The regulation of Multinational Enterprise (MNE) – unsatisfactory? Legislative and other methods of improving the current situation

Question:

“The MNE (Multinational Enterprise)… has been described as a challenge to the nation state, a creature with no loyalties except to itself, an entity that caused economic, social and political disruption in both the host and the home countries, and aimed at global dominance”

Extract from Muchilinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Blackwell, 1999), p. 7

Discuss, with reference to specific cases in which the regulation of MNE’s has been unsatisfactory and suggest legislative or other methods of improving the current situation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

a) Books

Butler M, Lessons from Thor Chemicals, in: Bethlehem L and Goldblatt M, The Bottom Line: Industry and the Environment in South Africa, (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1997)

Mitchell J and Morita K and Selley N and Stern J, The new economy of oil: Impacts on business, geopolitics and society (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs/Earthscan, 2001)

Muchilinski P, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (London: Blackwell, 1999)

b) Articles

Muchlinski P, The Bhopal case: Controlling ultrahazardous industrial activities undertaken by foreign investors, Modern Law Review, vol 50, September 1987

Meeran R, New Law Journal 1998, November, vol. 148 No 6864, p. 1686, 1687;

Chemicals”, in: Bethlehem L and Goldblatt M, “The Bottom Line: Industry and the Environment in South Africa”

Muchlinski P, Corporations in international litigation: Problems of jurisdiction and the United Kingdom Asbestos cases, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 50, January 2001

c) Internet Sources

http://www.oecd.org/daf/investment/guidelines/mnetext.htm

http://www.ccels.cardiff.ac.uk/pubs/wellspaper.pdf

http://www.ijoeh.com/pfds/0903_Meeran.pdf

http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Company/meeran2.htm

http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Charter/corpaccount1.htm

http://www.earthlife-ct.org.za/filemgmt_data/files/thor%20draft.pdf;

http://www.id21.org/insights/insights43/insights-iss43-art08.html

http://www.lawreports.co.uk/hlpc_jul1.8.htm

http://www.suntimes.co.za/2003/03/23/insights/in03.asp

http://www.4.ncsu.edu/~jherkert/envsdbhopal.html, 27.12.2004, p. 1

http://www4.ncsu.edu/~jherkert/envsdbhopal.html

http://www.american.edu/TED/bhopal.htm;

http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu21le/uu21le0c.htm

http://www.bhopal.com/chrono.htm

http://www.bhopal.com/pdfs/browning.pdf

http://www.bhopal.net/static/tour/legal.html

http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Company/meeran3.htm

http://www.uscib.org/index.asp?documentID=2573; http://www.riia.org/pdf/briefing-papers/TGCSR%20BP.pdf

http://www.mvo-platform.nl/mvotekst/irene%20controlling%20corporate%20wrongs.pdf, 20.12.2004

http://www.ilo.org

http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/multi/tridecl/decl.htm#decl

http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/greenpaper_en.pdf

http://www.globalcompact.org

http://www.riia.org/pdf/briefing-papers/TGCSR%20BG.pdf

http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Company/meeran3.htm

http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/links/norms-Aug2003.html

http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/2931.htm

http://europea.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/1999/c_104/c_10419990414en01800184.pdf

1. Introduction:

In order to approach the task it is important to give a definition of Multinational Enterprises.

According to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises those are:

“companies or other entities established in more than one country and so linked that they may coordinate their operations in various ways. While one or more of these entities may be able to exercise a significant influence over the activities of others, their degree of autonomy within the enterprise may vary widely from one multinational enterprise to another. Ownership may be private state or mixed.”^[1]

According to Muchilinski Multinational Enterprises behave very badly. Muchilinski says that:

“Multinational Enterprises has been described as a challenge to the nation state, a creature with no loyalties except to itself, an entity that caused economic, social and political disruption in both the host and the home countries, and aimed at global dominance.”^[2]

The following discussion will show whether Muchilinski is right.

2. Cases in which Multinational Enterprises caused disasters and how they were solved:

a) Thor Chemicals case:

(1) Description of the Thor case:

Thor Chemicals produces mercury-based products for the paint industry. In the 1980s Thor Chemicals produced mercury-based chemicals in a factory in Margate, in South East England.^[3] The Health and Safety Executive controlled the health and safety conditions at the factory. The factory came under critic because there was found high levels of mercury in the blood and urine of the workers.^[4] It was revealed that the substance mercury was very dangerous for the workers. The Health and Safety Executive stated that mercury poisoning could cause many diseases such as behavioural changes, psychosis, numbness.^[5] The consequence was that the company stopped its production in South East England. However it was decided that the mercury operations with the key personnel and the plant should go on in Cato Ridge, South Africa.^[6] The company did not change its health and safety standards because of the experience made in South East England. Rather the same deficiencies which had been identified in England were made. The company tried to avoid too much mercury poisoning by making extensively use of casual untrained labour. Workers with high levels of mercury were laid off and replaced by new casual workers.

Moreover Thor Chemicals offered to their clients a take-back-system of mercury containing waste. However the company was not able to recycle all the waste. Therefore huge amounts of mercury containing waste were stored at the Cato Ridge plant in South Africa.^[7] This led to environmental pollution. Near the Cato Ridge plant was a spring which feeds a stream and goes into a river. These waters were a potential source of drinking water and recreation for local people. However the water do not have drinking water quality any more according to the drinking water levels of the World Health Organization. The mercury levels are 1.000 times higher than the World Health Organization standards for drinking water.^[8]

In 1992 three workers died because of mercury poisoning and many others were poisoned and suffered from the consequences.^[9]

The Cato Ridge plant in South Africa closed in 1994.

(2) Legislative or other measures that were undertaken in this case:

(a) Criminal prosecution in South Africa:

In August 1993 Thor Chemicals South Africa and three managers were charged with culpable homicide over the dead former workers at the Cato Ridge plant. Moreover there were 42 charges under the Machinery and Occupational Safety Act.^[10] The criminal prosecution took place in the local Magistrates Court in Pietermaritzburg.

The trial ended with a plea bargain announced by the Attorney General of Natal. The defendants pleaded guilty to a single charge. They admitted that the doors of the compressor room which supplied fresh air to the breathing masks of the workers at the Cato Ridge plant were left open.^[11]

The magistrate imposed a fine on the defendants of US $ 3.7000.

The fine compared to the charge of homicide and other charges was absolutely insufficient. Moreover the admission that there was just one kind of accusation right is as well insufficient.

(b) The Commission of Inquiry into Thor Chemicals:

In 1995, the regional Department of Water Affairs and Forestry wanted to bring a prosecution against Thor Chemicals because of the water contamination in the river near the Cato Ridge plant. But the preparation for this action was stopped because a Commission of Inquiry into Thor Chemicals was convened.^[12]

The inquiry of the Commission was divided into two phases. The first phase in 1997 aimed at investigating the history and background to the acquisition of mercury waste by Thor Chemicals and to recommend the best practical environmental option for dealing with the remaining stockpile.^[13] At the end of the first phase the Commission published a report. The report revealed that over 15 years there has been an absence of coordination between the government departments for the environment. Furthermore it was stated that the lack of coordinated supervision was the result of the fragmentary legislation.

The conclusion of the report was that the mercury waste should be treated in an environmentally friendly manner by recycling through incineration or roasting.^[14]

The second phase never took place. In the second phase there should have been in the end a report on regulation and enforcement relating to the monitoring and control of mercury processing and recommendations how the protection of workers and the environment could be reached.^[15]

The methods undertaken for protecting the environment were insufficient. A prosecution because of the water contamination was not carried out although it could have been successful. The Commission of Inquiry did not finish its work.

(c) Civil proceedings in England:

There were two actions. In October 1994 compensation claims against the English parent company and its Chairman were commenced in the English High court by 17 workers and representatives of the three workers who died.^[16] The claimants got legal aid from public funds in the United Kingdom. The claimants said that the English parent company was liable because of its negligent design, transfer, set-up, operation, supervision and monitoring of the dangerous work with mercury.^[17] They argued that the parent company failed to take steps to protect the workers of the Cato Ridge plant against foreseeable risks of mercury poisoning. The parent company and its chairman argued - making use of the forum non conveniens principle - that South Africa was a more appropriate forum for the case.^[18] However the Court of Appeal rejected this argumentation. In 1997 the claim was settled for £1.3 million.

A second claim was brought by 21 workers of the Cato Ridge plant in 1998. Thor’s application to stay proceeding on forum non conveniens grounds was dismissed^[19] In December 1999 it emerged that the Thor parent company has undertaken a demerger and transferred subsidiaries valued at £19.55 million to a new company. In October 2000 the action was settled out of court for £240.000.

The civil proceedings took too much time. The victims had to suffer very long without compensation. In the end the compensation was not enough. Moreover the civil proceedings show that the company Thor Chemicals tried to avoid paying compensation with every means and partly was successful. Moreover the company always tried to win time.

b) Cape plc case:

(1) Description of the Cape plc case:

The Cape Asbestos Company Ltd was established in 1893. It started in South Africa with blue asbestos mines around Koegas and a mill at Prieska. Later on the company started exploiting brown asbestos in Penge.^[20] The Cape company was in South Africa up to 1989.

From 1893 to 1989 many people in South Africa suffered injuries from asbestos. Asbestos miners and millers, workers at factories, people involved in the transportation of asbestos as well as people living in the vicinity of these operations were injured.^[21] The exposure to asbestos had serious effects on health such as lung cancer. In the 1920s health concerns over exposure to asbestos dust emerged. In 1931 asbestos regulations in the UK were introduced.^[22] However in South Africa there were no regulations. The asbestos companies did not improve the conditions for workers. There were rather child labour, squalid living conditions of many workers and exposure to asbestos dust at work. The Cape company made use of the apartheid regime of racial discrimination within South Africa to reduce wage costs, to spend less on accommodation and safety precautions for its workers, and to expend less on medical and other facilities.^[23] For instance Cape gave to some of the black workers masks against the dust, less effective than those provided to white workers. In 1951 white workers who suffered from silicosis got compensation in contrast to black workers.

Cape put much effort in concealing that there were serious health risks resulting from exposure to asbestos dust.^[24]

As many asbestos mines and dumps were left abandoned there is also a risk for the environment.^[25]

(2) Legal measures that were undertaken in this case:

(a) Litigation in South Africa?:

In South Africa there were serious obstacles to accessing justice. Among them were lack of financial support and restrictive workers’s compensation legislation.^[26] Personal injury and compensation claims had been excluded from the South African legal aid scheme because there was a financial crisis in the South African Legal Aid Board. In South Africa the plaintiffs could not obtain professional representation in front of the court and expert evidence was not possible as well.^[27]

(b) Proceedings in England:

In England there was given legal assistance from public funds to the claimants.^[28] In 1997 five claimants sued Cape plc in the London High Court. Three of them had been exposed to asbestos dust living near the mines and mills in South Africa, two had worked at a mine in South Africa. The claimants argued that the South African operations were in fact controlled by Cape in London. They said, that the parent company knew about the risks to health of workers and of people living near the mills and mines.^[29] The Cape company argued that the management of the mills and mines in South Africa was done by local management. In addition, Cape said that the case needed to be brought in South Africa (forum non conveniens^[30] argument). It took three years until the court agreed that the case should be decided in England.

In 1999 the number of claimants increased to over 1.500. In 2001 there were 7.500 claimants. In 2001 Cape plc agreed to pay a total of £21 million. Cape wanted to pay this amount of money into a trust fund which was intended to make payments to people who can show that they suffered from an asbestos-related disease because they lived near a mill or mine or they worked there.^[31] One good point in the agreement was that the payments were not limited to the claimants. However the agreement collapsed because the banks withdrew their support after two directors tried to sell the companies’ assets below value.^[32]

In 2002 Gencor announced that it intended to unbundle. However the Johannesburg High Court interdicted Gencor to do that in order to maintain the possibility of compensation. Finally there was signed a new agreement on March 12, 2003.^[33] First there was a main settlement with the unbundling firm, Gencor, for about £35 million. From this sum £3 million should be provided for environmental rehabilitation. Second, there was a new settlement between the 7.500 claimants and Cape plc for £7.5 million. Third, there was a settlement between the 7.500 claimants and Gencor for about £3 million.^[34]

During this litigation many victims who suffered from asbestos-related diseases died. Therefore the proceedings were much too slow. The injured would have been in need of immediate compensation because many of them were very poor.

c) Bhopal case:

(1) Description of the Bhopal case:

In 1969 the Multinational Enterprise Union Carbide set up a small plant in Bhopal, India, where pesticides were produced. One of the chemical substances used in the pesticide production was methyl isocyanate (= MIC). MIC is a dangerous chemical.^[35]

On December 3rd, 1984 a dangerous chemical reaction occurred when water entered in one of the MIC storage tanks and caused a leak in the tank. Workers informed their supervisor about the leak, but the supervisor did not take action immediately. Therefore 40 tons of MIC poured out of the tank.^[36] The chemical substance MIC escaped into the air and spread over the city of Bhopal. There were huge slum colonies surrounding the plant. In the night of the disaster thousands of people were killed and hundreds of thousands were injured. The injured suffered from damage to the eyes and lungs and had respiratory ailments. The victims were mostly from the poorest members of the population.

At the Bhopal plant there was a lack of safety standards and maintenance procedures in contrast to the sister plant in West Virginia.^[37] Moreover there was a lack of community information and procedures for emergency response in case of large-scale disasters.

(2) Measures that were undertaken in this case:

Many lawsuits were filed in U.S. and Indian courts. In March 1985 the Indian government passed the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act 1985. The Act empowered the government to represent all claimants in the appropriate forum. Under this Act the Indian government formulated the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Scheme which included the registration, processing and determination of compensation to each claim and appeals.^[38]

The Indian Government sued the company Union Carbide in New York in March 1985. In April 1985 the company offered $5 million in relief for victims. However the Indian government rejected the offer. One year later judge Keenan in New York sent the litigation to India. In India the case started to be heard at the lowest-level court possible for such a case, the Bhopal District Court. After that the Bhopal case was heard at the State High Court and eventually at the Supreme Court of India after four years of litigation. The proceedings in India took very long time. During this time many victims died.

Union Carbide argued in front of the Indian Supreme Court that the gas leak could only have been caused by deliberate sabotage.^[39] But Union Carbide could not name the worker who caused the leak.

Eventually in February 1989 there was reached a final settlement. Union Carbide had to pay $470 million. The settlement amount was based on an estimated 40.000 injured victims, whereas medical studies revealed that the number of victims may be closer to 400.000.^[40] The amount of $470 was far below the initially estimated $3 billion. Union Carbide paid the money immediately. The money remained in a court-administered account until 1992, in order to sort out the claims first. In 1993 there were 630.000 claimants of which 350.000 had been substantiated on the basis of medical records.^[41]

The settlement did not only include the amount of money Union Carbide had to pay but also the dismissal of all criminal charges against the company and its managers.^[42] Therefore the agreement gave immunity to the company and its responsible persons.

After elections in India the new government wanted to return to the original $3 billion claim and to pursue criminal charges against the company and its executives. The Indian Supreme Court however upheld the settlement but at least reopened the criminal proceedings.^[43] Nevertheless up to now no representative of Union Carbide has had to face criminal charges in front of a court.^[44]

The civil proceedings took too much time. Many victims died without compensation. The poor injured would have been in need of immediate compensation. In the end the amount paid by Union Carbide ($470 million) was not enough money for all the victims. Proceedings in New York would have led to a higher amount of compensation. Criminal prosecution of the responsible persons is very difficult in cases where Multinational Enterprises caused disasters.

3. Suggestion of legal and non-legal methods to improve the current situation:

a) Litigation in the host or in the home state:

As the cases – Thor Chemicals, Cape plc and Bhopal – have shown proceedings in the host state are unsatisfactory. The criminal prosecution in South Africa in the Thor case led to a plea bargain. The defendants, who were initially charged with culpable homicide over three dead workers and 42 other charges, had to pay a fine of US $3.700. They did not get the penalty they deserved.

In the Cape plc case a litigation in the host state South Africa was impossible. There was a lack of financial support and legislation. The victims could not claim in front of the South African courts.

The Bhopal case was finally decided in the host state India although the plaintiffs and the Indian government argued that the Indian law was procedurally and substantively incapable of dealing with such complex issues of liability. In comparison to India the US law would have offered less delay and greater damages, they said.^[45] However the case was decided in India. The proceedings in India took a long time because the case started in the lowest-level court possible. Moreover the amount of compensation was far too low for the number of victims. In addition, the executives were not charged in the criminal courts of India.

On the other hand the proceedings in the home states which were in the Thor and Cape plc case England were insufficient as well. The proceedings took too much time. Many victims died during the long litigations. However these proceedings in England were only possible because of the legal standard “duty of care” which is used in England. “Duty of care” is an obligation applying to everyone in the UK. The central issue in these cases is whether the parent company of the Multinational Enterprise has a legal duty of care to victims suffering from the operations of the subsidiaries which are overseas.^[46]

Nevertheless litigations in the home and host states are not a good solution for the victims of Multinational Enterprise practices.

b) Legal and non-legal methods - we have - to improve the current situation:

The following discussion points out several legislative means in order to improve the situation of Multinational Enterprises’ careless behaviour in developing countries.

There are Codes of Conduct and international guidelines which regulate the behaviour of Multinational Enterprises. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises of 1977^[47] which were revised several times are one example. They are wide-ranging. They cover various areas of corporate social responsibility such as child labour, forced labour, social relations, environmental protection, consumer protection, transparency and disclosure, fight against bribery, transfers of technology, competition and taxation. The guidelines should provide a government-backed standard of good conduct of Multinational Enterprises. They include procedures for implementation and monitoring.^[48] However they are of a voluntary nature.

Another example is the International Labour Organisation Tripartite Declaration on Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy.^[49] This declaration covers many areas such as child labour, safety and health, equality of opportunity and treatment. It also includes procedures for implementation.^[50]

The Commission of the European Union drafted the EU Green Paper Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility.^[51] The Green Paper aims to launch a wide debate and to seek views on corporate social responsibility at national, European and international level.

In July 2000, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed the UN Global Compact.^[52] It comprises nine broad principles which the Multinational Enterprises should uphold in the areas of human rights, labour and environment. In summary these are: Protection of human rights, avoiding complicity in human rights abuses, freedom of association, elimination of forced labour, abolition of child labour, elimination of discrimination, precautionary approach to environmental challenges, promotion of greater environmental responsibility and development of environmentally friendly technologies.^[53] These are more goals than specific obligations. They need to be developed in more detail . Several Multinational Enterprises have signed up to the UN Global Compact.^[54]

The Fundamental Human Rights Principles for Business Enterprises have been formulated by a working group of the UN sub-group on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. These are based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The idea was that Multinational Enterprises should accept an international duty of care for their impact on the human, social and physical environment.^[55] The principles included inter alia the right to equal opportunity and non-discriminatory treatment, right to security of persons, rights of workers. Each Multinational Enterprise needs to implement these rules and they should report on it.^[56]

A committee of the European Parliament has proposed a European Directive requiring Multinational Enterprises to participate in a compulsory system of social reporting on the social and environmental impacts of their businesses.^[57]

Moreover there are the U.K.-U.S. Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights^[58] which were established in December 2000.

In January 1999 the European Parliament adopted the European Code of Conduct for European Enterprises operating in developing countries.^[59]

In addition, there exist non-legal methods which help to improve the current situation. They help to build up the sense of corporate social responsibility of Multinational Enterprises. Some examples are public hearings, private international relations, partnerships as well as education awareness-raising and public campaigning.

Public hearings are a good method. Since 1999 the European Parliament is holding public hearings.^[60] That means that victims of abuses by Multinational Enterprises can complain publicly before the Ministers of the European Parliament and in the presence of the executives of the Multinational Enterprises. Moreover the press and media are present. This mechanism confronts the Multinational corporations very effectively with the complaints of their victims.

Another example is the method of private international relations^[61]. Private international relations describe the situation that there is a growing public questioning of the acceptability of corporate activities and that companies need to respond.^[62] The reason for this is that via the Internet and other kinds of media the public opinion gets more sensible for ethical issues concerning Multinational Enterprises.

Furthermore partnerships help to improve the situation.^[63] Tri-sector partnerships involving governments, communities and businesses are very effective. An example is the Business Partners for Development which brings together the World and over 70 companies and NGOs to explore ways of working in partnership to maximize development impacts from particular projects.

NGOs put much effort in awareness-raising, education and public campaigning.^[64] In this way they build a critical mass of public opinion, calling corporations to be responsible for their abuses.

The problem of these means is that they are all voluntarily. They are not legally binding. Furthermore they are not enforceable and do not impose any sanction in the case of non-compliance. However they are necessary stepping stones towards legally binding rules.^[65]

c) Best solution: International legislation which is legally binding:

In order to avoid disaster such as Bhopal, Thor and Cape plc most effectively we need an international convention on Multinational Enterprise accountability.^[66] This convention should ensure that any new liability provision considers environmental, human rights and health and safety issues. The convention should also provide a way for good intergovernmental cooperation in environmental and social matters and should make possible access to justice in host countries.^[67] Law enforcement is another important aspect of a new legally binding convention.

5. Conclusion:

The Thor Chemicals, Cape plc and Bhopal case have shown that the citation of Muchilinski^[68] is right. Multinational Enterprises behave carelessly. They are a challenge to nation states because states need to provide international legislation or at least national legislation to control them. The disasters have shown that Multinational Enterprises feel no loyalties. The high costs which arise from disasters, the social problems and the need for politicians to react, describe the economic, social and political disruption caused by Multinational Enterprises. Multinational Enterprises aim at global dominance means that the companies only want to profit from developing countries and do not want to help them.

Therefore we need an international legally binding convention.

Word count: 3952

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^[1] http://www.oecd.org/daf/investment/guidelines/mnetext.htm; http://www.ccels.cardiff.ac.uk/pubs/wellspaper.pdf

^[2] Muchilinski P, Multinational Enterprises and the Law, (London: Blackwell, 1999), p. 7

^[3] Meeran R, New Law Journal 1998, November, vol. 148 No 6864 p. 1686, 1687

^[4] www.ijoeh.com/pfds/0903_Meeran.pdf

^[5] http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Charter/corpaccount1.htm

^[6] Meeran R, New Law Journal 1998, November, vol. 148 No 6864, p. 1686, 1687; http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Company/meeran2.htm

^[7] http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Charter/corpaccount1.htm

^[8] http://www.earthlife-ct.org.za/filemgmt_data/files/thor%20draft.pdf; Butler, M “Lessons from Thor Chemicals”, in: Bethlehem L and Goldblatt M, “The Bottom Line: Industry and the Environment in South Africa” (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1997)

^[9] Meeran R, New Law Journal 1998, November, vol. 148 No 6864, p. 1686, 1687

^[10] http://earthlife_ct.org.za/filemgmt_data/files/thor%20draft.pdf; http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Charter/corpaccount1.htm

^[11] http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Charter/corpaccount1.htm

^[12] http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Charter/corpaccount1.htm

^[13] http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Charter/corpaccount1.htm

^[14] http://www.earthlife-ct.org.za/filemgmt_data/files/thor%20draft.pdf

^[15] http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Charter/corpaccount1.htm

^[16] Meeran R, New Law Journal, November 1998, vol. 148 No 6864, p. 1686, 1688; http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Charter/corpaccount1.htm

^[17] http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Company/meeran2.htm; http://www.ijoeh.com/pfds/0903_Meeran.pdf

^[18] http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Charter/corpaccount1.htm

^[19] http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Company/meeran2.htm; http://www.ijoeh.com/pfds/0903_Meeran.pdf

^[20] http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Charter/corpaccount1.htm

^[21] Meeran R, New Law Journal, November 1998, vol 148 No 6865, p. 1706, 1706; http://www.ijoeh.com/pfds/ 0903_Meeran.pdf

^[22] http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Charter/corpaccount1.htm

^[23] www.ijoeh.com/pfds/0903_Meeran.pdf, p. 222

^[24] www.ijoeh.com/pfds/0903_Meeran.pdf, p. 219

^[25] http//: www.minesandcommunities.org/Charter/corpaccount1.htm

^[26] http://www.id21.org/insights/insights43/insights-iss43-art08.html

^[27] http://www.lawreports.co.uk/hlpc_jul1.8.htm

^[28] http://www.id21.org/insights/insights43/insights-iss43-art08.html

^[29] www.minesandcommunities.org/Charter/corpaccount1.htm, p. 8

^[30] Muchilinski P, Corporations in international litigation: Problems of jurisdiction and the United Kingdom Asbestos cases, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 50, January 2001, p. 1, 14

^[31] www.minesandcommunities.org/Charter/corpaccount1.htm, p. 9

^[32] http://www.suntimes.co.za/2003/03/23/insights/in03.asp

^[33] http://www.suntimes.co.za/2003/03/23/insights/in03.asp; http://www.ijoeh.com/pfds/0903_Meeran.pdf, p. 226

^[34] http://www.ijoeh.com/pfds/0903_Meeran.pdf

^[35] Muchilinski P, The Bhopal case: Controlling ultrahazardous industrial activities undertaken by foreign investors, Modern Law Review, vol 50, September 1987, p. 545; www.american.edu/TED/bhopal.htm, p. 2

^[36] www.4.ncsu.edu/~jherkert/envsdbhopal.html, 27.12.2004, p. 1

^[37] http://www4.ncsu.edu/~jherkert/envsdbhopal.html

^[38] http://www.american.edu/TED/bhopal.htm; http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu21le/uu21le0c.htm

^[39] http://www.bhopal.com/chrono.htm

^[40] http://www.american.edu/TED/bhopal.htm

^[41] http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu21le0c.htm; http://www.bhopal.com/pdfs/browning.pdf

^[42] http://www.american.edu/TED/bhopal.htm

^[43] http://www.bhopal.com/pdfs/browning.pdf

^[44] http://www.bhopal.net/static/tour/legal.html

^[45] Muchilinski P, Multinational Enterprises and the law, (London: Blackwell, 1999), p. 110

^[46] http://www.mvo-platform.nl/mvotekst/irene%20controlling%20corporate%20wrongs.pdf

^[47] http://www.oecd.org/daf/investment/guidelines

^[48] http://www.riia.org/pdf/briefing-papers/TGCSR%20BP.pdf

^[49] http://www.ilo.org

^[50] http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/multi/tridecl/decl.htm#decl

^[51] http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/greenpaper_en.pdf

^[52] see http://www.globalcompact.org

^[53] http://www.riia.org/pdf/briefing-papers/TGCSR%20BG.pdf http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Company/meeran3.htm

^[54] http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Company/meeran3.htm

^[55] http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Company/meeran3.htm

^[56] http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/links/norms-Aug2003.html

^[57] http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Company/meeran3.htm

^[58] http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/2931.htm

^[59] http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/1999/c_104/c_10419990414en01800184.pdf; http://www.mvo-platform.nl/mvotekst/irene%20controlling%20corporate%20wrongs.pdf

^[60] http://www.mvo-platform.nl/mvotekst/irene%20controlling%20corporate%20wrongs.pdf

^[61] Mitchell J and Morita K and Selley N and Stern J, The new economy of oil: Impacts on business, geopolitics and society (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs/Earthscan, 2001)

^[62] http://www.riia.org/pdf/briefing-papers/TGCSR%20BP.pdf

^[63] http://www.riia.org/pdf/briefing-papers/TGCSR%20BP.pdf

^[64] http://www.mvo-platform.nl/mvotekst/irene%20controlling%20corporate%20wrongs.pdf

^[65] http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Company/meeran3.htm

^[66] http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Charter/corpaccount1.htm; http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Company/meeran3.htm

^[67] http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Charter/corpaccount1.htm

^[68] see introduction