A4DAF23414689E2F96734764FF1~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html

EMBASSIES

http://www.iran-embassy.org.uk/page/?jsession=&m=vp&i=148

http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Laenderinformationen/Iran/Bilateral.html

European Union

http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/iran/intro/index.htm

http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/iran/index_en.htm http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/iran/news/ip01_1611.htm

http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/news/ferrero/2005/sp05_696.htm

http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/delegations/intro/web.htm#N http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_korea/intro/index.htm

http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/587&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en

http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_korea/intro/index.htm

http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_korea/csp/01_04_en.pdf

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/de/cfsp/87926.pdf

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/92122.pdf

OTHER

http://www.30giorni.it/te/articolo_stampa.asp?id=11318

http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/050211.htm

http://www.atomwaffena-z.info/heute/heut_nordkorea.html

http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9566.pdf

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/dprk/un/iaea-030212-med-advise_048.htm

http://www.learn-line.nrw.de/angebote/agenda21/dossier/Iran-Konflikt.htm http://www.marzeporgohar.org/index.php?l=1&cat=21&scat=&artid=201

http://eu2001.se/static/eng/docs/korea.asp

http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/proliferation/iran/eu-iran-nuclear-agreement.htm

http://hsfk.de/fileadmin/downloads/prif75.pdf

http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/npttext.html

http://www.stern.de/politik/ausland/:Nordkorea-Es-Million-Tonnen-Nahrung/585765.html

http://www.wfp.org/country_brief/indexcountry.asp?region=5&section=9&sub_section=5&country=408

http://www.sueddeutsche.de/,tt2m3/ausland/artikel/906/88818/

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.2705183/k.4CC0/North_KoreabrHistorical_ Chronology.htm (access: 03/08/2007)

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/dirty-bombs.html

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html

6.3. Documents of the International Atomic Energy Agency

- GOV/2007/22, Report by the Director General on 23/05/2007. Cf. http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/nuke/iaea0207.pdf (11/07/2007)

- Report by the Director General: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Board of Governors, GOV/2007/8, Vienna, 22 February 2007

- Report b the Director General: Cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Agency in the light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006), Board of Governors, GOV/2007/7, Vienna, 9 February 2007

- Report by the Director General: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, Board of Governors, GOV/2006/64, Vienna, 14 November 2006

- Report by the Director General: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2006/53, Vienna, 31 August 2006

- Report by the Director General: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, Board of Governors on 8 June 2006, GOV/2006/38, Vienna, 8 June 2006

- Report by the Director General: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV 2006/28, Vienna, 28 April 2006

- Report by the Director General: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV 2006/15, Vienna, 27 February 2006

- Board of Governors: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Resolution Adopted by the Board of Governors on 4 February 2006, GOV/2006/14, Vienna, 4 February 2006

- Draft Resolution on the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, submitted by Germany, France and the United Kingdom, GOV/2006/12/Rev.1, Vienna, 4 February 2006

- Statements issued by Germany on behalf of the EU3/EU, the EU, the United States of America, the Non-Aligned Movement, Iran, Dr. Larijani (Iran), Australia, Canada, Singapore, New Zealand and Norway during the Special Session on Iran of the IAEA Board of Governors, Vienna, 2 February 2006

- Explanatory memorandum, and a draft resolution on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, submitted by the Resident Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, GOV/2006/11, Vienna 1 February 2006

- Draft Resolution on the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Vienna, 1 February 2006

- Update Brief by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards: Developments in the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Agencies Verification of Iran's Suspension of Enreichment-related and Reprocessing Activities, Vienna, 31 January 2006

- Report by the Director General: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2005/87, Vienna, 18 November 2005

- Board of Governors: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Resolution Adopted by the Board of Governors on 24 Septembert 2005, GOV/2005/77, Vienna, 24 September 2005

- Report by the Director General: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2005/67, Vienna, 2 September 2005

- Board of Governors: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Resolution Adopted by the Board of Governors on 11 August 2005, GOV/2005/64, Vienna, 11 August 2005

- Statement of the UK on behalf of the European Union at the IAEA Board of Governors 9 August 2005

- Statement of the Deputy Director General for Safeguards (DDG–SG Goldschmidt) on 16 June 2005 at the Board of Governors Meeting, Vienna, 16 June 2005

- Board of Governors: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Resolution Adopted by the Board of Governors on 29 November 2004, GOV/2004/90, Vienna, 29 November 2004

- Report by the Director General: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2004/83, Vienna, 15 November 2004

- Board of Governors: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Resolution Adopted by the Board of Governors on 18 September 2004, GOV/2004/79, Vienna, 18 September 2004

- Report by the Director General: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2004/60, Vienna, 1 September 2004

- Board of Governors: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Resolution Adopted by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2004, GOV/2004/49, Vienna, 18 June 2004

- Report by the Director General: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2004/34, Vienna, 1 June 2004 and Corrigendum, GOV/2004/34Corr1, Vienna, 18 June 2004

- Note by the Secretariat: Secretariat Response to the Comments and Explanatory Notes provided by Iran in INFCIRC/628 on the Report of the IAEA Director General on Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran (GOV/2004/11), IAEA 2004/Note 17, Vienna, 30 March 2004

- IAEA: Excerpt from the Record of the 1094th Meeting of the Board of Governors, GOV/OR 1094, Vienna, 13 March 2004

- Chairman of the Board of Governors: Introductory Comments by the Chairman on Item 4 (a) Nuclear Verification: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director General, Vienna, 13 March 2004

- Board of Governors: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Resolution Adopted by the Board of Governors on 13 March 2004, GOV/2004/21, Vienna, 13 March 2004

- Report by the Director General: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2004/11, Vienna, 24 February 2004

- Board of Governors: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Resolution Adopted by the Board of Governors on 26 November 2003, GOV/2003/81, Vienna, 26 November 2003

- Report by the Director General: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2003/75, Vienna, 10 November 2003

- Board of Governors: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Resolution Adopted by the Board of Governors on 12 September 2003, GOV/2003/69, Vienna, 12 September 2003

- Director General’s Remarks on Iran during the IAEA Board of Governors Meeting on 9 September 2003, Vienna

- Report by the Director General: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2003/63, Vienna, 26 August 2003

- Director General’s Intervention on Iran during the IAEA Board of Governors Meeting on 18 June 2003, Vienna

- Report by the Director General: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2003/40, Vienna, 6 June 2003

http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf

http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2004/infcirc637.pdf

http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaDprk/us_statement.shtml

http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC46/Resolutions/gc46res14.pdf

http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaDprk/chrono_dec.shtml

http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n004.shtml

http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/MediaAdvisory/2002/med-advise_033.shtml

http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf

http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC48/Documents/gc48-17.pdf

7. Abbreviations

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

[...]


[1] Cf. FAZ-Online on 16/07/2007: „IAEA bestätigt: Nordkorea schaltet Reaktor ab“ Cf. http://www.faz.net/s/RubDDBDABB9457A437BAA85A49C26FB23A0/Doc~E41DB4A4DAF23414689E2F96734764FF1~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html (access: 03/08/2007)

[2] The non-proliferation treaty (NPT) is an internationally recognised treaty which aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It was opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. Currently 187 states are members of the NPT.

[3] This supposition will be examined in chapter three.

[4] This is the generally view held in Europe but will not be examined here.

[5] Liberalism means that the international relations are more peaceful the more democratic the states are. The main instruments of liberalism are dialog, trade and institutionalism. In contrast to this theory, the theory of realism is located. In that theory, the international relations are marked by anarchy, survival and a centralised state. In this zero sum game everyone tries to get more than the other, mostly by means of military actions.

[6] This paper is mostly elaborated on the basis of internet sources. Books and essays will be indicated in detail in the first footnote. In the following footnotes concerning the same book or essay, the name of the author, the page and the abbreviation “op. cit.” will be indicated. Internet sources are always completely indicated.

[7] The Institute for Security Studies is located in Paris. It is of one of the most important think tanks concerning European politics and is the editor of the so-called Chaillot-Papers.

[8] Becker, Jasper: „Rogue Regime – Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea“ Oxford University Press 2005, p. ix

[9] http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html (03/07/2007)

[10] Cf. President Bush’s State of the Union Address in January 2002

[11] Cf. Posch, Walter: “Conclusion: A Triple-track Policy for the EU?” in Chaillot paper no 89 of IISS (2006), p. 99

[12] Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/iran/intro/index.htm (access: 03/07/2007)

[13] Which is equally known as „Iranian Revolution“.

[14] Cf. Posch, p. 99, op. cit.

[15] Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/iran/index_en.htm (access: 03/07/2007)

[16] Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/iran/intro/index.htm (access: 07/07/2007)

[17] Cf. Ehteshami, Anoushiravan: „The future of Iran’s defence and nuclear policy” Chaillot paper no 89 of ISS, 2006

[18] Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/iran/index_en.htm (access: 03/07/07)

[19] Cf. http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Laenderinformationen/Iran/Bilateral.html (03/07/2007)

[20] ibid.

[21] Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/iran/index_en.htm (access: 03/07/07)

[22] “In December 1992 the European Union officially decided to engage Iran in 'critical dialogue' aimed at softening Iran’s behaviour while rewarding it with economic benefits.” Cf. http://www.marzeporgohar.org/index.php?l=1&cat=21&scat=&artid=201 (access: 27/07/2007)

[23] “Following the election of Mr. Khatami as President in May 1997, a renewed Comprehensive Dialogue in the form of semi-annual troika meetings was established (1998), replaced with old Critical Dialogue.” Cf. http://www.iran-embassy.org.uk/page/?jsession=&m=vp&i=148 (access: 27/07/2007)

[24] Cf. Posch, p. 100, op. cit.

[25] Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/iran/intro/index.htm (access: 27/07/2007)

[26] Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/iran/news/ip01_1611.htm (access: 27/07/2007)

[27] Cf. Posch p. 103, op. cit.

[28] Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/iran/intro/index.htm (access: 27/07/2007)

[29] Cf. E3 and EU3 respectively mean France, Germany and the United Kingdom. With regard to Iran these three countries took on oftentimes the negotiations.

[30] Cf. Posch, p. 103, op. cit.

[31] Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/iran/intro/index.htm (access: 27/07/2007)

[32] Cf. “The Iranian authorities reaffirmed that nuclear weapons have no place in Iran’s defence doctrine ant that its nuclear programme and activities have been exclusively in the peaceful domain […]. The foreign Ministers of Britain, France and Germany welcomed the decisions of the Iranian Government and informed the Iranian authorities that: Their governments recognize the right of Iran to enjoy peaceful use of nuclear energy in accordance with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty […].” Cf. http://www.bits.de/public/documents/iran/Tehran_EU_Iran_Agreement03.pdf (access: 27/07/2007)

[33] Cf. „The E3/EU recognise Iran's rights under the NPT exercised in conformity with its obligations under the Treaty, without discrimination.“ Cf. http://www.bits.de/public/documents/iran/Paris_Agreement_infcirc637.pdf (access: 27/07/2007)

[34] Which means Iran’s right to enrich Uranium for peaceful purposes

[35] Cf. http://www.armscontrol.org/country/iran/ParisAgreement.asp (access: 03/07/2007)

[36] http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/proliferation/iran/eu-iran-nuclear-agreement.htm (access: 03/07/2007)

[37] http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2004/infcirc637.pdf (access: 02/07/2007)

[38] Cf. Posch, p. 105, op. cit.

[39] ibid.

[40] Posch, p. 107, op. cit

[41] ibid.

[42] Reissner, Johannes: “EU-Iran relations: Options for Future Dialogue” in: Chaillot paper no 89 of IISS (2006), p. 15

[43] Ferrero-Waldner, Benita: Statement on recent declarations by the President of Iran. European Parliament, 16 November 2005 (Speech/05/969). In: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/news/ferrero/2005/sp05_696.htm (access: 03/07/2007)

[44] Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/iran/intro/index.htm (access: 27/07/07)

[45] ibid.

[46] British soldiers came free on 4 April 2007.

[47] Cf. http://hsfk.de/fileadmin/downloads/prif75.pdf (access: 15/07/2007)

[48] Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_korea/intro/index.htm

[49] Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/projects/asia/northkorea_en.htm (access: 06/07/2007)

[50] Cf. http://hsfk.de/fileadmin/downloads/prif75.pdf (access: 06/07/2007)

[51] Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_korea/intro/index.htm (access: 06/07/2007)

[52] Cf. Schmidt, Hans-Joachim: Peace on the Korean Peninsula – What can the EU contribute to the Six-party process? PRIF Reports No. 75. Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. In: http://hsfk.de/fileadmin/downloads/prif75.pdf (access: 04/07/2007)

[53] Cf. chapter three

[54] Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_korea/intro/index.htm (access: 02/07/2007)

[55] Cf. Schmidt, op. cit.

[56] Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_korea/intro/index.htm (access: 27/07/2007)

[57] Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/delegations/intro/web.htm#N (access: 06/07/2007)

[58] “KEDO is the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization. Its origin stems from the Agreed Framework of 1994 between the US and the DPRK which resolved a nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. In return for freezing nuclear installations and coming into compliance with this nuclear safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and eventually dismaneling its insecure installations, the DPRK receives two light-water reactors and interim supplies of heavy fuel oil […]. KEDO was set up in 1995 to provide the reactors and the oil. Its founding members were Japan, the US and the ROK [Republic of Korea].” Cf. “The EC – Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK); Country Strategy Paper 2001-2004”

[59] Cf. Schmidt, op. cit.

[60] The first round of the Six-Party-Talks began in August 2003 consisting of the United States, Russia, China, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan and North Korea. The rounds remained without any result.

[61] Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_korea/intro/index.htm (access: 07/07/2007)

[62] “President of the European Council Göran Persson headed the EU visit to North and South Korea on 2–4 May with a mandate from all the EU heads of state and government.” Cf. http://eu2001.se/static/eng/docs/korea.asp (access: 27/07/2007)

[63] The aim was a nuclear-free Peninsula.

[64] Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_korea/intro/index.htm (access: 06/07/2007)

[65] ibid.

[66] Cf. Schmidt, op. cit.

[67] Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_korea/intro/index.htm (access: 06/07/2007)

[68] Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, European Parliament Plenary Brussels, 11 October 2006: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/587&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (access: 06/07/2007)

[69] Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_korea/intro/index.htm (access: 07/07/2007)

[70] http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/iran/news/ip01_1611.htm (access: 07/07/2007)

[71] All information of this section is extracted from http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/npttutorial/chapter03_02.html (access: 08/07/2007) and http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/npttutorial/chapter03_03.html (access: 08/07/2007)

[72] All articles extracted from the Non-proliferation treaty, see http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/npttext.html (access: 08/07/2007)

[73] GOV/2003/40, Report by Director General on 6 June. Cf. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf (access: 11/07/2007)

[74] ibid.

[75] The most important nuclear facilities in Iran

[76] Cf. GOV/2004/21, Resolution adopted by the Board of Governors on 13 March 2004. Cf. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-21.pdf (access: 11/07/2007)

[77] GOV/2003/75, Report by Director General on 10 November 2003. Cf. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-75.pdf (access: 11/07/2007)

[78] Cf. GOV/2004/21, op. cit.

[79] Highly Enriched Uranium

[80] GOV/2004/21, op. cit.

[81] Cf. GOV/2005/67, Report by the Director General on 2 September 2005. Cf. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-67.pdf (access: 11/07/2007)

[82] ibid.

[83] signed on 18 December 2003 but never ratified by Iran.

[84] that means that uranium is about 5 percent enriched.

[85] which means an enrichment of a minimum of 80 to 90 percent of uranium.

[86] “Each non-nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control of such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”

[87] Cf. GOV/2003/40, Report by Director General on 6 June. Cf. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf (access: 11/07/2007)

[88] Cf. GOV/2003/69, Resolution adopted by the Board on 12/09/2003. Cf. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-69.pdf (access: 11/07/2007)

[89] Cf. GOV/2003/40, op. cit.

[90] Cf. GOV/2003/81, Resolution adopted by the Board on 26 November 2003. Cf. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-81.pdf (access: 11/07/2007)

[91] GOV/2007/22, Report by the Director General on 23/05/2007. Cf. http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/nuke/iaea0207.pdf (access: 11/07/2007)

[92] Cf. ibid.

[93] Cf. Gontscharow, Piotr: „Moskaus Vorschlag für Teheran bleibt in Kraft“ on 30/12/2005. Cf. http://www.uni-kassel.de/fb5/frieden/regionen/Iran/russland2.html (access: 11/07/2007)

[94] Cf. Saforow, Radschab: „Der Westen kann Iran nicht an der Atomforschung hindern“ on 11/01/2006. Cf. http://de.rian.ru/science/20060111/42943058.html (access: 10/07/2007)

[95] Cf. http://www.30giorni.it/te/articolo_stampa.asp?id=11318 Auszug aus Nr. 9 / 2006 Interview mit Hans Blix von Giovanni Cubeddu

[96] In November 2004 Iran suspended again uranium enrichment as part of the deal for negotiations with EU.

[97] Cf. GOV/2003/63, Report by the Director General on 26/08/2003. Cf. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-63.pdf (access: 11/07/2007)

[97] Cf. Spiegel-Online on 12/04/2006: „Nuklearprogramm: Iran plant Urananreicherungmit 54000 Zentrifugen“. Cf. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,411077,00.html (access: 27/07/2007)

[98] Cf. chapter 2.1.2.

[99] Ahmadinejad stated that Israel should be wiped off the map.

[100] Cf. Spiegel-Online on 12.04.2006: „Nuklearprogramm: Iran plant Urananreicherungmit 54.000 Zentrifugen“, Cf.: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,411077,00.html (access: 11/07/2007)

[101] ibid.

[102] Cf. the studies of Buzan and Waever about uncertainty

[103] GOV/2005/77, Resolution adopted on 24/09/2005. Cf. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf access: 27/07/2007)

[104] Cf. Hans Blix, Ex-Director of the IAEA stated: „Sie behaupten, das Recht zu haben, Uran anzureichern, und das stimmt, weil es ihnen der Atomsperrvertrag nicht verbietet“ (They pretend to have the right to enrich Uranium und this is right, because the NPT does not forbid it) cf. http://www.30giorni.it/te/articolo_stampa.asp?id=11318 (access: 08/07/07) excerpt from No 9/2006, interview with Hans Blix by Giovanni Cubeddu

[105] Cf. Spiegel-Online on 11/07/2007: „Brasilien: Lula träumt vom Atomkreislauf – wie Ahmadinejad“, Cf. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,493700,00.html (access: 11/07/2007)

[106] “A dirty bomb is in no way similar to a nuclear weapon or nuclear bomb. A nuclear bomb creates an explosion that is millions of times more powerful than that of a dirty bomb […].Most RDDs would not release enough radiation to kill people or cause severe illness - the conventional explosive itself would be more harmful to individuals than the radioactive material. However, depending on the scenario, an RDD explosion could create fear and panic, contaminate property, and require potentially costly cleanup.” See http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/dirty-bombs.html (access: 03/08/2007)

[107] North Korea signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985. It was internationally pressured to do so because the US-American intelligence detected a secret reactor that was equipped for enriching plutonium. Cf. http://www.atomwaffena-z.info/heute/heut_nordkorea.html (access: 12/07/2007)

[107] Cha, Victor D./ Kang, David C.: Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies. Columbia University Press, 2003

[108] http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/npttutorial/chapter03_03_1992.html (access: 07/07/2007)

[109] Cf. ibid.

[110] Cf. http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/npttutorial/chapter05_north_korea.html : North Korean Withdrawal (access: 07/07/2007)

[111] Cf. http://www.atomwaffena-z.info/heute/heut_nordkorea.html (access: 12/07/2007)

[112] Cf. Congressional Research Service . The Library of Congress , CRS Issue Brief for Congress, Received through the CRS Web, Order Code IB91141, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program, Updated April 5, 2002 Larry A. Niksch Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. Cf. http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9566.pdf (access: 27/0772007)

[113] Cf. http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/npttutorial/chapter03_03_1992.html (access: 07/07/2007)

[114] IAEA & North Korea: The Verificaton Challenge - US State Department Statement on North Korea on 16/10/2002. Cf. http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaDprk/us_statement.shtml (access: 12/07/2007)

[115] “Under the Joint Declaration, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) agree not to test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons; to use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes; and not to possess facilities for nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment.” Cf. http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pdfs/koreanuc.pdf (access: 27/07/2007)

[116] IAEA & North Korea: The Verificaton Challenge - US State Department Statement on North Korea on 16/10/2002. Cf. http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaDprk/us_statement.shtml (access: 12/07/2007)

[117] http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/MediaAdvisory/2002/med-advise_033.shtml (access: 07/07/2007)

[118] ibid.

[119] http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/yongbyon-5.htm (access: 07/07/2007)

[120] ibid.

[121] GC(46)/RES/14 Resolution adopted on 20 September 2002 during the 9th plenary meeting. Cf. http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC46/Resolutions/gc46res14.pdf (access: 12/07/2007)

[122] Cf. http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/npttutorial/chapter05_north_korea.html : North Korean Withdrawal (07/07/2007)

[123] http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaDprk/chrono_dec.shtml (access: 21/07/07)

[124] Cf. http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/npttutorial/chapter03_03_1992.html (access: 07/07/2007)

[125] IAEA Board of Governors Adopts Resolution on Safeguards in North Korea 12 February 2003, cf. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/dprk/un/iaea-030212-med-advise_048.htm (access: 21/07/2007)

[126] Cf. ibid.

[127] ibid.

[128] Congressional Research Service . The Library of Congress , CRS Issue Brief for Congress, Received through the CRS Web, Order Code IB91141, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program, Updated April 5, 2002 Larry A. Niksch Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. Cf. http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9566.pdf (access: 21/07/2007)

[129] Art 2 of the NPT

[130] http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/050211.htm (access: 10/07/2007)

[131] Cf. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.2705183/k.4CC0/North_Koreabr

Historical_ Chronology.htm (access: 03/08/2007)

[132] Art. 10, Abs. 2 of the NPT

[133] “The Team Spirit exercise, held between 1976 and 1993 by the U.S. and South Korean militaries, was cancelled in hopes North Korea would abandon its nuclear program and allow international inspections. Team Spirit continued to be scheduled from 1994 to 1996 but was cancelled each year as an incentive to improve relations.” Cf. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/team-spirit.htm (access: 27/07/2007)

[134] Cf. http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/npttutorial/chapter05_north_korea.html (access: 10/07/2007)

[135] USA persuaded North Korea to suspend the "effectuation" of its withdrawal and to accept normal IAEA inspection of the seven sites it had declared in the Initial Report to the Agency. Cf. http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/npttutorial/chapter05_north_korea.html (access: 10/07/2007)

[136] Cf. http://www.atomwaffena-z.info/heute/heut_nordkorea.html (access: 12/07/2007)

[137] “On October 21, 1994, the United States and North Korea signed an agreement - the Agreed Framework - calling upon Pyongyang to freeze operation and construction of nuclear reactors suspected of being part of a covert nuclear weapons program in exchange for two proliferation-resistant nuclear power reactors. The agreement also called upon the United States to supply North Korea with fuel oil pending construction of the reactors. An international consortium called the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was formed to implement the agreement. The Agreed Framework ended an 18-month crisis during which North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), under which North Korea committed not to develop nuclear weapons.” Cf. http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/agreedframework.asp (access: 27/07/2007)

[138] http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n004.shtml (access: 12/07/2007)

[139] Cf. http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/npttutorial/chapter03_03_1992.html access: 10/07/2007)

[140] Cf. ibid.

[141] Cf. http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/npttutorial/chapter05_north_korea.html (access: 10/07/2007)

[142] reproduced in document INFCIRC/403.

[143] Cf. http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC48/GC48Documents/English/gc48-17_en.pdf (access: 03/08/2007)

[144] Cf. ibid.

[145] Cf. GC(48)/17 Report by the Director General on 16/08/2004. Cf. http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC48/Documents/gc48-17.pdf (access: 13.07.2007)

[146] Article 26 of the safeguard agreement. Cf. INFCIRC/403

[147] North Korea could not have used uranium only for peaceful purposes during its time in the NPT. An enrichment of at maximum five percent can only be used for peaceful purposes; but if North Korea has already possessed highly enriched uranium (about 80-90 percent) for nuclear weapons (cf. North Koreas nuclear test on August,9, 2006) three years after its withdrawal, this means that the enrichment process was not (or not only) determined for peaceful purposes. Already in 1996 U.S. intelligence estimates North Korea possesses one or two nuclear weapons in violation of its NPT commitments . cf. http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/npttutorial/chapter03_03_1992.html (access: 07/07/2007)

[148] As regards Iran, the EU seems to have the role of a mediator because both countries have almost not been in contact since the end of the Korean War. Legally, both states are still in war because a treaty of peace has never been signed, only an armistice.

[149] All information, if not mentioned otherwise, are extracted from Alvarez, Andreas: “Theorien der Internationalen Beziehungen: Realismus, Liberalismus und Weltsystemtheorie. Cf. http://www.weltpolitik.net/Sachgebiete/Internationale%20Sicherheitspolitik/Grundlagen%20internationaler%20Sicherheitspolitik/Theorien%20Internationaler%20Beziehungen/Grundlagen/Theorien%20der%20Internationalen%20Beziehungen:%20Realismus,%20Liberalismus,%20Weltsystemtheorie.html (access: 31/07/2007)

[150] Both are main concepts of the International Relations.

[151] This has often been written but the case of the USA will not be examined here.

[152] Cf. Statement by the United Kingdom on behalf of the European Union at the IAEA Board of Governors, 9 August 2005. Cf. http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/bog092005_statement-eu.pdf (access: 29/07/2007)

[153] which has resulted in the adoptions of resolutions 1737 and 1747.

[154] Cf. Press Releases between 2005 and 2007

[155] Statement by the United Kingdom on behalf of the European Union at the IAEA Board of Governors, op. cit.

[156] Cf. Declaration on behalf of the Eurpean Union on Iran´s Unilateral Resumption of Activity at the Uranium Conversion Facility in Esfahan on 17 August 2005. Cf. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Divil ata/docs/pressData/en/cfsp/86001.pdf (access: 27.07.2007)

[157] Cf. Press Releases between 2005 and mid-2007

[158] Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on Iran´s intentions to resume suspended nuclear activities on 7 January 2006. Cf. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/de/cfsp/87926.pdf ( access: 01/08/2007)

[159] Cf. External Relations Council, Council Conclusion on Iran on 20 March 2006. Cf. http://www.delsyr.cec.eu.int/en/whatsnew/detail.asp?id=223 (access: 29/07/2007)

[160] Cf. External Relations Council on 10 to 11 of April 2006. Cf. http://www.iranwatch.org/international/EU/eu-council-conclusions-iran-041006.pdf (access: 29/07/2007)

[161] According to the Council the proposal “would give Iran everything it needs to develop a modern civil nuclear power industry while addressing international concerns”.

[162] The High Representative Javier Solana visited Tehran on 6 June 2006. He “presented to the Iranian authorities a new proposal for resolving the Iranian nuclear issue through a long-term agreement.” Cf. http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=PRES/06/162&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (access: 29/07/2007)

[163] Council Conclusion on 17 to 18 July 2006. Cf. http://www.iranwatch.org/international/EU/eu-council-conclusions-iran-071706.pdf (access: 29/07/2007)

[164] ibid.

[165] ibid.

[166] Cf. Many Press Releases between 2005 and 2007

[167] On 11 December 2006 the “Council regrets that in spite of the mutual agreement to hold a meeting of the EU-Iranian Human Rights Dialogue in Helsinki on 18-19 December 2006, Iran finally decided not to engage in the dialogue with the EU. The EU remains willing to take up the dialogue with Iran.” Cf. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/92122.pdf (access: 01/08/2007)

[168] Cf. EU External Relations Council on 5 March 2007. Cf. http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_6823_en.htm (access: 31/07/2007)

[169] Cf. The EC – Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) – Country Strategy Paper 2001-2004, p. 3

[170] Cf. North Korea is rarely mentioned in the press releases of the Council

[171] Cf. Press Releases of the Council between 2005 and 2007

[172] The EC – Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) – Country Strategy Paper, op. cit.

[173] Cf. ibid.

[174] And this is certainly not the case.

[175] Cf. http://www.wfp.org/country_brief/indexcountry.asp?region=5&section=9&sub_section=5&country=408 (access: 01/08/2007)

[176] Cf. Stern: “Es fehlt eine Million Tonnen Nahrung“, 28/03/2007.Cf. http://www.stern.de/politik/ausland/:Nordkorea-Es-Million-Tonnen-Nahrung/585765.html (access: 01/08/2007)

[177] Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_korea/intro/index.htm (access: 01/08/2007)

[178] Cf. The EC – Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) – Country Strategy Paper, op. cit.

[179] Cf. Chapter 2.2.2.

[180] Some documents are listed on the homepage of the Council but are confidential.

[181] Cf. “Nordkorea droht mit `gnadenlosen Schlägen`“ on 17 October 2006 cf. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/,tt2m3/ausland/artikel/906/88818/ (access: 02/08/2007)

[182] Cf. Press Releases and Council Conclusions between 2005 and mid-2007

[183] The frequency of Press Releases from the EU concerning Iran proves that.

[184] Be it for peaceful or other purposes.

[185] http://www.30giorni.it/te/articolo_stampa.asp?id=11318 Auszug aus Nr. 9 / 2006 Interview mit Hans Blix von Giovanni Cubeddu http://www.30giorni.it/te/articolo_stampa.asp?id=11318 (08/07/07) excerpt from No 9/2006, interview with Hans Blix by Giovanni Cubeddu

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Pages
39
Year
2007
File size
487 KB
Language
English
Catalog Number
v111109
Institution / College
University of Vienna – Institut für European Studies
Grade
2,0
Tags
Strategy Reality EU-Iranian EU-North Korean Relations Violation Non-Proliferation-Treaty Iran Korea

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Title: Strategy and Reality  -  The EU-Iranian and the EU-North Korean Relations with regard to the Violation of the Non-Proliferation-Treaty by Iran an dNorth Korea