The Phenomenon of the Creolized Chinese

Index

Introduction

1. The Phenomenon of the Creolized Chinese in Southeast Asia
1. Explanation
2. Peranakan, Baba and Mestizoes
3. The Malay Peninsula
4. Java
5. Philippines
6. Thailand

2. The Question of Assimilation
1. Successful Integration
2. Unsuccessful Integration and the Role of Islam
3. Antithesis

3. Conclusion

Bibliography

Introduction

In this paper I would like to highlight the different processes of integration of ethnic Chinese and creolized Chinese in Southeast Asia, originally based on the paper by G. William Skinner: “Creolized Chinese Societies in Southeast Asia”. The initial situation was different in every case and reached more or less successful ends.

Today Chinese are an integral part of Southeast Asian society and economy, but their integration remains often ambivalent. Most of the Chinese see themselves as citizens of the respective country but in many cases they do not share the same rights and prestige. Their integration, and sometimes their unwillingness to integrate themselves, has different backgrounds which I would like to highlight in the first part.

In the second part I am trying to explain the success or the failure of integration. The question is being raised, in what way different factors account for the process of integration. I am testing my thesis, whereby similarity of religion is one, maybe the most, important factor for successful integration.

1. The phenomenon of the creolized Chinese

1.1. Explanation

Chinese have settled in the region which was known to them as the ‘Nanyang’ (South Seas) for many centuries. How long exactly we do not know, but when the Portuguese came to Southeast Asia in the year 1511 they started to break an already existing trade monopoly of Chinese merchants.

The first big wave of migration we can trace back happened in the 17th century. At this time the Ming dynasty in China broke apart and Chinese rule fell to the Manchus, ethnically foreign peoples from North Asia. The Manchus were suspicious of all Chinese activities outside China and the home provinces of most of the Nanyang traders at the South China Coast, Fujian, Guangdong and Chekiang provinces, also happened to be the ones which resisted the Manchu rule until last. The Manchus forced a policy of cutting off the coast and thereby people’s means of living. It then happened that many chose to migrate to the Nanyang.

Most of them settled along the coasts of the South China Sea, where they used to trade Southeast Asian indigenous products and Chinese goods for a long time. Ethnic Chinese can be found in all countries of the region today, but the heaviest concentrations are found in Malaysia, Java and the island of Luzon in the Philippines. Other areas like Thailand and Indochina received a large share of Chinese immigrants as well, but for reasons we shall examine later the Chinese are not as recognizable there today as they are in the aforementioned regions.

The Chinese’ migration took place for economic reasons; therefore the settlers consisted almost exclusively of men, because it was not suitable and even forbidden for a respectable Chinese woman to leave China. The plan was to stay a few years and go back to the homeland to live in prosperity there. The Chinese migrants soon married indigenous women, who in most cases were perfectly aware of the Chinese spouse and the fact that their husbands would move back one day. This was a kind of family contract, for the indigenous wife would keep the children and enough money to make a living. Those Creole children would be assimilated as indigenes and probably even enjoy a high social reputation because of their sinicised physical features, which bore connotations of wealth and social prestige.

However, many Chinese stayed forever, thereby founding a Creole society which is known as ‘Baba’ in Malaysia, ‘Peranakan’ in Java and ‘Mestizo’ in the Philippines.

1.2. Peranakan, Baba and Mestizoes

Leo Suryadinata examines the terms used for Chinese of mixed ethnic background in more detail^[1]. He points out, that there are in fact all kinds of ‘Peranakan’. The term was originally used to refer to Indian or Jawi Peranakan. Because of the sheer size of the Chinese Peranakan community the term ‘Cina Peranakan’ was dropped for a shorter ‘Peranakan’. During the colonial era the term was used in Java to refer to Chinese Muslims.

Another case is the term ‘Straits Chinese’, which seems to have come into use during the British colonization. This term rather refers to the birthplace, the Strait of Malacca, rather than the culture of a person. But among the Straits-born Chinese some were still untouched by foreign cultural influence and therefore called sinkeh, or newcomers. The term ‘Straits Chinese’ refers to the British educated among the Chinese.

But, to make things more complicated, the Malacca Chinese were anything but untouched by foreign influence. They were in fact heavily Malayinized, but not British educated. They referred to themselves as ‘Baba’, a term whose origin is not certain. It might stem from the Middle East and came into being during Dutch and British colonial times. However, the term was not used beyond West Java. Its usage is rather loose. One might consider calling an ethnic Chinese who speaks Malay as his first language a Baba, but actually every family where at least one female member wears a traditional sarong or konde is seen as Baba^[2].

Concerning the usage of language one must also acknowledge the fact that for instance Penang Babas are undoubtedly to be seen as cultural Baba, nevertheless they do not speak Malay as a first language, but rather Hokkien (a South-Chinese dialect) with Malay vocabulary while the Malacca Babas speak Malay with some Hokkien vocabulary. Suryadinata states that at least in West Malaysia the distinction today is not Baba or Chinese, but rather Malay-educated and Chinese-educated.^[3] He cites Khoo Joo Ee, who thinks that ‘Baba’ has colonial Connotations, while ‘Straits-born’ is anachronistic, because ‘The Straits’ do no longer exist as a political entity. Concerning Malaysian politicians, the usage of the term ‘Peranakan’ is mandatory to avoid resentments.^[4] Suryadinata takes the opposite approach by stating that ‘Baba’ has no colonial connotations, because the term existed before colonial times, but ‘Straits-born’ does, because it refers to a colonial political entity.^[5]

We shall use the term Baba for any person of Chinese background who adopted the use of Malay language, dress, cuisine and social conduct.

1.3. The Malay Peninsula

Chinese appear to have settled on the Malay Peninsula from quite early times on. By the middle of the 17th century most Chinese men in Malacca, then a Dutch colony, appear to have been settled in households with indigenous women.^[6] SKINNER argues that it was indeed in Malacca that Baba society took shape. However, sixteen years ahead of Skinner’s paper John R. Clammer^[7] argued vigorously against the popular view, that all Chinese men married indigenous women. He stresses the fact that daughters in Malacca-Chinese society were indeed a precious good and were married very carefully to Chinese men, preferably non-Straits-born, to keep the Chinese heritage alive. This fact manifested a system of matriarchy within Baba society, which brought with it a system of matrilocal marriage and female heads of household. According to Clammer, the sex ratio among the Chinese in Malacca was always quite balanced and few indigenes would have been allowed into this society.^[8]

But, more importantly, he denies the formation of a ‘Baba culture’ before the beginning of British colonial rule in the 19th century or at least sees no evidence for this view. He argues that:

“Firstly, very few contemporary Malacca Baba families have any record of ethnic intermarriage. Marriage was either intra-communal or new spouses were acquired from migrants from China. […] Secondly, peranakan lineages are usually very shallow and rarely extend beyond the early or mid nineteenth century. Thirdly, an examination of the gravestones in the great Chinese cemetery at Bukit Cina in Malacca revealed that few burial sites went back to earlier than the eighteenth century, and that most of the lineages represented there either are not peranakan ones, if they have continued to this day, or have died out.”^[9]

Clammer sees the emergence of Baba culture rather in the beginning of British colonialism.

In 1819 Sir Raffles acquired the island of Singapore for the British crown. Obviously the Dutch failed to create a favourable business climate for the Chinese settlers in Malacca, because an influx of Baba Chinese into Singapore set in. Another large share of Baba went to the other British colony, Penang, where they mingled with genuine Chinese from the mainland to create a new distinct Penang Baba society. When the whole of Malaya finally fell to British authority, ethnic boundaries where erected where beforehand haven’t been any. Chinese and part-Chinese were seen as one by the authorities. This group happened to be into trading and commerce and more wealthy than the rest of the Malayan society. The colonial distinction set them apart from Malayan society in a way, which made complete assimilation impossible till this day.

Skinner even stresses that, in a way, colonial rule would have fostered the term of Masuk Melayu, of what makes a Malay a true Malay. By using religion as an indicator of ethnic affiliation it was made impossible for the Baba to be seen as Malay, if they refused to reject their ancestor worship and become Muslim. On the other hand, such distinction encouraged the Chinese to see their Chinese traditions as essential to their identity, which leads away from Malay society towards sinification.^[10] We do not know if the living together of different ethnicities was conducted in a more symbiotic way than it is today, but it appears that a deep rift was created by the establishment of a colonial bureaucracy.

Baba society managed to take advantage of the colonial rule. They preferred British education to any other, which made them valuable personnel for the colonial service and intermediaries between the British crown and the indigenous subjects. The word spread of “the Queen’s own Chinese”, a term which most of the Penang Chinese proudly attached to themselves. By the end of British colonialism in the 1950s they lost their position in the service of the authorities to Chinese-educated Chinese and a resinification of the Baba set in.

Many of the British-educated Baba have lost all their affiliation to mainland China and do not speak a Chinese dialect. They do however speak a pidgin called ‘Baba Malay’, which Skinner characterizes as “two thirds Malay, one fifth Hokkien Chinese, the remainder being Dutch, Portuguese, English, Tamil, and assorted Indonesian languages.”^[11] In a way they merged their Malay host-language with Hokkien grammar and syntax and alternated some pronunciations as well.

With the emergence of a Chinese nationalism and a larger influx of newly arrived Chinese, many Baba started to learn Mandarin rather than a dialect. Until today Chinese schools and Chinese education gains popularity among the Straits-Chinese; however, the upper strata of Chinese society in Malaysia still prefers British education.

The grouping together with Chinese with strong bonds to the motherland brought with it special problems for the Baba in post-war Malaya. Chinese-backed communist guerrilla fought a battle in the mountains of West-Malaya against the British usurpers, the so-called ‘Malayan Emergency’, which lasted at least eleven years and made a couple of emergency laws possible which are in force until today. Chinese were being stigmatised as communists and terrorists and a good deal of demonstration of their loyalty to Malaya was necessary, mostly in the form of generous funding.

Today the Baba culture of the Penang and Malacca days appears to be dying out in Malaysia, but a distinctively Chinese society is very much alive. Many of the Malaysian Chinese are citizens of the country and can’t read or even speak a Chinese dialect. Nevertheless they maintain a distinct Chinese identity, observe Chinese traditions, learn Mandarin and have mostly ethnically Chinese friends and partners.

1.4. Java

Other than in the Southeast Asian nations discussed here, Peranakan Chinese are actually a cultural group very much alive in Java. Prior to the arrival of the Dutch in the mid-eighteenth century, assimilation of Chinese, even into the Javanese elite-strata, was not uncommon. But with Dutch colonization curbing the power of Javanese kingdoms along the north coast the Chinese merchant communities lived up to a new challenge. According to Skinner, assimilation or not assimilation depends on the desirability of local nationhood, in other words on the prestige of the local rulers. Upon the arrival of the Dutch the Javanese kings enjoyed such a prestige in the eyes of the Chinese, but with the establishment of Dutch rule the Peranakan communities had a new ideal to look up to.^[12] Skinner undermines his argument by stating that Chinese who lived further south in the central mountainous region still obeyed to the Javanese kings, because these regions were less affected by Dutch colonial rule.^[13] Therefore, the north coast’s Peranakan way of life got westernized, even though assimilation into European society was impossible. What formed itself out of this situation was an intermediate society which merged in a unique way Javanese, Chinese and Dutch elements.

Similarly to Malaya, many Peranakan worked in the colonial service and therefore enjoyed a prestigious position just below the Dutch themselves. But they too were threatened by the arrival of a new wave of mainland Chinese known as totok in Indonesia. This term sums up a group of culturally still very ‘pure’ Chinese who enjoy Chinese education, speak Mandarin and observe their Chinese customs.

Peranakan as well as Chinese in Indonesia are nevertheless willing to assimilate to a high degree. Mely G. Tan cites in her paper^[14] Indonesian-Chinese of different backgrounds, saying that they think of themselves as Indonesians, that their children even do not know that they are considered Chinese, and that they always speak and think Indonesian. Such a degree of integration or at least the will to integrate has a rather violent background in Indonesia.

Since independence Chinese fought to be accepted as a suku, or ethnic group, within Indonesia after the official motto of ‘Unity in diversity’. President Soekarno pledged to abandon all discriminations against ethnic Chinese and welcomed their contribution to the nation.^[15] But towards the 1960’s Chinese ethnicity became closely associated with communism and Chinese were heavily discriminated against. Jemma Purdey cites Ariel Heryanto by saying: “there was a general essentialising identification of this ethnicity with Communism.”^[16]

Under the ‘New Order’ regime of President Suharto integration was forced upon Chinese by abandoning the use of any Chinese language signs, texts and usage as well as the public display of Chinese festivities. In an environment of fear the Chinese community was split into two factions, one favouring the Chinese contribution to Indonesian nationalism and the other one advocating a self-denial policy of complete assimilation into Indonesian mainstream society by language, name, inter-marriage and culture.

The presidential policy appeared to be one of dealing with the Chinese in business and money terms, while chastening them publicly and discriminate them by judicial practice.

It seems like integration never made any real progress when anti-Chinese riots broke out in May 1998. Although soon afterwards the New Order regime was put to a halt and part of the violence could be blamed on state agents, there remains a sense of distrust and bewilderment among the Chinese. The idea of a loyal ethnic grouping within Indonesia is still very much alive, but many feel that they have to be careful towards their compatriots. This atmosphere of gloom leads to an almost entire lack of Chinese involvement in mainstream parties and other organisations. The feeling of being a ‘money cow’ remains for many Chinese, because their cause is only a topic during election campaigns.

1.5. Philippines

The situation is very much different in the Philippines. Skinner shows, that after the settling of a considerable number of Chinese male the proportion of the Mestizo population grew rapidly and always outstripped the proportion of the ‘pure’ Chinese population, even the growth of the indigenous population.^[17] Therefore Filipino society, and all the more Filipino business society, became pretty much Mestizo-dominated.

It is all the more surprising that there remain strong resentments towards Chinese in modern Philippine society, assuming that a very large proportion of the population actually derives from Chinese. The numbers of Chinese influence in the population are naturally very different in every publication, simply because it is so difficult to trace who came under Chinese influence and who not. In most cases it is simply a question of each individual’s preference whether he or she acknowledges Chinese influence or not.

Teresita Ang See gives the following numbers among Filipino citizens who are considered Chinese: 55. 9% of them have parents of pure Chinese stock, while 32% are of Mestizo stock.^[18] But as mentioned before, the rooting of Mestizoes into Philippine society are untraceable. She further gives the number of about 10% of Filipino society, who have Chinese blood, while 1.2% can be considered ‘Ethnic Chinese’.^[19]

Chinese are in general percepted rather negatively. The prejudice of ‘economic animals’ remains. They are on the one hand “business-minded, good in mathematics, rich industrious, thrifty, dynamic, and persevering”, while on the other “exploiters, abusive employers, shrewd businessmen, and tax evaders” and “Chinese control the economy”.^[20]

It is not to be denied that ethnic Chinese are very present in Southeast Asia’s economy, but in an earlier paper Teresita gives a good explanation, which, in my opinion, explains the course of the Chinese in Southeast Asia overall:

“1. The Philippine economy was still in its natural subsistence stage when the Chinese came. So the Chinese conveniently filled the vacuum left by the Spaniards, who considered being merchants too lowly an occupation, and by the inhabitants who were still subsistence farmers at that time […]
2. As immigrants whose stay was to be temporary only, the Chinese were after quick returns so they could go back home sooner. Agricultural production, requiring a much longer gestation period, was not an option for them.
3. No Chinese could own land during Spanish times, […]

[…]

5. Lack of citizenship barred the Chinese from the practice of professions, hence they all had to flock into business.^[21]

She further argues that “there are no Chinese in strategic industries” and “Chinese are successful in such light industries […] because they are pioneers in these fields.”^[22]

Another interesting fact to note is that the Muslims of the Southern Philippines, themselves a discriminated minority, seem to have the least negative attitudes towards Filipino Chinese, while some of the indigenous minority groups who don’t speak Tagalog as their first language, have the most.^[23]

Skinner notes in his conclusion, that the Chinese Mestizoes eventually became modern Filipino society.^[24] In his view they defined what Filipino actually is and they appear to be better off than other ethnic groups.

I would like to mark the case of the Chinese Mestizoes in the Philippines as one of two examples of a surprisingly complete assimilation.

1.6 Thailand

The other example would be Thailand. The story is a little bit different than in the Philippines. One can easily admit that the assimilation of Chinese into Thai society is the result of considerable pressure from the Thai side. Under Prime Minister Phibulsongkram from 1938 on any kind of Chinese identity among Thai residents was declared undesirable. Chinese newspapers were banned and opium dens, regular meeting points of Chinese secret societies, raided by the police. The Chinese residents were offered the choice of either abandoning Chinese habits and adopting Thai nationality or leaving the country. Most of the Chinese were quick to pledge their obedience to the king and loyalty to the Thai state, and indeed they tried to be as good Thais as possible. They abandoned what they have been asked for but secretly kept a part of their Chinese identity, what Chantavanich calls a three-tiered-identity:

“1) a secret Chinese nationalist identity; 2) an overt Thai nationalist identity; and 3) a Chinese ethnic and cultural identity.”^[25]

She further describes the Thai identity of the Chinese rather as a down-playing than as a true assimilation.

It appears that the majority of these newly assimilated Thais were then readily accepted to society. The children of these Chinese, all the more those whose parents were born in Thailand, not China, honestly identify themselves as Thai. They have the same opportunities as native Thais, as long as they speak and behave like Thais. Even the duality of their identity is accepted and they are free to observe their Chinese traditions. There remain the already known stereotypes towards the ‘business-minded Chinese’ in Thailand, but those who switched to Thai are accepted as long as they support “the three traditional and everlasting symbols of Thai nationalism: nation, religion and king.”^[26]

We see here a different example of seemingly successful assimilation and integration. The success seems to be based on governmental rigidity. But there is something which is similar to conditions in the Philippines, which I believe to be essential to the success of assimilation: religion.

In this chapter I tried to draw a sketch of four different creolized Chinese societies in Southeast Asia: Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. In the following chapter I would like to discuss conditions for assimilation and integration based on this knowledge.

2. The question of assimilation

First of all, I would like to clear the understanding of the terms integration and assimilation as I understand them. In the case of the Philippines the Chinese Mestizoes got integrated, because their values and views became a new standard in Filipino society and they themselves are now an integral part of Filipino culture.

In the case of Thailand, Chinese got assimilated. They had the choice of complete adoption or of leaving the country, because they enjoyed no higher prestige over royal indigenous society in Thailand. The customs the Chinese kept are rather accepted and tolerated by the Thais, but they did not become a new aspect of Thai culture itself.

2.1. Successful Integration

In the Philippines and Thailand assimilation and integration was supported by the fact that both indigenes and Chinese Peranakan turned towards a similar religious belief. In the Philippines the greatest share of the population is catholic. As mentioned before the Mestizoes tried to imitate the lifestyle of the Spanish colonialists under whom they ranked in social order (and under the Spanish-Filipino Mestizoes whose number was miniscule). Apart from adapting dress and social behaviour they converted, undoubtedly with the strong encouragement of the Spanish authorities, to Catholicism. The industrious padres of the Franciscan order brought the indigenous population to the same end (except the Muslims of the southern sultanate of Mindanao with whom the Spaniards fought a continued war).

Teresita Ang See cites a survey which states that 82.9% of the ethnic Chinese in the Philippines are Catholics or Christians.^[27] She admits that the absence of religious animosity helped to make Chinese an integral part of Filipino society. Furthermore, she observes a widespread syncretism of Christian and Buddhist or Taoist elements, like Buddhist figures next to the Virgin Mary. Although the Christian churches discourage the practice of ancestor rituals by their members, I believe that particularly Buddhism and the Confucian ethical doctrine of Taoism is viewed with tolerance by the church, because these beliefs do not imply a God-figure which would stand in contrast to the Christian doctrine of one single and almighty God and creator. Rather, Buddhists, Taoists and Christians share a similar view of humanism towards mankind.

The lack of a ‘religion-gap’ between indigenes and Mestizoes let the Mestizoes not appear as ‘other people’ or ‘the Chinese’ but as a rather well-to-do people of merchants and landowners who would later on be the ideal lifestyle-figure for the simple Filipino citizen.

In his review of Teresita Ang See’s paper Renato S. Velasco writes:

“…the intermarriage between the locals, mestizoes and the Chinese produced the economically-powerful, educated but politically disenfranchised middle class in the 1860s. This same class later championed the Philippine reform and independence movement against Spanish colonization and American invasion.”^[28]

This shows once more that the Chinese in the Philippines did not develop as a separate group but actually became the leading and defining group of Filipino society.

Edgar Wickberg developed a scheme which illustrates the points of contact with Filipino society of Chinese in the Philippines. Thereby the more one rises within the Chinese community, the more one gets exposed to cultural influences other than Chinese ones. The so-called leaders of the community are actually vital members of Filipino society while having gained an equal amount of knowledge about both Filipino and Chinese culture. On the contrary, as one performs unsuccessfully and drops out of the Chinese community, one is completely absorbed into Filipino society and becomes indistinguishable.^[29] We might therefore argue that the actual Chinese intermediate society is the Chinese middleclass only.

This both serves as an argument for the leading nature of Filipino Chinese and for another thesis by William Skinner which we have touched before.

Skinner argues that immigrants tend to resist assimilation if it implies a downward-mobility. If the host country does not carry the prestige or lacks a ‘high civilization’ (as it was the case in the Philippines too) the Chinese communities rather founded their own intermediate society. In the case of Thailand or Cambodia, there was an overwhelming royal elite, which was the carrier of a prestigious, highly developed civilization. Therefore the prospect of assimilation was sweetened, as Skinner puts it, by the prospect of being included into this sphere of prestige.^[30] In the case of the Philippines the tendency of distinguishing oneself from the natives was true in the first two or so centuries, but in the course of history the Mestizoes assimilated in a way that we have sketched before.

In the course of assimilation the immigrant is expected to accept a number of habits and attitudes which are generally viewed as the norm in the respective country. The person in question should speak the language of the country, observe its festive days and, in older times much more important than today, should wear the proper clothes.^[31] If there was a widespread religious belief, he was also expected to take on this belief. In the case of animist religions this might happen quite easily, for the Chinese themselves observed a number of animist cults which circled around the usual themes such as harvest, fertility, birth, death etc.

The Thai Theravada Buddhism too did not pose an obstacle to the assimilation of Chinese. Most of the beliefs were quite familiar to the settlers and Buddhism also does not ask for a rite de passage to enter the faith. Impact upon everyday-life was therefore rather small.

On the other hand, a faith like Christianity or Islam demands a much greater commitment and renouncing of the pre-religious life. A new disciple of Christendom is asked to worship no other God but the Christian God. He is also asked to make adjustments to his life, like monogamy, attendance of worship or even celibacy. He is inducted into the community of Christians by a rite de passage and might even adopt a new name.

It is thus clear, that the convert becomes rather estranged to his old ethnic community, which poses an inhibition towards converting. On the other hand, the gain of a higher prestige, such as the one of the Spanish elite in the Philippines, might be sweetening again and a stronger argument.

2.2. Unsuccessful Integration and the Role of Islam

In two societies which I would describe as ‘non-assimilative’ towards Peranakan Chinese, Indonesia and Malaysia, the pre-dominant religion, in the sense of ‘the religion of the ruling class’, is Islam. One might argue, in a somewhat provocative way, that Islam is a highly un-integrative religion.

First of all it asks for a catalogue of new habits, similar to those of Christendom: the convert renounces all other Gods, he has got to pray five times daily (which means a severe change to the daily routine), he has to observe religious duties like Ramadan and the Hajj, and he should get circumcised, which in itself makes potential converts refrain. And, most importantly to many Chinese, he shall not eat pork and shall not make profit by granting loans.

In Malaysia the identity as ‘Malay’ is strongly intertwined with Islam. I already cited Skinner by saying that the popular term of ‘Melayu’, that is the Malay culure and identity, is actually a colonial forging. Shamsul repeats this argument by writing that the “history of hotly debated concepts such as ‘Malay identity’ and ‘Malayness’ is largely based on an Orientalist-colonial construction”.^[32] The impossibility for the Chinese and Indians in modern Malaysia to become a part of ‘Bangsa Malaysia’ may therefore be a late heritage of the British colonial urge to divide its subjects by ethnicity and define their ethnicity by their religion.

The term ‘Bangsa Malaysia’ is a concept introduced by the former Prime Minister Dr. Mahatir. It is a derivation of ‘Bangsa Melayu’ meaning the ‘Malay race’, which identifies itself by originating from the Malay Peninsula and being Muslim. ‘Bangsa Malaysia’ on the other hand coins a concept of many races sharing a mutual identity, namely the one of being ‘a Malaysian’.

Nevertheless, Adrian Vickers writes in a study on the Malay identity that “The ruling class of the nation state of Malaysia maintains a hegemonic Malay identity based on difference between supposedly indigenous Islamic Malays and ‘outsiders’, namely Chinese and Indians. This identity is regarded as a natural ethnic base of the state.”^[33]

Virginia Matheson Hooker calls the debate about ‘Bangsa Melayu’ a “difference-driven discourse”^[34] and adds:

“If those Malays [showing ethno-nationalist reactions to ‘Bangsa Malaysia’] believe that the Malay sense of identity is threatened by a loosening of the linkage between Melayu and Islam, so that some Islamic values could be espoused by non-Malays, then it would be very difficult for Islam to be the basis for a civil religion and serve as a unifying element in the Bangsa Malaysia”^[35]

We might therefore assume that the willingness of the Malays in general not only to permit ‘outsiders’ to share the same rights as they do, but also to share their religious values, is quite low. So we can not expect that “the different ethnic groups should be able to share a common ‘national identity’”^[36], but rather that the reality continues accordingly to the Federal Constitution of Malaysia:

“’Malay means a person who professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language, conforms to Malay custom and—was before Merdeka Day born in the Federation or in Singapore, or is on that day domiciled in the Federation or in Singapore; or is the issue of such a person”^[37]

In the Republic of Indonesia Islam is not, as in Malaysia, the state-religion, but one of six officially recognized religions. It is mandatory though to belong to one of these six religions. However, all power in Indonesia lies within its capital Jakarta, and the people of the island of Java and the ruling elite is predominantly Muslim. Many young people of Chinese descent are unsatisfied with their position in society and impatiently to wait for a change of consciousness. This is the reason why more and more choose the short-cut of conversion to Islam. A famous convert is Junus Jahja, who believes that “the best road to assimilation is by becoming a Muslim”^[38]

As in Malaysia, official ambitions are towards a united nation, where “racial origin should not be an issue”^[39], as Juwono Sudarsono, chairman of Bakom-PKB, states. Bakom-PKB is a board which was installed under the aegis of the Department for Home Affairs, to engage in the integration of all Indonesian ethnicities.

But in reality the majority of about 84% Muslims seems to be little interested in sharing its power. In a reaction to Mely G. Tan’S paper A. Dahana writes that “there were several ministers with ethnic Chinese background. Now we do not have one.”^[40]

Historically speaking, the adoption of Islam did not seem to be a big issue before colonial times. In areas where Islam was strongly enforced, many conversions of Chinese on all levels of society took place.^[41] In other parts, as we have noted before, the power and prestige of Muslim rulers was too weak to make conversion necessary. In strongly Muslim areas conversion was the only way to access women for marriage and to do business. We shall take it as a given fact that those who converted to Islam got finally absorbed into indigenous society and are not recognizable any more. It is exactly this feature of conversion which poses a threat to any Chinese afraid of losing his culture and, more importantly, the contact to his own kin and people.

Summarized, I argue that religion is the most effective factor in assimilating to another society. Language and habit and a certain code of conduct are important too, but as we can see from the examples of Malaysia and Indonesia they do not suffice. Even though the Chinese are highly willing to integrate themselves they are viewed with suspicion and stigmatised through stereotypes, as long as their religion is much different from the host country. Only in the cases of religious converting the Chinese became an integral part of society.

2.3. Antithesis

One example which challenges my thesis is the case of the Chinese in Vietnam. For many centuries Vietnam was exposed to Chinese dominance which influenced Vietnamese culture a great deal. Nevertheless the Vietnamese people soon developed a nationalism of their own which caused them to fight the Chinese insurgents and not except them as their legal rulers. The continued Chinese threat, which actually lasted until the 20th century, strengthened this sense of nationalism by challenging it again and again.

Concerning the question of religion, the two countries are even closer than Chinese religion and Theravada Buddhism. Actually the heavily Confucian religion practised in Vietnam derived conspicuously from Chinese practises. From this point of view one might assume a smooth assimilation of Chinese migrants.

As in British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies the French colonial system in Vietnam distinguished its subjects by ethnicity for the purpose of taxation. A difference was made between Chinese of mixed descent and migrated Chinese, who were forced to join a Chinese association of their homeland, the so-called bang, in order to reside in Indochine française. It is needless to say that this kind of organisation conserved a strictly Chinese society which severed integration.

By the 1950s, after the end of French occupation, the Vietnamese government tried to deal with the ‘Chinese problem’ with pressure. Either one becomes a Vietnamese citizen and a Vietnamese in every way or has got to leave the country or be fined heavily. This kind of pressure is similar to the one used in Thailand, but other than the Sino-Thai, the Vietnamese-Chinese had strong resentments to consider themselves Vietnamese for historical reasons. Chinese resistance at this point was not very strong and many simply transferred their businesses to Vietnam-born children. But from 1973 to1979 tensions between China and Vietnam heightened, cumulating in the Vietnam-China border struggle of 1979. The events of these years estranged many Chinese from the Vietnamese and deepened their loyalty towards China. Khanh gives the number of 230.000 who left in these years to China and another 220.000 who left to other Southeast Asian countries.^[42] This exodus was politically condoned by the Vietnamese government. Many Chinese who stayed still declared themselves as Chinese, although they have been forcefully assimilated to Vietnamese citizenry in the 1950s. They preferably claimed to be citizens of Hong Kong or the Republic of China (Taiwan) in order to keep a door open for themselves out of the communist country.

Only with the introduction of reforms in 1986, known as Doi Moi, the contribution of the ethnic Chinese to Vietnamese society was acknowledged. But this late honour was rather given for strategically reasons, because the reforms included a multiple segment market and an experimental form of capitalism. For this purpose the business-savvy Chinese were urgently needed. Throughout Vietnamese society resentments towards the Chinese still linger, concerning such known issues as market dominance, business mind-set and so on. It seems that the loyalty of the Chinese in Vietnam towards Vietnam rises and falls with Vietnam’s political openness and its economical success. This in turn is again a question of prestige as Skinner defined it. As long as Vietnam is not a thriving business destination it’s not desirable for its Chinese citizens to identify themselves as Vietnamese. Their citizenry is merely a political measure with no influence upon the Chinese´ identity.

This shows that other factors can at least disturb the process of assimilation, even though the religious factor is positive. In the case of Vietnam we should consider two factors: political and ideological hindrances rooting in the bilateral history of the two countries and the relative poverty of the people compared with other Southeast Asian societies, which easily produces resentments towards the Chinese businessmen and shop owners.

3. Conclusion

Integration and even more so assimilation does not depend on a number of factors which simply have to be fulfilled and crossed out one by one on a checklist. It is rather a process which highly depends on the given situation in a certain society. There are points which are mandatory for integration, such as language and manner, but their fulfilment is far from providing integration.

Most societies strive to assimilate rather than integrate, although integration is the term used on political agendas. Most people are willing to assimilate strangers, “if they become just like us”, but not to learn from their customs and practice some elements by themselves. For such a process we have enough evidence all over the world. But learning and integrating seems to be a process which takes place in inferior societies which meet superior ones. This way Islam was spread in native Southeast Asian societies, Chinese script was introduced to Japan, Filipino society developed towards mestizo standards, and nowadays most of the world introduces American customs and standards. But rarely do migrant groups influence their host country. One example might be Indian cuisine which became something like the English cuisine itself because of the large contingent of Indian and Pakistani immigrants.

I argued that religion is a major factor which makes assimilation much easier, more than any other factor. I see this point proven in Southeast Asian Buddhist societies which assimilated Chinese people, and in the Philippines where almost all people became Catholics. In western societies one can observe this tendency easily: there is a certain anxiousness towards Islam and most people are unsure how to handle a Muslim colleague for example. The readiness to accept people from other Christian societies is much higher even if the people in question do not practice any religion at all.

But we have seen that even a common religious belief can not bridge differences which developed historically and between ethnicities. This is exemplified by the tough stand of Chinese in Vietnam. The reaction to repel a superior (colonial) power can be observed all over the world, even though the inferior society integrated many customs into their own and, as the French in Indochina always stressed, profited a great deal from their colonization. This is true of every colonized country.

So the question is: what weights more? Nationalism, history, religion, ethnicity or language? My answer might be unsatisfying, but I believe all of it. The more differences there are the less likely becomes a fruitful coexistence. But on the other hand, is assimilation always desirable? Shall we, in Western Europe, not take the stance of the Malaysian nation for example, and stress the differences while striving to not discriminate them? As Teresita Ang See asks:

“Finally, we have mentioned that all Southeast Asian countries share some racial, historical and geographical affinity as well as the unique presence of the ethnic Chinese in their midst. Can this uniqueness be tapped to strengthen the development of Southeast Asia as a region? More concretely, can the web of relations spawned by the ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians be tapped to have a greater influence economically, culturally and politically on the region? Since Southeast Asia has the greatest concentration of ethnic Chinese in the world, they can be tapped to play a historical role of uniting the region and spur a more concerted effort to develop the region.”^[43]

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[...]

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^[1] SURYADINATA 2002.

^[2] Ibid, p. 74

^[3] Ibid, p. 78

^[4] Ibid, p.79

^[5] Ibid, p.79

^[6] SKINNER, 1996. p. 57

^[7] CLAMMER, 1980.

^[8] Ibid, p. 124

^[9] Ibid, p.124

^[10] SKINNER, p. 71

^[11] Ibid, p. 60-61

^[12] Ibid, p. 66 ff

^[13] Ibid, p. 67

^[14] TAN, p. 47 ff

^[15] PURDEY, p.424

^[16] Ibid, p.425

^[17] SKINNER, p. 55

^[18] TERESITA 1997, p.179

^[19] Ibid, p.177

^[20] Ibid, p.169

^[21] TERESITA 1992, page unknown

^[22] Ibid

^[23] TERESITA 1997, p.170. The author gives the example of the Ilocano-speaking groups of Luzon.

^[24] „Chinese Mestizoes were not really absorbed into indigenous society; rather, they merged with it to form modern Filipino society“ SKINNER, p.90

^[25] CHANTAVANICH, p. 249

^[26] Ibid, p. 254

^[27] TERESITA 1997, p. 190

^[28] TERESITA 1997, p. 207

^[29] WICKBERG, in: TERESITA 1992, page unknown

^[30] SKINNER, p.65 ff

^[31] In colonial Southeast Asia the ethnic groups were subject to a colonial differentiation and were requested by law to wear the attire proper to their ethnic belonging. See SKINNER, p. 69

^[32] SHAMSUL, p. 137

^[33] Adrian Vickers: „Malay Identity: Modernity, Invented Tradition, and Forms of Knowledge”, Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs, 31, 1 (1997): 175. Cited in: HOOKER, p.158

^[34] HOOKER, p.161

^[35] Ibid, p. 163

^[36] Ibid, p. 162

^[37] Laws of Malaysia: Federal Constitution, Article 160. Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan Nasional Malaysia, 1997. p. 152. Cited in: HOOKER, p.158

^[38] TAN, p.55

^[39] cited in: TAN, p. 58

^[40] TAN, p. 67

^[41] SKINNER, p. 74

^[42] KHANH, p. 276

^[43] TERESITA 1997, p.197