Neutrality in the context of international security

Neutrality in the context of international security

Markus Ermert, Student No. 99112779, "The new European security disorder", Lecturer:

Karin Gilland, Department of political science, Trinity College Dublin, Essay No. 2: "Assess critically the advantages and disadvantages of subscribing to a policy of neutrality in the context of collective security!"

Introduction

What are the disadvantages or advantages of this essentially European concept¹ called neutrality. And what does it mean in an environment where most states are members in one or more organisations of collective security, as is the case in Europe? Is it still a viable policy option considering the changed international stage, which has switched from the predictable bipolar cold war environment to an environment which is more unpredictable, and especially in the Eastern part of Europe, Russia and the Ukraine, signified by irresponsible political behavior and internal instability in the countries of the CIS.

The argument is, that Neutrality is only viable under certain conditions, which are only partly given in the actual political environment while, considering the new threats and an holistic approach to security, the advantages of being a member in an organisation for collective security are probably outweighing the advantages of being neutral.

Advantages of being neutral

Neutrality has been the mainstay of most European small states since the end of the first world war, neutral countries were Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Ireland and Switzerland, and with limitations Finland after the second world war.² Many of them lost their neutrality in the second world war, and did not subscribe to this policy again after it, but, significantly, no major European power became neutral. So the advantages of being neutral have to be assessed with having the situation of small states in mind.

But even the concept of neutrality is not clear and changing from state to state and from time to time. It can range from complete non membership in multilateral treaties, as is the case with Switzerland to a simple role of bystander in ongoing armed conflicts. As the two extremes are pointed out by two quotes. James Connolly defines neutrality as "a permanent policy orientation in peace as well as war of keeping out of pacts or alliances in peacetime with view to remaining neutral in any future war."³ Binter on the other hand sees neutrality as "in essence, non-participation in ongoing wars".⁴ In my view this is the more realistic view of neutrality considering the fact that neutrality model Sweden had close contacts with Nato even through the high times of the cold war, though they were never admitted at the time.⁵

Theoretically the concept of neutrality has several advantages for states, especially small countries.

- The first and foremost is certainly the low likelihood of being drawn into a conflict between major powers, an advantage especially vital in the cold war era.⁶

- Second: being neutral can enhance the diplomatic weight of a small country because it could provide vital services of mediation and conflict management to conflicting major powers, thus rendering itself important for bigger countries, i.e. for meetings on neutral ground. This was the Swiss strategy for the last some hundred years. Unfortunately there is only a limited need for mediators, so not every country can use this strategy.⁷

- Third: nonalignment and neutrality are superior in terms of sovereignty of the single state, because they can determine their defence spending on their own, while alliance members often have to adhere to a common standard of weaponry and defence spending; but: neutrals have to defend themselves on their own, though alliance member neighbours often invite to freeride.⁸

Conditions of viable neutrality

These advantages are quite obvious and will probably never change, but neutrality is often only viable under certain conditions which are exemplified by Knudsen⁹, he identifies 6 conditions, of which for this context the most important are geographic and strategic location and the degree of tension between great powers, because a neutral, i.e. without allies will likely be the victim of an adjacent neighbour great power who might regard the territory of the neutral to be important for his own defence, or second, the neighbour could launch a pre-emptive attack on the small state, because it fears that the rival could do this step beforehand, thaus gaining an advantage in the overall power-game in times of high tension.

Another condition in favour of neutrality is identified by Cox ans McGinty¹⁰. They claim that that neutrality flourished after the second world war not despite but precisely because of the conditions of the cold war. The system at this time was state-centred, with clear boundaries in which the superpowers consciously tolerated the neutral countries, because an attack of either side would have upset the whole carefully balanced international, with a major war as a likely consequence. Here the neutral states were the balancing mass for the international power-scale.

Conditions of viable neutrality

These advantages are quite obvious and will probably never change, but neutrality is often only viable under certain conditions which are exemplified by Knudsen¹¹, he identifies 6 conditions, of which for this context the most important are geographic and strategic location and the degree of tension between great powers, because a neutral, i.e. without allies will likely be the victim of an adjacent neighbour great power who might regard the territory of the neutral to be important for his own defence, or second, the neighbour could launch a pre-emptive attack on the small state, because it fears that the rival could do this step beforehand, thaus gaining an advantage in the overall power-game in times of high tension.

Another condition in favour of neutrality is identified by Cox and McGinty¹². They claim that that neutrality flourished after the second world war not despite but precisely because of the conditions of the cold war. The system at this time was state-centred, with clear boundaries in which the superpowers consciously tolerated the neutral countries, because an attack of either side would have upset the whole carefully balanced international, with a major war as a likely consequence. Here the neutral states were the balancing mass for the international power-scale.

Disadvantages of neutrality in the light of the collective security possibility

Under the changed conditions after the end of the cold war, certain disadvantages of neutrality come to light, in my view aggravated by the possibility of burden sharing through collective security. Collective security in this case shall encompass two aspects: 1. An obligation to refrain from the use of military force among member states, 2. A binding commitment to assist members that are victims of aggression.¹³

- First: while being neutral has advantages in terms of legal sovereignty, after the end of the cold war this also means a certain seclusion from the field of diplomacy. While other nations are being consulted for peacekeeping and Intervention politics, for example in Kosovo, the neutrla can just stand by and does not have a say in what for example NATO does, while possibly being affected by their decision.
- Second: In a time where perceived threats are becoming more and more complex and geographically distant, the military capabilities of one country alone may not be enough to secure the desired impact. The war on different fronts can only be won in an alliance. Thus the Swedish government recognised that the step to membership in the EU, though not an organisation of collective security, already gave Sweden the security plus it needed to support the Baltic states in their quest for sovereignty.¹⁴ Supposedly, because everybody would see an EU membership as implying collective security aspects.
- Third: the burden of defence, which was, during cold war times, not so heavy, since the blocs agreed on respecting their neutrality can now only be carried by assistance of others, mainly organisations of collective security such as NATO, OSCE and WEU, for the balance of powers is not as stable as before and who wants to be armed for every eventuality has to spend more in defence.¹⁵

This is not to say, that the European environment has become more threatening, but it certainly has, considering the cold war as a measurement, become more unpredictable and less stable. Though a breakdown now may not necessarily have worldwide obliteration as a consequence. But the neutral states now have to consider for the possibility of a relatively fast decay in relations to other major powers.

Contributing to the advantages of membership in collective security may be the fact that the decisions of an organisation of collective security may affect the security of a neutral state in Europe, since it may be surrounded by alliance members and bordering to an enemy of this alliance on one side, as is the case with Sweden and Finland. A decline in relations between these two powers will certainly affect the neutral state in between. But without a membership the neutral state does not have a say in these matters.

A third aspect of the changed international environment is that it has become, at least in Europe, increasingly integrationist¹⁶. By adhering to a policy of strict neutrality, e.g. not being part of any alliance or union, the neutral sates in Europe would seclude themselves from their immediate neighbourhood, and in case of the EU, seriously endanger their economic wellbeing. By not being a member of Nato, this isolation would certainly not endanger the immediate security of their state, but they can also not be part of the more interventionist policies which emerged after the cold war, thus rendering themselves more unimportant than necessary on the international game. Even more so, since the need for mediators between two great powers has diminished since the cold war ended.¹⁷

Neutrality - still an option?

Many neutral states have changed their policy towards neutrality somewhat in the last 10 years. The only country that is still persistingly neutral seems to be Switzerland. This may be a hint towards my conclusion: in the changed security environment the traditional concept of security, as practised during the cold war cannot be carried on, or so it seem.

The burden of carrying their own defence to guarantee security towards their population may be too great to endure. At the same time the isolationism is not sustainable anymore since the integration in Europe goes further and further, and becomes more and more political. At the same time Europe's predominating collective security organisation, NATO, goes further and further into former Warsaw pact territory, even Russia's executing president, and very likely next president says that he could think of the possibility of Russia joining NATO. This would make neutrality completely obsolete.

The advantages of being neutral, mainly increased sovereignty and the low risk of being drawn into conflict between other powers seem to be diminished in a time where the general tendency seems to go in direction of irreversible integration, thus making wars in this area even more unlikely, and the new security problems call for a multilateral approach anyhow.

Thus, neutrality in Europe may be on the drawback, after a time where it was very well a policy option. Now the governments in the neutral countries such as Sweden and Ireland face the problem, that neutrality has become a feature of national identity¹⁸. This has to be reversed, but most of them are well on their way. Sweden has already admitted close contacts to NATO even during the cold war, coming near to a mutual defence agreement, while Ireland joins the partnership for peace program initiated by NATO, thus admitting, that neutrality was once a nice idea, but is no more.

Bibliography

Binter, J.B.: "Neutrality in a changing Europe: Old roots, new branches"; In: Birnbaum, K. E., et al. eds.: "Towards a future European peace order?", London, Macmillan 1991, pp.113-126

Connolly, J.: "Riding the tiger", Dublin 1992

Cox, M., McGinty, R.: "Farewell to a beautiful idea, the end of neutrality in the post cold war world"; In: Bauwens, W., et al. eds.: "small states and the security challenge in the new Europe", London, Brassey, 1996, pp. 122-137

Dahl, A.S.: "To be or not to be neutral: Swedish security strategy in the post cold war era"; In: Bauwens, W., et al. eds.: "small states and the security challenge in the new Europe", London, Brassey, 1996, pp 175-196

Fanning, R.:"Neutrality, identity and security: the example of Ireland"; In: Bauwens, W., et al. eds.: "small states and the security challenge in the new Europe", London, Brassey, 1996, pp. 137-150

Halliday, F.: "European Neutralism and Cold War politics", Sheffield 1990 Knudsen, O.F.,: "Analysing small state security: the role of external factors"; In: Bauwens, W., et al. eds.: "small states and the security challenge in the new Europe", London, Brassey, 1996, pp. 3-20

Möller, B.: "Small states, non-offensive defence and collective security"; In: Bauwens, W., et al. eds.: "small states and the security challenge in the new Europe", London, Brassey, 1996, p. 144

Sandler, T., Murdoch, J.C.: "Swedish military spending and armed neutrality"; In. Sandler, T., Hartley, K.: "The economics of defence spending", London, Routledge 1990, pp.148-176

Sundelius, Bengt: "Dilemmas and security strategies for the neutral democracies"; In: Sundelius, Bengt: "The neutral democracies and the new cold war", Boulder, Westview, 1987, pp. 11-33

Väyrynen, R.: "Neutrality, dealignment and political order in Europe."; In: Kaldor, M., Falk, R.: "Dealignment", Oxford, Blackwell, 1987

[...]

¹ Binter, J.B.: "Neutrality in a changing Europe: Old roots, new branches"; In: Birnbaum, K. E., et al. eds.: "Towards a future European peace order?", London, Macmillan 1991, pp. 113-126

² Cox, M., McGinty, R.: "Farewell to a beautiful idea, the end of neutrality in the post cold war world"; In: Bauwens, W., et al. eds.: "small states and the security challenge in the new Europe", London, Brassey, 1996, pp. 122-137

³ Connolly, J.: "Riding the tiger", Dublin 1992, p.5

⁴ Binter, J.B.: "Neutrality in a changing Europe: Old roots, new branches"; In: Birnbaum, K. E., et al. eds.: "Towards a future European peace order?", London, Macmillan 1991, p. 115

⁵ Dahl, A.S.: "To be or not to be neutral: Swedish security strategy in the post cold war era"; In: Bauwens, W., et al. eds.: "small states and the security challenge in the new Europe", London, Brassey, 1996, pp 175-196

⁶ Most authors are of this opinion, and it is logically clear, see for example: Väyrynen, R.: "Neutrality, dealignment and political order in Europe."; In: Kaldor, M., Falk, R.: "Dealignment", Oxford, Blackwell, 1987

⁷ Binter, J.B.: "Neutrality in a changing Europe: Old roots, new branches"; In: Birnbaum, K. E., et al. eds.: "Towards a future European peace order?", London, Macmillan 1991, pp.113-126

⁸ Sandler, T., Murdoch, J.C.: "Swedish military spending and armed neutrality"; In. Sandler, T., Hartley, K.: "The economics of defence spending", London, Routledge 1990, pp.148-176

⁹ Knudsen, O.F.,: "Analysing small state security: the role of external factors"; In: Bauwens, W., et al. eds.: "small states and the security challenge in the new Europe", London, Brassey, 1996, pp. 3-20

¹⁰ Cox, M., McGinty, R.: "Farewell to a beautiful idea, the end of neutrality in the post cold war world"; In: Bauwens, W., et al. eds.: "small states and the security challenge in the new Europe", London, Brassey, 1996, pp. 122-137

¹¹ Knudsen, O.F.,: "Analysing small state security: the role of external factors"; In: Bauwens, W., et al. eds.: "small states and the security challenge in the new Europe", London, Brassey, 1996, pp. 3-20

¹² Cox, M., McGinty, R.: "Farewell to a beautiful idea, the end of neutrality in the post cold war world"; In: Bauwens, W., et al. eds.: "small states and the security challenge in the new Europe", London, Brassey, 1996, pp.122-137

¹³ Taken from: Möller, B.: "Small states, non-offensive defence and collective security"; In: Bauwens, W., et al. eds.: "small states and the security challenge in the new Europe", London, Brassey, 1996, p. 144

¹⁴ Dahl, A.S.: "To be or not to be neutral: Swedish security strategy in the post cold war era"; In: Bauwens, W., et al. eds.: "small states and the security challenge in the new Europe", London, Brassey, 1996, pp 175-196

¹⁵ Halliday, F.: "European Neutralism and Cold War politics", Sheffield 1990

¹⁶ Cox, M., McGinty, R.: "Farewell to a beautiful idea, the end of neutrality in the post cold war world"; In: Bauwens, W., et al. eds.: "small states and the security challenge in the new Europe", London, Brassey, 1996, pp. 122-137

¹⁷ ibid.; Sundelius, Bengt: "Dilemmas and security strategies for the neutral democracies"; In: Sundelius, Bengt: "The neutral democracies and the new cold war", Boulder, Westview, 1987, pp. 11-33

¹⁸ Fanning, R.:"Neutrality, identity and security: the example of Ireland"; In: Bauwens, W., et al. eds.: "small states and the security challenge in the new Europe", London, Brassey, 1996, pp. 137-150