Das polnische Parteiensystem vor den Sejm Wahlen 2001

Introduction

This focus of this paper is to give an overview over the present Polish party-configuration. For deeper understanding the first part delivers a short introduction into the theory regarding party-division in post- communist democracies. To understand the present very dynamic process of party regrouping it is necessary to go back to the situation after the Sejm elections in 1997. The party system presented in the second part was stable until the split of the government in summer 2000. In the third part I will give an overview about the events since then. As the process of re-grouping has not ended yet, this last part will just provide a snapshot of the situation in end of May 2001. As there are still three month to the Sejm and Senat elections this is just a presentation of the pre-election situation. The first two parts are based on literature, whereas the later two parts are based on articles of newspapers and magazines. Here I have to admit that the most of the sources are liberal magazines, this might have negative effects of the objectivity of the paper. In this paper generally the Polish acronyms of parties will be used, but in the long version I will give an translation in English.

Introduction into party formation theory for PostCommunist Countries

The theoretical part of this paper is based on the studies of Lipset and Rokkan, which analysed the formation of party-systems in industrialised countries. They state that the party system will crystallise around four major cleavages. These are centre/periphery, religious/secular, urban/rural and capital/labour. In the Western countries these cleavages developed during the industrialisation in the 19th and early 20th century and the dividing lines within the party system were continued, even major socio-economic changes altered the society. Not only the societal cleavages found their expression in different programmes defining the party system. In Western Europe the most parties today can be differentiated by their economic and social programmes and are categorised in the left-right scheme.¹ It must be questioned if these patterns can be applied to young democracies like in Central Europe. The development of a party system in Poland already started at the end of last the 19th century² and was continued during the inter-war period. Although the totalitarian regimes and foreign rule since 1939 interrupted the developments, pre-communist legacies still shape the present system. Poland like most transformation countries belonged to the periphery of Europe, and the main process of industrialisation and urbanisation took place after 1945. The formation of societal cleavages into a party system was not possible during this time. The party system is rather formed by the struggle against communist rule especially since events of 1980/81 To sum previous arguments up the Western left-right scheme is not useful for Poland, therefore different factors have to be taken into account for the evaluation of the party configuration.³

For the present Central European party system I will follow the cleavages which were worked out by the German scholar Kitschelt.

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The question of citizenship is based on the general two different understandings of nationality. The first stresses the ethnic and cultural aspects and is presented in the German/Slavonic principle of jus sanguis. In opposition the French and Anglo-Saxon definition of nationality is based on residence (jus solis). The difference between the first rather particularist definition and the second rather universalist also is a further cleavage. This is not only connected with the question of citizenship, it is also reflected in cultural conservatism, stressing the collective will and a cultural liberalism stressing the individual autonomy.⁴ The second factor of ethnicity plays in a nearly mono-ethnic and mono-religious country in comparison to multi-ethnic neighbour countries like Slovakia or Lithuania no role in the party system and is therefore not further developed.⁵ The collapse of the communist-system brought also a rebirth of religion in Central and Eastern Europe. In Poland the church played a vital role in the dissident movement. Therefore some religious political groups demand an important role of the church in the democratic state, whereas laicist parties promote a secular state with clear separation of state and church. For Poland it is important to see that the Polish understanding of nation also connects Catholicism very close with "Polishness".⁶

The cleavage of capital and labour mentioned above can be found in the parties values in social and economic spheres. Free-market economy is not questioned by any of the main political groups. Therefore the differences deal with the role of the state. The one group demands a strong state intervention towards social programme redistribution of income via tax programmes, whereas the other has an economic liberal approach. These different factors find their extremes on the one side in free-market liberalism and on the other side in economic populism.⁷ The rejection of communism went hand in hand with the rejection of foreign dominance. This rejection was also intended as a re-orientation to Western Europe and the integration into European security and economic organisation. A simple and clear pro- and anti-(Western-) European division among parties is very difficult, because some parties are for a NATO membership but not for an EU membership. Also the stress on relations to other Central European countries and CIS countries has to be taken into account.⁸ The uprisings in 1980/81 and 1989 were a clear result of the confrontation between the majority of the society and a minority of society, which collaborated with the state. This confrontation is often described in "us" and "them". This is in Poland very strong because of the imposition of "martial law" in 1981 and was neither overcome by the Round Table agreement nor by the thick line policy of the first democratic government. Therefore it is important to take the party history and the biographies of party leaders into account. Some parties continue the structures and persons (but not in norms and values) of the communist system, they are described as post-communist parties and others were founded in the dissident movement and will be described as post-dissident movement parties. The latter group is often also with connected with an aggressive policy of the past. They demand a decommunisation of the system and co-operation with the previous⁹ Parties do not act in an political vacuum. Even they are independent institutions their policy and their programmes are contested by the electorate in election rounds. The parties in Poland are elite led. The masses of people are neither members of party nor do they try to influence the policy via the mass organisations, lobby-groups and other NGOs. The underdevelopment of a "civic society" forces interest groups to take directly part in the political competition. This explains, why for example trade union take directly part in elections and many parties act directly in a clientelistic manner, this means their programme is limited to the needs and demands of one specific group of the electorate.¹⁰ The relation between the people and the parties is still very weak. This explains firstly the erratic support for parties in polls and elections. Secondly party leaders are engaged in personal feuds leading to fragmentation and re-grouping of the party system which are not based on programmatic differences or similarities. The people suspect the political elite only to follow personal interests, to which the high number of cases of corruption is not helpful. As a third factors is to mention that the society still continues the "us" against "them" policy of the past. This leads to the disrespect of the ruling, this is one explanation for the pendulum effect, this means that a ruling party has hardly any change to win the next elections. Also a decreasing participation in elections and increasing frustration of the political class is widely spread..¹¹

Party system after the Sejm elections in 1997

In the following part I analyse the party system after 1997. As political entities I will take all individual parties which are elected into the Polish Sejm. This means that the coalition AWS (Election campaign "Solidarity") will not be treated as one entity but as the five individual parties constituting this coalition. Additionally I take three non-parliamentarian parties into account. These are the Union for Labour (UP), which with 4,7% got nearly into the parliament and the parties of political enfants terribles, the radical farmer union Samoobrona of Andrzej Lepper and the Union for Real Politics of Janusz Korwin-Mikke. These parties and their leaders are despite very limited success in elections highly visible in the political life. To explain the party configuration after the elections 1997 and the problems to form a stable government I will visualise the Polish party system in the three graphs.¹² Beside an evaluation of the party programmes I also take the profile they want to give them self into account. Therefore I divided the parties in four groups. In case of the "Left" and the "Right" I will use the Polish expression "Lewica" and "Prawica" since a left-right division in Western understanding did not develop yet. Between these two groups are the "Centrum" and Populist (clientelistic) parties.¹³

- "Lewica": Parties trying to get a western like social democratic profile mostly with clear post-communist background. These are the Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD), the successor of the communist PZPR and their affiliated organisations and the post-Solidarity socialists of UP. (in the graphs: black with white letters) ¹⁴
- "Centrum": Parties trying to develop a economically and culturally liberal profile. The main party is the liberl party Union for Freedom (UW). The party has a high number of well-known politicians and is the representation of the typical Polish "intelligentsia". A second party in the Centrum is the Conservative Peoples Party, which joined the AWS coalition.¹⁵ (white and normal letters)
- "Prawica": Parties, which either try to develop a Christian-Democratic profile and/or parties stressing patriotism or a strong state in their programmes and campaigns. This is the most fragmented part of the Polish party system. All of the parties have their roots in Solidarity movement and many of them are now united in the AWS, which was founded in 1996 by over 30 groups. The main representatives are the Christian-National Association ZChN, the Christian-Democratic Party PPChD, the Social Movement-AWS (RS-AWS) as well as the trade union NSZZ Solidarnity (`S'). Outside of AWS are only two bigger parties of the "Prawica". The rightist - authoritarian Movement for the Reconstruction Poland's (ROP) of the former Prime Minister Olszewski. As a second is the American-style neo-liberal but culturally conservative UPR, which appears rather exotic in the political spectrum. (grey and normal letters)¹⁶
- "Populist": This is of course not a label given them by themselves, these parties present the interest of agrarians or pensioners. Their programmes are not very clear and their attitude to specific issues is rather erratic. Therefore these parties are difficult to assess. The biggest party is the Polish People's Party (PSL), which is successor of the previous affiliated party ZSL. The party is very "flexible" in its political approach and in the decision for political partners. The second agrarian party is the Samoobrona (Self-defence), which became known by it spectacular protest actions.¹⁷ (white with italic letters)

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Figure 1: Classification of parties due to their history

In the first graph I assess the history of the party, resp. their attitude to history. On the extreme left the Post-communist parties are listed, in the centre parties with mixed origin and on the right post-dissident groups. Parties demanding political de-communisation and restitution of property are set on the right edge. This shows that in Poland most of the parties still have either a clear post-communist or post-Solidarity profile. The past is still an insurmountable trench between the political leaders and played especially during the election campaign an important role. Those parties with mixed standing mostly have members of the former affiliated parties ZSL and SD or are willing to co-operate with the other side (like UP).

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Figure 2: Classification of parties by their relation to church and question of nationality

In this division it clear visible that the parties of the "Prawica" are nearly all in the upper right quadrant and the "Lewica" in the lower left. The self- declaration is mostly defined by the parties' programme in relation to the church and concerning the question of nationality and national culture. This is no wonder as the Catholic Church is seen as the guarantor of the existence of the Polish nation. It is also visible that the PSL tries to get a patriotic and religious profile, despite the past of the party. The liberal UW is in this case closer to the "Lewica" with its more Western understanding of nation and the role of the church. One should not forget that the party is in these points very divided between a Christian-democratic wing and a economic liberal one.¹⁸

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Figure 3: Classification of parties by their economic and foreign policy

The third graph shows the heterogeneity the "Prawica". The economic programme is differing between neo-liberal free-market politics to economic socialist state interventionism. The economic programme is strong orientated towards social egalitarianism. Here the dominating position of "S" and AWS-RS is visible inside AWS. The "Lewica" seems more united in its economic programme. However the SLD tries despite its "social democratic" economic programme to protect particularist interests, like unemployed, pensioners and workers. The transition of Poland's economy is closely linked with its integration with Western Europe. In this field inside AWS has also an enormous discrepancy among its members. Whereas the majority is pro-EU the, like the parties of the "Centrum" and "Lewica", Christian national wing are openly against an EU membership. The Polish euro-sceptic offer hardly any serious alternative to the Western integration. Interesting are to follow the different positions PSL already had in this question. Their policy changed from "Euro-sceptic", via "Euro- realist" to "pro-EU" in a relatively short period. One has to take into consideration that the declining support for the access to the EU among the population is not reflected in the party system at all. All parties support NATO membership and even during the Kosovo war only from the extreme left and right came open criticism.¹⁹

The government formed by AWS and UW had to undertake several far- reaching reform projects in administration, taxation, health care, education and pension. Additionally the government had to speed up the approximation of the Polish legislation to the necessities of the acquis communautaire. To undertake this ambitious programme the government needed a sure majority in the Sejm. This was despite a majority of 30 seats not given. The reasons for this are the limited unity inside of AWS concerning real-political needs and several MPs on which the coalition could not rely on. The position of Prime Minister Jerzej Buzek inside AWS was rather weak, as Krzaklewski, they leading figure preferred to keep some independence as leader of the caucus and head of NSZZ "S". He even used once the trade union against decisions of "his" government. Also the differences between the two coalition partners were enormous and led to permanent frictions. An additional burden for the Buzek government was the co-habitation with the very popular president Kwa_niewski. Several times the president used his veto against laws, which the Sejm could only overrule with 60% of the votes, which was impossible to find in these critical issues. It is rather a surprise that the pale PM Buzek, was able to push through the reforms and to get positive from the European Commission towards accession. This is especially surprising as the government had to face scandals like the dismissal of Vice-Primer Tomaszewski and Minister of Defence Mroziewicz, defections of several members of AWS and declining popularity.²⁰

Changes of the party system since July 2000

After nearly three years the heterogenic coalition between AWS and UW split. The decision for UW to leave the government after many struggles was triggered by the dissolution of the Warsaw City council, in which UW had a coalition with SLD. The decision of Buzek to continue with a minority government of AWS, brought surprisingly more continuity into specific political issues. The legislation regarding EU accession are no worked out in a co-operation with UW and SLD. The co-operation between "Prawica" and "Lewica" in the parliamentarian committees is a novum for Polish politics and shows that the historic dimension looses its importance. The presidential elections in October 2000 were the next event with impact on the existing party configuration. The trend was very clear. The SLD and UP with increasing support from the electorate united its forces to support President Kwa_niewski. The former foreign minister Olechowski started as independent candidate and received the support by UW and SKL, was therefore the only candidate of the "Centrum". The picture of the right side was completely different. Beside SKL also other groups of AWS supported other candidates than their chairmen Krzaklewski. Overall 13 candidates run for presidency most of them with populist national or clientelistic agenda. The surprise of these elections was not re-election of the president in the first round, but rather the electorate rejected Krzaklewski's aggressive campaign and he became only third behind the newcomer Olechowski. Significant was also that the three moderate candidates, with similar agenda towards EU accession united nearly 90% of the votes. This shows that Polish politics are concentrating increasingly in the political centre.²¹

The crushing defeat of Krzaklewski and the appearance of a integrative figure for the "Centrum" brought the tensions inside of AWS to the open. The open struggle inside AWS had two dimensions. Firstly the institutional future of the party. The trade union "S" and AWS RS are in favour of a merger of all member organisations in one party organisation, which is opposed by the other groups. The second dimension is the political leadership over the "Prawica" after the defeat of chairmen. It seems that programmatic differences did not play any role in the fight. It took until mid-December 2000 that AWS agreed about its institutional future and leadership. The main result was that Buzek became party chairmen, that the new established party federation will merge after the elections into one party and NSZZ "S" leaves party politics.²² This fragile construction lasted until mid of January, when the second winner of the presidential election Olechowski founded with the previous AWS RS speaker of the Sejm P³aczynski and UW vice chairmen Tusk (both leaving after being defeated in internal struggles) founded a new party the Civic Platform. This group placed itself into the political centre and wants to found a counterweight to the strong "Lewica". It immediately became a magnet for disappointed members of UW and AWS. In March SKL joined the new political force. which taking polls into account has the second highest support in the country.²³

In April the struggles inside AWS started again and AWS finally broke into two groups. The first one consists out of the remaining AWS members and ROP under the leadership of Prime Minister J. Buzek and the label AWSP(rawicy). The second group is the new movement Law and Justice (PiS) of the very popular politicians Lech and Jaros³aw Kaczynski. This group was joined by the Right Alliance, which was founded by SKL and ZChN defectors in April. Until now it is not very clear if there will be programmatic differences between the two groups. Both include politicians from the different wings of the previous AWS. The motivation for the split for the Kaczynskys was to disassociate themselves from the AWS wreck and to become the leaders of the "Prawica".²⁴ The fragmentation of the political right was accompanied by an integration of the forces of the "Lewica". In March SLD agreed with UP to form a coalition. Later the pensioners' party KPEiR agreed in supporting the coalition and may even joining the coalition.²⁵

Current situation before the elections 2001

In the present situation the "Lewica" is keeps its dominant and strong position. SLD was able to keep 90% of its electorate of the previous elections and to win 30% new voters especially from AWS and previous non-voters. Recent polls show that the coalitions SLD-UP will reach close over 40% of the votes. In the "Centrum" PO took the leading role. PO won its electorate from previous UW and AWS voters and is ranking in recent polls around 17%.²⁶ In the present situation it is questionable if UW will return into the parliament, as it ranks in the elections around 5%. The party is at the moment lacking a individual profile as it is in the programmes very close to the "Lewica" and PO. In case of the "Prawica" it is still not clear what will be the final configuration for the elections. Moral issues, like de-communisation and religion are becoming the main issues of the coming campaign. The one group will start under its banner "Law and Justice" and AWSP decided use "Integrity, Order, Work" as its slogan. Both existing groupings are around 10%, which means that the share of this political spectrum of votes is half compered to 4 years ago. One has to wait if other nationalist and religious splinter parties will, like Alternatywa or Polish Understanding (PP) will join one of these groups or run alone. The changes to pass the 5% threshold are very unlikely..²⁷

Very interesting is the analysis of PSL. In comparison to the last elections it can keep only half of its previous electorate but is the party beside PO, which is able to gain the most defectors. One of the reasons might be the change of the political campaign under the new leader Kalinowski often referred to as "political folklore". The party ranges in recent polls around 13%. As the situation of the peasants is a main issue for Polish politics, it is no wonder that also Samoobrona shows good results in the polls with around 3%.²⁸

Taking the present situation into account there are several options for the future government. Also SLD-UP has not 50% of the votes it is likely that they will gain over the half of the seats in the Sejm. This depends especially on the number of parties not overcoming the 5% (and 8% for coalitions) threshold. In the case the right stays fragmented and continue their struggles it is likely that they will help the "Lewica" to the absolute majority. The other possiblities are a coalition between SLD-UP with PSL, to which both sides seem to be open for. The same coalition ruled already four years ago and was not able to undertake the necessary reforms. Economicaly this government may tend to an interventionist policy, which can prolong the budget stabilisation and membership in the EU. At the moment most people would favour a "Lewica" - "Centrum" coalition. Neither UW nor PO made a clear statement about the possibility of this coalition. This coalition would continue economic reforms including with further reduction of the welfare system. It is expected that this government could ensure the quickest access to the European Union.

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¹ S. Lipset and S. Rokkan; Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction; in Party Systems.Continuety and Change,; 1967; New York; pg. 1-64 and Herbert Kitschelt; Fromation of party cleavages in post-communist democracies; in: Political communication; Vol 1, No4, 1995; London; pg.448

² see P. Wandycz, The Price of Freedom, London and New York, pg .183

³ see: V. Havel, Die Schrecken des Postkommunismus (speech at George Washington University, at. 22.04.93), in Moral in Zeiten der Globalisierung,1998 Hamburg, pp. 33-35; K. Dawisha and B. Parrot; Research guidelines for country-studies; Politics, power, and struggle for democracy in South-East Europe; 1997; Camebridge/UK; pp. 453- 455 and G. Gorzelak, B. Jalowiecki, A. Kuklinski, l. Zienkowski; Eastern and Central Europe 2000, 1995; Luxembourg; pg. 47 and L. Holmes; PostCommunism; 1997; Camebridge/UK; pp. 282-283

⁴ see Kitschelt; pg. 458, Z. Sokolewicz; Citizenship, Nationality, and the Civil Society, in European Enlargement and Identity; 1997; Kraków; pg. 105 and S. Whitefields and G. Evans; The Ideological Bases of Policial Competition in Eastern Europe; paper presented at the 1994 Annual Meeting of the Americal Political Science Association; 1994

⁵ see Kitschelt pg. 463

⁶ see L. Holmes pp. 278-279, and G. Gorzelak, B. Jalowiecki, ...; pg. 63

⁷ see G. Gorzelak, B. Jalowiecki, ... pg. 61 and L. Holmes; pp. 210-218

⁸ see. L. Homes pp. 309 - 325, and T. Sasinska-Klas; Changes on the Polish Left: Exit the communist party, enter the socialdemocratic; in: From Eastern to central Europe; 1990; Guelph; pp. 200 - 203

⁹ see K. Dawisha and B. Parrot; pp. 455 and A. Toeffel; Parteienbildung und Parteiensysteme in Ostmitteleuropa im Vergleich; Essay for Eastern- Europe Seminar at the University of Vienna; 1998, and C. González Enriquez; Elites and Decommunisation in Eastern Europe; in: Postcommunist Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe; 1998; London, New York; pg. 282

¹⁰ see K. Dawisha and B. Parrot; pp. 454 as well J. Higley, J. Kullberg, J. Pakulski; Elites, institutions and regimes in East-Central Europe; in: Political Elites in East-Central Europe; 1995; Warszawa; pg. 1-5 and B. Geddes; A Comparative Perspective on the Leninist Legacy in Eastern Europe; in: Comparative Political Studies; 1995; ppg. 239

¹¹ P. Sztompka; Civilizational Incompetence: The Trap of Post-Communist Societies; in: Zeitschrift für Soziologie 22; 1993; pg. 39 and H. Blumenthal, Polen im Wahljahr 1997, in: FES Analyse, Bonn, 1997

¹² The visualisation is based on an idea in Kitschelt's essay. The analysis of the individual parties and their programmes as well as the assessment of the dimenshions is not documented in the paper due to the limited space. As many of the parties or "sub-parties" have changing programmes or are very populist the exact evaluation is difficult. The graphs should not be seen as a mathematical exact record, but rather a visual support for my following argumentation.

¹³ the division of Polish parties in these four groups is taken from a short paper of Kowalski. In difference to his division I see Samoobrona as a populist agrarian parry like PSL and not part of the "Lewica" and what he discribes as "liberal option" is in my paper characterised as Centrum, see: M. Kowalski, Electoral Geography in Poland, in: A. Duró, Spatial Research in Support of the European Integration, 1999, Pécs, pp. 87-96

¹⁴ Friedrich Ebert Stiftung: Solidarnosc kehrt zurück, in: Politikinformation Osteuropa, No. 73, 1998 and T. Dibberd, Regierungssystem der Republik Polen, paper handed in at Univeristät Kiel, 2000, pg. 3

¹⁵ A. Krzeminski, Polen im 20. Jahrhundert, 1998, Mümchen, pg.199

¹⁶ H. Fehr, Von der "Solidarität" zum Kampf um die Macht. Elitenbidlung und Inteligenz in Polen, in: Aus Poltik und Zeitgeschichte 8/98, pp. 10-14 and Blumenthal, pg. 4

¹⁷ for PSL: FES, pg. 3 and M. Kazmierczak, for Samoobrona: H. Schmidtendorf: Radikale Bauern legen Polen lahm, in: Die WELT online, 27/01/1999, (http://www.welt.de/daten/1999/01/27/0127eu59893.htx. The Pensioner Party KPiR is not analysed, as very little material is available about this group.

¹⁸ Blumenthal, pg. 3

¹⁹ FES, pg. 4, Blumenthal. pp- 4-6, J. Jucher, Polens Halung zur Europäischen Union, in: Osteuropa (Mai 1999), pg. 488

²⁰ European Comission; 1999 Regular Report from the Comission on Poland's progress towards accession; 1999; Bruxelles. pg. 12, F. Altmann, Dr. M. v. Baratta, Dr. W. Baumann, ...; Der Fischer Weltalmanach 2000;1999; Frankfurt, pg. 627, J. Juchler, Polens politische Entwicklung unter der Mitte-Rechts-Regierung, in: Osteuropa (Februar 1999), pp. 123- 126 and R. Wróbel, SLD utrzymuje przewage nad AWS, in: Rzeczpospolita, (23/06/1999)

²¹ F. Altmann, Dr. M. v. Baratta, Dr. W. Baumann, ...; Der Fischer Weltalmanach 2001;2000; Frankfurt, pg. 630-631 and W. Zygulski, And after the Elections...?, in: Warsaw Voice,No. 43, 22/10/2000

²² W. Zygulski, Anzone's Guess, in: Warsaw Voice, No. 45, 5/11/2000, W. Zygulski, A Party Divided, in: Warsaw Voice, No. 50, 10/12/2000 and W. Zygulski, Is AWS's Crisis Over, in: Warsaw Voice, No. 1, 7/1/2001

²³ B. K., Platforma druga sila, in: Reczpospolita, 08/02/2001, I. Czerwinska, A New Friend or Foe?, in: Warsaw Voice, No. 4, 25/01/2001, K. Gottesmann, 17 procent chce glosowac na Platforme, in: Rzeczpospolita, 02/02/2001 and W. Zygulski, A Shrinking AWS, in: Warsaw Voice, No. 12, 25/03/2001

²⁴ W. Zygulski, New Parties, New Alliances, in: Warsaw Voice, No. 13, 1/1/2001, J. Paradowska, Rój strzelców, in: Polityka, No. 21, 26/05/2001, B. Mazur, Naród z Partia, in: Wprost, No. 21, 27/05/2001 and J. Paradowska, Magia pierwszych miejsc, in: Polityka, No. 22, 2/6/2001

²⁵ F. Garwys, Ponad polowa dla koalicji SLD-UP, in: Rzeczpospolita, 17/02/2001, J. Paradowska, Przeszli Nyse, in: Polityka, No. 17, 28/04/2001

²⁶ E.G. Wtórne, ciekawe, antydemocratyczne, in: Rzeczpospolita, 29/05/2001,

²⁷ Alternatywa Ruch Spo³eczny, (http://www.alternatywa.pl), 06/06/2001

²⁸ M. D. Zdort, Kto stoi na czele partii, inn: Rzeczpospolita, 04/04/2001 and B. I. W., Badzmy dzentelmenami, in: Rzeczpospolita, 29/05/200, Wysoki start Kaczyñskiych, in: Gazeta Wyborcza, 6/6/2001